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## Analysis of Cybercrime Organization and Status in North Korea

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### Abstract

**Purpose:** North Korea is training elite cyber hacking personnel and using them for cyber financial crimes, cyber terrorism, and cyber psychological warfare. The purpose of this study is to analyze the current state of cybercrime in North Korea and provide basic data to effectively respond to cybercrime in North Korea.

**Method:** To train cyber specialists, North Korea selects elite personnel after intensive training through elementary, middle, and university education, and then forms a cyber hacking organization through them to analyze cybercrime conditions such as cyber financial crimes and cyber terrorism.

**Results:** North Korean cyber agents are trained as cyber specialists at Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Mirim Military University. Since then, it has been confirmed that it is a member of the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau under the Reconnaissance General Bureau, engaged in cyber financial crimes, cyber terrorism, and cyber psychological warfare, and that APT37, North Korea's hacking organizations, and Kimsuky are working to steal military secrets from major countries such as South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

**Conclusion:** North Korea's network environment and Internet utilization are among the lowest in the world, but its cyber hacking capabilities are estimated to be among the best in the world. In order to respond to such cyberattacks from North Korea, it is urgent to improve legislation, such as strengthening cyber investigation capabilities and enacting the National Cyber Security Framework Act.

**Keywords:** North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Cyber Financial Crimes, Cryptocurrency Extortion, Cyber Terror, Cyber Psychological War

## 1. Introduction

As of 2022, North Korea's Internet utilization rate ranked last in the world, while ranked first in the National Cyber Competency Index (NCPI). In addition, 34 people, including Kimchaek University of Technology students, won the online international programming competition. This means that apart from North Korea's low Internet utilization rate, it has been specializing in cyber technology since childhood to cultivate cyber talent. Since 2012, North Korea has been providing computer education to elementary schools to train cyber manpower. After that, he systematically studies computer subjects at Pyongyang First Middle School, a science and technology gifted school, and conducts cyber talent training at Kim Il-sung University and Kimchaek University of Technology. In particular, North Korea has secretly established Mirim Military University to train cyber specialists. In 2009, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the headquarters of the South Korean task force, was established, and each cyber-related organization dedicated to cyber research and hacking was incorporated into the Technology Reconnaissance Bureau, a third country of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, to oversee cyber-related affairs. According to an analysis of North Korea's cybercrime committed through such cyber-related organizations,

it is a recent surge in cyber financial crimes, cyber terrorism to neutralize South Korea's military power, and cyber psychological warfare.

Therefore, this study aims to understand the current status of North Korean cyber personnel training and cyber hacking organizations, and then analyze the current status of cybercrime in North Korea. Through this, we would like to present basic data to effectively respond to North Korean cybercrime.

## **2. North Korea's Cyber Education and Hacking Organization**

### **2.1. Summary**

North Korea ranked 238th out of 238 countries in terms of global Internet utilization in 2022. The world's Internet utilization rate is 65.6%, and North Korea's utilization rate is significantly lower at 0.07%<sup>[1]</sup>. Nevertheless, the National Cyber Power Index (NCPI) ranked first in the Cyber Finance Capability category in 2022. In March 2022, 34 students, including Kim Il-sung University, Kimchaek University of Technology, and College of Li Studies, won the online international programming competition "Codechef"<sup>[2]</sup>. This suggests that apart from North Korea's low-level network environment and Internet utilization rate, it has trained excellent cyber talents by professionally teaching cyber and hacking technologies since childhood. Although North Korea's cyber talent training process is not well known, it is centered on Kim Il-sung University, North Korea's top university, Kimchaek University of Technology, and Pyeongseong University of Science. In addition, Mirim Military University, a secret military university and specialized university in North Korea, is also training cyber talent. I would like to examine how cyber talents, which can be said to be the core of North Korea's cyber power, are being nurtured, focusing on educational institutions.

### **2.2. Training for cyber agents**

Through the reorganization of the curriculum in 2012, North Korea has allocated a total of 52 hours of computer-related technology, information technology (IT), to elementary schools to provide basic education necessary for training cyber personnel. Students who show excellent talent in this basic education class will be selected and systematically raised by teaching computer technology at Geumseong 1 Middle School and Pyongyang 1 Middle School, which are gifted schools in Pyongyang<sup>[3]</sup>. Afterwards, they advance to elite courses such as Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongsong University of Science, and Mirim Military University, where they receive more systematic and professional education.<sup>1</sup>

Kim Il-sung University, founded in 1946, is a higher education institution that trains the best elite in North Korea. The Computer Science University, established in 1999, is teaching information technology to foster cyber talent. Kimchaek University of Technology is a school specializing in science and technology and provides education to foster cyber talent at undergraduate schools such as the College of Computer Science, the College of Mechanical Science and Technology, and the College of Information Science and Technology. These faculties were established because of North Korea's national strategy to promote economic reconstruction and development through the development of science and technology and the development of science and technology in the field of advanced science and technology<sup>[4]</sup>. Pyongsung University of Science and Technology became independent from Kim Il-sung University in 1985 and focuses on research and development rather than fostering technical talent. While Kim Il-sung Univer-

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<sup>1</sup> Sae Jeonbuk Newspaper, "North Korea's Cyber Attack," March 11, 2021.

sity and Kimchaek University of Technology have a strong focus on applying and using technologies such as hacking and programming to carry out practical cyberattacks, Pyongsung University of Science focuses on research and development to improve the skills necessary for operating system development, hacking, and programming.

Mirim Military University is a specialized university established in 1986, and it can be said to be one of the secondary talent education systems that can be selected and admitted after graduating from a science and engineering university. It was a secret military university that even North Koreans could not know, but its substance was revealed in 1999. The official name is 'Kim Il Military University', also known as 'Korean People's Army Command and Automation University'. First, the best students from military schools (two-year) and gifted schools in each province are selected and admitted, and through regular courses (five-year undergraduate departments) and research courses (three-year graduate schools), they are nurtured as hacker experts. It is divided into a total of five specialized departments, including command automation. Here, simulations are conducted based on related data such as the location of South Korean military units and the organization of the South Korean military[5], and according to a statement from a North Korean defector from Mirim University, the data includes all detailed information such as South Korea's computer program, operation and tactical programs, as well as all unit names and troop strategies, including special forces[6].

Lastly, Moranbong University is a member of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and focuses on cultivating cyber operatives by training experts such as computer information processing, cryptanalysis, and hacking. The selection of cyber trainees at Moranbong University selects 30 outstanding new cyber students from graduates of Pyongyang First Middle School, Pyongyang City, and each province's lieutenant rank, and gives them the People's Army's 'Lieutenant' class from the time of admission[7]. While attending school, he receives special training such as martial arts and shooting, as well as communication wiretapping, code decoding, and information acquisition through hacking, and later performs various duties as a cyber operative.<sup>2</sup>

### 2.3. Cyber hacking organization

Not much is known about North Korea's cyber organization, but according to the public information revealed so far, North Korea established the Mirim Military University in 1986 to train more than 100 cyber specialists. After the Gulf War, North Korea recognized the importance of cyber warfare and established the Commanding and Automation Bureau under the General Staff of the People's Army. The Bureau of Conductor's Fairy Tale consists of about 60so officers and is still known to develop hacking programs. It operates 32so that develop military-related programs and 56so that develop command and communication programs. The General Staff also has a 204so that conducts cyber psychological warfare against the South Korean military and its citizens. Separately, Unit 121so which was a cyber-related research department, was expanded and reorganized into a research institute 110 dedicated to hacking and cyber warfare in 1998. Since then, when the Reconnaissance General Bureau was launched in February 2009, various cyber-related departments, including Research Institute 110, have been incorporated into the Technology Reconnaissance Bureau, a third country of the Reconnaissance General Bureau[8].

Cyber activities known to be led by the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau are handled by the Technical Reconnaissance Team under the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau. The Technical Reconnaissance Team is a department in which the '121so' and the '100 Research Institute', which were in charge of hacking, are integrated, and was also pointed out as the background of the 7.7 DDoS incident in 2009. In addition, Lazarus, Andariel, Kimsuky, and Bluenoroff, known as North Korea's hacking group, are known to belong

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<sup>2</sup> Daily NK. Attention of 'Moranbong University', the best hacker education institution in North Kore. 07.11, 2009.

to the technology reconnaissance team[9]. North Korea recognizes the importance of other cyber sectors and, unlike other departments, continues to expand and reorganize the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Recently, as North Korea's cyber activities have increased and its technological capabilities have advanced, units under the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau are also being subdivided. It is trying to steal COVID-19 information and vaccine technology by creating "180" and "325" specialized in cyber financial crimes [10]. While North Korean hacking organizations Lazarus and APT38 specialize in cybercrime, APT37 and Kimsuky mainly target military and defense companies and public institutions in major countries such as South Korea, the United States, and Japan and specialize in information theft[11].

### **3. Cybercrime in North Korea**

#### **3.1. Cyber financial crime**

Cyber financial crimes in North Korea can be divided into three main types: illegal withdrawal through hacking of SWIFT and ATM terminals inside banks, extortion using ransomware, and cryptocurrency theft[12].

First, it is the type of illegal withdrawal through SWIFT and ATM terminal hacking inside the bank. North Korea is a crime through hacking of internal terminals of banks connected to the SWIFT network, an international network for bank-to-bank remittances, and the ATM network, an automated teller machine. North Korea mainly uses a method of seizing internal computers linked to SWIFT and ATM network accounts by sending phishing e-mails containing malicious codes to employees' mail accounts believed to be internal managers.

Second, it is a type of exploitation using ransomware. Starting in 2022, North Korea stole technical data such as laser anti-aircraft weapons by hacking domestic research institutes, defense contractors, and pharmaceutical companies, a hacking organization within the Reconnaissance General Bureau. In addition, 'Andariel' has intercepted more than 400 million won in bitcoin since it penetrated the computer system and spread the virus. Some of the bitcoins taken from ransomware attacks demanding money using them as hostages after the virus infection were washed and withdrawn from a bank near the border between North Korea and China. "Andariel" used a domestic company that leased servers to unidentified subscribers to attack ransomware, and confirmed that it accessed the server 83 times from December 2022 to March 2023 in Ryugyong-dong, Pyongyang, using a domestic server rental company as a stopover. Companies affected by Andariel's ransomware attack were robbed of more than KRW 470 million worth of bitcoin in exchange for computer system recovery. In addition, police confirmed that server user account information was stolen, including key technical data such as laser anti-aircraft weapons and detectors.

Third, it is a type of cryptocurrency takeover. As North Korea was expelled from the International Association for Interbank Communications (SWIFT) in 2017, North Korea's hacking organization became interested in cryptocurrency. Hackers in North Korea are attacking cryptocurrency exchanges by encouraging internal employees to open emails containing malicious codes, taking control of their internal networks, and then siphoning off the exchange's cryptocurrency. Starting with the crime of hacking Interpark, an Internet shopping mall in South Korea, in 2016, stealing members' personal information and demanding 3 billion won of bitcoin using this as an excuse, it hacked the domestic cryptocurrency exchange six times since April 2017, and one of them went bankrupt. In 2018, it violated banks and cryptocurrency exchanges around the world [13].



**Figure 1.** North Korea develops cryptocurrency mining and exchanges.



Note: Naver post (August 29, 2018).

According to a 2020 UN Security Council North Korea Sanctions Committee panel report, North Korea stole more than \$310 million in cyber profits from hacking from 2019 to 2020 and used the money to develop nuclear weapons and missiles. It also produced and sold gambling programs, illegal auto programs, and securities futures site programs. In particular, North Korea earns \$1 billion (about 1 trillion won) in cyber foreign currency annually by developing and selling IT technology publicly. In a related development, the U.S. Department of Justice recently said it has indicted three hackers from the North's Reconnaissance General Bureau on charges of more than \$1.3 billion in cryptocurrency theft, cyberattacks, and participation in the development and distribution of malicious cryptocurrency apps.<sup>3</sup>

**Figure 2.** U.S. Homeland security secretary takes over \$1 billion in North Korean cryptocurrency, develops weapons.



Note: Fort news (2022.10.19).

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<sup>3</sup> Seoul Economy, February 18, 2021.

### 3.2. Cyber terrorism

North Korea is likely to neutralize South Korea's weapons system in case of emergency by collecting South Korean military secrets and analyzing weaknesses in its weapons system to make up for the weakening of its military power[14]. From 2014 to 2016, North Korea seized more than 40,000 data from 10 Hanjin affiliates and 17 SK affiliates[15]. In April 2016, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering hacked 40,000 internal data, including 60 military secrets related to destroyers, frigates, and submarines, and in September 2016, the Defense Integrated Data Center (DIDC) was pierced, resulting in a large amount of 235GB of data. In 2019, military information was collected by modulating mobile bus apps[16]. North Korea intends to destroy major infrastructure and cause social chaos and insecurity rather than direct attacks on the military[17].

In August 2016, North Korea attacked the military Internet and intranet networks to leak key military confidential data to the outside world, disabling network separation and attacking public PCs used for Internet access by frontline units, infecting about 3,200 units. In this case, malicious code was distributed through a vaccine relay server that manages the security of PCs on the external Internet network, and malicious code was found on a number of PCs [18]. The way North Korea attacked it was that malicious code was transferred from the Internet network to the defense network through the connection point by inserting it into the Gyeryongdae Defense Integrated Data Center server together. A total of 295 confidential information leaked from the military's external Internet network and internal intranet by the hack, including operation plan 5027, subsequent military operation plan 5015, and operation plan 3100, which is a response plan to infiltration and local provocation.

