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Comprehensive Threats and Directions in Northeast Asia

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Abstract

Purpose: In Northeast Asia, not only Japan, which dominated East Asia in World War II, China, the world's second largest economy, and North Korea, a communist country that has become a religious dictatorship due to the discontinuation of the rationing system, but also Russia's military power, which was confident of taking over Kyiv, Ukraine, in three days, shows the limitations of the impact of hard power.

Therefore, this study presents six threats and discussion points of Northeast Asia through case studies and suggests the direction of Northeast Asia in the future.

Method: This study was conducted as a case study according to the purpose of the study. We selected 6 specific cases and targeted individual cases, and tried to derive phenomenological results through data collection and analysis of the collected data on social phenomena.

Results: First, the role of governments in pandemics such as Covid-19; second, drug trafficking to finance the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un; third, internal agitation and Subversion of regimes in North Korea; fourth, the Korean Wave in Northeast Asia and the expansion of Chinese espionage; fifth, China's distortion of history, repression of the Xinjiang Uyghur region, and consolidation of Islamic culture; and sixth, election interference in neighboring countries, In Northeast Asia, in addition to the governments of North Korea, China, and Russia, liberal governments such as South Korea, Japan, and the United States are strengthening their intelligence capabilities to control uncertainty, but the personal information contained in the threat information is causing controversy in their countries, and the "social value" of the value conflict between threat information and personal information collection is presented as a discussion point.

Conclusion: Soft power, not hard power, will play an important role in the establishment of liberalism in Northeast Asia, the Internet and travel will play an important role in cultural transmission and experience, and North Korea, like China and Russia, will gradually move towards reform and opening up. And in Northeast Asia, through Japan and Korea, now China's educated population has increased rapidly, and economic polarization is increasing relative poverty. It is expected that the violent act, which started from extreme social anger, will further disturb the Chinese people and government. The Chinese government will try to protect these problems by expanding the social surveillance network through the public security force, but we must not overlook the historical case that the expansion of the social audit network, which did not harmonize freedom and control, has led to more serious situations such as regime change.

The international community has already recognized that the problems of Northeast Asia cannot be solved by hard power, and it is now necessary to pursue peace and prosperity through political and economic union systems such as the EU. In this process, China and North Korea should have the courage to move towards liberalism, and the establishment of the EU model in Northeast Asia will mean a shift from a perception of an adversarial situation to a perception of cooperative problem solving, with win-win effects on population, energy, and environmental issues.

Keywords: South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, North Korea

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of the study

Humanity has experienced new security threats from non-combatant sources through the COVID-19 pandemic, signaling a paradigm shift in security from "physical security" to "cybersecurity" to the era of "comprehensive security" [1][2][3][4].

Comprehensive security is an approach to security issues from various aspects to ensure the safety and stability of a country or region, and it is a concept that encompasses not only military aspects but also various areas such as politics, economy, society, and environment [5][6][7]. The need for comprehensive security is becoming more prominent for various reasons [8][9]. In recent years, not only security by traditional forces such as military power, economic power, and energy, but also soft power, which is comprehensively produced by the interaction of factors such as politics, economy, society, and culture, has formed the concept of comprehensive security along with traditional security, hard power.

This comprehensive security encompasses a wide range of threats to human life, and as soft power is transmitted across borders through the Internet, influenced by cultural dependence on other countries, the role of governments is changing in many ways [10][11].

Especially in Northeast Asia, Japan, which has been a superpower since World War II, China, which recently boasted the world's second largest and expanding economy, and North Korea, which stopped rationing, have changed from a communist state to a religious dictatorship that requires religious loyalty to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un.

China's economic growth, coupled with President Xi Jinping's lifetime rule, has the potential for war, as has Putin's strategy of prolonging his rule through the Russian-Ukrainian war, and there are traditional threats from North Korea and Taiwan. South Korea, on the other hand, is closely tied to the United States and Japan, where historical feelings remain, and the recent "Washington Declaration" by U.S. President Biden and South Korean President Yoon Seok-yul envisioned peace through the power of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

However, if we look at past cases, such as the U.S. military's failure to win the Vietnam War, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after negotiations with the Taliban, the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan after 10 years of invasion, and the ongoing war that Russia started to take over the Ukrainian city of Kyiv in just a few days, which is still going on a year later, it shows the limitations of the influence of traditional security, or hard power. Indeed, the Russian-Ukrainian war has given the world an intimate view of the Russian military.

So far, studies on the Comprehensive threat have been conducted with the concepts of Comprehensive crisis and Comprehensive security, but this is a connection between the existing national administration and social structure, which is different from the present study based on the characteristics and phenomena of Northeast Asia.

Therefore, this study exploratively examines the comprehensive threats in this turbulent situation in Northeast Asia and suggests the role of diversified Northeast Asian countries.

1.2. Analyze the literature

Prior studies related to this topic are very diverse. Research on comprehensive security began to be conceptualized as a segmented categorization of the traditional concept of national security [12][13][14], and in Korea, it has been dominated by research on the concept and categorization of comprehensive security, and internationally, it has been dominated by post-Cold War ideological national weapons systems, trade routes, energy, and reserve currencies [15][16][17][18].

However, it was not a comprehensive study of threats specific to Northeast Asia, nor did it consider the impact of spot power as conceptualized after COVID-19. In particular, Northeast Asia is the geographic nexus of the Indo-Pacific, and research on these topics is crucial, but

researchers outside of the region are making inaccurate assumptions based on limited information, which adds to the confusion in understanding Northeast Asia. Therefore, this study introduces six "comprehensive threats" in Northeast Asia through case studies and proposes a diversified role for governments in the Indo-Pacific region.

1.3. Research methods

The method of this study was a case study in accordance with the research objectives. A case study is a research method that organizes relevant data to reveal the unique characteristics of the region and social unit to be studied, such as the social relations of community groups or phenomenological changes in culture. Therefore, this study collected data on phenomena corresponding to comprehensive threats in Northeast Asia, analyzed the data, and selected and presented six cases of specific phenomena.

2. Case Studies

2.1. The role of government in a pandemic like COVID-19

In December 2020, a new coronavirus(COVID-19) outbreak occurred in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. Recent research suggests that the coronavirus in Wuhan, China, may have originated in animals such as bats and pandas. These animals are thought to act as "intermediate hosts," allowing the virus to spread from other animals to humans. COVID-19 is highly contagious and has occurred in nearly every country in the world. The virus is primarily spread by the respiratory tract, and symptoms include fever, cough, and shortness of breath. According to the World Health Organization(WHO), COVID-19 has caused more than 4.7 million deaths worldwide.

China officially claims that it is not working on biological weapons, but some reports indicate that it invests extensively in military and civilian biological research, and there are concerns that it is attempting to develop new weapons through biological research. The Chinese government, in particular, has recently been actively pursuing research into viruses that could be used for military purposes; indeed, the country has been ramping up its infrastructure and workforce in virus research and genetic manipulation techniques. These efforts appear to be aimed at building China's military capabilities, which has raised concerns in the international community. However, while China has publicly stated the importance of abiding by international laws and regulations, including the Biological Weapons Convention(BWC), and is committed to strictly adhering to all international regulations and agreements, there are still concerns that a pandemic like the last coronavirus will occur in Northeast China. This emphasizes the need for information power for prevention against non-violent factors. Therefore, disease prevention efforts can be strengthened by collecting and analyzing the information necessary for disease prevention. For example, by identifying areas or time periods where highly infectious diseases are likely to occur in advance, and taking appropriate preventive measures accordingly, the spread of diseases can be minimized. This requires collecting and analyzing various information even during normal times.

As such, responding to the fear of "Uncertainty" such as the coronavirus pandemic has given intelligence agencies new tasks in crisis response and management, as well as health authorities[19][20]. The role of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, for example, has shown that the "mission driven by the purpose of national security" has no limits, with intelligence-based strategy in the face of rising deaths and uneven vaccine supply. Studies showing that vaccines saved 20 million people worldwide during the pandemic, as well as the increase in government debt during the pandemic, remain an ongoing challenge for the concept of economic security.

2.2. North Korea's Kim Jong Un regime uses drug trafficking to fund its rule

North Korea is under economic sanctions from the international community, which has made it difficult to govern the dictatorship, which is expensive to maintain. For this reason, North Korea earns foreign currency in a variety of ways, one of which is drug manufacturing and distribution[21][22]. North Korea produces various drugs such as cannabis, opium, and methamphetamine domestically, and earns foreign currency by distributing them domestically or exporting them abroad. North Korea's drug production and distribution is an international problem, and while the international community has implemented a number of measures to combat it, it is likely to continue as long as Kim Jong Un remains determined to maintain his dictatorship.

Most "defectors" who fled the North Korean dictatorship have resettled in South Korea. There are about 30,000 of them. North Koreans receive government support for their livelihoods under South Korean law, including housing and medical care, but the fact that drugs are the number one cause of prison sentences for illegal behavior in South Korean society means that North Koreans have been exposed to drugs indiscriminately and unwillingly.

2.3. Internal agitation and regime change in North Korea

North Korea's nuclear arsenal, second only to China's in Northeast Asia, "balances" the military alliance of South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and while this "balance of terror" has kept proliferation in check, it has also led to a famine in North Korea from 1994 to 2000. At least three million people died, and the government's rationing system came to an end, transforming the country from a communist regime where people ate and lived well together to a religious dictatorship that demanded unconditional loyalty to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. The North Korean regime blames the U.S. for the starvation of its people because it pays for the development of nuclear weapons and missiles to protect them from U.S. aggression, but China and North Korea signed a formal military alliance in 1961 called the "Sino DPRK Alliance Treaty," and if the U.S. invaded North Korea, China would automatically join the war, so a military alliance with a nuclear power is not a compelling argument for North Korea's need to develop its own nuclear weapons. In any case, while the international community imposed economic sanctions on the North Korean dictatorship for developing nuclear weapons, the Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un regimes believed that economic development would improve the education level of the population, which would have a negative impact on their dictatorship. In fact, Mao Zedong of China also used the Cultural Revolution to make China illiterate in order to maintain his dictatorship as a religious dictatorship.

Dictatorship as a religious dictatorship. In this religious dictatorship, people outside of Pyongyang are starving to death, and cars in Pyongyang are running out of gas. In addition, while the public practice of Christianity is strictly controlled and monitored in North Korea, in recent years, the Christian faith has been quietly expanding inside the country. This is due to underground activities such as secretly distributing and teaching Christian doctrines such as the Bible through North Korea's strict surveillance system. This expansion of the Christian faith inside North Korea also involves the church in South Korea. Several South Korean Christian organizations send missionaries into North Korea to spread their doctrines in secret, and faculty and students at South Korea's Unification Theological Seminary, located inside North Korea, are also working to expand the Christian faith inside North Korea.

Another important factor is the circulation of Korean culture inside North Korea. Because North Korea strictly restricts the flow of outside culture, the distribution of Korean culture is largely underground. Korean Wave content, such as South Korean dramas, music, and movies, is distributed through physical media such as USBs and DVDs, and is often brought into North Korea through countries such as China and Russia. Although it is strictly forbidden to watch or listen to such content inside North Korea, some people ignore the ban and distribute it, so some North Koreans are risking their lives to enjoy Korean Wave content. Others want to imitate the

outfits they see in South Korean content, so they wear skinny jeans but wear long coats over their tops and go out on the streets. This is the kind of culture that spreads faster the more it is controlled, and the North Korean government recognizes this phenomenon as very dangerous and has taken strong measures to stop it. People associated with the Korean Wave are being arrested or executed in North Korea. But history tells us that at some point it can get out of control. The collapse of North Korea's Kim Jong Un leadership would likely lead to the collapse of North Korea's military power, and since North Korea is a nuclear weapons state, a collapse of North Korea's military power would pose a major threat to regional security in Northeast Asia. This would mean security challenges for both China and Russia.

2.4. The Korean wave in Northeast Asia and China's expanding espionage activities

The most active and widespread espionage state in Northeast Asia is China, which now conducts espionage internationally. The Chinese government has directly intervened and organized large-scale espionage efforts, provided covert support and protection, and used private companies and individuals for industrial espionage. Chinese espionage is taking place in a variety of sectors, but most notably, the Chinese government is conducting espionage against companies in the United States and Europe, as well as South Korea and Japan, which allows Chinese companies to quickly acquire the technology and knowledge of their competitors and use it to improve their technological capabilities. China's espionage efforts are increasingly international in scope, with the United States, Europe, South Korea, and Japan among the most affected.