### 3.3. Cyber psychological warfare

Cyber psychological warfare has serious harm because it can instill confusion and fear in the people[19]. In particular, social anxiety can be promoted in the event of a cyber psychological war that disturbs the media or circulates rumors, which has a greater ripple effect than simple hacking in that it can be a means of psychological disability and division of public opinion[20]. If carefully calculated cyber terrorism, along with cyber psychological warfare, occurs in state institutional facilities and infrastructure, it could cause considerable confusion and fear for Koreans, whose living environment is largely connected to the Internet. In order to develop such cyber psychological warfare, North Korea operates various sites such as 'Our People'[21]. In addition, cyber psychological warfare is being conducted through pro-North Korean sites active in Korea. North Korea has established pro-North Korean sites abroad, praised Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, and propaganda against the North Korean regime[22].

Recently, cyber psychological warfare has been developed using cleverly manipulated fake news. In November 2023, the North Korean General Staff announced that it had fired two strategic cruise missiles into international waters 80 kilometers off Ulsan, but it was fake news that did not happen at all. This seems to have been trying to confuse the South Korean military's reconnaissance activities and undermine public confidence in the South Korean military's announcement, claiming that the cruise missile, which is less visible on the radar than the ballistic missile, flew to Ulsan through an anomalous flight. However, the Korean people responded coldly due to North Korea's continued provocative acts and anger caused by fake news.

## 4. Conclusion

North Korea provides basic cyber-related education such as information technology, a computer-related technology subject, at elementary schools to train cyber agents. After systematically educating at science gifted schools such as Geumseong First Middle School, he went to Kim Il-sung University, Kimchaek University of Technology, and Mirim Military University to train as the best cyber specialist in North Korea. In 2009, North Korea integrated cyber research institutes and hacking units scattered across the country into the Technology Reconnaissance Bureau, a third country in the Reconnaissance General Bureau. In particular, North Korean hacking organizations APT37 and Kimsuky are mainly organizations that target military facilities and defense companies in major countries such as South Korea, the United States, and Japan and operate to steal information.

We analyzed the actual state of cybercrime committed through cyber hacking organizations in North Korea.

First, cyber financial crimes. This is a crime through hacking of internal terminals of banks, a crime of extortion using ransomware, and a crime of stealing cryptocurrency after scholarship to a cryptocurrency exchange through malicious code. Second, cyber terrorism aimed at collecting South Korean military secrets and neutralizing the weapons system. Third, it is a cyber psychological war to promote social anxiety by disturbing the media or spreading rumors. As such, cybercrime in North Korea is becoming organized, meticulous, and diverse. Recently, with the emergence of new technologies such as robots, the need for specialized research institutes to respond to rapidly changing national security threats has emerged. To this end, it is necessary to enact the Framework Act on National Cyber Security in order to establish a national cybersecurity system. It is also time to establish a cooperative system with information investigation agencies and a cooperative system to respond to international cyberattacks.

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## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	NB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> </ul>

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## A Study on Korean Police Officers' Perceptions of North Korean Defectors

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### Abstract

**Purpose:** As of 2024, approximately 34,000 people who escaped North Korea are risking their lives to escape the oppression and human rights violations of the North Korean Kim Jong-un regime and settle in South Korea. They learn the truth about the outside world only after secretly watching South Korean dramas in North Korea, and they decide that there is no future for them as long as Kim Jong-un holds power in North Korea, so they take their children and escape North Korea. After overcoming the crisis of death and settling in South Korea, they receive comprehensive help from the South Korean police to settle into South Korean society. Therefore, South Korean police officers have a high level of understanding in research on North Korean defectors, and since South Korean police officers are public officials, sufficient objectivity can be expected. This study is valuable academic basic data that can provide many researchers internationally with South Korean society's perception of North Korean defectors.

**Method:** The data processing of this study was conducted using the statistical package program SPSS 23.0 Program, and the following statistical verifications were performed according to the purpose of data analysis. First, frequency analysis was conducted using the SPSS/PC+23.0 program to identify general characteristics. Second, Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was calculated to verify the reliability of the questionnaire. Third, One Way ANOVA was conducted to find out the difference in police officers' perception of North Korean defectors according to their period of working. Fourth, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to find out police officers' perception of North Korean defectors.

**Results:** Korean police officers who had worked for a long time recognized that North Korean defectors visit police stations after settling in South Korea to receive legal support. Among Korean police officers who had experience working in security departments directly managing North Korean defectors, those who had worked for a longer time recognized that what was necessary for adapting to South Korean society was an understanding of South Korean society, such as liberal democracy and the market economy system, and that what was difficult about settling in South Korean society was feeling insecure about their personal safety. In addition, they recognized that the average monthly income per household of North Korean defectors in South Korean society was moderate.

**Conclusion:** Since North Korean defectors acquire South Korean citizenship normally, once they settle down in South Korean society, there is no discrimination based on constitutional values, and there are cases of them being elected to the National Assembly, showing their acceptance. In addition, the minimum wage is set at \$7.45 per hour, which is higher than the monthly salary of North Korean diplomats (0.3 dollars), and North Korean defectors also receive compensation for their work and enjoy a stable life. In addition, all North Korean defectors live while enjoying South Korea's social security system, including unemployment benefits, health insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance, national pension, and old-age pension.

**Keywords:** Kim Jong-un's Politics of Fear, North Korea's State Security Department's Violence, The Influx of K-Content into North Korea, North Korean Defectors, Settlement in South Korean Society


## 1. Purpose of the Study

According to statistics from the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, as of 2024, approximately 34,000 North Korean defectors have settled in South Korea. The majority of North Korean defectors are women, accounting for approximately 70% of all defectors. Despite the threats to their lives during the escape process and the torture and detention camp life they experience when they are caught and sent back to North Korea due to the oppression and human rights abuses of the Kim Jong-un regime, attempts to escape North Korea are increasing[1][2][3].

The reason for escaping North Korea is that North Korea rejects the market economy because the regime was established based on traditional communism[4]. However, the distribution pursued by the communist regime has been discontinued, but the biggest reason is that the Kim family does not pursue reform, openness, and a market economy in order to maintain power[5]. However, street vendors called *jangmadang*, which exist in every neighborhood in North Korea, have already taken root and play an essential role in the lives of North Korean residents[6][7].

In the midst of this, North Korea prohibits internet use, but when defectors to South Korea send balloons with Korean dramas attached to USBs near the Military Demarcation Line, North Korean residents begin to learn a little about the outside world outside North Korea by sharing them with people around them, and Kim Jong-un and his family and the officials of the Workers' Party of Korea realize that they are sacrificing North Korean residents for their own selfish desires[8][9]. Above all, the number of defectors, who can be called North Korea's elite, has increased rapidly. All of the defectors said that they decided to defect because "even if I live and die like this, I cannot allow my children to live in a slaughterhouse like North Korea." This is why North Koreans risk their lives trying to escape North Korea[10].

**Figure 1.** Status of North Korean defectors entering South Korea.



Note: Ministry of unification (Based on those entering the country as of the end of June 2024).

Despite tight surveillance, North Korean residents cross the Tumen River in the north of North Korea - cross the border between China and Vietnam in the south - go through Cambodia - and enter South Korea via the South Korean embassy in Thailand. After investigation and education, they settle down and continue their lives, and South Korean police officers are very close to North Korean defectors. The police operates a security department in police stations to ensure that North Korean defectors receive safe protection immediately after entering South Korea. This can be very important for those who may be threatened with death by the Kim Jong-un

regime in North Korea. It also helps North Korean defectors build relationships with local residents in the local community and provides necessary administrative support to help them adapt to their new environment[11][12][13].

Through this role, the South Korean police have a high level of understanding of North Korean defectors and, as public officials who enforce the law, have unbiased objectivity, making them appropriate for studying the perception of North Korean defectors, which is the purpose of this study.

In addition, the significance of this study is important in order to comprehensively prepare for all situations, including the transition from the North Korean Kim Jong-un regime to a democratic regime, not only for North Korean defectors, but also for Internet use and overseas travel liberalization. In particular, we hope to attract more attention by providing academic basic data to many researchers internationally so that human lives suffering from human rights violations and oppression by the North Korean Kim Jong-un regime can find hope.

## 2. Method of the Study

### 2.1. Survey subjects and sampling method

This study targeted 100 trainees from the Korean Police Human Resources Development Institute, a police training institute in Korea, among security department police officers with experience working with North Korean defectors, using the self-administration method. Of the returned questionnaires, 91 questionnaires were used as a valid sample after excluding those with insincere responses or missing survey content.

**Table 1.** Subject of investigation.

	Description	N (%)	Total
Gender	Male	61(67.0%)	91
	Female	30(33.0%)	
Age	20s	7(7.7%)	91
	30s	28(30.8%)	
	40s	30(33.0%)	
	50s or older	26(28.6%)	
The total period of working as a police officer	5 years and less	13(14.3%)	91
	6-10 years	32(35.2%)	
	11-15 years	13(14.3%)	
	16-20 years	13(14.3%)	
	Longer than 20 years	20(22.0%)	
The period of working at the security department	2 years and less	16(17.6%)	91
	3-5 years	56(61.5%)	
	6-10 years	17(18.7%)	
	Longer than 10 years	2(2.2%)	

### 2.2. Measurement tool

In this study, in order to increase the content validity of the questionnaire and verify the construct validity, a method appropriate for each verification method was selected. Content



validity was secured through consultation with relevant experts in order to adopt questionnaire items that fit the purpose of the study, and the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was .878.

**Table 2.** North Korean defectors' perception (Regulation Vol. 7 no. 1, Lee C & Kim B & Cho S, thesis and survey are the same).

	Questions
Q-1	North Korean defectors are satisfied with their lives in South Korea.
Q-2	North Korean defectors are distressed because of their families left behind in North Korea.
Q-3	North Korean defectors feel threatened.
Q-4	North Korean defectors feel hostile toward South Koreans.
Q-5	North Korean defectors believe that there are forces that support the North Korean regime within South Korean society.
Q-6	In the process of North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society, police officers in charge of personal protection play an important role.
Q-7	North Korean defectors believe that they may be a threat to themselves due to political changes in South Korea.
Q-8	Police officers in charge of personal protection for North Korean defectors need various types of help outside of their duties.
Q-9	North Korean defectors are receiving counseling on various issues as police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-10	North Korean defectors are satisfied with the system of police officers in charge of personal protection in South Korea.
Q-11	North Korean defectors hope that police officers in charge of personal protection will be active in terms of legal support issues.
Q-12	North Korean defectors hope that police officers in charge of personal protection will be active in terms of employment and job placement issues.
Q-13	North Korean defectors hope that police officers in charge of personal protection will be active in terms of personal safety issues.
Q-14	North Korean defectors are satisfied with the job of the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-15	North Korean defectors believe that the South Korean police organization serves the people.
Q-16	North Korean defectors believe that the South Korean police organization is an organization that honestly enforces and cracks down on the law.
Q-17	North Korean defectors believe that the South Korean police organization is an oppressive organization that reigns over the people.
Q-18	North Korean defectors believe that the South Korean organization is an organization that protects the socially disadvantaged.
Q-19	North Korean defectors visit South Korean police stations comfortably when necessary.
Q-20	The reason North Korean defectors visit police stations in South Korea is to find fellow defectors or relatives.
Q-21	The reason North Korean defectors visit police stations in South Korea is because they have been defrauded or assaulted by someone.
Q-22	The reason North Korean defectors visit police stations in South Korea is to receive legal support.
Q-23	The reason North Korean defectors visit police stations in South Korea is to complain about unfair treatment such as unpaid wages.
Q-24	The most necessary education for North Korean defectors to adapt to South Korean society is an understanding of South Korean society.
Q-25	The most necessary education for North Korean defectors to adapt to South Korean society is an understanding of the legal aspects.
Q-26	The most necessary education for North Korean defectors to adapt to South Korean society is an understanding of cultural life.
Q-27	The most necessary education for North Korean defectors to adapt to South Korean society is an understanding of job training.

Q-28	North Korean defectors find jobs on their own in South Korean society.
Q-29	North Korean defectors are seeking employment in South Korean society through religious organizations.
Q-30	North Korean defectors are seeking employment in South Korean society through job placement agencies.
Q-31	North Korean defectors are seeking employment in South Korean society through police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-32	North Korean defectors are seeking employment in South Korean society through other government agencies (career counselors, the South-North One Foundation).
Q-33	The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society is employment.
Q-34	The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society is personal safety.
Q-35	The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society is economic life.
Q-36	The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society is adjusting to daily life.
Q-37	The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors settling into South Korean society is communication with neighbors.
Q-38	The average monthly income per household of North Korean defectors is moderate.

### 2.3. Data processing and analysis method

The data processing of this study was conducted using the statistical package program SPSS 23.0 Program, and statistical verification was performed as follows according to the purpose of data analysis.

First, frequency analysis was conducted using the SPSS/PC+23.0 program to identify general characteristics.

Second, Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was calculated to verify the reliability of the questionnaire.

Third, One Way ANOVA was conducted to find out the difference in police officers' perception of North Korean defectors according to their period of working.

Fourth, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to find out police officers' perception of North Korean defectors.

## 3. Result

### 3.1. Perception of North Korean defectors according to police officers' period of working

**Table 3.** Differences in perception of North Korean defectors according to total period of police working.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	5 years or less	13	2.7692	.59914	.512	.727	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.5313	.67127			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.6923	.48038			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.5385	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	2.7000	.73270			
Q-2	5 years or less	13	2.8462	.80064	2.207	.075	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.5938	.49899			

Q-3	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.6154	.65044	1.701	.157	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.3846	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	2.3000	.47016			
	5 years or less	13	2.6923	.75107			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.2813	.45680			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.4615	.66023			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.3846	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	2.2500	.44426			
	5 years or less	13	2.4615	.51887			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.3438	.48256			
Q-4	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.5385	.51887	.828	.511	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.3846	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	2.2500	.44426			
	5 years or less	13	2.9231	.75955			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.6563	.74528			
Q-5	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.6154	.86972	.689	.602	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.6154	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	2.5000	.68825			
	5 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.3438	.86544			
Q-6	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.1538	.55470	.709	.588	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.5385	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	3.5500	.82558			
	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.8750	.79312			
Q-7	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.7692	.83205	1.282	.283	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.0769	.64051			
	20 years or more	20	2.8000	.76777			
Q-8	5 years or less	13	3.4615	.66023	.756	.557	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2813	.92403			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.1538	.80064			

	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3077	.75107			
	20 years or more	20	3.6000	.82078			
Q-9	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043	1.176	.327	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.1875	.89578			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.0000	1.00000			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.4615	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	3.5500	.82558			
Q-10	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.85485	.592	.669	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2500	.71842			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.0000	.57735			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	20 years or more	20	3.4000	.88258			
Q-11	5 years or less	13	3.1538	.80064	1.263	.291	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.1875	.73780			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.1538	.68874			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.37553			
	20 years or more	20	3.5500	.60481			
Q-12	5 years or less	13	3.0769	.64051	1.622	.176	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.4375	.71561			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.0000	.81650			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3846	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.76089			
Q-13	5 years or less	13	3.1538	.80064	.574	.682	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2500	.76200			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.55470			
	20 years or more	20	3.4500	.68633			
Q-14	5 years or less	13	2.9231	.64051	1.422	.234	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2813	.77186			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.8462	.80064			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044			

	20 years or more	20	3.3000	.92338			
Q-15	5 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044	.727	.576	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.4688	.76134			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.4615	.66023			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.80064			
	20 years or more	20	3.6000	.82078			
Q-16	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043	1.168	.331	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.4375	.66901			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.2308	.72501			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.80064			
	20 years or more	20	3.6500	.87509			
Q-17	5 years or less	13	2.3846	.50637	.587	.673	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.2500	.50800			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.5385	.77625			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.3077	.63043			
	20 years or more	20	2.4000	.68056			
Q-18	5 years or less	13	3.0000	.81650	1.641	.171	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2500	.71842			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3077	.75107			
	20 years or more	20	3.6500	.81273			
Q-19	5 years or less	13	2.9231	.64051	.717	.583	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.8438	.88388			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.6923	.75107			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.9231	.64051			
	20 years or more	20	3.1500	.93330			
Q-20	5 years or less	13	2.5385	.51887	.308	.872	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.6250	.65991			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.6154	.76795			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.7692	.59914			
	20 years or more	20	2.5500	.51042			



Q-21	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043	.352	.842	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.0938	.73438			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.68874			
	20 years or more	20	3.2000	.69585			
Q-22	5 years or less	13	2.9231	.27735	3.072	.020	E>D
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.0938	.46555			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.0000	.57735			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.8462	.37553			
	20 years or more	20	3.4000	.68056			
Q-23	5 years or less	13	2.7692	.83205	.795	.531	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.9063	.64053			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.7692	.43853			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.7692	.72501			
	20 years or more	20	3.1000	.71818			
Q-24	5 years or less	13	2.8462	.68874	2.451	.052	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.3438	.60158			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.4615	.77625			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.5385	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.76089			
Q-25	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.75107	.770	.547	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.0625	.61892			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.1538	.68874			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3846	.50637			
	20 years or more	20	3.3000	.80131			
Q-26	5 years or less	13	3.5385	.66023	.524	.719	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.4375	.61892			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.6154	.65044			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.6923	.48038			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.51299			
Q-27	5 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044	.580	.678	

	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.2813	.63421			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.2308	.72501			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.2308	.59914			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.60698			
Q-28	5 years or less	13	3.3077	.75107	.975	.425	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.8750	.75134			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.0000	.70711			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.68874			
	20 years or more	20	3.0000	.64889			
Q-29	5 years or less	13	2.8462	.55470	.617	.651	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.9375	.43533			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.8462	.37553			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.0000	.57735			
	20 years or more	20	2.7500	.63867			
Q-30	5 years or less	13	3.0000	0.00000	.670	.614	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.9375	.50402			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.7692	.43853			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.0000	.57735			
	20 years or more	20	2.9500	.22361			
Q-31	5 years or less	13	3.0769	.75955	.237	.917	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.0625	.61892			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.9231	.64051			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.0769	.49355			
	20 years or more	20	3.1500	.74516			
Q-32	5 years or less	13	3.3846	.65044	.422	.792	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.1563	.62782			
	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.1538	.55470			
	20 years or more	20	3.2000	.61559			
Q-33	5 years or less	13	3.2308	.72501	.650	.629	
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.3750	.70711			

	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.3846	.76795			
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.0769	.64051			
	20 years or more	20	3.4500	.75915			
	5 years or less	13	2.4615	.66023			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.3125	.53506			
Q-34	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.1538	.37553	.626	.645	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.4615	.66023			
	20 years or more	20	2.3500	.67082			
	5 years or less	13	3.5385	.66023			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.5000	.62217			
Q-35	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.5385	.66023	.601	.663	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.3077	.63043			
	20 years or more	20	3.6500	.58714			
	5 years or less	13	3.6154	.65044			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.5000	.56796			
Q-36	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.6154	.65044	.197	.939	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.4615	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.68825			
	5 years or less	13	3.7692	.43853			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	3.4375	.66901			
Q-37	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	3.6154	.65044	.768	.549	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	3.5385	.51887			
	20 years or more	20	3.5000	.60698			
	5 years or less	13	2.8462	.37553			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	32	2.8125	.47093			
Q-38	11 years or more to 15 years or less	13	2.8462	.37553	.138	.968	
	16 years or more to 20 years or less	13	2.9231	.49355			
	20 years or more	20	2.8500	.48936			

Note: A: 5 years or less, B: 6 years or more to 10 years or less, C: 11 years or more to 15 years or less, D: 16 years or more to 20 years or less, E: 20 years or more.

<Table 3> shows the difference in perception of North Korean defectors based on the total period of police working. The analysis results showed that at the 5% level, Q-22 20 years or more was higher than 16 years or more to 20 years or less.

**Table 4.** Differences in perception of North Korean defectors based on working period in security department.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	2 years or less	16	2.7500	.57735	.893	.448	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.6250	.64842			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.5882	.61835			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			
Q-2	2 years or less	16	2.6875	.70415	1.425	.241	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.5714	.56752			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.2941	.46967			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-3	2 years or less	16	2.5625	.62915	1.408	.246	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.3750	.55800			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.1765	.39295			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-4	2 years or less	16	2.5000	.51640	2.706	.050	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.4286	.49935			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.1176	.33211			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			
Q-5	2 years or less	16	2.8125	.75000	.458	.712	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.5893	.70780			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.7059	.77174			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-6	2 years or less	16	3.4375	.81394	.047	.986	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3929	.73059			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.3529	.78591			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-7	2 years or less	16	3.0000	.73030	.694	.558	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.9464	.79589			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.7647	.66421			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-8	2 years or less	16	3.3125	.87321	.555	.646	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3214	.85508			

	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4706	.71743			
	10 years or more	2	4.0000	.00000			
Q-9	2 years or less	16	3.2500	.77460	1.149	.334	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2143	.86790			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.5294	.71743			
	10 years or more	2	4.0000	.00000			
Q-10	2 years or less	16	3.2500	.85635	.169	.917	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2500	.71985			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.3529	.78591			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-11	2 years or less	16	3.0625	.85391	.833	.480	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2679	.67396			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4118	.50730			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-12	2 years or less	16	3.1875	.83417	.329	.804	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3750	.70227			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.2941	.68599			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-13	2 years or less	16	3.1250	.88506	.773	.512	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2857	.65267			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4706	.71743			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-14	2 years or less	16	3.1250	.80623	1.349	.264	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.1429	.77292			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4706	.79982			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-15	2 years or less	16	3.4375	.89209	.571	.636	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3750	.72770			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.6471	.70189			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-16	2 years or less	16	3.3750	.71880	.020	.996	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3929	.73059			



	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4118	.87026			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-17	2 years or less	16	2.4375	.51235	.429	.732	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.3214	.57547			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.4118	.79521			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			
Q-18	2 years or less	16	2.9375	.85391	2.577	.059	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3214	.71623			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.6471	.70189			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-19	2 years or less	16	3.0000	.81650	.917	.436	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.9286	.80582			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.8824	.85749			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			
Q-20	2 years or less	16	2.4375	.51235	1.778	.157	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.7143	.65267			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.5294	.51450			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			
Q-21	2 years or less	16	3.1250	.80623	1.922	.132	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.1071	.62315			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4118	.71229			
	10 years or more	2	4.0000	.00000			
Q-22	2 years or less	16	2.9375	.44253	.548	.651	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.1250	.42906			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.1176	.85749			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-23	2 years or less	16	2.7500	.77460	.576	.632	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.9464	.58526			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.8824	.85749			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-24	2 years or less	16	3.0000	.63246	3.130	.030	C>A
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3393	.66815			

	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.7059	.68599			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-25	2 years or less	16	3.1250	.80623	.402	.752	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.1964	.58526			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.3529	.86177			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-26	2 years or less	16	3.4375	.62915	.691	.560	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.5000	.60302			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.7059	.46967			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-27	2 years or less	16	3.3125	.60208	.414	.743	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2857	.65267			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4706	.62426			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-28	2 years or less	16	3.2500	.85635	1.309	.277	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.0000	.63246			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.8235	.80896			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-29	2 years or less	16	2.8750	.50000	2.494	.065	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.9643	.50324			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.5882	.50730			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-30	2 years or less	16	3.0000	.00000	.235	.872	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.9286	.49935			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.8824	.33211			
	10 years or more	2	3.0000	.00000			
Q-31	2 years or less	16	3.0625	.68007	.676	.569	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.0536	.67203			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.1765	.52859			
	10 years or more	2	2.5000	.70711			
Q-32	2 years or less	16	3.1875	.75000	.156	.926	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.2143	.56292			

	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.2353	.66421			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-33	2 years or less	16	3.3125	.70415	.136	.938	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.3036	.73657			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.4118	.71229			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-34	2 years or less	16	2.4375	.62915	3.222	.027	D>B,C
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.2857	.52964			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.2941	.58787			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-35	2 years or less	16	3.3750	.71880	1.249	.297	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.4821	.63220			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.7647	.43724			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-36	2 years or less	16	3.5000	.63246	.268	.848	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.5000	.57208			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.6471	.70189			
	10 years or more	2	3.5000	.70711			
Q-37	2 years or less	16	3.5000	.73030	.466	.707	
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	3.5179	.53906			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	3.5882	.71229			
	10 years or more	2	4.0000	.00000			
Q-38	2 years or less	16	2.8750	.50000	3.014	.034	D>A,B
	3 years or more to 5 years or less	56	2.8929	.41247			
	6 years or more to 10 years or less	17	2.7647	.43724			
	10 years or more	2	2.0000	.00000			

Note: A: 2 years or less, B: 3 years or more to 5 years or less, C: 6 years or more to 10 years or less, D: 10 years or more.

<Table 4> shows the differences in perception of North Korean defectors by security and period of working. The analysis results show that Q-24 6 years or more to 10 years or less was 5% higher than Q-34 10 years or more than 3 years to 5 years and 6 years to 10 years or less than Q-38 10 years or more than 2 years or less and 3 years to 5 years or less.

### 3.2. Factors affecting police officers' perception of North Korean defectors

In order to determine the construct validity of the 38 items of the scale for perception of

North Korean defectors, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to extract latent factors. The standard deviation of the sampling adequacy (MSA) was 0.779, which means that the data are suitable for factor analysis. In addition, the results of Bartlett's sphericity test were  $\chi^2=1829.068$ ,  $p=0.000$ , which means that the correlation between the variables of the 'scale for perception of North Korean defectors' was recognized at the significance level of 0.05, so it can be said that factor analysis is possible overall. Accordingly, five subfactors were extracted, and factor 1 of the 'scale for perception of North Korean defectors' was named 'perception of settlement support', factor 2 'perception of law and economy', factor 3 'perception of social settlement', factor 4 'perception of psychological anxiety', and factor 5 'perception of life safety', respectively.

**Table 5.** Test of the Korean police officers' perception of North Korean defectors.

KMO's sampling adequacy (MSA) test	0.779	
Bartlett's sphericity test	Approx $\chi^2$	1829.068
	Degrees of freedom ( <i>df</i> )	703
	<i>p</i>	.000***

Note: \* $p<0.05$ , \*\* $p<0.01$ , \*\*\* $p<0.001$ .