This Chinese espionage has not only attracted the attention of global companies like Samsung Electronics, but also the Korean Wave culture. The fact that the Korean Wave, which started with Korean idol singers, has progressed to movies and dramas, and is now being translated and studied around the world, is a testament to the power of Korean culture, which China does not want. BTS and BLACKPINK have been studying English for a long time for their fan signing ceremonies in Korea, but their fans have been studying Korean to speak to them at face-to-face events such as pen societies, and this phenomenon, coupled with the development of IT technologies such as language translation in the 4th industrial revolution, is spreading Korean culture rapidly. This phenomenon makes Seoul a hub for intelligence agencies around the world, and counterintelligence authorities need to keep a close eye on this phenomenon and explore various ways to protect national interests. In addition, the outflow of human assets, which is scouting for Korean leaders in Olympic short track and taekwondo, requires a systematic response.

2.5. China's distortion of history, suppression of Xinjiang Uyghurs, and consolidation of islamic culture

Historical revisionism in China refers to projects that distort or alter historical facts to serve the government's position or national interests. In China, historical revisionism is primarily used to achieve the Chinese government's nationalistic objectives, and is specifically twisted to say what the Chinese Communist Party wants it to say.

The "Northeast Project" is a policy of the Chinese government that aims to promote investment in China's Northeast region and develop the region's economy, but it has led to a number of problems, including human rights violations, environmental degradation, and the loss of local culture and identity, as well as propaganda that distorts the history of the Northeast region as a former Korean territory into a Chinese history. The region is home to an ethnic minority called the Koreans, and the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in South Korea sparked controversy when it featured Koreans wearing traditional Korean clothing called "hanbok," and social surveys now show that people in their 20s and 30s in South Korea have a higher level of hatred of China than North Korea.

Adding to the problem is the systematic plundering of cultural heritage that directly affects

South Korea's national interests by the Chinese Communist Party's Academy of Social Sciences, which is responsible for spreading historical distortions around the world and reproducing them through foreigners who are not familiar with South Korea[23][24]. These causes include historical conflicts, as well as exposure to information about the Chinese government's dictatorship and human rights abuses in the Xinjiang and Uyghur regions, which may have fostered distrust or hatred of China. Human rights organizations have reported that the Chinese government has detained millions of Uyghurs, forced them into forced labor, and suppressed their cultural and religious traits. These controversies have become an international issue, and the global spread of negative opinions about China in online communities and in the media provides some indication of the problems in the region. This violent surveillance and control is bound to cause problems at some point, and even now the Xinjiang Uyghur region is experiencing internationally unknown terrorism. Moreover, China is a communist country and does not recognize religion, while the Xinjiang Uyghurs are Muslims, so neighboring countries should be aware that while the CCP is using force to keep them under surveillance, it could turn into a threatening situation that could lead to a catastrophic event like the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

2.6. Election interference in neighboring countries

Recently, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of a military contractor close to Russian President Putin, stated that Russia interfered in the U.S. election and will continue to do so[25]. In Northeast Asia, such interference has been on the rise in recent years. While autocracies such as China, Russia, and North Korea are essentially free of such interference, and Japan is characterized by unchanging ruling parties, South Koreans are now aware of the North Korean regime's ongoing interference in elections in a presidential system like the United States.

South Koreans are well aware of the reality of North Korea, so they expect North Korea to have some form of influence on their elections, but South Korea was once colonized by Japan during World War I and II and has a strong nationalist ideology. While South Koreans rationally recognize that the real threat from North Korea requires increased military alliance with the United States and cooperation with Japan, North Korea's foreign intelligence services are working inside South Korea to remind South Koreans of their colonial rule by Japan during World War I and World War II so that they will still be perceived as unforgivable, and that this reverse selection will result in a regime favorable to North Korea.


Recently, North Korea's overseas propaganda agency, the Agency for Cultural Exchange, was put on trial for recruiting South Korean laborers to intervene in South Korean politics, a strategy that continues to strengthen its grip on society. This is a "strategizing" of a loophole in democracy, as seen in Easton's concept of the cycle of politics, where public opinion is distorted by adversarial intervention, and politicians are unable to understand the needs of the people. North Korea's overt intervention in South Korean domestic politics has the potential to shift the balance of power in Northeast Asia from U.S.-centered to China-centered in an instant, with major implications not only for Northeast Asia but also for Indo-Pacific strategy and the potential for Northeast Asia to escalate into World War III in the hands of a long-term Chinese Communist Party like Russia, which is currently at war with Ukraine.

3. Social Discussions

The government is trying to collect information extensively to prevent threats, but the collection of threat information may include 'personal information', and the government is expanding its information collection strategy as a preventive measure against Uncertainty, but it is facing political attacks domestically as an invasion of privacy, and the value conflict over which value is more important, terrorism prevention or privacy protection, needs to be discussed

more vigorously in society and the role of the government should be proposed based on such discussion[26][27].

Figure 1. Uncertainty must be met with intelligence and strategy.



In the U.S., Google Chairman Eric Schmidt has strongly criticized the NSA's surveillance of civilians, and the irony of the above-mentioned issues of privacy to prevent threats is that they are not socially controversial in North Korea, China, or Russia, and are dilemmas that are limited to governments in most liberal countries.

Table 1. Information handling manual when personal information must be exposed to collect threat information.

Classification	Contents
Purpose restrictions	When collecting personal information, be clear about the purpose and do not use it for any other purpose. Be clear about the purpose of collecting threat information and do not use it for any other purpose.
Collect minimal information	When collecting personal information, only collect the minimum amount of information necessary. Sensitive personal information should only be collected when necessary and not otherwise.
Consent and transparency	Before you collect personal information, you must obtain consent from the data subject. You must clearly explain what information is being collected and why, and allow the data subject to give their consent.
Secure storage	The personal information you collect must be kept secure. You must take appropriate security measures to prevent the exposure and misuse of personal information.
Limiting third-party offerings	If you provide the personal information you collect to a third party, you must have the consent of the data subject or have a legal basis for doing so. You must also ensure the security of the personal information by restricting access to and use of the personal information provided.
Retention period limits	Personal information should only be retained for as long as necessary after the purpose for which it was collected has been fulfilled. When it is no longer needed, it should be destroyed immediately.
Designate a privacy officer	You should designate a person responsible for privacy to oversee and manage the implementation of your privacy policy.

4. The Direction of Governments in Northeast Asia

4.1. Liberalization in northeast Asia

The recent rise of "soft power" from the Korean Wave will play a big role in the liberalization of Northeast Asia, and the Internet is a medium for spreading culture and travel is a medium for experiencing culture, making government control obsolete.

From this perspective, China, like Russia, and North Korea, like China, will gradually move down the path of reform and opening up. In particular, North Korea's reform and opening process requires strengthening dialogue and negotiation, opening and reforming the economy, ensuring human rights and media freedom, diversifying education and culture, establishing a sound legal system, and receiving support and cooperation from the international community. North Korea should also become a normal country and contribute to the stability of Northeast Asia, which is not a choice of the Kim Jong-un regime, but a question of maintaining the regime in line with liberalism or creating a new regime.

4.1.1. China

China began its reform and opening-up policy in 1978, leading to economic development and modernization. China is now one of the most populous and largest economies in the world, and is also making rapid progress in technology and the internet.

First, regarding the internet, the Chinese government operates a system of internet censorship called the "Great Firewall". Internet access is restricted within China, and some foreign sites and services may be blocked or censored. These restrictions are claimed to be aimed at information control, social stability and security issues, and countering cybercrime and terrorism. In terms of freedom to travel, China recognizes the freedom of its citizens to travel abroad, and domestic travel within China is also quite advanced. However, China does restrict the movement of its citizens, and travel to some areas may be restricted, particularly based on factors related to social stability and security.

However, while China's push for economic reform and opening has led to rapid economic growth, political reform has been slower. This is in part because the Chinese government operates a system of censorship. Within China, there may be travel restrictions or regulations in some areas or at certain times. This censorship can be traced back to the traumatic "Tiananmen Square" incident in China. The Tiananmen Square massacre occurred on June 3 and 4, 1989, when a mass demonstration and pro-democracy movement took place in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, and was suppressed by the Chinese government through military means. While the event is considered an important event in China's political history, it is considered extremely dangerous to speak out in China, and has attracted international attention and controversy. From April to June 1989, China saw massive protests by students and other citizens calling for democratization and improved human rights. Tiananmen Square served as the center of the protests, with thousands of citizens chanting slogans calling for freedom and democracy. The protests criticized the Chinese government for its corruption and unfair social system. However, on June 3 and 4, 1989, the Chinese government used military means to suppress the protesters. Numerous citizens were killed or injured, and Tiananmen Square was occupied by military tanks and soldiers. The event received much international condemnation, and was controversial within China. The Chinese government claims the Tiananmen crackdown as a "legitimate measure to quell social unrest and agitation," and has since censored information about the event and suppressed informal memories. The Tiananmen crackdown remains a sensitive issue in China, as the event is never officially mentioned.

However, the Chinese government is revealing more information than it has in the past, the international community is integrating faster, and the rational judgment of the Chinese people may no longer be controllable. At some point, China will have direct elections to choose its

leaders, and there will be political parties that strive to be supported by the Chinese people, which will make life freer for the Chinese people and make China a strong enough player in the international community.

4.1.2. North Korea

North Korea may be much different from what the closed international community sees. This lies in inaccurate assumptions based on limited information. North Korea began as a communist state pursuing a socialist system, a socio-economic system based on Marxist-Leninist theories, which sought modernization of the means of production, economic equality, social justice, and a society without divisions between classes. But what hasn't changed between the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's reform and opening up is that North Korea's communist system is based on the desire of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un to pass on power to their children. But if you want to pass the reigns of your country to your children, you don't want your voters to have the intellect to make rational judgments, and you don't want them to be frustrated by international economic sanctions like they were during Mao's Cultural Revolution, so nuclear weapons and missiles became the "political tools" you needed to stay in power.

The "March of Troubles" is one of the most important events in North Korea's history. The term refers to a period of economic hardship and hunger that occurred in North Korea in the early 1990s as a result of the collapse of economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. This caused North Korea to lose major economic support, and at the same time, flaws in its own economic system and lack of resources led to severe food shortages and starvation. During the "March of Hardship," countless North Korean citizens suffered from hunger and malnutrition, and food shortages caused more than three million people to starve to death or make difficult journeys to find food. This event meant that North Korea was no longer a communist country, but a religious dictatorship run by the Kim family of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Therefore, the necessary factors for North Korea's reform and opening up process are as follows.

Table 2. North Korea's reform and opening up process.

Classification	Contents
Enhance conversations and negotiations	Reform and democratization in North Korea requires increased dialogue and negotiation. With the cooperation and support of the international community, North Korea can build mutual understanding and trust through dialogue with various actors.
Economic opening and reform	North Korea can bring about democracy through economic opening and reform. It should open its economy by attracting foreign investment and making domestic companies more competitive, and it should pursue economic reforms such as moving away from a centralized economic system and introducing market principles.
Ensuring human rights and press freedom	Reform and democratization in North Korea requires ensuring human rights and press freedom. Put in place laws and institutions that respect and protect the basic human rights of citizens, and create an environment where an independent and diverse media can thrive
Diversify education and culture	North Korea should spread the values and principles of democracy through education and cultural diversification. Along with political and economic reforms, improving the education system and supporting free cultural activities can increase citizens' understanding of and participation in democracy.
Build a sound legal framework	North Korea must establish the rule of law and a sound legal system. It must establish a system of law and order and have an independent and impartial judiciary to prevent abuse of power and corruption and to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
International support and collaboration	North Korea needs the support and cooperation of the international community. The international community can support North Korea's reforms and introduction of democracy, and provide necessary assistance and resources. We can work with international organizations to implement a variety of programs to bring stability and development to North Korea.

Therefore, freedom of travel for North Koreans must be achieved first. North Korea has opened some areas to foreign tourists, but the ability of North Korean citizens to travel abroad is highly restricted.

4.2. Resetting the concept of terrorism 'violence that wants to die'

Terrorism is the process of the French Revolution in which the monarchy was replaced by a republic in the 18th century, that is, the concept of violence for "political purposes" is unreasonable to explain the aspect of terrorism in today's diversified society hundreds of years later.

Table 3. The difference between terrorism and crime as we know it today.