**Table 6.** Structure of North Korean defectors by South Korean police officers.

Item	Commonality	Factor				
		1	2	3	4	5
Awareness 37	.697	.804	.071	-.101	.182	-.043
Awareness 21	.612	.751	-.167	-.066	-.096	-.082
Awareness 32	.647	.738	-.285	.074	.037	-.117
Awareness 36	.652	.733	.296	-.089	.104	.093
Awareness 35	.667	.724	.322	.066	-.031	.185
Awareness 8	.678	.655	-.027	.327	-.376	.020
Awareness 9	.666	.643	.136	.166	-.433	.136
Awareness 26	.626	.611	.147	.109	.081	.461
Awareness 33	.609	.575	.171	.114	-.226	.431
Awareness 7	.446	.570	-.131	-.247	.153	.142
Awareness 6	.482	.553	.324	.074	-.238	.091
Awareness 24	.405	.475	.143	.230	-.260	.198
Awareness 16	.580	.469	.416	.304	-.202	-.232
Awareness 18	.470	.453	.398	.233	-.222	-.057
Awareness 15	.598	.431	.304	.427	-.371	-.014
Awareness 11	.609	.072	.732	.232	-.083	.081
Awareness 12	.642	.137	.692	.133	-.319	.159
Awareness 13	.587	.204	.648	.225	.053	.268
Awareness 10	.570	.096	.561	.470	-.158	-.008
Awareness 38	.324	-.061	.512	.041	.114	-.209
Awareness 23	.425	-.038	.494	.238	.281	-.209
Awareness 22	.389	.010	.478	.398	-.004	.030
Awareness 27	.504	.403	.467	.097	.082	.327
Awareness 25	.576	.150	.252	.685	.093	-.111
Awareness 19	.752	-.209	.463	.682	-.129	-.109
Awareness 28	.594	-.029	-.047	.657	.177	.357
Awareness 1	.483	.081	.212	.613	.144	.188

Awareness 31	.464	.146	.282	.576	.124	-.128
Awareness 14	.540	.018	.448	.553	-.182	-.001
Awareness 5	.530	.445	-.043	-.543	.161	.099
Awareness 29	.212	.115	.247	.310	.176	-.102
Awareness 3	.598	-.031	.056	-.023	.769	.050
Awareness 2	.409	.062	-.006	.048	.628	.090
Awareness 4	.405	-.043	-.100	.165	.490	-.355
Awareness 17	.458	-.367	-.046	.283	.490	-.028
Awareness 30	.374	-.068	-.017	.217	-.020	.567
Awareness 34	.397	.150	.038	-.221	.098	.561
Awareness 20	.534	-.297	.307	.215	.247	-.494
Factor name		Settlement support awareness	Law and economic awareness	Social settlement awareness	Psychological anxiety awareness	Life safety awareness
Eigenvalue		8.779	5.519	2.473	1.831	1.605
Variance ratio		23.103	14.525	6.509	4.819	4.225
Cumulative variance ratio		23.103	37.628	44.137	48.956	53.180

Note: Extraction Method: CFA(common factor analysis).

## 4. Discussion

First, as a result of analyzing the difference in perception of North Korean defectors by the total period of police working, in Q-22, “The reason North Korean defectors visit South Korean police stations is to receive legal support,” the response to the question of police working of 20 years or more was higher than the response of 16 years or more to 20 years or less. This is because the first people North Korean defectors encounter in South Korean society are South Korean police officers, and when legal issues arise after settling down, they visit South Korean police stations rather than lawyers or defector groups in South Korea because they trust South Korean police officers and believe that they will kindly resolve their problems if they ask for help. Second, as a result of analyzing the difference in perception of North Korean defectors by security and period of working, in Q-24, “The most necessary education for North Korean defectors to adapt to South Korean society is understanding South Korean society,” the response to the question of 6 years or more to 10 years was higher than the response to the question of 2 years or less, and the response to Q-34, “The most difficult thing for North Korean defectors to do when settling down in South Korean society is personal safety.” In the question, 10 years or more was higher than 3 years or less than 5 years and 6 years or more than 10 years or less. In addition, in the question Q-38, “The average monthly income per household of North Korean defectors is at an appropriate level,” 10 years or more was higher than 2 years or less and 3 years or more than 5 years or less.

In this study, statistically significant differences by period of working were found because police officers with long working experience in Korea have abundant experience with North Korean defectors through handling various cases, and because the security and police officers in charge of managing North Korean defectors in the Korean police organization are departments through which all police officers rotate, police officers with long working experience can have most of their security and working experience during their police careers, so it is analyzed that police officers with long working experience have a higher understanding of North Korean defectors. Third, the structure of perception of North Korean defectors by South Korean police officers is structured as ‘perception of settlement support’, ‘perception of law and economy’, ‘perception of social settlement’, ‘perception of psychological anxiety’, and ‘perception of



safety in daily life'. The South Korean government is very interested in the economic independence of North Korean defectors, and as a result of this policy, many North Korean defectors are living free lives with stable incomes[14].

## 5. Conclusion and Suggestions

Because North Korean defectors experienced South Korean society only through dramas and movies while they were in North Korea, it is important to understand democratic politics and the free market economic system in South Korea in order to overcome social alienation due to prejudice and misunderstanding caused by the customs they had in North Korean society[15]. In addition, North Korean defectors are considered a potential threat by the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea, so North Korean spies in South Korea seek to collect various information on North Korean defectors[16]. North Korean spies are arrested every year in South Korea, and they try to recruit North Korean defectors who have acquired South Korean citizenship as double agents under the pretext of ensuring the safety of the families of North Korean defectors who remain in North Korea. However, the South Korean government has sufficient programs in place to address this, and not only the South Korean police but also the National Intelligence Service (NIS) detects all of their actions, so the safety of North Korean defectors who have acquired South Korean citizenship is protected in the same way as South Korean citizens born in South Korea[17]. Recently, in 2022~2023, large-scale espionage cases related to the North Korean Reconnaissance General Bureau, the United Front Department, and the Cultural Exchange Bureau were detected and brought to trial in South Korea. Based on the contents reported through the media, it has been revealed that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) has been monitoring and collecting evidence for at least 10 years[18]. How much network data has been accumulated in the meantime? In fact, it may be that they are monitoring and managing the entire thing. This means that North Korean defectors do not need to worry about their personal safety in South Korea.

In addition, North Korean defectors normally acquire South Korean citizenship, so there is no discrimination under the South Korean Constitution. South Korea guarantees the basic income of workers by establishing the minimum wage by law, and this applies to all of South Korean society, so they are the same as citizens who are born in South Korea and automatically acquire citizenship. Everyone receives compensation for the amount of work they do, so they can live a stable life. These social values are basic truths that are protected in all countries where human rights are guaranteed. South Korea's social security system is not only the minimum wage, but also unemployment benefits, health insurance, industrial accident insurance, national pension, and old-age pension, which achieved rapid economic growth as well as democracy and a tight social security system from the 1960s to the 1980s[19][20].

Lastly, in North Korea, capitalism is already operating in the marketplace, and there are increasing numbers of North Korean residents who have already rationally realized that communism is an illusion. They have watched Korean dramas, movies, and entertainment programs and have fully realized that it is difficult to realize the rights they deserve under the regime of Kim Jong-un and the Workers' Party of Korea, but they are unable to express their longing for freedom that is rising in their hearts due to the fear-mongering of North Korean State Security Agency leaders. Historically, such social unrest and atmosphere are difficult to sustain. Moreover, even after a middle school student was publicly executed for watching the South Korean Netflix series "Squid Game," North Korean youth continue to watch South Korean dramas, movies, and variety shows, and secretly use language from South Korean dramas with their partners. I wonder what North Korea will be like when each generation becomes an adult. Will they eventually execute all North Koreans?

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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li></ul>

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## The Goal of the Terrorism Victim Support System

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### Abstract

**Purpose:** In modern criminal proceedings, human rights guarantees have been discussed mainly for perpetrators who are expected to be punished in the future, but interest in the criminal law status of victims, which has been marginalized since 1980, has increased.

Terrorist crimes will also not be free from this trend. No, terrorist crimes are crimes that require more importance in consideration of victims under the Criminal Policy and Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, The purpose of this article is to identify the current status and problems of the support system for victims of terrorist crimes in Korea and find ways to improve them.

**Method:** Terrorism will also not be free from this trend. No, terrorism is a crime in which consideration should be given to victims under the Criminal Policy and Criminal Procedure Act. This is because terrorist crimes, unlike ordinary crimes, have a very high need to repair property, physical and psychological damage to victims directly from criminal acts in that they are used as tools for human life and body, as well as take structures that mass-produce such victims.

This research begins with the question "Where is the current state of consideration for victims of terrorist crimes under our actual law?" To this end, we will first review the concept and scope of victims of terrorist crimes. This is because the concept of terrorist crimes is value-charged and the victims of terrorism are the same. In addition, the ministry conducted a review of the characteristics of the victims of terrorism. Based on these discussions, we look at the structure of the nation's support system for victims of terrorist crimes and discuss the support of victims of terrorist crimes abroad. In particular, the government took the issue as a reference to the Korean government's plan to improve the support system for victims of terrorist crimes by examining the international community's response philosophy and support system, including the United Nations, in terms of guaranteeing the human rights. Finally, the Act on the Prevention of Terrorism and the Act on the Protection of Victims of Crimes reviewed measures to improve the support system for victims of terrorist crimes.

**Results:** The main improvement measures for the support system for victims of terrorist crimes according to this paper are as follows.

First of all, it was argued that the damage of terrorist crimes should be considered not only traditional physical damage but also metaphysical legal interests such as the right to self-determination of personal information. In particular, it was argued that the people's right to self-determination of personal information by performing investigation activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act and collecting information should also fall under the damage of terrorist crimes. Next, since most of the current support for victims of terrorist crimes focuses on the financial support system, it was proposed to strengthen access to support victims of terrorist crimes as well as the input of human and material assets to overcome the trauma of victims (although there are also payments for mental damage recovery). In addition, the Korean Crime Victim Support Center was ordered to play an active role in introducing an active victim support system such as CVAP in New York State.

**Conclusion:** This research begins with the question "Where is the current state of consideration for victims of terrorist crimes under our actual law?" To this end, we will first review the concept and scope of victims of terrorist crimes. This is because the concept of terrorist crimes is value-charged and the victims of terrorism are the

same. In addition, the ministry conducted a review of the characteristics of the victims of terrorism. Based on these discussions, we look at the structure of the nation's support system for victims of terrorist crimes and discuss the support of victims of terrorist crimes abroad. In particular, the government took the issue as a reference to the Korean government's plan to improve the support system for victims of terrorist crimes by examining the international community's response philosophy and support system, including the United Nations, in terms of guaranteeing the human rights. Finally, the Act on the Prevention of Terrorism and the Act on the Protection of Victims of Crimes reviewed measures to improve the support system for victims of terrorist crimes.

**Keywords:** *Terror Crime, Victim of Terror Crime, Support of Victims, Crime Victim Protection Act, Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security*

## 1. Intro

It is a well-known fact that modern criminal procedures have been biased toward protecting the human rights of the offender, and the status of the victim has been relatively neglected. Fortunately, at the end of the last century, a trend began to strengthen consideration for the victim in criminal policy, and the so-called Renaissance of victimology began, and this trend continues to this day.

Terrorism crimes cannot also be free from this trend. Traditionally, in the field of criminal law, terrorist crimes have not been the subject of great interest, and this is similar even after the enactment of the ACT ON COUNTER-TERRORISM FOR THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AND PUBLIC SECURITY (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Terrorism Act). I think it is difficult to expect attention to the victims of terrorist crimes in itself in a situation where the fundamental issue of terrorism is not reviewed normatively. However, terrorist crime is a crime that requires more importance in consideration of the victim in criminal policy and criminal procedure law. Since terrorist crime, unlike general crimes, uses human life and body as tools, not only is there a very high need to recover the direct property, physical, and psychological damage of victims of criminal acts, but it is also taking a structure in which victims are mass-produced. Furthermore, there is a possibility of mass production of secondary victims, indirect victims, and potential victims.

This situation is similar not only in Korea but also abroad. The reason why terrorist crimes are discussed abroad is that after the symbolic event in 2001, discussions in terms of criminal substance and procedural law leading to the strengthening of the authority of state agencies and the resulting guarantee of the defendant's status were centered [1]. In other words, in terms of normative terms, the focus of responding to terrorist crimes was on ways to improve the prevention and suppression of terrorist crimes [2]. However, as a symbolic event in 2001, an active view began to develop on strengthening the status of victims of terrorist crimes. In addition, the international community, such as the UN and the EU, continues to demand special consideration not only for victims of general crimes but also for victims of terrorist crimes. Then, where is the current state of consideration for victims of terrorist crimes under our positive law? Korea's support system for victims of terrorist crimes has two main paths. i) support under the Crime Victim Protection Act and ii) support under the 'Terrorism Prevention Act', 'Enforcement Decree of the same Act', and 'Enforcement Rules of the same Act'. However, a critical view of the 'Terrorism Prevention Act' enacted in 2016 is not a critical view of the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act itself, but an aspect that the Anti-Terrorism Act enacted and in force actually has many gaps in responding to terrorist crimes.

The starting point of this study is the question of whether support for victims of terrorist crimes by the anti-terrorism law system will be provided efficiently in this situation. In addition, although terrorist crimes are a sub-class of crimes in the criminal justice system, the second starting point of this study is how effective support under the Crime Victim Protection Act,

which assumes general crimes, will be in supporting victims of terrorist crimes in situations where there is a difference from general violent crimes.

Therefore, this study aims to derive the current status and problems of the support system for victims of terrorist crimes under the current Anti-Terrorism Act and the Crime Victim Protection Act, and improvement measures. To this end, we will first review the characteristics of victims of terrorist crimes, which are the premise of discussion (II). In particular, the characteristics of victims of terrorist crimes will be necessary to derive the limitations of the Crime Victim Protection Act from supporting victims of terrorist crimes. Next, the international trend of the support system for victims of terrorist crimes is reviewed (III), and finally, the current status of the support system for victims of terrorist crimes and ways to improve it are reviewed (IV).

## **2. Characteristics of Terror Crimes and Victims of Terror Crimes**

### **2.1. The scope of victims of terrorist crimes**

#### **2.1.1. An existing discussion**

There are many difficulties in improving the support system for victims of terrorist crimes, but first of all, it is difficult to determine the scope of terrorist victims because the concept of terrorist crime itself is unclear and broad. In addition, the second reason is that the discussion of terrorism and victims of terrorism itself is unfamiliar in Korea.

Prior to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act, there was a view that victims of terrorism were included in crime victims prescribed in Article 3, No. 1 of the Crime Victim Protection Act[3]. However, the fact that the normative system to respond to terrorism, including the Anti-Terrorism Act, is being completed, and that the victims of terrorist crimes are identified with those of ordinary crimes is not reasonable in that it undermines the unique characteristics of terrorist crimes.

Accordingly, the intention of terrorist crimes is to create fear in unspecified people, and since terrorism is an extreme pseudo-case and a criminal act that affects many unspecified people in addition to direct victims, there is also a position to expand the scope not only to direct victims of terrorist crimes but also to unspecified people who are not directly related [4]. This position extends the scope of terrorist crimes to an unspecified number of unspecified people, pointing out that terrorist crimes are symbolic and affect unspecified people in addition to direct victims. However, this position has the disadvantage of expanding the scope of support too broadly in the victim support system, which requires limited financial resources in the event of a terrorist crime, and the scope of the unspecified number of people needs to be recharged.

#### **2.1.2. Trends in the international community**

Since the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 to combat terrorism, the UN has announced amendments every two years. In addition, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and basic freedoms in 2005 to ensure basic rights to be neglected in response to terrorist crimes. The Special Rapporteur has declared that the most serious violation of human rights is terrorism by terrorist criminals, including non-state actors, and that victims of terrorist acts should be included as serious victims of violations of international human rights law [5]. In other words, it is understood that the scope of victims of terrorist acts is a violation of the human rights of victims in the process of terrorist acts, regardless of whether the state is responsible. Through this, the special rapporteur classifies victims of terrorism into the following four categories.

#### **2.1.2.1. A direct victim of terrorism**

A person who dies or suffers serious physical or mental damage as a result of a terrorist act. This is because direct victims of terrorism are violated or threatened with their most basic human rights such as their right to life, physical safety, and human dignity due to terrorist acts.

#### **2.1.2.2. Secondary victims of terrorism**

Direct means the victim's relatives or dependents. The UN has declared that the scope of crime victims includes "direct family members or dependents of direct victims" [6]. It was clearly recognized by regional human rights organizations such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in that the fundamental purpose of the state is to protect the lives and bodies of community members [7], and has extended to human relationships that are not legally protected, such as common-law marriages [8].

#### **2.1.2.3. An indirect victim of terrorism**

An individual who has suffered serious physical or psychological injuries as an indirect result of terrorist acts. This scope includes i) those killed or injured through the use of lethal force against a terrorist actor (hostile or bystander), ii) witnesses who have suffered serious psychological damage from witnessing a terrorist incident or the aftermath thereafter, iii) those who have been mistaken for terrorist actors and have suffered direct or indirect damage by counterterrorism agencies, and iv) rescuers who have suffered serious physical or psychological damage by participating in emergency rescue after a terrorist incident.

#### **2.1.2.4. A potential victim of terrorism**

Although it does not fall into the three categories above to promote comprehensive legislative efforts of individual countries on basic human rights and obligations, people who may potentially experience damage from terrorist crimes are also widely recognized as potential victims.

### **2.1.3. Victims of terror crimes in ROK**

Since there is no explicit provision for the concept of a victim of a terrorist crime, it has to be solved by interpretation. First of all, victims of a terrorist crime can assume a person who is directly affected by the terrorist act, but there is room for not only the family members of the deceased but also those who have witnessed and been psychologically shocked to be considered victims of terrorism. This can be confirmed that the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act includes treatment costs for mental and psychological damage to the scope of support for terrorist damage (Article 35, Paragraph 2, No. 2). In addition, there is room for those who are damaged while responding to terrorism to be considered victims of terrorism. The National Intelligence Service may exercise the right to investigate and trace in order to collect information or data necessary for counter-terrorism activities (Article 9, Paragraph 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act), for example, when the fact of the subject is not related to the fact of the allegation. In other words, since the concept of terrorism is variable, the concept of victim is also highly likely to be expanded.

Relief for victims of terrorist crimes is ultimately in line with the purpose of the terrorism response policy [9]. Therefore, considering the need to participate in the international regime not only in response to terrorism but also in supporting terrorist victims and the protection of community members, the fundamental purpose of the state (guaranteeing basic rights as much as possible), it would be better to set the scope of terrorist victims as wide as possible. Therefore, the concept of victims of UN OHCHR, which encompasses not only direct victims of terrorism but also secondary victims, indirect victims, and potential victims, is reasonable.



## 2.2. Characteristics of victims of terror crimes

What are the characteristics of terrorist crimes that distinguish them from general violent crimes? There are two main characteristics to distinguish between terrorist crimes and violent crimes in general. i ) terrorist crimes are directed at the general public, and ii ) terrorists use violence to pursue dramatic effects, to instill fear in the public[10]. In addition, iii) terrorist criminals intentionally inject fear of humans in order to secure and maintain control over the state, local governments, and foreign governments[11]. Therefore, unlike violent crimes, it has the characteristics of spreading and controlling fear throughout the community.

## 3. International Trends on the Support System for Victims of Terrorism

### 3.1. Post 9/11 - counterterrorism legislation and victim support

The symbolic event in responding to terrorist crimes was the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. This is because this is an event that elevated the terrorist response from the conventional criminal struggle to the form of war, and as a result, various legislative and institutional supplements were actively made to fight terrorist crimes, inevitably leading to the strengthening of state power and infringement of basic rights, including terrorist criminals.

In the legislation against terrorism, which has been carried out since 2001 until recently, many legislations viewed the safety of the community of the state as a higher value than the protection of the basic rights of the people. Recent counterterrorism legislation is increasing the level of punishment and response, conscious of the risk of a special form of politically and ideologically motivated violence[12]. This was inevitably symbolized by the emergence of hostile criminal laws that contradicted the liberal criminal law system that emphasized human freedom and dignity, and this legislation sought to improve the prevention and suppression of terrorism through isolation and exclusion[13].

In the conventional response to terrorist crimes, the state and terrorist actors were mainly assumed as conflicting parties, and it was difficult for victims to intervene in this structure. However, in theory, the critical perception that such legislation to respond to terrorism runs counter to the strengthening of victim status that has continued since the 1980s, and the question of "understanding" and "why do they hate us" in the West as well as the United States since 2001, have led to the introduction of the victim's concept into the response to terrorist crimes by reflective consideration on the trend of criticizing the existing political system[14].

Is it really reasonable to separate the victim from the criminal act of terrorism? Given that terrorism essentially separates the victim from the victim, and the victim is in a means position, isn't it necessary to consider the victim in responding to terrorist crimes? Moreover, considering that there have been cases in which groups organized by victims of terrorist crimes have pursued political and social improvement campaigns against the root causes of terrorism to seek fundamental solutions to terrorism, as traditional state power has exposed limitations in the prevention of terrorist crimes, the case of Northern Ireland[15], where victims of terrorist crimes played an active role in removing the cause of conflict in terrorist crimes beyond strengthening victim support in terrorism response policies, and the active role of victim groups is of sufficient value not only at the criminal level of strengthening the role of crime victims, but also at the political and social level.

### 3.2. Trends in the support system for victims of terrorism crime in Europe

The Council of Europe's concerns about the protection of crime victims, including terrorist crimes, go back to the 1970s. Since the early 1970s, the European Parliament has been agonizing over compensation for crime victims in the public domain, and signed the 'European Convention

on the Compensation of Violent Crimes' in 1983 [16]. The purpose of the Convention is to introduce and develop a compensation plan for crime victims and to establish minimum ground rules for compensation for material and non-material losses. Since then, the European Parliament has also declared 'Recommendations on Assistance to Victims and the Prevention of Victims' on September 17, 1987 [17].

Specialized for victims of terrorist crimes is the Protection of Victims of Terrorist Acts enacted in 2005 and recently revised in 2018. These guidelines largely consist of purpose and basic principles, emergency rescue, guaranteeing victims' right to access information, state obligations to support victims, consideration for victims in investigation and trial proceedings, guaranteeing victims' access to the judicial system, compensation procedures, privacy and (especially when present as witnesses), training obligations of related agencies, raising public awareness of victim support, and cooperation with the private sector.

First of all, he declared that the suffering of victims of terrorist crimes deserves national and international solidarity and support, and emphasized that the state should take necessary measures to protect the basic rights and human rights of community members (Article 1). In addition, support for victims of terrorist crimes should not depend on the identification of terrorist actors, arrest, detention, prosecution, or guilt (Article 2, Paragraph 2), but should be based on the principles of respecting human dignity and the privacy and family life of victims, and should also be protected from aggressive media practices (Article 9, Paragraph 2). The importance of emergency assistance, as well as long-term medical, psychological, social and material support, is emphasized (Article 5, Paragraph 1). In particular, when a decision to not prosecute a terrorist actor is made, the state must guarantee victims the right to disobey the decision to not prosecute (Article 6, Paragraph 5), and it declares that victims should not only guarantee an efficient approach to the judicial system (Article 7), but also guarantee victims their status in litigation (Article 6, Paragraph 6). The guidelines, which have been maintained so far due to continuous revisions, declare the general standard of support and compensation for crime victims beyond terrorist crime victims, focusing on protection in criminal proceedings, privacy protection, fair and effective compensation, and appropriate training of investigative agencies.

### **3.3. Trends in the support system for victims of terrorism crime in the U.S**

#### **3.3.1. Legislative response**

Specific laws for victims of terrorism have been developed in the United States since the early 1980s. Victims of terrorism have a lot in common with victims of other violent crimes, but they experience a higher level of pain than victims of violent crimes and the need for special protection is recognized.

In fact, the U.S. has a long history of legislation on victims of terrorist crimes. The first law that provided federal support to victims of terrorism was the "Hostage Relief Act of 1980" enacted in response to the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1980. The bill was enacted in response to a treaty signed by the United States and Iran that included provisions to prevent victims from being harmed in U.S. courts against Iran. In other words, it included loss of income for hostages, medical expenses due to detention, tax exemption for compensation, and payment of education expenses for spouses or children. In particular, medical compensation was accompanied by a subsidy clause.

The second bill is the "Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act 1986," which applies only to public officials and is not limited to specific terrorist acts. In addition to the benefits described above, the law compensates each victim with \$50 per day held. A notable bill is the "Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," which was enacted as a bombing case in Oklahoma City. The law was enacted to enable rapid and effective punishment for terrorist criminals,

but it also includes federal subsidies to state, public institutions and NGOs to help victims of terrorism. The law also guaranteed victims of terrorist crimes the right to participate in criminal proceedings caused by the Oklahoma City bombing.

And the iconic 2001 event brought about new legislation. The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act grants tax breaks to victims of the Oklahoma City terrorist attacks, the anthrax attacks after 9/11 and 9/11 and their relatives, exempting those who died from income taxes in both the year of the attack and the year before, and providing additional tax exemptions[18].

The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 established the Victim Compensation Fund, which seeks to protect airlines from civil lawsuits while addressing economic and non-economic losses[19]. You can receive \$50,000 if the victim dies and \$25,000 if you are seriously injured, and the person in charge of setting up the compensation fund is authorized to review economic and non-economic damage in light of specific circumstances. As such, U.S. laws on the protection of victims of terrorism are characterized by countering certain acts of terrorism. In addition, relevant U.S. laws also provide effective civil procedures for victims of terrorism to sue foreign criminals in U.S. federal courts and be based on U.S. tort laws.

### **3.3.2. Practical response**

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) should be considered as a practical response to support victims of terrorist crimes. OVC was granted the authority to spend emergency reserve funds under the Crime Victims Act of \$50 million to rescue victims of terrorist and collective violence crimes in 1996. In detail, this can be spent on five types: (a) crisis response subsidies, (b) outcome management subsidies, (c) criminal justice support subsidies, (d) compensation subsidies, and (e) technical support and training services[20].

There are two activities of OVC specialized in terrorist crimes. The first is the Terrorism and International Victims Unit (TIVU). It is an organization that supports victims of international crimes such as terrorism, group violence, and human trafficking to women and children[21]. In addition, the administration of the International Terrorism Victims Compensation Program works with the Ministry of State to link support for victims of terrorist crimes abroad with various foreign crime compensation programs.

## **4. Current Status of Support System for Victims of Terrorist Crimes and Improvement Measures**

### **4.1. Current status of support system for victims of terrorism crimes in ROK**

Legislation to protect crime victims in Korea enacted the Crime Victim Rescue Act in 1987 to institutionalize the payment of relief funds for crime victims in the state. The Act on Special Cases for the Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes and the Act on the Punishment and Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence Crimes began to consider protecting crime victims. Nevertheless, as various forms of violent crime became a serious social problem, interest in protecting victims increased[22]. In order to protect and support victims in a timely manner, the government prepared a new bill to form a crime victim protection fund along with the revision of the Crime Victim Protection Act, and as a result, the Crime Victim Protection Act and the Crime Victim Protection Fund Act were enacted in 2010. The former integrated the existing Crime Victim Rescue Act into the same law, expanding the scope of crime victims, and the latter mainly focuses on establishing the Crime Victim Protection Fund to secure stable financial resources for the protection and support of crime victims.

The Crime Victim Protection Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act do not establish the concept of terrorist victims, and if the external aspect (political character, media relevance, etc.) of terrorism is eliminated, only the minimum element of crime will exist, so it is natural to be included in the crime of the Crime Victim Protection Act. In Article 3 of the Crime Victim Protection Act, crime victims mean "a person who has been victimized by another person's criminal act and his/her spouse (including a de facto marriage relationship), immediate relatives, and siblings," so this includes victims of terrorist crimes. If so, the procedure for supporting crime damage prescribed by the Crime Victim Protection Act will begin.

## **4.2. Problems and improvement measures for the scope of terrorism damage**

### **4.2.1. Damage in counterterrorism activities -what about damage caused by the right to self-determination of information?**

According to Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, citizens who have suffered physical and property damage due to terrorism shall report to related agencies, and the state and local governments may fully or partially subsidize expenses incurred in treatment and recovery.