Division	Terrorism	Crime
Motivation	just and great cause, belief system	Personal gain
Activity	Visibility (messaging)	Stealth
After the incident	Death, Self-surrender	Escape

To summarize the difference between terrorism and crime, which have been classified so far, they have a general routine of radicalization that believes that their violent acts are appropriate for political purposes.

Recently, in the Northeast Asian region, not only terrorism by the military or intelligence department for political purposes involving the state, but also "violence that wants to die" that scares many people even though there is no personal benefit to the general public and the purpose is unclear, has occurred. However, the reason why this kind of violence is terrorism, not anger crime, is that their actions have their own message, just as the traditional purpose of terrorism is to deliver a 'message'.

The cause of these violent incidents without personal benefit can start from the 'relative poverty' that humans have. Like this, not a highly planned attack by an enemy country, but an act of violence initiated by the internal anger of the people themselves can cause social destruction. In light of this seriousness, there are difficulties that are unpredictable, such as 'lone wolf' terrorism, and must be dealt with in a comprehensive way.

Figure 2. Stages of the 'violence that wants to die' model.



Since industrialization, has brought humanity a life of abundance through increased production, the human need to compare oneself to others determines one's happiness, and this need intensifies sharply with increasing intellectual level. In particular, through Japan and Korea in

Northeast Asia, China's educated population is now changing from high school graduates to university graduates. After recent rapid economic growth, China's economic polarization has led to the rise in relative poverty in cities and rural areas and within cities. It is expected that it will further disturb the Chinese people and the government by bringing 'violence that wants to die'.

The Chinese government will try to protect these problems by expanding the social surveillance network through public security forces, but we must not overlook the historical case that the expansion of the social audit network, which did not harmonize freedom and control, has led to more serious situations such as regime change.

4.3. Building a political and economic union in northeast Asia: the EU model

All countries recognize that the problems in Northeast Asia cannot be solved through the traditional methods of hard power such as military power, economic power, and economic sanctions, and in order to achieve stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia, we need to borrow the power of soft power such as culture to build a political and economic union system such as the EU to lead Northeast Asian countries to the path of prosperity through peace, security, and economic development, and to do so, we need to have the courage to become a liberal world despite being afraid of China and North Korea. Such courage will promote the development of Northeast Asia, and the problems that arise between countries will be resolved cooperatively, reducing unnecessary wastage of energy and strengthening Northeast Asia's international competitiveness. First and foremost, it will play a role in peace and stability, but it will also address population, energy, and environmental issues from a win-win development perspective.

Table 4. Building political and economic alliances in Northeast Asia.

Classification	Contents
Promote peace and stability	Establishing a council of governments in Northeast Asia can help strengthen political dialogue and cooperation between countries in the region. This can help maintain stability and peace in the region by promoting mutual understanding and trust.
Strengthening economic cooperation	Northeast Asia is an economically important region, and economic cooperation between countries plays an important role in the development and prosperity of the region. Through government councils, you can negotiate policies to expand the size and scope of your economy and improve the trade and investment environment.
Troubleshooting regional issues	Northeast Asia faces a variety of regional challenges and issues, including North Korea's nuclear program, maritime disputes, and environmental concerns. Establishing a government council can provide a platform to form common positions on these issues and work together to solve them.
Increase population movement and talent exchange	Northeast Asia is a region of population movement and talent exchange. The council of governments can explore collaborative responses to these population movements and cross-border issues, and promote talent exchange to enhance mutual understanding and cultural exchange between the region.
Strengthening resource and energy cooperation	Northeast Asia is endowed with a variety of resources and energy resources. Through the council of governments, cooperation on the development, management, and distribution of these resources and energy resources can be enhanced to support energy security and economic development in the region.

This study analyzes the threat factors in Northeast Asia, and as a researcher, I wondered what concerns could make Northeast Asia more peaceful and safe. The author's motive for publishing this thesis in English while living in a Non-English region is to reach more researchers around the world on the phenomenon of Northeast Asia more broadly and if so will be freed from violence by the government such as in North Korea, China and Russia. I believe in the idea that more human rights will be protected.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Evolution of the US' Strategic Ambiguity in the Cross-Straits Relations

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Abstract

Purpose: This paper analyzes how the US policy on Taiwan is gradually evolving from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. First, I would like to analyze China's Taiwan policy in terms of the core interests of the Communist Party of China. Second, I would like to specify why the US policy on Taiwan is evolving from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. Third, in the event of the Taiwan contingency, the security threat to the Korean Peninsula is identified and policy alternatives are proposed.

Method: This paper delves into the US policy on Taiwan with the Balance of Interest theory of Randall Schweller. A neoclassical realist suggests that national foreign policy is indirect and complex and must be reinterpreted through a parameter unit of domestic factors. According to Neo-Classic realists, the parameters that affect a country's foreign policy are such as domestic interest groups and the political leader's ideology and identity.

Results: The main parameters of the US policy shift towards Taiwan from the perspectives of Neo-classical Realism are as follows. First, it is Biden's identity of value diplomacy which prioritizes democracy and human rights. Second, Xi Jinping's military threats to annex Taiwan, and the pursuit of a gray zone strategy are driving factors for the US Policy shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. Third, the US policy shift to Taiwan was initiated by curbing China's rise through the control of the Indo-Pacific maritime control and global supply chain.

Conclusion: The contingency in the Taiwan Strait is closely linked to security on the Korean Peninsula due to the US' strategic flexibility. Currently, tensions between the US and China are rising in the Indo-Pacific region as the US military support for Taiwan's self-defense. The ROK should be wary of being involved in the unintended Taiwan crisis. To build a free and prosperous Indo-Pacific, strategic communication between the US and China should be strengthened while respecting the "one China" principle.

Keywords: Neo-Classical Realism, US Foreign Policy, Value Diplomacy, Gray Zone Strategy, Taiwan Contingency

1. Introduction

Tensions between China and Taiwan are escalating as Xi Jinping ordered preparations for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027 after his third consecutive term. The US has maintained the status quo of cross-strait relations and has advocated maintaining strategic ambiguity about Taiwan. But The US shifted to a policy of keeping China in check as China challenged the established order of the US against the backdrop of economic power and military buildup. The US ostensibly agrees with the "one China" principle, but recognizes Taiwan's independent existence, drawing strong opposition from China. The Taiwan issue is impossible to make mutual concessions or agreements between the US and China. This is because of the maritime rights of the Indo-Pacific region, which is the national strategic interest of the US. However, from China's point of view,

Taiwan is China's own territory and the core interest among its national interests. Taiwan is the only territory claimed by Beijing that maintains its independence from the CHINA. Many sinologists have accepted that the Chinese are unlikely to grant self-determination to Taiwan, which they regard as a province[1]. The US' rhetoric and political behaviors directly impact the cross-strait balance of rivalry[2].

The US has expressed its opposition to China's attempt to change in status quo against Taiwan, selling a large number of defense high-tech weapons to Taiwan, and dispatching more than 100 military instructors to guide Taiwanese military training. President Biden has mentioned three times that if China invades Taiwan by force, it will defend Taiwan. The US has been criticized by China for a series of political activities that seem to deny 'one China', including enacting the Taiwan Travel Act, allowing high-ranking US officials to visit Taiwan.

This paper delves into the US policy on Taiwan with the Balance of Interest Theory of Randall Schweller, a neoclassical realist. First, I would like to analyze China's Taiwan policy in terms of the core interests of the Communist Party of China. Second, I would like to specify why the US policy on Taiwan is evolving from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. Third, in the event of the Taiwan contingency, the security threat to the Korean Peninsula is identified and policy alternatives are proposed.

2. Neo-Classical Realism

According to the neoclassical realist Randall Schweller's Balance of Interest Theory, the driver of the state's action is profit, and the state decides to maintain the status quo or break the status quo by comparing the benefits of maintaining the current state. Neoclassical realists believe that a country's foreign policy is chosen by the international system and the country's relative material capabilities, while neo-classical realists believe that its impact on foreign policy is indirect and complex and must be reinterpreted through a parameter unit of domestic factors[3]. It is a Neo-realist view that defines the relationship of the state through the complementary action between structural realism and domestic reality[4]. According to Neo-Classic realists, the parameters that affect a country's foreign policy are such as domestic interest groups and the political leader's ideology and identity

In Neo-classical realism, the distribution of power alone cannot fully explain a state's foreign policy, it is translated through domestic drivers and the leader's perception and ideology. These domestic parameters interact with the relationship between relative material power between the US and China in the process of making foreign policies[5].

In analyzing the US policy on Taiwan, the dependent variables are the international system, interactive factors between China and Taiwan, and domestic politics in the cross-straits relations. As a domestic factor, it encompasses China's leader's assertiveness against Taiwan and Taiwan's leader-level independence tendency against China. I would like to suggest that the power balance and strategic interdependence between the US and China are international system factors. Biden administration's value diplomacy that cherishes democracy and human rights are parameters of domestic factors that affect US policy toward Taiwan. In addition, the US strategic interest in shifting the global supply chain, and safeguarding the US' maritime control of the Indo-Pacific region are also domestic parameters of the US foreign policy.

From a neoclassical realism perspective, I am going to analyze China's Taiwan policy by setting independent variables as political and diplomatic aspects of US-China hegemony competition and dependent variables as conflict patterns and find out why the US Taiwan policy evolves from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. In conclusion, I would like to identify the security threat to the Korean Peninsula in case of the Taiwan contingency and overture policy alternatives. The

US' strategic clarity triggers the CHINA's aggressive sabotage of the US interest around the world. The US has no intention to go to war with China at the moment if the status quo is maintained. Therefore, the US superficially articulating its strategic ambiguity to Taiwan to cool down growing tensions at the Taiwan Straits[6].

3. China's Policy towards Taiwan

The Communist Party of China has set the Taiwan annexation as the Communist Party's prime goal and ordered preparations for the invasion of Taiwan by 2027. China recognizes Taiwan as a core national interest, and the US think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS), warns that China will invade Taiwan around 2026 in the scenario of the war game.

In a speech marking the 110th anniversary of the Shinhai Revolution, President Xi Jinping declared that "the unification of the fatherland will be achieved." Xi also vowed that China would never abandon mobilizing force to achieve reunification[7].

The Communist Party of China has set a goal to have the capacity to unify the two sides by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army in 2027[8][9]. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang said that "Taiwan has long been China's indigenous territory, and Taiwan's return to China has been part of the international order since World War II, and it is written in the 'Cairo Declaration' and the 'Potsdam Declaration'." He urged the West to stop meddling with China's domestic affairs by opposing its initiative to change the status quo. At the same time, he issued a strong message, saying, "In Taiwan, Those who play with fire will surely burn themselves to death." In a speech at the opening ceremony of the Lanting Forum held in Shanghai on April 21, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Chin Kang stressed that the Taiwan issue is "the core of China's core national interests." China's policy toward Taiwan is promoting exchanges under the "92 formula" that recognizes 'one China'. The '92 formula' recognizes one China, but the expression of the two states is at its convenience.

3.1. Set the red line for the use of force

The CHINA's long-standing coherent policy has been to unify the mainland with Taiwan to complete its territorial integration. In response to Taiwan's independence movement, the Chinese Communist Party enacted the "anti-national division law" and curbed Taiwan's independence. Article 8 of China's "anti-state division law" is, First, China will use forces when Taiwan's independent forces create Taiwan's division in any name and manner. If the Taiwanese government abandons its "one China" policy, declares independence, and holds a referendum, it will use force. Second, it is a case where a major situation has occurred in which Taiwan can independent from China. In that case, China will use legal force when foreign troops are stationed in Taiwan or foreign forces intervene in Taiwan's internal affairs. Currently, as tensions have risen since President Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, the US has dispatched more than 100 active army instructors to Taiwan and plans to send 200 more troops in the future. Chinese Foreign Minister Chin Kang warns that US interference in Taiwan is beyond the red line. Third, if the possibility of peaceful unification is completely lost, it is officially declared that force will be used. China enacted the National Unification Act in March 2022 to focus on promoting unification. From China's point of view, if Taiwan delays peaceful unification and completely loses the possibility of peaceful unification, China will use force to promote unification.

Taiwan's foreign minister, Wu Zhaoxie, predicted that China's invasion of Taiwan could be in 2027. The reason is that 2027 will be the fourth term of Chinese President Xi Jinping, and if Xi's performance is limited in his previous three terms, such as internal turmoil, economic recession caused by COVID-19, and unemployment, he may try to invade Taiwan for his political achievement. Taiwan remains at the forefront of China's economic and military coercion as the CHINA will not give up the use of force to thwart Taiwan's independence[10].