It cannot be denied that the damage of terrorism is commonplace due to direct terrorist crimes. However, it is regrettable that it has overlooked the fact that anti-terrorism activities can also cause civil infringement. According to Article 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, intelligence agencies may exercise the right to investigate and track terrorism if necessary as well as collect information on terrorist suspects. Although in-depth research on the scope and limitations of the right to investigate and track counter-terrorism is insufficient, Article 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Act stipulates that it is the authority to "conduct field surveys, access documents, collect samples, etc. to collect information or data necessary for counter-terrorism activities, or request the subject to submit data and statements." In addition, since it does not stipulate what an on-site investigation is, what is an access to documents, and what is a request for a statement, the difference between the interrogation of the suspect or seizure or search is ambiguous from the public's point of view.

However, given that there is a possibility that the right to investigate or trace can be realistically diverted to investigative disposition, physical and property damage may occur to the people who are the prisoners, so it can be seen as damage to the subject and the person to be tracked<sup>[23]</sup>. In other words, if you look at the damage of terrorism through consultation, it is a case caused by a terrorist crime, and in a broad sense, it can be understood as an infringement of the basic rights of the people caused by counter-terrorism activities.

### **4.2.2. Expansion of the scope of victims of terror crime**

Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act restricts only 'people' to support terrorist damage, but it is not valid in reality now that exchanges with foreign countries have become awkward enough to say that the era of internationalization is awkward. Of course, Article 16 stipulates that special compensation is paid as 'people'. However, it should be taken into account that the restoration and consolation of terrorist damage are different, and that the international community demands that the same principle be applied to all victims and their relatives without discrimination. Of course, it is an inevitable legislative decision due to the government's limited financial resources, and in this regard, it can be understood that legislative discretion was exercised. However, it is questionable whether this attitude of the current law fits the liberal view of the state, considering the non-political nature of human nature, natural, and national freedom and rights, and safety from terrorism and recovery from damage. This is because human safety and recovery from damage are the value-normative nature of the fundamental rights that bind all state powers, including legislators. Therefore, it is necessary to consider legislatively a plan to change the target of terrorist damage to a person, not the people, under the current Anti-Terrorism Act.

### **4.3. Problems of the victim support system under the anti-terrorism act**

#### **4.3.1. Binary protection system for victims of terrorism**

The biggest problem with the support system for victims of terrorism is that the support for victims is too focused on the financial aspect. Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act stipulates that those who have suffered physical or property damage due to terrorism shall immediately report it to related agencies, and that the state or local government may subsidize some of the expenses necessary for treatment and recovery for those who have been damaged. Article 35 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act also assumes that the damage support fund is for treatment for physical damage and recovery for property damage, and Article 36 or less of the Enforcement Decree stipulates that special compensation may be paid for those who die or have a disability due to terrorism. In addition, Article 7 of the Enforcement Rules of the Anti-Terrorism Act stipulates that treatment costs are expenses for the direct purpose of recovering physical and mental damage that require more than five weeks of treatment at a medical institution.

Economic support is also important to support crime victims, especially terrorist crime victims, but it is necessary to consider strengthening accessibility to support terrorist crime victims as well as the input of human and material assets to overcome the trauma of terrorist victims (although there are also payments for mental damage recovery). Nevertheless, the current Anti-Terrorism Act, the Enforcement Decree of the Act, and the Enforcement Rules of the Act (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Terrorism Act System) focus on economic support, so improvement is needed.

Of course, this can be understood as a passive regulation because terrorist crimes are also subject to the Crime Victim Protection Act, but I think it is an issue to consider whether the support system divided into the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Crime Victim Protection Act is effective from the standpoint of the norm. In other words, it is necessary to expand the scope of support for terrorist damage in the 'anti-terrorism law' system.

#### **4.3.2. A passive support system**

Since the current anti-terrorism law system established a victim support system centered on economic support, it was inevitably designed as a system in which the victim of terrorism applies for damage relief to the state. However, it is necessary to reconsider whether a person who has suffered a very unusual crime called a terrorist crime can apply for subsidies within six months from the date of the damage in the terrorist incident.

To this end, a system worth referencing is the "The Crime Victim Assistance Program (CVAP)" operated by the NYPD. CVAP is a system developed by the NYPD and operated by Safe Horizon, a non-profit organization for crime victim support, and CVAP is a crime victim support system that visits two victim protection officers at all NYPD police stations.

In Korea, the crime victim support center plays a similar role. However, in order to receive the help of the crime victim support center, there is a difference because the victim must actively contact the crime victim support center in the area or the police officer in charge of each police station. If a support center linked to an investigative agency plays this role like CVAP, it will be a way to actively provide information necessary to protect the rights of crime victims.

However, in practical terms, the budget of the current crime victim support center is heavily dependent on the Ministry of Justice, and each center is installed on the site of the local prosecutor's office. And it is also a reality that terrorist crimes are basically led by the National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Center. What is even more regrettable is that there is a realistic ambiguity between intelligence agencies and investigative agencies. The existing organization that can be considered to overcome this is the Office of the Human Rights

Protection Officer of the Counter-Terrorism Center under the Office for Government Policy Coordination. In other words, it is possible to consider a plan to realize support for terrorist victims through the connection between the human rights protection officer and the support team and the crime victim support center.

In particular, in the case of terrorist crimes in Korea, state agencies will conduct investigation and intelligence activities, but the actual victim support project is expected to be carried out by the crime victim support center. However, considering that regional crime victim support centers have a poor understanding of terrorist crimes, strategic alliances and partnerships between the two agencies (Human Rights Protection Office and Crime Victim Support Center) will be needed to realize support for victims of terrorist crimes.

#### **4.4. Support system for residents of crime areas**

In the event of a terrorist crime, the crime site will probably be closed and access to the general public will be restricted. But what if the crime is in your residential area? People who lived in the crime site will be infringed on their living base due to a very accidental incident that the terrorist crime occurred in their residence. To this end, it will also be necessary to consider how to help them live and exercise property rights. Recall that subsidies under Article 35 of the Anti-Terrorism Act consist of medical expenses for physical damage and recovery expenses for property damage.

##### **4.4.1. A matter of medical expenses**

According to Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, a person who has suffered physical or property damage can receive part of the treatment and recovery from the state, and according to Article 35 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the treatment costs are divided into physical injuries and aftereffects (No. 1) and treatment costs for mental and psychological damage (No. 2). According to Article 39 of the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act, a person who intends to apply for the payment of subsidies shall submit an application for payment and evidentiary documents to the head of the relevant agency that has established a countermeasure headquarters within six months from the date of "damage" due to the terrorist incident.

However, if a terrorist incident causes damage, physical injuries may occur at almost the same time as a terrorist incident, but mental and psychological damage may occur after time, such as PTSD. In this case, there may be cases in which it is not included in the exclusion period under Article 39 of the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act. For example, if the terrorist attack occurred on November 21, 2023, and the mental damage caused by this is considered to be three months later, 2024.02.21, there are only two months left until the six-month exclusion period. Therefore, it will be necessary to specify the meaning of the "day of damage" in Article 39 of the Enforcement Decree. In order to materialize this, it is necessary to distinguish between physical and mental damage, such as "the day of damage", not "the day of damage".

##### **4.4.2. A matter of restoration costs**

For example, a person who has lost his or her residence due to a terrorist crime may apply for recovery expenses for property damage pursuant to Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Act and Article 35 of the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act. In addition, even if you look at the State Affairs Coordination Office Regulation No. 16, "Guidelines for Operation of Support for Victims of Terrorism", it stipulates that the standard for payment of recovery expenses is paid in accordance with the "Operation Guidelines for Social Disaster Relief and Recovery Cost Burden" of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. The operating guidelines are currently not searched, so details cannot be identified, but if they are assumed to be similar to the Presidential Decree, "Regulations on Social Disaster Relief and Recovery Cost Burden Standards",



they are focused on funding. In other words, according to the 'Regulations on Social Disaster Relief and Recovery Cost Burden Standards', cost support is defined as living stability support (No. 1), indirect support (No. 2), and damage recovery support (No. 3), and all are interpreted as supporting funds. According to this, since it is supposed to pay only the recovery cost to those who have lost their housing, the housing problem of those who have lost their housing will emerge immediately. Since the housing support project by the Bumpy Center is also going through the improvement of the residential environment and guidance on the LH housing support application procedure to the victim's family, it is also necessary to consider the issue of housing support for victims whose housing has been lost or controlled due to terrorist crimes.

#### **4.5. A victim's language support issue**

If a terrorist crime occurs, the sooner the support for the victim will be, the better. However, if the victim of terrorism is a foreigner, especially a short-term resident, difficulties arise in that it is supporting the victim. This is because on-site relief and support for foreigners may be difficult in the confused situation of the victim site. Of course, you can expect the basic foreign language proficiency of the employees who are engaged in on-site relief and support, but institutional supplementation will be more urgent.

To this end, it is necessary to manually document procedures and methods for supporting terrorist victims in foreign languages and distribute them in areas where terrorist crimes have occurred. It is possible to rely on the foreign language skills of the field staff, but its effectiveness is suspected at an urgent site.

### **5. Outro**

In the above, measures to improve the victim support system for terrorist crimes were reviewed. Mainly, it was intended to derive several problems and improvement measures, such as the problem of the scope of terrorist damage and the problem of the victim support system under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

The status of victims, who have been alienated from the traditional criminal justice system, is gradually improving around the 2010s, and the application of the Crime Victim Protection Act and the activation of the Crime Victim Support Center have been achieved to some extent. However, this is support for general crimes, and interest in terrorist crimes is actually very scarce. In particular, although not covered in detail in this study, it is necessary to improve the support system for victims of terrorist crimes as part of a soft counter-terrorism policy, considering the UN's view that the active support system for victims of terrorist crimes is not only the state's fundamental mission but also the basis for policies to respond to terrorist crimes, and the case of Northern Ireland, where terrorist victims groups improve the political situation that caused terrorist crimes.

However, there is a long way to go before this. This is because, in the general perception of society, the area of victim support is still unfamiliar, and it is undeniable that the perception of crime victims in Korea is not very generous. This is because, in the event of a serious terrorist crime in this situation, I am afraid that it focuses only on the physical recovery of the terrorist crime and becomes passive in supporting the victims of the terrorist crime. In order to improve this, not only the interest of the academic world, but also the interest and active support of government-related organizations and the private sector will be needed.



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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	WP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li></ul>

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## A Study on the Difference Analysis of Jeju-Type Autonomous Police's Linked Work, Collective Efficiency, and Public Safety Satisfaction

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### Abstract

**Purpose:** The local police system is vital for meeting community needs and maintaining order. Despite its introduction under Moon's administration, it faces criticism and conflict, especially in Jeju. This study aims to assess perceptions among Jeju residents, police, and experts, focusing on the system's effectiveness and areas for improvement, emphasizing the need for thorough evaluation and stakeholder input before full implementation.

**Method:** This study analyzes differences in linkage tasks, collective efficiency, and security satisfaction based on age in the Jeju local police system. Using a survey of 500 Jeju residents conducted via Macroembrain, the study employs SPSS and Amos for factor analysis, reliability testing, and regression analysis. The research aims to evaluate residents' perceptions and the impact of the local police system, examining factors such as demographic variables and system awareness.

**Results:** Hierarchical regression analysis of the Jeju local police system reveals that demographic variables (gender, age, residence, education) have minimal impact on governance linkage, collective efficiency, and security satisfaction. In contrast, awareness of the local police system significantly influences governance linkage ( $\beta=.189$ ), collective efficiency ( $\beta=.375$ ), and security satisfaction ( $\beta=.220$ ), highlighting its greater importance over demographic factors.

**Conclusion:** Research on the implementation of local police systems has been mainly theoretical. This study, using factor and regression analyses, finds that awareness of the local police system positively impacts governance, efficiency, and security satisfaction. Effective practices and improvements, including increased public awareness and training, are suggested to enhance the system's impact.

**Keywords:** Local Police System, Governance Linkage, Collective Efficiency, Security Satisfaction, System Awareness

## 1. Introduction

The local police system plays a crucial role in meeting community needs and maintaining public order[1][2]. In April 2022, the Presidential Transition Committee under President Yoon Suk-yeol announced plans to substantiate the local police system, criticizing the current system as a "National police with only the name of local police"[3]. Despite its introduction during the Moon Jae-in administration, public perception remains low[4]. In Jeju, initial conflicts between national and local police highlighted implementation challenges[5][6].

The primary goal of the local police system is to provide security services tailored to regional characteristics, meet community needs, and maintain social order. It aims to expand resident participation[7][8], and enhance local law enforcement power, thereby increasing connectivity with the community[9]. According to a survey by the Seoul Metropolitan Government's Civil

\*This paper summarizes Jaeyong Lee's Kyonggi University Doctoral Thesis.

Affairs Investigation Unit, 58.2% of respondents prefer a dual system of national and local police[10][11]. Particularly, 23.4% of police officers, 53% of Jeju local police officers, and 70.5% of experts support a dual system, emphasizing the need for local police[12]. Jeju maintains a dual local police system, leading to a higher understanding of the system among its residents[13][14]. Therefore, investigating Jeju residents' perceptions of the local police system is essential.

This study aims to analyze the perceptions of Jeju residents, police officers, and experts regarding the early implementation of the local police system. It seeks to identify the system's efficiency and areas for improvement by considering various variables such as age, education, occupation, and residence, and to evaluate the system's collective efficiency and public safety satisfaction. This analysis will contribute to proposing practical improvements for the successful establishment of the local police system.

Prior to the full implementation of a dual local police system, local governments and the central government must carefully examine and analyze various alternatives to minimize trial and error. The purpose of implementing local police should be to enhance the 'safe living and quality of life' for residents, not to engage in power struggles between local and central governments[15][16][17]. Successful implementation requires gathering opinions from diverse stakeholders, legal reviews, and ensuring political neutrality[18][19][20]. This study aims to identify areas for improvement based on existing research and provide empirical data to support the effective establishment of the local police system.