3.2. Pursuing a gray zone strategy

Currently, the US deterrence against China's invasion of Taiwan is maintained. In the contingency of a US-China conflict over Taiwan, the US, and China have no choice but to endure enormous damage rather than overwhelming victory by either side, therefore military clashes are being suppressed. China may begin any aggression against Taiwan with deniable operations or low levels of gray-zone" tactics[11].

China is pursuing a grand strategy to become a maritime power to project power into "far seas." China is pursuing a layered approach to achieve this status. The first layer includes the defense of China's "near sea"-the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas to deter the US. China is building naval capability to project power into the Western Pacific during Taiwan Contingency[12]. Yet China is doing so without the use of violence. China has adopted "gray zone" approaches to alter the status quo while shunning military combat between uniformed military. The CHINA has depended upon ambiguity, asymmetric capabilities, and incrementalism to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait while avoiding outright war. The incremental "Salami slicing" has enabled China to achieve much of its political territorial agenda without a military response from the US. Preventing Taiwan's independence is one of the CHINA's prime naval tasks along with "enforcing Beijing's claims in the East and South China Seas, presence on the global scene, and defending China's economic interests".

The best alternative to China's reunification of Taiwan is the application of the gray zone strategy. The gray zone strategy refers to strategies that attempt to escape significant retaliation by staying under a key threshold. As characteristics of gray zone tactics, spreading false information, social system confusion, coercion using economic dependence, and threats through military exercise near the border are employed[13]. This way can be effective to block US intervention. China attempts to transform the Taiwanese regime into pro-China through tailored coercion through military threats, economic sanctions, and information distortion. By doing so, China can create a favorable environment for united front tactics to realize territorial integrity. There will be a presidential election in Taiwan in January 2024. China has invited former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou to emphasize the cooperation of the Chinese people to empower Taiwan's pro-China Kuomintang. China is expected to join hands with Taiwan's pro-China Kuomintang to carry out a hybrid united front strategy. Because of the US pledge to support Taiwan, China's armed attack on Taiwan can cause enormous losses to China's economic growth, so it is expected that China will adopt a strategy to absorb Taiwan by establishing a pro-China government in Taiwan by pursuing a gray zone strategy. The CHINA views Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) as radically pro-independence[14]. Since the DPP's victory in 2016, cross-strait relations have entered uncharted waters and tension has dramatically escalated[15].

There may be a high degree of political stability in Taiwan if the Kuomintang(KMT) scores a major victory in the upcoming presidential election in January 2024[16]. Many mainland Chinese believes that Taiwan would be peacefully drawn back into China's orbit if China offers carrots. China also needs time to cope with many domestic problems such as unemployment and corruption and military modernization before deciding on outright war with Taiwan[17].

4. The Policy Shift of the US and the Threat of Taiwan Contingency to the Korean Peninsula

4.1. Significance of Taiwan's strategic geography as an unsinkable aircraft carrier

The US and China are at stake in the India-Pacific region, while Taiwan is an important strategic hub for the US Taiwan is the gateway to march the west pacific for China. As Taiwan's independent identification increases, the prospect of conflict over Taiwan raises[18]. If Taiwan is handed

over to China, the US is likely to lose maritime control of the Indo-Pacific region and lose credibility in its regional security commitment.

If Taiwan is unified with China by any means, first, it would make it easier for China to repel US forces from its maritime periphery, and second, to threaten US military bases in Northeast Asia including USFK and US forces in Japan [19]. It may undermine the US' forward deployment and presence in the region.

This may allow North Korea to boldly launch provocations against the South. Taiwan's strategic importance can be summarized in three ways. First, the Taiwan Strait is geographically part of Korea, Japan, and the US Maritime Transportation Route (SLOC). According to the Bloomberg News Agency, the Taiwan Strait is the busiest shipping channel in the world and 88% of the world's trade is transported through the Taiwan Strait. Second, Taiwan is a strategic base that can ensure regional stability and the superior status of the United States by serving as a forward base for the US military in the region. The Taiwan crisis is closely linked to the security of the Korean Peninsula in connection with the strategic flexibility of the US Army. Thirdly, Taiwan will be the yardstick for evaluating the United States' commitment to security in East Asia. If the US fails to manage the security crisis in the region, it could undermine the credibility of the US security pledge and trigger a shift in security order.

4.2. Control of Taiwan semiconductors in shifting global supply chain

Taiwan has a complicated political, economic, and military relationship with both the United States and the CHINA [20]. As China exercises military hegemony in Taiwan and the South China Sea and promotes the revival of a great China, the US attempts to exclude China from the global supply chain by using the Chip 4 alliance (Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the US). Taiwan occupies more than 70 percent of the global semiconductor market in the foundry sector.

The United States is trying to develop this semiconductor economic alliance into a security alliance in the Indo-Pacific. As a means of suppressing China, the United States intends to curb China by blocking the supply of semiconductors, which are essential parts for the development of cutting-edge industrial and military technologies. To this end, the US needs Taiwan's participation.

4.3. Value diplomacy in the Biden administration

Taiwan is a strategic base for democratization of the mainland China in terms of the US' democracy expansion policy. Taiwan is a democratic region that shares values with the United States. The US House Foreign Affairs Committee passed eight bills in support of Taiwan, which defy Chinese threats. The Taiwan Assurance Act requires the State Department to regularly review its guidelines for involvement in Taiwan and submit a report to Congress every two years to strengthen the supervision of government agencies on US relations with Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan Guarantee Act includes ensuring that any policy change in the US will deepen and strengthen bilateral relations between the US and Taiwan. The traditional US policy toward Taiwan includes providing weapons to Taiwan to ensure its safety and support its defensive strength and promising not to set a deadline for the conclusion of arms sales to Taiwan and refraining from amending the Taiwan Relations Act [21]. Recently, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee also passed the "Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act" and the "Underwater Cable Control Act" against China. Those bills are a measure to assure the US defense commitment against Taiwan.

As the US is recently pushing to enact another Taiwan-related law, the "Taiwan Policy Act," which is pending in the Senate, is waiting for a vote. Proposed by Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the Democratic Party, the main focus is to designate Taiwan as a major ally among countries that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and plans to provide \$3.5 billion over the next four years. If the bill is passed, it is a

clear sign that the US policy on Taiwan will legally shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, which means that the US' awareness of Taiwan may evolve from strategic interests to core national interests. Biden's Taiwan policy includes the US' firm military stance and its commitment to enhancing Taiwan's ability to defend itself[22].

4.4. Threats to the Korean peninsula in case of Taiwan contingency

Were the CHINA to attempt to use military forces to topple the government of Taiwan and occupy the island, the outcome of the US-led military operation to defend Taiwan could spark the third world war[23]. In the case of Taiwan's Contingency, South Korea could face a military vacuum in its forces against North Korea. In the Wargame(virtual war simulation), which assumes that China invades Taiwan, announced by the US think tank CSIS, half of the US Air Force forces in Korea will move to Okinawa to participate in the Taiwan War. Former Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, Abrams said the US could send the USFK to Taiwan contingency. Bennett, a US military expert, argued that even if the US intervenes militarily in Taiwan, its ally South Korea "does not automatically intervene under the Korea-US alliance, but if China attacks the US, it is obligated to join." Bruce Klingner, a senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation, argued that US troops deployed in the region are likely to be redeployed to Taiwan in case of emergency. If the US reinforcements are blocked by China's long-range anti-ship missiles in the Pacific Ocean, a substantial power vacuum could occur on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea may not rule out the possibility of using it as an opportunity to provoke.

If the US and China collide over Taiwan, South Korea will automatically be involved in the war if China preemptively strikes the US Forces in Korea, Japan, and the US bases in the Philippines with missiles. After all, ROK's involvement may be inevitable[24][25]. This is because THAAD missiles deployed in South Korea that detect Chinese missiles and 28,000 US troops in South Korea that can reach China could be China's military targets. If China invades Taiwan by force, the security threat to the ROK follows. First, it starts with a war involving the US and Japan, which are interested in Taiwan, but if China strikes support forces in the war, the possibility of the ROK's involvement in the war will be obvious. Second, if China preemptively strikes US bases in Northeast Asia with missiles and North Korea makes simultaneous provocations, it is highly likely to expand to World War III. This is because North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as US allies and NATO, can join this warfighting. If China is ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, China could be more aggressive against South Korea. If a pro-China government is established in Taiwan and cooperation is achieved, China's next target could be South Korea and Japan in the mid-to-long term perspective.

The ROK's response strategy in the event of a contingency in Taiwan can be divided into follows. First, it is necessary to strengthen the security alliance with NATO, AUKUS, and QUAD based on a strong Korea-US alliance. Through this, China's provocation can be suppressed. Second, maintaining both the Korea-US alliance and strategic cooperation with China. However, it may be difficult to maintain the status quo through balanced diplomacy in the event of a military confrontation between the US and China. Third, it may pursue the realization of transcendental diplomacy by strengthening relative autonomy from both the US and China while respecting China's core national interests in Taiwan. There are still many uncertainties regarding the US' ability to defend Taiwan against China's tailored coercion[26]. The ROK should be wary of being involved in the unintended Taiwan crisis.

5. Conclusion

The US awareness of Taiwan is evolving from a strategic interest to a national core interest perspective and the Taiwan Intervention Act is being revised accordingly. This paper tried to specify why the US policy on Taiwan is evolving from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. The

US is reevaluating Taiwan as a national core interest as Taiwan's strategic value is increasing as a major strategic base in the Indo-Pacific maritime control. The main parameters of the US policy shift towards Taiwan from the perspectives of Neo-classical Realism are as follows.

First, it is Biden's identity of value diplomacy which prioritizes democracy and human rights.

Second, Xi Jinping's military threats to annex Taiwan, and the pursuit of a gray zone strategy are driving factors for the US Policy shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity.

Third, the US policy shift to Taiwan was initiated by curbing China's rise through the control of the Indo-Pacific maritime control and reshuffling global supply chain on semiconductor.

The contingency in the Taiwan Strait is closely linked to security on the Korean Peninsula due to the US's strategic flexibility. Currently, tensions between the US and China are rising in the Indo-Pacific region as the US military support for Taiwan's self-defense. To build a free and prosperous Indo-Pacific, strategic communication between the US and China should be strengthened while respecting the "one China" principle. For the maintenance of the status quo in the cross-strait issues, strengthening US deterrence cannot be the best alternative. This is because frustration over the reunification of Taiwan may eventually lead to China's armed provocation.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Response Strategies Through Case Analysis and Reasons for Re-Entry of North Korean Defectors

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Abstract

Purpose: As of December 2021, there are 33,819 North Korean defectors who have entered the Republic of Korea. To support their stable settlement, the public and private sectors are implementing a settlement support policy. However, due to discrimination in South Korean society and longing for family, there is a problem of re-entry to North Korea after leaving South Korea. After analyzing the causes of re-entry into North Korea, the purpose of this study is to provide policy suggestions to block re-entry into North Korea, such as improving the resettlement support system for North Korean refugees and Strengthening the protection officer system.

Method: The concept of North Korean defectors and re-entry is defined, the current status of North Korean defectors entering the country and re-entry is identified, and the causes and problems of re-entry are analyzed through case studies of re-entry.

Results: In the case of North Korean defectors who have entered South Korea, despite government policy support, they are experiencing difficulties in adapting due to discrimination and neglect by South Koreans, difficulties in finding a job, and longing for their families in North Korea. Some of them were found to be re-entering North Korea to meet their families in North Korea.

Conclusion: Problems were derived by analyzing the causes and cases of re-entry of some North Korean defectors. Based on these problems, I would like to suggest policy implications such as improving the education system for North Korean defectors and a resettlement support system that fits the reality in order to block re-entry.