## **2. Research Methodology**

### **2.1. Research design**

This study aims to analyze the differences in linkage tasks, collective efficiency, and security satisfaction based on age within the Jeju local police system. To assess residents' perceptions of the local police system, its necessity, requirements, and issues, the independent variables include gender, age, and awareness of the local police system. The dependent variables are overall satisfaction with the local police system, and its sub-variables include security satisfaction, linkage tasks, and collective efficiency. This analysis seeks to evaluate resident satisfaction with the implementation of the local police system and derive policy implications for its improvement.

### **2.2. Research Questions: Are there differences in linkage tasks, collective efficiency, and security satisfaction based on age?**

Hypothesis 2. 2-1: Age will affect linkage tasks.

Hypothesis 2. 2-2: Age will affect collective efficiency.

Hypothesis 2. 2-3: Age will affect security satisfaction.

### **2.3. Survey subjects**

This study utilizes data from the Jeju Autonomous Police Committee for the year 2022, and can be divided into two groups. First, the general citizen sample consists of 330 South Korean nationals residing in Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. Second, the expert group sample, which includes police officers, comprises 310 individuals. The Jeju Autonomous Police Committee commissioned the online survey to the specialized survey agency 'Macromill Embrain' for resident questionnaires. The online survey was conducted over a period of 5 days, from November 16 to November 20, 2022.

## 2.4. Measurement tool

This study utilized the measurement tool developed in the Jeju Autonomous Police Committee Research Report to measure residents' perception of the implementation of the autonomous police system[21]. The Jeju Autonomous Police Committee developed seven questionnaire items to measure residents' perception of the Jeju-type autonomous police system. Each item measured the linkage between police administration and local administration, collective efficiency, and public safety satisfaction using a 5-point Likert scale.

### 2.4.1. Linkage office

The governance linkage between local administration and public security administration is not exclusively provided by the national police, but rather forms a diverse network through the restructuring of police activities. To measure this, seven items on a 5-point Likert scale were used. Namely, ① strengthening the comprehensive service of local police and local administration, ② strengthening the governance linkage between the local police system and architecture and urban planning administration, ③ strengthening the governance linkage between the local police system and transportation administration, ④ strengthening the governance linkage between the local police system and health administration, ⑤ strengthening the governance linkage between the local police system and social welfare administration, ⑥ strengthening the governance linkage between the local police system and education administration, ⑦ strengthening the local governance linkage between the local police system and village communities.

### 2.4.2. Collective efficiency

Collective efficiency means that residents voluntarily intervene in public issues based on a sense of community solidarity. This is measured with five items on a 5-point Likert scale: ① awareness of methods for expressing residents' opinions, ② degree of reflection of opinions, ③ operation of organizations reflecting opinions, ④ willingness to participate in resident consultative bodies, ⑤ willingness to participate in discussion meetings.

### 2.4.3. Security satisfaction

Security satisfaction is the result obtained during the process of using security services. This is measured with ten items on a 5-point Likert scale: ① Improved efficiency of security services, ② Strengthened democracy, ③ Improved accountability, ④ Improved speed, ⑤ Strengthened transparency, ⑥ Strengthened ties with local residents, ⑦ Promoted collaboration and communication, ⑧ Provision of customized security services, ⑨ Improved satisfaction with security, ⑩ Improved trust in the police.

## 2.5. Data collection

The purpose of this study is to empirically verify the impact of changes in the police service system following the implementation of the autonomous police system on individual linkage work, collective efficiency, and security satisfaction. The research subjects were limited to Korean citizens residing in Jeju Island. The survey target was set to 500 adult men and women residing in Jeju Island as of 2022, and the survey was conducted for a total of 5 days from November 16 to 20, 2022 through the online survey specialist 'Macroembrain'. In the process, 500 people out of 1.3 million online panels owned by Macroembrain were selected as research subjects.

## 2.6. Analysis method

In this study, SPSS 27 and Amos 26 were used to conduct frequency analysis, factor analysis, reliability analysis, Pearson correlation analysis, regression analysis, and structural equation modeling. The analysis procedure is as follows. First, the characteristics of the sample were

identified through frequency analysis, and the response frequency and mean for demographic factors and major variables were confirmed. Through this, the skewness and kurtosis of the data were examined and the suitability of the normality assumption was evaluated. Second, the internal consistency and reliability of the variables were examined through factor analysis and reliability analysis, and the KMO value and Cronbach's  $\alpha$  value were used. Third, the correlation between variables was examined through Pearson correlation analysis to identify non-spurious relationships. Fourth, the influence of independent variables on the dependent variable was analyzed through OLS regression analysis, and causal relationships were examined by controlling other variables.

### 3. Research Results and Discussion

#### 3.1. Sociodemographic characteristics

This study collected samples through an internet survey targeting 330 adults living in Jeju Island, and the sociodemographic characteristics of the study subjects are as shown in <Table 1>.

**Table 1.** Sociodemographic characteristics of the study subjects. (n=330)

Category		Frequency (persons)	Percentage (%)	Category		Frequency (persons)	Percentage (%)
Age	20s	71	21.5	Education	High school graduate	57	17.3
	30s	110	33.3		Enrolled in college or higher	219	55.4
	40s	97	29.4		Enrolled in graduate school or higher	54	16.3
	50s and above	52	15.7				
Gender	Male	125	37.9	Residential area	City center	164	49.7
	Female	205	62.1				
Occupation	Self-employed	26	7.9		Urban periphery	87	26.4
	Service industry	62	18.8				
	Office worker	97	29.4		Rural area (Including Villages, Islands, and Mountain areas)	45	13.6
	Managerial and professional	54	16.4				
	Student	17	5.2				
	Unemployed and others	74	22.4				

There were 125 males (37.9%) and 205 females (62.1%). The distribution by age group was 71 in their 20s (21.5%), 110 in their 30s (33.3%), 97 in their 40s (29.4%), and 52 in their 50s or older (15.7%), indicating that the sample was relatively young. The education level was 57 (17.4%) who graduated from high school or lower, 219 (66.4%) who were enrolled in college or

higher, and 54 (16.3%) who were enrolled in graduate school or higher, reflecting the characteristics of a highly educated society. The occupational distribution was 97 (29.4%) office workers, 62 (18.8%) service workers, 54 (16.4%) management and professional workers, 26 (7.9%) self-employed, 17 (5.2%) students, and 74 (22.4%) others. In Jeju Island, service and self-employed workers were relatively more prevalent, and office workers were less prevalent. As for housing type, 164 (49.7%) lived in the city center, 87 (26.4%) lived on the outskirts of the city, and 45 (13.6%) lived in rural areas, with most living in the city center.

## 3.2. Reliability and validity of the questionnaire

### 3.2.1. Verification of reliability and validity of governance linkage

As shown in <Table 2>, Cronbach  $\alpha$  was also 0.910, which suggests that consistency in measurement can be expected.

**Table 2.** Results of governance linkage reliability analysis.

Component	Reliability(cronbach $\alpha$ )
Governance linkage	.910

**Table 3.** Validity verification for governance linkage.

Distinction	Component
	Governance linkage
Governance linkage 1	.798
Governance linkage 2	.763
Governance linkage 3	.792
Governance linkage 4	.862
Governance linkage 5	.827
Governance linkage 6	.813
Governance linkage 7	.783
Variance explained(%)	64.961
Cumulative explained(%)	64.961
KMO sample fit	.911
Bartlett unit matrix test	1341.454(df=21 sig=,000)

As shown in <Table 3>, the validity verification results for governance linkage show that governance linkage items explain approximately 64.961% of the total variability, and the component values of each item are .798 for governance linkage 1, .763 for governance linkage 2, .792 for governance linkage 3, .862 for governance linkage 4, .827 for governance linkage 5, .813 for governance linkage 6, and .783 for governance linkage 7. The KMO sample fit is .911, which is very suitable, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 1341.454 (df=21, sig=.000), which indicates that the correlation between variables is very significant, which means that governance linkage items explain approximately 64.961% of the total variability, and the KMO sample fit is .798 for governance linkage 1, .763 for governance linkage 2, .792 for governance linkage 3, .862 for governance linkage 4, .827 for governance linkage 5, .813 for governance linkage 6, and .783 for governance linkage 7. The KMO sample fit is .911, which is very suitable, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 1341.454 (df=21, sig=.000), which indicates that the correlation between variables is very significant. The goodness of fit was .911, indicating a very good fit, and the Bartlett identity matrix



test result was 1341.454 (df=21, sig=.000), indicating that the correlation between the variables was very significant.

### 3.2.2. Reliability and validity verification for collective efficiency

As shown in <Table 4>, Cronbach  $\alpha$  was also 0.808, which suggests that consistency of measurement can be expected.

**Table 4.** Reliability analysis results for collective efficiency.

Component	Reliability(Cronbach $\alpha$ )
Collective Efficiency	.808

**Table 5.** Validation of collective efficiency.

Distinction	Component
	Collective efficiency
Collective efficiency 1	.787
Collective efficiency 2	.794
Collective efficiency 3	.822
Collective efficiency 4	.722
Collective efficiency 5	.644
Variance explained(%)	57.241
Cumulative explained(%)	57.241
KMO sample fit	.750
Bartlett unit matrix test	631.559(df=10 sig=,000)

As shown in <Table 5>, the validity verification result for collective efficiency shows that collective efficiency items explain about 57.241% of the total variability, and the component values of each item are .787 for collective efficiency 1, .794 for collective efficiency 2, .822 for collective efficiency 3, .722 for collective efficiency 4, and .644 for collective efficiency 5. The KMO sample fit is .750, which is appropriate, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 631.559 (df=10, sig=.000), which indicates that the correlation between variables is very significant. This means that collective efficiency items explain about 57.241% of the total variability, the KMO sample fit is .750, which is appropriate, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 631.559 (df=10, sig=.000), which indicates that the variables have a significant correlation. It was shown that the correlation between the two was highly significant.

### 3.2.3. Reliability and validity verification of security satisfaction

As shown in <Table 6>, the Cronbach  $\alpha$  value was .940, indicating that the consistency of measurement could be expected.

**Table 6.** Reliability analysis results of security satisfaction.

Component	Reliability(Cronbach $\alpha$ )
Security Satisfaction	.940

**Table 7.** Validity verification of security satisfaction.

Distinction	Component
	Security satisfaction
Security satisfaction 1	.662
Security satisfaction 2	.626
Security satisfaction 3	.630
Security satisfaction 4	.623
Security satisfaction 5	.627
Security satisfaction 6	.636
Security satisfaction 7	.726
Security satisfaction 8	.736
Security satisfaction 9	.614
Security satisfaction 10	.633
Variance explained(%)	65.118
Cumulative explained(%)	65.118
KMO sample fit	.932
Bartlett unit matrix test	1817.992(df=28 sig=,000)

As shown in <Table 7>, the validity verification results for the satisfaction with public safety show that the items of satisfaction with public safety explain approximately 65.118% of the total variability, and the component values of each item are .662 for satisfaction with public safety 1, .626 for satisfaction with public safety 2, .630 for satisfaction with public safety 3, .623 for satisfaction with public safety 4, .627 for satisfaction with public safety 5, .636 for satisfaction with public safety 6, .726 for satisfaction with public safety 7, .736 for satisfaction with public safety 8, .614 for satisfaction with public safety 9, and .633 for satisfaction with public safety 10. The KMO sample fit is .932, which is very suitable, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 1817.992 (df=28, sig=.000), which shows that the correlation between variables is very significant. This indicates that the items of satisfaction with public safety explain approximately 65.118% of the total variability, the KMO sample fit is .932, which is very suitable, and the Bartlett unit matrix test result is 1817.992 (df=28, sig=.000), which shows that the correlation between the variables is very significant.

### 3.3. OLS hierarchical regression analysis

To verify the hypothesis of this study, OLS hierarchical regression analysis was conducted six times in total for each dependent variable, including 'governance linkage', 'collective efficiency', and 'security satisfaction'.

#### 3.3.1. Governance linkage

In order to identify the factors affecting the first dependent variable, governance linkage, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, and the results are shown in <Table 8>.

**Table 8.** Results of hierarchical regression analysis on governance linkage.

Classification	Model 1		Model 2	
	b(S.E)	$\beta$	b(S.E)	$\beta$
Gender	-.087 (.081)	-.062	-.043 (.081)	-.030

Age	-.004 (.004)	-.064	-.006 (.004)	-.088
Education level	.089 (.060)	.083	.056 (.060)	.053
Housing type	.012 (.046)	.015	.033 (.045)	.040**
Autonomous police system			.155 (.047)	.189***
$R^2$	.012		.044	
adj $R^2$	.000		.029	
$F$	1.024		10.603***	

In Model 1, the influence of demographic variables such as gender, age, residential type, and education level on governance linkage was confirmed, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was .00 ( $F=1.024$ ,  $p>.05$ ). This means that demographic variables cannot provide a significant explanation for the dependent variable, governance linkage. Specifically, none of the control variables, such as gender, age, educational level, and residential type, had a positive effect on governance linkage. These results mean that demographic variables do not affect the level of police work and division of labor. In general, the perception of the autonomous police and local governments' linked work and governance cannot be explained by demographic variables. In Model 2, the awareness of the autonomous police system was input as an independent variable, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was 0.029 ( $F=10.603$ ,  $p<.001$ ), confirming that the explanatory power of the regression model significantly increased in explaining the governance linkage, which is the dependent variable of the awareness of the autonomous police system. It can be interpreted that Model 2 has an explanatory power of 3% in explaining the awareness of the autonomous police system. When examining the results of the regression analysis for Model 2, it was found that as the awareness of the autonomous police system increased, the governance linkage increased ( $\beta=.189$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

### 3.3.2. Collective efficiency

In order to identify the factors affecting the second dependent variable, collective efficiency, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, and the results are shown in <Table 9>.