Keywords: North Korean Defectors, Re-Entry, North Korean Families, Residential Protection, Settlement Support

1. Introduction

Looking at the domestic legal definition of a North Korean defector, it is defined as “a person who has an address, immediate family, spouse, workplace, etc. in North Korea and has not acquired foreign nationality after leaving North Korea.” However, in this paper, it is limited to those who have left North Korea and are residing in South Korea. Re-entry to North Korea refers to a person who escapes from North Korea, enters the Republic of Korea and lives there, then escapes from South Korea and re-enters North Korea. The number of North Korean defectors who entered South Korea has continued to increase since exceeding 10,000 in 2007, and as of December 2021, there are 33,818 (male 9,475, female 24,340). The government, in cooperation with private organizations, developed various support activities for the early settlement of North Korean defectors. However, despite such settlement support, it is true that North Korean defectors are having difficulties settling into South Korean society due to psychological and economic difficulties. Some of these misfits have escaped from South Korea and returned to North Korea, causing re-entry into North Korea. According to the data of the Ministry of Unification,

a total of 31 North Korean defectors were confirmed to have re-entered North Korea between 2012 and 2022. Considering the secret nature of re-entry, the number of North Korean defectors who actually re-entered the North is estimated to be much higher. The reason why North Korean defectors risk their lives to return to North Korea is, first, because of longing and guilt for their families in North Korea. The second can be seen as anger due to discrimination and neglect in South Korean society. The third is economic problems caused by difficulties in finding a job. Lastly, it is the conciliation and intimidation of the North Korean authorities. North Korea is attempting to re-enter North Korea through conciliation and threats, targeting defectors who are willing to re-enter North Korea by using their family members who remain in North Korea as hostages. In addition, the North Korean authorities make re-entry defectors appear in the propaganda media to emphasize the negative aspects they experienced in South Korea, and create an appearance of welcoming the re-entry defectors without punishing them. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the causes of re-entry of North Korean defectors, the problems that arise from them, and the cases of each type that actually occurred. Based on this analysis, I would like to present basic data for a response strategy to prevent North Korean defectors from re-entering North Korea.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Definition of 'North Korean defectors'

Prior to 1990, North Korean defectors were called variously, but here we will refer to them as North Korean defectors[1]. Since then, with the enactment of the 'Act on Support for Protection and Settlement of North Korean Refugees' in 1997, the government has officially used the term 'North Korean refugees'. Also, since 2014, the term North Korean defector has been used at the suggestion of the National Police Agency. Article 2 of the 'Act on Protection and Settlement Support of North Korean Refugees' defines 'North Korean refugees' as those who have an address, immediate family, spouse, workplace, etc. in the area north of the Military Demarcation Line(hereinafter referred to as "North Korea"). It is defined as a person who has not acquired a foreign nationality after leaving the country[2]. In this definition, it is a concept that includes both North Korean defectors who have entered South Korea and North Korean defectors who are residing abroad, such as China, after escaping from North Korea. Therefore, in this paper, the term North Korean defector refers only to those who have escaped from North Korea and entered South Korea and are currently residing there.

2.2. Definition of 're-entry to North Korea'

Re-entry means entering the Republic of Korea after escaping from North Korea, living there, escaping from South Korea, and re-entering North Korea. Reasons for re-entry to North Korea can be divided into two major categories. First, they failed to adapt to South Korean society and voluntarily entered North Korea. Second, they could be appeased, threatened, or kidnapped by the North Korean authorities[3]. From 2012 to 2022, the number of North Korean defectors who re-entered North Korea reached 31. Such re-entry of North Korean defectors is sometimes used for propaganda by the North Korean authorities, but it also gives considerable fear and psychological shock to North Korean defectors living in South Korea. In addition, it may be punished for the crime of escape, Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the National Security Law.

2.3. Reasons for 're-entry to North Korea'

When a North Korean defector enters the country, the NIS will undergo an investigation to determine whether or not to protect them. After the survey, they enter Hanawon, a North Korean refugee resettlement support facility operated by the Ministry of Unification, and receive social adaptation education and initial resettlement support for 12 weeks. After completing the

‘Hanawon’ education, they move to the desired residence and receive basic protection necessary for social settlement for 5 years from local governments, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, and the police station. Also, at the private level, local private organizations, medical institutions, religious groups, and volunteers cooperate with the government to provide settlement support. As such, the government, local governments, and the private sector are promoting North Korean refugee resettlement support policies through mutual cooperation. It is true that some North Korean refugees are unable to adapt to South Korean society despite such support for resettlement of North Korean refugees[4]. Some of them are even returning to North Korea. Let's examine the reasons for this re-entry into North Korea. The first is the longing for the North Korean family. North Korean defectors are suffering from guilt and longing for leaving their family behind in North Korea[5]. In some cases, remittances are sent to North Korea to provide economic support to families residing in North Korea. According to the ‘2017 Economic and Social Integration Status of North Korean Defectors’, the reason why North Korean defectors consider re-entering North Korea is missing their family is the highest at 34.3%[6].

Table 1. Reasons for considering re-entry(multiple responses).

Division	Frequency	Ratio
I miss my hometown	39	28.5
I miss my family	47	34.3
Difficulty adapting to South Korean society	34	24.8
Etc	17	12.4
Sum	137	100%

Note: ‘2017 State of Economic and Social Integration of North Korean Defectors’(Seoul: North Korean Human Rights Information Center, 2018).

Second, it is maladjustment to South Korean society[7]. When North Korean defectors enter the country, they want to be recognized for their worth because they risked their lives to live in a free South Korea, but they feel a great sense of loss and anger due to discrimination and neglect by South Koreans[8]. As such, North Korean defectors' maladjustment to South Korean society is causing various psychological problems[9].

The third is economic difficulties[10][11]. After North Korean refugees receive education at Hanawon and settle down in their residence, they receive employment support from the Employment Protection Officer of the Ministry of Employment and Labor. Even when they find such a job, they are experiencing economic difficulties because their income level is lower than that of the general public and they are unable to find a stable job[12].

The fourth is the conciliation and intimidation of the North Korean authorities. North Korea uses the National Security Agency[13], a South Korean intelligence agency. In order to catch defectors and re-enter North Korea, 'Operation Team' and 'Arrest Team' are being operated in China. In addition, North Korean defectors who re-enter the country obtain state secrets, such as information on North Korean defectors residing in South Korea.

2.4. Status of North Korean defectors

As of December 2021, there are 33,818 North Korean defectors entering the country(male 9,475, female 24,340). The number of North Korean defectors entering the country was maintained at 1,000 from 2001, increased to 2,000 from 2006, and maintained at 1,000 again from 2012 to 2019. However, it fell sharply to 229 in 2020 and 63 in 2021. It is analyzed that the

border closure after 2020 due to the influence of Corona 19 is the biggest cause [14]. However, with the end of COVID-19 from 2023, it is expected that the number of North Korean defectors entering the country will continue to increase in order to solve the problems of the North Korean dictatorship, economic difficulties, and children's education.

Table 2. Domestic entry status.

Division	Total	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21
Total	33,815	20,400	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	1,137	1,047	229	63
Male	9,475	6,379	795	404	369	305	251	302	188	168	202	72	40
Female	24,340	14,021	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	969	845	157	23

Note: Ministry of Unification(2022).

3. North Korea Re-Entry Status and Problems

3.1. North Korea re-entry situation

“Re-entry to North Korea” means that North Korean defectors who have acquired South Korean nationality return to North Korea due to reasons such as maladjustment to South Korean society. According to data from the Ministry of Unification, a total of 31 defectors re-entered North Korea between 2012 and 2022. The number of North Korean defectors who re-entered North Korea by year was 7 in 2012, 7 in 2013, 3 in 2014, 3 in 2015, 4 in 2016, 4 in 2017, 1 in 2019, 1 in 2020, and 1 in 2022. Etc.¹

Table 3. Status of North Korean defectors re-entering North Korea.

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2019	2020	2022	Sum
Personnel	7	7	3	3	4	4	1	1	1	31

Note: Reorganization of the Ministry of Unification(2022).

3.2. Problems with re-entry to North Korea

When North Korean defectors re-enter North Korea, North Korean defectors residing in South Korea become worried and anxious about the safety of their families in North Korea. In fact, North Korean defectors who re-enter North Korea are investigated by the North Korean authorities. In this process, the identity information of North Korean defectors residing in South Korea and the Hanawon curriculum are stated [15]. In particular, in the case of North Korean defectors' personal information and contact information, the North Korean authorities use them as important information that can be used for reentry to North Korea and intimidation. And in the North Korean propaganda media, the North Korean authorities welcome the re-entered North Korean defectors without punishing them, and emphasize the negative aspects that the defectors experienced in their life in South Korea [16]. The reasons why North Korean defectors who re-entered North Korea are appearing in the propaganda media are, first, because North Koreans are feeling the political burden due to the continuous increase in North Korean defections.

¹ BBC NEWS Korea(2022. 9. 28.).

Second, it is to distort the reality of North Korean defectors and suppress North Korean defectors. Third, it is to criticize the South Korean system and reinforce the idolization of the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea[17]. And it is because it serves as a means to induce North Korean defectors who cannot adapt to life in South Korea to re-enter North Korea. These factors also affect North Korean defectors' decision to re-enter North Korea. In fact, there are cases of re-entering North Korea after seeing such propaganda. This is an interview with a North Korean defector who re-entered North Korea by appearing in a North Korean propaganda media. "The majority of North Korean refugee women are forced into prostitution. As such, the situation of North Korean refugee women in South Korea is miserable." "The future of our Republic, where the leader and the people are of one mind and advances for the prosperity of the country, is bright and prosperous. It is my determination to serve the respected Marshal higher and start anew from now on and devote all my passion to building a prosperous nation." In this way, the videos of North Korean defectors who re-entered North Korea appearing in the propaganda media have a negative impact, such as agitating the society of North Korean defectors living in South Korea.

Figure 1. Press conference for North Korean defectors to return to North Korea(pyongyang).



Note: Yonhap News Agency(2013. 1. 24.)

4. Cases by Type of North Korean Re-Entry(Judicial Precedent-Based)

4.1. Cases due to maladjustment to Korean society

North Korean defector A entered a domestic university through special admission after settling into South Korean society, but was unable to adapt to life in South Korea as she struggled with apologetic feelings for her family she left behind in North Korea. Afterwards, he took a leave of absence from university and applied for refugee status to the governments of Canada and the United States. However, he failed in his continued refugee application and returned to Korea to live as a day laborer. Later, after staying for a while at a shelter for North Korean refugees, he got a job at a food factory, but got fired after fighting with a fellow employee. After that, North Korean defector A, unable to settle down in one place, became disillusioned with the life of wandering around the world and decided to re-enter North Korea. After that, North Korean defector A contacted the North Korean consul to re-enter North Korea through the North Korean consulate in Shenyang, China, but gave up the plan to enter North Korea and returned home due to a change of heart. Afterwards, defector A left for China, crossed the Yalu River on foot, re-entered North Korea, and was interrogated by the North Korean State Security

Agency. At this time, North Korean defector A stated state secrets such as the identity information of North Korean defectors residing in Korea, the identity of the police officer in charge of personal protection, the location of Hanawon, and education matters.²

4.2. Cases due to economic hardship

Around April 2010, North Korean defector B went through education at Hanawon, a resettlement support facility for North Korean defectors, and was discharged into society. Afterwards, North Korean escape broker K filed a lawsuit demanding payment of 1 million won out of B's 5 million won for escaping from North Korea. North Korean defector B failed to attend the trial because he was not requested to appear at the court, and the lawsuit proceeded and lost. Based on this, the rental housing deposit supported by the government to North Korean defector B was provisionally seized. B was very dissatisfied with this situation. In the meantime, around June 2012, Q, a North Korean defector who re-entered North Korea, held a press conference in North Korea and watched a scene where defectors were welcomed in North Korea, such as a family reunion, on TV. Accordingly, North Korean defector B thought that North Korean authorities would forgive and welcome defectors, so she wanted to live in North Korea with her mother and other family members. Also, while consulting at the Korea Legal Aid Corporation on the issue of North Korean defection costs, when an employee of the corporation told him that B had no chance of winning, he became angry and decided to go to North Korea. Afterwards, they prepared for re-entry into North Korea by closing time deposits and savings accounts at banks and disposing of cars. After that, on October 20, 2012, I arrived at Yanji Airport in China via Incheon International Airport. B visited the North Korean consulate in Shenyang, China and said, "I am a North Korean defector. I went to South Korea and came here to return to my motherland." On November 3, 2012, she boarded a plane from Shenyang Airport in China to Pyongyang and arrived at Sunan Airfield in Pyongyang to re-enter North Korea.³

4.3. Cases case of appeasement by the North Korean authorities

North Korean defector C tried to let his son P, who was in North Korea, escape North Korea, but failed. Later, when his son persuaded him to come to North Korea, saying that the authorities would forgive everything if he returned to North Korea, he decided to re-enter North Korea. Afterwards, C was introduced to broker Y, who is smuggling in connection with the State Security Agency in Hyesan, North Korea. C was concerned that if he re-entered North Korea, he would be punished by the North Korean authorities for his past defecting history. In response, through Y, he promised to donate 200 tons of rice to the North Korean authorities, along with an oath of allegiance saying, "Even if I go to my country in the future, I will give my all with my spotless and pure heart for the party and country led by our general." Reported to the North Korean State Security Agency. Afterwards, C, along with Y, paid 105 million won to purchase 130 tons of Chinese rice and sent it to North Korea by having it sent to Hyesan Customs in North Korea through Changbai Customs in China. In addition, North Korean defector C sent the remaining 70 tons of rice to North Korea as a loyalty gift, as reported to the State Security Agency in Hyesan, North Korea. And while preparing for re-entry, C tried to re-enter North Korea by way of Yanji, China, by taking out a loan from a bank and preparing funds totaling about 320 million won.

² Chuncheon District Law 2015.4.8. Sentence, 2015 High Dan 44 ruling.

³ Seoul Central District Court 2013.12.20. Sentencing, 2013 Gohap 954 ruling.

5. Conclusion

The government, local governments, and the private sector are promoting North Korean defector support policies through mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, it is true that some North Korean defectors are unable to adapt to South Korean society[18]. Some of them even go back to North Korea and re-enter North Korea. The reason for such re-entry is, first, longing and guilt for the family repatriated to North Korea. The second is maladjustment to South Korean society due to discrimination and neglect by South Korean residents. Third is economic hardship. The fourth is the conciliation and intimidation of the North Korean authorities. Cases of reentry to North Korea that actually occurred were analyzed with a focus on precedents. 'Case of re-entry to North Korea due to maladjustment to Korean society', 'Case of re-entry to North Korea due to economic difficulties', 'Case of re-entry to North Korea due to conciliation by the North Korean authorities' could be confirmed. As can be seen through the case studies, the reasons for re-entry to North Korea are diverse, including psychological and economic causes and North Korean authorities' operations[19]. For these reasons, when defectors leave South Korea and re-enter North Korea, defectors residing in South Korea worry and become anxious about the safety of their family members in North Korea. A North Korean defector who re-enters North Korea is subject to investigation by the North Korean authorities and must state the identity of the defector residing in South Korea. This North Korean defector status can be used by the North Korean authorities to persuade or intimidate the re-entry family against the North Korean family[20]. As such, the re-entry of North Korean defectors is having a negative impact, such as shaking up the North Korean defector society where they are settling down and living in South Korea. Therefore, I would like to suggest a plan to curb the re-entry of North Korean defectors in the future. First, for the stable settlement of North Korean refugees, the counseling and training hours of professional counselors for psychological stability must be greatly expanded in the Hanawon curriculum[21]. Second, in local governments where more than 300 North Korean refugees live, a dedicated team of 2 to 4 people in charge of protection for the residence is formed to strengthen an effective and customized settlement support system, and to establish sisterhood relationships with local residents who can serve as mentors. You need to provide psychological and emotional support. Lastly, it is time to prepare a response system that can promptly investigate re-entry cases by training personal protection police officers with expertise in North Korean system and security investigations in order to block the North Korean authorities from conciliating re-entry into North Korea.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	NB	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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'Korean Police' Selection Without Gender Distinction: A Review of the Physical Fitness Test: Focusing on the United States, France, and Japan

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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of eliminating gender segregation in physical fitness testing for police recruitment can be understood as twofold. In the case of a gender-neutral selection process, a police organization can eliminate gender segregation in the selection process, including the physical fitness test, in order to provide an equal opportunity for all applicants. The idea is to ensure that both men and women can take the test under the same conditions and that the best candidates are selected for police positions based on their abilities and skills. Gender-neutral job requirements. As with any industry, police work can be physically demanding. As such, it may include a gender-neutral physical fitness test to verify the ability to perform the duties of a police officer regardless of gender. This approach focuses on the abilities and skills required to do the job, and emphasizes a fair selection process that does not discriminate based on gender.

Method: In order to study the physical fitness test for police recruitment without distinguishing between men and women, the following research methods were utilized. The current police physical fitness test consists of five events. The physical abilities of quickness, cardiopulmonary endurance, muscular endurance, and strength are measured through the physical fitness test, but the physical fitness test items related to the ability to respond quickly and accurately to constantly changing exercise tasks(coordination) are not included. Therefore, in order to meet various motor functions, it is necessary to refer to the Job Standards Test(JST) of the NYPD in the United States, which is composed of sports closely related to the job of a police officer, the physical fitness test of the MET Police in the United Kingdom, which is an event-type measurement method, and the Épreuve d'exercices physiques of the French National Police. The Japanese National Police has a separate physical fitness test for new constables and a separate physical fitness test for police officers. In addition, there have been many legal cases in the West, such as the United States, regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the male and female fitness tests. This is especially true in the United Kingdom and the United States. Therefore, we conducted a comparative analysis to scientifically and rationally improve the physical fitness test standards that disadvantage female applicants.

Results: The results of a gender-neutral physical fitness test for "Korean police" recruitment can be understood as follows. First, a unisex physical fitness test ensures that all applicants have an equal opportunity to participate. It evaluates the abilities and skills required to perform police work regardless of gender, and provides a fair opportunity for all applicants without discrimination. Second, as an assessment of ability and vision, physical fitness tests help to assess the physical abilities and skills required to perform police work. These tests measure a candidate's physical strength, stamina, and power to help identify the right person for the job. Third, by enhancing diversity, gender-neutral physical fitness tests contribute to greater diversity and inclusion. Police organizations can recruit people from different backgrounds and genders to reflect more diverse perspectives and experiences. Fourth, it emphasizes fairness. A unisex physical fitness test eliminates gender-based discrimination and focuses on applicants' skills and competencies. This ensures that all applicants are selected based on their abilities and helps prevent unfair treatment based on gender. These findings suggest that gender-neutral physical fitness tests for police recruitment contribute to fair and reliable talent selection and help strengthen the diversity and performance of police organizations.

Conclusion: A gender-neutral fitness test for "Korean police" recruitment is an important approach to emphasize fairness and diversity. By administering a fitness test in this way, you can ensure that all applicants, including female applicants, have an equal opportunity to apply, and you can accurately assess the skills and abilities needed to perform the duties of a police officer. A gender-neutral fitness test assesses police performance regardless of gender and helps to strengthen diversity and inclusion in police organizations. This approach contributes to eliminating gender-based discrimination and ensuring that all individuals have access to opportunities based on their abilities and capabilities. It is important to ensure fairness and provide equal opportunities for all applicants when conducting gender neutral fitness tests. It contributes to the success of the police organization and helps to identify high-caliber candidates by assessing their abilities and skills as police officers. Therefore, gender neutral physical fitness testing in police recruitment plays an important role in promoting fairness and diversity and should continue to be developed as an important approach for the future of police organizations.

Keywords: Police Physical Fitness Test Standards, Foreign Police Physical Fitness Standards, Gender Segregated Recruitment of Police Officers, Physical Fitness and Police Work, Male and Female Physical Fitness Differences

1. The Need for Research

The need for a gender-neutral fitness test study in police recruitment is important for a number of reasons. By conducting a gender-neutral study of physical fitness tests, you can provide a fair and equal opportunity for all applicants. It eliminates gender-based discrimination and allows you to fairly evaluate all candidates based on their abilities and skills. By studying physical fitness tests without gender segregation, you can ensure that you recruit a diverse group of people into the police force, including female applicants. Increased diversity and inclusion allows police organizations to attract people with different perspectives and experiences, which can improve organizational performance. And gender-neutral fitness testing research can accurately measure the abilities and skills needed to actually perform police work. By assessing police performance regardless of gender, you can ensure your organization's performance and safety. By conducting a gender-neutral fitness test study, you can prevent gender-based discrimination. This will help eliminate unnecessary discrimination based on gender and ensure that all applicants are screened based on their abilities and competencies. By researching physical fitness tests, you can ensure that they are fair and reliable. Research can help you optimize the effectiveness of your fitness test by ensuring that the criteria and items are set reasonably and that feedback on the assessment method is incorporated.

Modern society emphasizes fair opportunities and respect for diversity, regardless of gender. Therefore, it is important for police organizations to meet these social expectations and fulfill their social responsibility by researching gender-neutral fitness tests. For the above reasons, researching gender-neutral physical fitness tests for police recruitment is of great value in building a fairer and more inclusive police organization and identifying talented individuals based on their abilities and capabilities.

2. Research Methods

To study the case of conducting physical fitness test for recruitment of 'Korean police' without distinguishing between men and women, the methodology can be designed as follows. A literature review was conducted to examine and analyze relevant literature such as academic papers, reports, government policies, news articles, etc. Collected and analyzed information on physical fitness testing without gender segregation in various countries and regions. As a case study, we analyzed in-depth cases of unisex physical fitness tests in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. This is because foreign case studies can be used to identify successful methods and results in conducting physical fitness tests for both men and women, and to discover

factors that can be applied to domestic police recruitment. This can also help build a fairer and more effective selection system.

3. Research

Previous studies on gender-neutral physical fitness testing in police recruitment have been conducted in various countries and regions, and these studies confirm the importance and effectiveness of gender-neutral physical fitness testing. One such study is Gender-Neutral Physical Fitness Testing for Law Enforcement Officer Applicants[1], which examines the implementation of gender-neutral physical fitness testing in police organizations in the United States and analyzes the effectiveness of gender-neutral physical fitness testing. The results suggest that gender-neutral physical fitness testing has a positive impact on enhancing fairness and diversity and improving police organization performance.

Government report Gender-Neutral Physical Fitness Testing in Law Enforcement[2]. This report analyzes the implementation of gender-neutral physical fitness testing in Canadian police organizations, emphasizing the importance of promoting diversity and fairness in hiring. It also provides guidelines for how gender-neutral physical fitness testing can be implemented in Canadian police organizations. Evaluating Gender-Neutral Physical Fitness Testing in Police Recruitment[3]. This thesis evaluates the outcomes of implementing gender-neutral physical fitness testing in an Australian police organization. The study analyzed the fairness, reliability, and effectiveness of the physical fitness test and concluded that gender-neutral physical fitness testing is valid for selecting individuals who are fit to perform police work.

On the other hand, domestic studies have focused on the measurement method of physical fitness tests, the difference in standards between men and women, and the work-relatedness of the test items. In particular, they have presented problems with the measurement method between men and women and the physical fitness standards of female candidates Kim, Hanbae Korean Journal of Public Security and Public Administration Kim, Eunjung, Kim, Pilseung [4][5]. However, there are very few papers on the standards of physical fitness tests following the abolition of gender-segregated recruitment. Therefore, this study suggests the direction of improvement of reasonable physical fitness test standards without disadvantages for men and women in the integrated recruitment of men and women, which will be implemented from July 1, 2023, and confirms the suitability and effectiveness of implementing physical fitness tests without distinguishing between men and women in various countries through previous studies, and can contribute to the operation of physical fitness tests without distinguishing between men and women in Korea by referring to the results of these studies.

4. Theoretical Background on Police Physicals

4.1. Police performance and physical fitness

Physical fitness plays a very important role in police work. Police officers must maintain safety and order in society, prevent crime, and react quickly and accurately in a variety of situations. The nature of their work requires physical strength and stamina, and insufficient physical fitness can limit their performance. Here's how physical fitness affects police performance [6] Emergency response and control requires police to react quickly in urgent situations. If they don't have enough physical strength and stamina, they may have difficulty performing tasks that last for a long time, and they may be limited in protecting people's lives and property. The second type of work is physical: police officers perform physical tasks such as arresting criminals or searching places. These tasks require physical strength and stamina, and a lack of physical fitness can affect the efficiency and safety of their work. Third is stress management. Police officers work long hours and in dangerous situations, which can be physically demanding and

stressful. Officers with sufficient physical fitness are better able to manage stress and perform their jobs more effectively. Finally, teamwork and collaboration. Police officers often work in teams, and teamwork and collaboration are important. Officers with sufficient physical fitness can work with their teammates to carry out effective operations.

Therefore, training and physical care to maintain and enhance physical strength and stamina are important for police officers[7]. Police organizations should devote much attention and effort to assessing and improving physical capabilities through physical fitness testing and training, and contributing to enhancing police performance and safety[8].