**Table 9.** Results of hierarchical regression analysis on collective efficiency.

Classification	Model 1		Model 2	
	b(S.E)	$\beta$	b(S.E)	$\beta$
Gender	-.214** (.077)	-.158	-.130 (.073)	-.096*
Age	-.002 (.004)	-.023	-.006 (.004)	-.091
Education level	.073 (.057)	.071	.010 (.054)	.010
Housing type	-.061 (.044)	-.076	-.021 (.042)	-.026
Autonomous police system			.294 (.043)	.375***
$R^2$	.037		.159	
adj $R^2$	.025		.146	
$F$	3.114**		47.148***	

In Model 1, the influence of demographic variables such as gender, age, residential type, and education level on collective efficiency was confirmed, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was .025 ( $F=3.114$ ,

$p < .05$ ). This means that demographic variables can provide a significant explanation for the dependent variable, collective efficiency. Specifically, the control variable, gender, had a significant effect on collective efficiency, but age, education level, and residential type were not statistically significant. This result means that among the demographic variables, gender affects collective efficiency, which is consistent with previous studies. This is because women are less likely to engage in active social control than men. Overall, only gender has a significant effect on collective efficiency among the demographic variables. In Model 2, the awareness of the autonomous police system was input as an independent variable, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was 0.146 ( $F = 47.148$ ,  $p < .001$ ), confirming that the explanatory power of the regression model significantly increased in explaining the dependent variable, collective efficiency, when the awareness of the autonomous police system was used. It can be interpreted that Model 2 has an explanatory power of approximately 15% in explaining the awareness of the autonomous police system. When examining the results of the regression analysis for Model 2, it was found that as the awareness of the autonomous police system increased, collective efficiency *increased* ( $\beta = .375$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

### 3.3.3. Security satisfaction

In order to identify the factors affecting the third dependent variable, security satisfaction, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, and the results are shown in <Table 10>.

**Table 10.** Hierarchical regression analysis results for security satisfaction.

Classification	Model 1		Model 2	
	b(S.E)	$\beta$	b(S.E)	$\beta$
Gender	-.090 (.081)	-.063	-.038 (.081)	-.027
Age	-.001 (.004)	-.010	-.003 (.004)	-.050
Education level	.056 (.060)	.052	.017 (.060)	.016
Housing type	.018 (.047)	.022	.043 (.046)	.051
Autonomous police system			.181 (.048)	.220***
$R^2$	.007		.050	
adj $R^2$	.005		.035	
$F$	.603		14.422***	

In Model 1, the influence of demographic variables such as gender, age, residential type, and education level on security satisfaction was confirmed, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was .005 ( $F = .603$ ,  $p > .05$ ). This means that demographic variables cannot provide a significant explanation for the dependent variable, security satisfaction. Specifically, the control variables such as gender, age, educational level, and residential type did not have a positive effect on security satisfaction. These results remind us of the reality that demographic variables do not affect perception of the police and satisfaction with security, and that security satisfaction is affected by actual police activities. In general, security satisfaction could not be explained by demographic variables. In Model 2, the awareness of the autonomous police system was input as an independent variable, and the adjusted  $R^2$  was 0.035 ( $F = 14.422$ ,  $p < .001$ ), confirming that the explanatory power of the regression model significantly increased in explaining the dependent variable, satisfaction with public safety, when the awareness of the autonomous police system was used. It can be interpreted that Model 2 has an explanatory power of 3% in explaining the awareness of the autonomous police system. When examining the results of the regression analysis for Model 2,

it was found that as the awareness of the autonomous police system increased, satisfaction with public safety increased ( $\beta=.220$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

### 3.4. Variable correlation analysis

The variable correlation analysis table in <Table 11> shows the correlations between gender, age, education level, housing type, awareness of the autonomous police system, governance linkage, collective efficiency, and satisfaction with public safety.

**Table 11.** Variable correlation analysis table.

Classification	Gender	Age	Education	Housing Type	Awareness of autonomous police system	Governance Linkage	Collective Efficiency	Security Satisfaction
Gender	1							
Age	-.246**	1						
Education	-.099	.037	1					
Housing Type	-.040	.79	-.114**	1				
Awareness of autonomous police system	-.221**	.199**	-.205**	-.133*	1			
Governance Linkage	-.057	-.057	.085	.004	.182**	1		
Collective Efficiency	-.156**	-.029	.94	-.079	.381**	.432**	1	
Security Satisfaction	-.067**	-.026	.055	.018	.212**	.833**	.446**	1

There is a negative correlation of -.246 between gender and age, and a negative correlation of -.099 between gender and education level. There is a negative correlation of -.040 between housing type and gender, and a positive correlation of .79 between age and housing type. There is a negative correlation of -.221 between awareness of the autonomous police system and gender, and a positive correlation of .199 between awareness of the autonomous police system and age. There is a negative correlation of -.205 between awareness of the autonomous police system and education level, and a negative correlation of -.133\* between awareness of the autonomous police system and housing type. There is a negative correlation of -.057 between governance linkage and gender, and a negative correlation of -.057 between governance linkage and age. There is a positive correlation of .085 between governance linkage and education level, and a positive correlation of .004 between governance linkage and housing type. There is a negative correlation of -.156 between collective efficiency and gender, and a negative correlation of -.029 between collective efficiency and age. There is a positive correlation of .94 between collective efficiency and education level, and a negative correlation of -.079 between collective efficiency and housing type. There is a negative correlation of -.067 between public

safety satisfaction and gender, and a negative correlation of  $-.026$  between public safety satisfaction and age. There is a positive correlation of  $.055$  between public safety satisfaction and education level, and a positive correlation of  $.018$  between public safety satisfaction and housing type. There is a positive correlation of  $.212$  between the perception of the autonomous police system and satisfaction with public safety, and a positive correlation of  $.833$  between governance linkage and satisfaction with public safety. Finally, there is a positive correlation of  $.446^{**}$  between collective efficiency and satisfaction with public safety.

### 3.5 Analysis of differences in perception of Jeju autonomous police system by age

As shown in <Table 12> the results of the analysis of differences in perception of Jeju Autonomous Police System by age showed that the overall average scores were 2.50, 2.15, 2.69, and 2.66, and by age group, the 20s had 2.50, 2.15, 2.69, and 2.66, the 30s had 2.49, 2.26, 2.65, and 2.57, the 40s had 2.66, 2.49, 2.76, and 2.72, the 50s had 2.69, 2.55, 2.76, and 2.76, and the 60s and older had 2.34, 2.56, 2.17, and 2.30. The standard deviations were 1.07, 1.39, 1.05, and 1.15 overall, and by age group, 20s were 1.07, 1.39, 1.05, and 1.15; 30s were 1.32, 1.50, 1.37, and 1.41; 40s were 1.23, 1.46, 1.22, and 1.28; 50s were 1.20, 1.39, 1.24, and 1.23; and 60s and older were 1.55, 1.69, 1.55, and 1.57. The F values were 0.80, 1.43, 1.06, and 0.78, and the p values were 0.525, 0.224, 0.375, and 0.542. Through this, we can see that the awareness of Jeju residents on the Jeju Autonomous Police System differs by age group, and in particular, the awareness of those in their 60s and above is lower than that of other age groups. The average score for whether residents are aware of the methods and channels through which they can express their opinions was 2.15, showing the lowest score for those in their 60s and above, and the average score for whether their opinions are reflected was 2.69, showing the lowest score for those in their 60s and above.

**Table 12.** Analysis of differences in perception of Jeju autonomous police system by age.

Classification	20s		30s		40s		50s		60s and above		F	p
	Average	Standard deviation	Average	Standard deviation	Average	Standard deviation	Average	Standard deviation	Average	Standard deviation		
Total	2.50	1.07	2.49	1.32	2.66	1.23	2.69	1.2	2.34	1.55	0.80	0.525
A	2.15	1.39	2.26	1.5	2.49	1.46	2.55	1.39	2.56	1.69	1.43	0.224
B	2.69	1.05	2.65	1.37	2.76	1.22	2.76	1.24	2.17	1.55	1.06	0.375
C	2.66	1.15	2.57	1.41	2.72	1.28	2.76	1.23	2.30	1.57	0.78	0.542

Note:- A(Whether residents are aware of the methods and channels through which they can express their opinions).

-B(Whether citizens' opinions are reflected).

-C(Whether citizens are aware of the operation of organizations and systems to reflect citizens' opinions).

In addition, the average score for awareness of the operation of organizations and systems for reflecting opinions was 2.66, with those in their 60s and older showing the lowest score. These results show that the awareness of Jeju residents regarding the Jeju Autonomous Police System differs by age group, and in particular, it suggests that awareness is low among those in their 60s and older. This suggests that efforts are needed to raise awareness of Jeju residents regarding the Jeju Autonomous Police System.

## 4. Discussion

This study analyzed the differences in the Jeju-type autonomous police in terms of age, cooperation, collective efficiency, and public safety satisfaction, and examined the influence of

the awareness of the autonomous police system on these variables. The following major results were derived through hierarchical regression analysis and difference analysis.

First, the research result that the higher the awareness of the autonomous police system, the stronger the governance linkage suggests that the autonomous police system can enhance the linkage between the national administration and local administration, and since the introduction of the autonomous police system, each local autonomous police committee has proposed customized policies for the region, established autonomous crime prevention units, and expanded crime prevention activities, thereby strengthening the linkage between local administration and police administration[22][23][24][25], and the autonomous police system can play an important role in developing customized security policies reflecting the voices of local residents, increasing satisfaction with security, and improving security and safety in local communities, thereby contributing to increasing the efficiency of local governance. In the Jeju region, a pedestrian-centered culture was established and the environment was improved to reduce traffic accidents, which shows that the autonomous police system supports effective linkage between local administration and police administration.

Second, the awareness of the autonomous police system also had a positive effect on collective efficiency. The results that the autonomous police system can reduce crime by promoting community solidarity and informal social control indicate that the autonomous police system contributes to achieving the essential goal of improving crime prevention capabilities at the local level[26][27][28][29].

Third, the perception of the autonomous police system had a positive effect on satisfaction with public safety. It can be interpreted that the increase in cooperative projects with related organizations and the expansion of resident participation services due to the implementation of the autonomous police system led to an increase in satisfaction with public safety[30][31][32]. This means that the autonomous police system is effective in increasing the satisfaction with public safety of local residents.

The results of the difference analysis showed that there were significant differences in governance linkage and collective efficiency by gender, and age showed a significant difference only in collective efficiency. The expected effect by education level was not statistically significant, and housing type showed a significant difference only in collective efficiency. In addition, the difference in expected effects of the autonomous police system was clearly revealed between the autonomous police and the national police, and the national police recorded lower scores than other expert groups in the efficiency, democracy, accountability, speed, and transparency of the autonomous police system[33][34][35]. This means that the national police evaluate the expected effects of the autonomous police system relatively low. This study suggests that the expected effects of the expansion of the autonomous police system may differ by demographic and socio-economic variables and groups, and suggests the need for the autonomous police system to implement customized policies for each group.

## 5. Conclusion and Suggestions

### 5.1. Conclusion

Research on the realization of the autonomous police system is limited, and most of it focused on normative research. At a time when the autonomous police system needed to pass a law in the National Assembly to be implemented, there were more theoretical studies than empirical verifications. After the passage of the complete revision of the Police Act, the autonomous police system was implemented nationwide, and the need for the realization of the system increased. This study designed a research model to investigate ways to realize the autonomous



police system and to clarify the relationship between the autonomous police system and collective efficiency, public safety satisfaction, and governance linkage.

The study examined the differences in the components and perceptions of the autonomous police system through confirmatory factor analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. As a result, it was found that the perception of the autonomous police system had a positive effect on governance linkage, collective efficiency, and public safety satisfaction. The autonomous police system increases the linkage between the national and local administrations, is effective in preventing crimes in the region and protecting the socially vulnerable, and contributes to increasing public safety satisfaction. Since the introduction of the system, local crime prevention activities such as autonomous security forces have expanded, and pedestrian-centered environmental improvements and traffic accident reduction work have been carried out. As a policy proposal, although Jeju residents have a relatively high level of awareness of the system, awareness of projects such as the Happy Security Center is low, so more active promotion is needed. In particular, the younger the age group, the more negative the perception of the autonomous police system, so promotion and awareness improvement for the younger generation were required. The Jeju Autonomous Police Committee needs institutional and operational improvements, and suggestions include expanding on-the-job training for national police officers, improving treatment, and introducing a personnel exchange system. In addition, an official consultative body should be formed along with setting the vision and goals of the Jeju-type autonomous police system to reflect the opinions of frontline police officers. The ultimate goal of the autonomous police system can be achieved through the introduction of a practical dual autonomous police system.

## 5.2. Suggestions

It is necessary to consider how much the results of the study on Jeju Island's local police system can be applied to other regions or countries, or whether similar results can be expected in other environments. In order to provide actionable recommendations to policymakers and stakeholders, continuous improvement should be promoted through status analysis, goal setting, strategy establishment, implementation plan, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback to improve the autonomous police system as a roadmap for implementing the police system. The autonomous police system is trying to provide services that meet local security needs, but it is not able to overcome the limitations of the unified autonomous police system. In order for the Jeju-type autonomous police system to take a leap forward, effective linkage measures between local administration and public safety administration are necessary, and cooperation with traffic safety affairs and special judicial police is especially important. The autonomous police system should develop customized public safety policies that reflect the voices of local residents and increase public safety satisfaction. To this end, it is necessary to build a public safety network between the autonomous police force, the national police, and local residents, establish the Jeju Autonomous Police Research Institute, analyze local public safety and disaster information, and provide educational programs to strengthen the capacity of the autonomous police.

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# 7. Appendix

## 7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	JL	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	SP	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	YL SH	-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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