4.2. Differences in physical abilities between men and women

There are usually differences in physical abilities between men and women. This may be due to a combination of biological differences and social factors. However, there can be individual differences, and not all men are more physically capable than women[9]. As a result, there are several factors that need to be considered in order for women to perform the same tasks as men. In addition, due to biological differences, men are on average taller, have more muscle mass, and may be able to absorb more oxygen. These biological differences can cause men to perform better in certain physical fitness tests. In terms of social perceptions, in the past, women were considered more vulnerable, so it was common to see men dominate working jobs such as police[10]. These perceptions may prevent women from participating more actively in training to improve their fitness, and may have some impact on their career as a police officer. Women need to put in more effort and perform regular training and exercise to improve their physical fitness. With proper training and effort, women are capable of high physical performance. Police organizations need to consider the distribution of tasks between male and female officers. Certain tasks can be very physically demanding, so it's important to utilize and distribute competencies according to the nature of the task. Importantly, despite differences in physical ability, police performance is highly dependent on individual effort and training. Therefore, it is important to work and train to overcome physical limitations, and police organizations should appropriately evaluate and encourage women's work performance to ensure that all officers are able to perform to the best of their ability. It is also important to provide fair evaluations and opportunities without discrimination based on gender.

Figure 1. Testing men and women for physical fitness to enhance field responsiveness during the hiring phase[11].



4.3. The relationship between police fitness and job performance

Police physical fitness and job performance go hand in hand. Police officers perform a variety of tasks to maintain safety and order in society and prevent crime. These tasks require physical strength and stamina, so police fitness is a critical component of their ability to perform their duties. Therefore, there are several important aspects of the fitness-performance relationship[12]. First, emergency response and control. Police officers need to respond quickly and accurately in emergency situations. For example, they need to quickly arrive at a crime scene to protect victims, arrest criminals, etc. Police officers with good physical strength and stamina can

handle long hours of work. Second is physical work. Police officers perform many physical tasks, such as arresting or apprehending criminals and searching places. These tasks require strength and stamina, and insufficient physical fitness can affect the efficiency and safety of their work. Third is stress management. Police officers work in dangerous situations, and the long hours and complexity of their work can be stressful. Maintaining and managing sufficient physical fitness can help them better manage stress and perform their jobs more effectively. Fourth, it improves job performance. Officers with good physical fitness can work better with their teammates, perform more effectively, and achieve higher levels of performance. In addition, through training and efforts to improve their fitness, officers can achieve better job performance.

Figure 2. Police fitness and performance[13].



For this reason, police physical fitness has a significant impact on job performance, and it is important for police organizations to promote physical fitness and provide support for physical fitness management. In addition, physical fitness testing and training should be used to assess and improve officers' physical capabilities to support safe and effective job performance[14].

5. Police Physicals and Fitness Tests

Police physical fitness testing is the process of assessing the physical abilities and stamina required to perform the duties of a police officer[15]. Police fitness tests are used by police organizations to select new officers or to assess and manage the fitness of existing officers[16]. These tests play an important role in assessing the ability of police officers to perform their duties and ensure that officers are able to perform their jobs safely and effectively, as shown in <Table 1> main.

Table 1. Percentage of points for the police selection test.

Distinguish	Scoring ratio
Handwriting	50%
Fitness	25%
Aptitude	Use as interview material
Interview	20%(step 1 10%, step 2 10%)
Extra credit	5%

Note: Kim Pil-seung, Reorganizing the Physical Fitness Test System for Integrated Selection of New Police Officers 2021.

A fitness testing system is a systematic framework of procedures and standards used to administer police fitness tests. Police organizations implement standardized physical fitness tests


by designing different events over time, as shown in <Table 2>, to measure and manage the physical capabilities of their officers.

Table 2. Changes in police physicals over time.

Year	Fitness test events
2026(planned)	Changing from an event-style test to a rotating test to changing to a rotating test obstacle course run, pole hurdle, push pull, rescue, trigger pull
2023	Sit-ups. Push-ups. Handstands. 50 meter run. Running laps
2012	Sit-ups. Running 100 meters. Push-ups. Running 1000 meters. Strength
2008	Long jump in place, handstand. 100 meter dash, sit-ups
1993	Long jump in place, sit-ups. 100 meter run

Note: Kim Pil-seung, How to Improve Physical Fitness Test Standards by Abolishing the Gender-Segregated Recruitment System for Police Officers Reprinted 2021.

Figure 3. 2026 draft police rotational fitness testing manual[17].



A fitness testing system can include the following elements. First, physical fitness test items. To assess the physical capabilities of police officers, a physical fitness test is administered consisting of several items. These items are set according to the nature and requirements of the police work, and typically include aerobic and strength exercises that require physical strength. Second, the physical fitness test system sets pass or fail criteria to evaluate the physical fitness of police officers. The passing standard may vary depending on the tasks and operating policies of the police organization, and is set appropriately according to the physical fitness capabilities and skills of the police officers.

Table 3. Evaluation criteria and methods of physical fitness test for police officer recruitment test.

Distinguish		10 points	9 points	8 points	7 points	6 points	5 points	4 points	3 points	2 points	1 points
Man	Running 100 meters (seconds)	13.0 within	13.1 ~ 13.5	13.6 ~ 14.0	14.1 ~ 14.5	14.6 ~ 15.0	15.1 ~ 15.5	15.6 ~ 16.0	16.1 ~ 16.5	16.6 ~ 16.9	17.0 after

	Running 1000 meters (seconds)	230 within	231 ~ 236	237 ~ 242	243 ~ 248	249 ~ 254	255 ~ 260	261 ~ 266	267 ~ 272	273 ~ 279	280 after
	Sit-ups (reps/1 min)	58 or more	57 ~ 55	54 ~ 51	50 ~ 46	45 ~ 40	39 ~ 36	35 ~ 31	30 ~ 25	24 ~ 22	21 or less
	Left and right force (kg)	61 or more	60 ~ 59	58 ~ 56	55 ~ 54	53 ~ 51	50 ~ 48	47 ~ 45	44 ~ 42	41 ~ 38	37 or less
	Push-ups (reps/1 min)	58 or more	57 ~ 52	51 ~ 46	45 ~ 40	39 ~ 34	33 ~ 28	27 ~ 23	22 ~ 18	17 ~ 13	12 or less
Woman	Running 100 meters (seconds)	15.5 within	15.6 ~ 16.3	16.4 ~ 17.1	17.2 ~ 17.9	18.0 ~ 18.7	18.8 ~ 19.4	19.5 ~ 20.1	20.2 ~ 20.8	20.9 ~ 21.5	21.6 after
	Running 1000 meters (seconds)	290 within	291 ~ 297	298 ~ 304	305 ~ 311	312 ~ 318	319 ~ 325	326 ~ 332	333 ~ 339	340 ~ 347	348 after
	Sit-ups (reps/1 min)	55 or more	54 ~ 50	49 ~ 45	44 ~ 40	39 ~ 35	34 ~ 30	29 ~ 25	24 ~ 19	18 ~ 13	12 or less
	Left and right force (kg)	40 or more	39 ~ 38	37 ~ 36	35 ~ 34	33 ~ 31	30 ~ 29	28 ~ 27	26 ~ 25	24 ~ 22	21 or less
	Push-ups (reps/1 min)	50 or more	49 ~ 45	44 ~ 40	39 ~ 35	34 ~ 30	29 ~ 26	25 ~ 21	20 ~ 16	15 ~ 11	10 or less

Note: 1. If a candidate receives a score of 1 or more among the evaluated items of the physical fitness test, he/she shall fail.

2. The specific measurement method for the evaluation items of the physical fitness test shall be determined by the National Police Commissioner.

3. In the case of 100-meter run, discard the second decimal place or less among the measured figures, discard the first decimal place or less in the case of 1,000-meter run, and round up from the first decimal place in the case of left and right muscular forces.

*Source: National Legal Center, Enforcement Rules for Appointment of Police Officers, reprinted 2016.

Third, the physical fitness testing system is implemented periodically to regularly assess and manage the physical fitness of police officers. This will allow them to track changes in their fitness and make improvements as needed. Fourth, police organizations should consider gender neutrality when implementing fitness testing. Ensure that female officers are able to perform fitness tests under fair conditions. Fitness testing and fitness regimes play an important role in ensuring that police officers are able to perform their duties and are safe. They allow police organizations to identify talented individuals and improve the competence and capabilities of their officers.

6. Male and Female Selection Systems and Physical Fitness Testing Standards in Foreign Police Forces

6.1. Gender selection in foreign police forces

International police organizations have implemented different recruitment systems depending on the laws, policies, and culture of each country and region. In general, the trend is toward gender neutrality and equality. Many countries and regions are working to eliminate discrimination between men and women and provide equal opportunities for all genders [18]. Common

examples of gender-neutral police selection systems in the United States, France, Japan, and other countries include: First, police physical fitness tests are designed to be gender-neutral, meaning that both men and women are tested to the same standard. This ensures that all police officers have an equal opportunity to demonstrate their competence as a police officer and be selected. Secondly, some countries and regions have implemented policies to maintain gender balance within their police organizations. To this end, they actively support the recruitment of female officers and run programs to empower them. Third, through the promotion of gender diversity, police organizations strive to promote diversity and increase the participation of women officers. The goal is to respect the abilities and capabilities of female officers and provide opportunities for women to assume leadership roles within the organization. Finally, awareness raising is necessary to eliminate gender discrimination. Through education and training, it is important to recognize gender discrimination and contribute to its elimination. Through these examples, police organizations in other countries are working to ensure that gender neutrality and equality are respected and that both men and women have a fair chance at a police career.

6.2. Physical fitness testing standards for men and women in foreign police forces

6.2.1. America

Physical fitness testing standards for men and women in the U.S. police vary by state, region, and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. The United States is a federal system, and each state and local government operates its own police agencies and determines its own hiring standards[19]. In general, the physical examination standards of the U.S. police are evaluated on the following items: <Table 4> U.S. Police Physical Fitness Minimum Standards.

Table 4. U.S. police physical fitness minimum standards.

Distinguish	Instrument	Minimum	
United states federal bureau of investigation (FBI)	Run 300 meters(seconds)	M	52.5 seconds
		F	65.0 seconds
	1.5 mile run(approximately 2.4 km/sec)	M	12분 25 seconds
		F	14 minute
	Sit-ups(1 minute/reps)	M	37 times
		F	34 times
	Pull-ups(unlimited time/reps)	M	Times 1
		F	Times 0
	Push-ups(unlimited time/reps)	M	29 times
		F	13 times
United states federal police ※Note for ages 25-29 non-minimum physical fitness requirements	Sit-ups(inches)	M	21 inches
		F	22.75 inches
	Bench press(% of body weight)	M	127.8%
		F	68.0%
	Agility run(seconds)	M	16.34%
		F	18.4 minute 1 seconds
	1.5-mile run(about 2.4 mph)	M	113 seconds
		F	13 minute 32 seconds
	Body fat(%)	M	12.32 seconds
		F	20.16%

NYPD	Obstacles, stair climbing, airbag simulation, manikin dragging, trigger pulling	Unisex	4 minute 28 seconds
	Shooting		1 time
Washington, DC police	Patrol cars, obstacles, and stair climbing dragging suspects, crawling on tables jumping fences, identifying suspects	Unisex	1 minute 28 seconds
	Shooting		1 time
San Francisco police department	Obstacle running	Unisex	27.17 seconds
	Sit-ups(1 min/time)		25 times
	Bodyweight		48kg
	Push-ups(unlimited)		21 times
Los Angeles police department ※Note non-minimum standard self-checklists lowest standard	Sit-ups(1 min/time)	M	37 times
		F	31 times
	Push-ups(1 min/time)	M	27 times
		F	14 times
	Run 1.5 miles(about 2.4 km/sec)	M	12 minute 53 seconds
		F	15 3 minute 2 seconds
	300-meter run(seconds)	M	60 seconds
		F	74 seconds

Note: Kim Pil-seung, Reorganizing the direction of improvement of physical fitness test standards according to the abolition of the gender-segregated recruitment system for police officers 2021.

Figure 4. In the united states, the new york police department uses a physical fitness test called the job standards test[20].



As shown in <Table 4>, the FBI, the Federal Police, and the Los Angeles Police Department have different fitness standards for men and women. Similar to ours, the FBI has different fitness standards for men and women in the 300-meter run, 1.5-mile run, sit-ups, pull-ups, and push-ups. For example, in push-ups, men are required to do 29 untimed push-ups and women 13 or fewer to meet the minimum standard. On the other hand, New York, Washington, and San Francisco have the same fitness standards for men and women. Notably, the New York and Washington police departments do not use an event-based test, but rather a course rotation. Both men and women are held to the same standard and must complete the tasks in a certain amount of time. New York police officers must complete six events, including stair climbing, running, and dragging a mannequin, within 4 minutes and 28 seconds, while Washington police officers must complete seven events, including stair climbing, fence jumping, and suspect identification, within 1 minute and 28 seconds. Washington officers also have a shooting test, which requires them to hit at least one shot. U.S. police physical fitness testing standards are subject to continuous improvement and change, and we are constantly working to make them more fair and realistic. Police organizations are studying and making appropriate modifications to their

selection testing processes to ensure that officers are able to perform their jobs safely and effectively.

6.2.2. The United Kingdom

As with the United States, there are no consistent standards for male and female police fitness testing in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is not a nationally centralized system, but rather a country made up of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, each of which operates its own police service. As a result, police organizations in each of the UK's regions set their own standards for police recruitment and fitness testing[21]. In general, however, as shown in <Table 5>, police fitness tests in the UK consist of items that assess physical strength and stamina federal.

Table 5. UK metropolitan police minimum standards for male and female fitness tests.

Inspection items		Minimum standards		
15-meter dash(reps)		46		
Push-pull(kg)		Push(34 kg) or more - Pull(35 kg) or more		
National name	National police agency	Physical fitness test items	Evaluation criteria	Minimum standard
United Kingdom	Metropolitan police (MET) (instrumentation)	1. 15-meter long run(times) 2. Push-pull(kg)	Individuals above minimum (pass/fail)	Gender by same
	West midland police department (cyclic instrumentation)	1. Close 3 meters 2. 1m 20cm jump up 3. 2 m 80 cm high jump 4. 1 meter 20 cm hurdle jump 5. Jump between cones 6. Carry 2 8.2 kg cones 7. 2 m dummy (35 kg) Drag 40 cm	Time limits complete within pass/fail	Gender by same

Note: Park, Il-Hyuk, Establishing Physical Fitness Standards for Integrated Selection of Male and Female Cadre Candidates: A Research Report of the Institute of Sports Science, Seoul National University, reprinted 2018.

Police organizations in the United Kingdom also emphasize gender neutrality and equality, ensuring that female officers have an equal opportunity to prove themselves as police officers. This approach aims to eliminate discrimination between men and women and promote diversity and talent in the police force. Local police forces in the UK are committed to continually improving their fitness testing standards and ensuring they remain practical and useful[22].

6.2.3. France

The physical fitness standards for men and women in the French police may vary between French police organizations and police academies. In general, however, the French police fitness test consists of items that assess the physical abilities required to perform police work[23]. In general, as shown in Table 6, the French police physical examination standards include the following items.

Table 6. Minimum standards for police physicals in France.

Stocks	Minimum(times per minute)		Contents
	M	F	
1. Sandbags	40kg	25kg	*A total of 10 events(1 endurance test: running with sandbags, 9 agility tests) above the minimum standard(pass/fail) *7 out of 10 events are equal for men and women
2. Push-ups	5 times	3 times	
3. Jumping jacks	71cm	61cm	

4-10 events (same for men and women)	Same	Same	(except for sandbag running and 3 events for jumping over obstacles)
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Note: Kim, Pil-seung, Examination and implications of the physical fitness test system for new police officers in France: Korean Journal of Sports Science, reprinted, 2019.

Figure 5. French police physical fitness test is similar to military field training[24].



Police organizations in France also emphasize gender neutrality and equality, and strive to ensure that female officers have an equal opportunity to prove themselves as police officers. This approach is aimed at eliminating discrimination between men and women and promoting diversity and talent in the police force. French police organizations are committed to continuously improving their physical fitness testing standards and keeping them realistically useful [25].

6.2.4. Japan

The standards for physical fitness tests for men and women in the Japanese police may vary depending on the police organization and police academy. In general, however, the Japanese police physical examination consists of items that assess the physical abilities required to perform police work, as shown in <Table 7> [26].

Table 7. Minimum standards for Japanese police physical fitness test items.

Police departments	Sports
National police (sports)	Push-ups, sit-ups, burpee test, side steps (different minimum standards for men and women, minimum standards for each item are not disclosed)
Osaka police (sports)	1. Push-ups(7+ reps for women, 10+ reps for men) 2. Burpee test(burpee test) 3. Sit-up(17 reps for men, 7 reps for women) 4. Side step(32 times for 20 seconds for women, 38 times for 20 seconds for men) 5. Handgrip strength
Kyodo prefectural police (sports)	1. Bench press(32 kg or more for men, 21 kg or more for women) 2. Push-ups(6+ reps for women, 10+ reps for men) 3. Sit-up(24+ reps for men, 20+ reps for women) 4. Side step(45+ reps for men, 42+ reps for women) 5. 20-meter shuttle run(67+ reps for men, 41+ reps for women)
Fukuoka police (sports)	1. Bench press(45 kg or more for men, 25 kg or more for women) 2. Push-ups(30+ reps for men, 15+ reps for women) 3. Side step(50+ reps in 20 seconds for men, 40+ reps in 20 seconds for women) 4. Sit-ups(25 reps in 30 seconds for men, 15 reps in 30 seconds for women) 5. Long jump in place(men over 225 cm, women over 165 cm) 6. 20-meter shuttle run(65+ reps for men, 35+ reps for women)

Note: Kim, Pil-seung, Problems in the physical fitness test of female police officers following the abolition of gender-divided recruitment [point: Korean Journal of Sports Science, reprinted, 2020.

Police organizations in Japan also emphasize gender neutrality and equality, and strive to ensure that female officers have an equal opportunity to demonstrate their competence as police officers. This approach is aimed at eliminating discrimination between men and women and promoting diversity and human resources in police organizations. Japanese police organizations are committed to continuously improving their physical fitness testing standards and keeping them practical and useful.

6.3. Implications of physical fitness testing in different countries

This study examined the physical fitness tests and evaluation criteria of police organizations in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Japan. Among the four countries, the United States(U.S.), the United Kingdom(U.K.), and Japan(Japan) are the only two countries that use a dual system of physical fitness tests, while the United States(U.S.), the United Kingdom(U.K.), and Japan(U.K.) are the only two countries that selectively use a single test, and France(France) uses a single test. If we look at the selection systems for men and women in foreign police forces, we can draw the following conclusions. First, increased gender neutrality, with police organizations in many countries and regions introducing gender-neutral physical fitness tests and selection criteria. This helps women have a fairer shot at policing and is an important effort to eliminate discrimination between the sexes. Second, diversity and inclusion.

There is a growing trend to actively support the recruitment of female officers and to welcome officers of different genders and backgrounds. By doing so, police organizations are attracting diverse talent and allowing officers to share different perspectives and experiences. Third, promote leadership and engagement. Women officers are developing their leadership skills and enabling women to become more engaged and take on leadership roles within their organizations. Fourth, social awareness and support. Gender discrimination is a big issue in society, and police organizations are sensitive to this issue. There is a strong focus on protecting and supporting the safety and rights of women, which in turn improves the public credibility and standing of police organizations. Finally, awareness and education. We can see that awareness and education are necessary to eliminate gender discrimination. Police organizations recognize that women have the capacity to be police officers and are working to improve awareness of gender discrimination.

An examination of male and female selection systems in foreign police forces reveals a trend toward gender neutrality and equality. Police organizations are increasingly focusing on promoting diversity and inclusion, enhancing the leadership capabilities of female officers, and proactively addressing socially important issues of gender discrimination. These efforts are expected to contribute to improved police performance and public trust. Therefore, if the physical fitness test for new police recruits in Korea is aimed at determining the basic fitness of applicants and the minimum fitness level required by the police academy curriculum, it would be appropriate to adopt the current sport-type measurement method. However, after examining the physical fitness tests of foreign police forces, the current Korean physical fitness test has significant differences in standards between men and women, so it is necessary to improve it. In addition, if various physical abilities are required for police work and the standards should be reflected, it suggests that the Korean police should not discriminate between men and women, but should set a unified physical fitness test standard. In addition, if an applicant passes the standard, whether male or female, they should be given equal opportunities[27].

7. Conclusion

Alternatives to increasing police responsiveness may be less about the selection criteria themselves and more about how they operate once selected. This is especially true if the current debate is part of a process to find evolutionary alternatives to increase police responsiveness. Police departments have amended their laws to require men and women to meet the same

physical fitness standards. Like the NYPD, they plan to rotate courses and implement it for the 2026 recruit class. However, as we continue to hear that police fitness tests are still run on a knuckle-dragging basis, it's unlikely that a cosmetic change will improve police responsiveness. Therefore, this study analyzes the physical fitness test items and evaluation criteria for men and women in each country's police agencies to provide an efficient physical fitness test for the purpose of gender-equal appointment following the abolition of recruitment.

We summarize the results of this study as follows. First, there is no basis or regulation for gender-segregated recruitment in the Korean Police Service Act or the Police Service Appointment Decree. Nevertheless, the number of female police officers is limited and recruitment is divided. This may be unconstitutional under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Labor Standards Act, and the Constitutional Right to Equality, as shown in the case of the recruitment of men and women in foreign police forces described above [28]. Second, it may be logical to apply a uniform standard to the physical fitness test for men and women when integrated recruitment is conducted. However, since the physical fitness test has a significant impact on women's success, it may be necessary to consider policies such as the U.S., where active measures are implemented for a limited period of time to increase the number of women entering the workforce, or to closely examine the statistics of female recruitment to achieve a certain level of female officer ratio [29]. Third, in the case of the current physical fitness test standards for women, the maximum score for each sport is 50% of that of men (50/25 points), which raises the issue of female officers' physical fitness. However, in the revised physical fitness test for the 2023 integrated recruitment of men and women, overall, the standard has been raised in all sports for both men and women, but there is still a significant difference between men and women at the level of more than 50% (50/23 points), so the physical fitness standard for women should be raised to the level of 70 - 80% level of men. Fourth, the current physical fitness test in Korea is conducted in five sports. Therefore, physical abilities such as quickness, cardiopulmonary endurance, muscular endurance, and muscle strength are measured through the physical fitness test, but the physical fitness test items related to the ability to quickly and accurately respond to constantly changing exercise tasks (coordination) are insufficient. It may be necessary to refer to the NYPD's JST and the French National Police's JST [30]. Fifth, in the West, where gender-segregated recruitment has been abolished, there has been a lot of litigation about the advantages and disadvantages of unisex fitness testing. This is especially true in the United Kingdom and the United States. Therefore, it is imperative that researchers specializing in the field of gender cognition are included in the development of physical fitness tests to ensure that physical fitness tests that disadvantage female applicants are reasonably improved and do not favor or disadvantage a particular gender. This study has the following limitations. First, it is difficult to deny that the analysis of foreign cases is still insufficient, as the different policing environments in each country and the presence or absence of firearms affect the physical fitness test items and standards [31]. Police inadequacy is often criticized. The controversy extends to the "female police futility theory" and is often accompanied by the pointing out of low physical fitness standards when selecting female police officers. In particular, there are media reports comparing Korean police to foreign police forces. In the case of foreign police physical fitness tests, some say the standards are different for men and women, while others say they are the same. We hope that follow-up studies will be conducted more actively to establish reasonable physical fitness test measures that are not disadvantageous to men and women.

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9. Appendix

9.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	HY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Critical Review about Parricide Crimes of Korean Criminal Law

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Abstract

Purpose: In recent years, the number of infanticide cases has been steady at around 30 per year and the number of toddler murders at around 10 per year, which are generally punishable as ordinary murder. Also Crimes against immediate family members are subject to aggravated penalties. A person(descendant) who kills a member of his or her own or his or her spouse's immediate family is guilty of subsistence murder, which is punishable by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for seven years or more. This is a more severe offense than ordinary murder, which is punishable by death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for five years or more. Most survival-related violent crimes, such as injury, assault, abandonment, abuse, arrest, confinement, and intimidation, have aggravated penalties. However, under the current law, there is no provision for aggravated punishment for violent crimes against direct survivors. There is an aggravated punishment for the murder of a direct survivor by a direct descendant, but there is no aggravated punishment for the murder of a direct descendant by a direct descendant. The Korean Constitution stipulates that "no one shall be discriminated against on the basis of social status," which may violate the Equal Rights Clause of Article 11 of the Constitution. In other words, it is unconstitutional because it may constitute "discrimination based on birth". Therefore, we would like to critically examine whether the Korean criminal law should continue to provide for the offense of feticide.

Method: The aggravated punishment of capital murder is one of the most controversial issues in society. In this critical review of the aggravated murder penalty, we will first look at the Constitutional Court's decision on the aggravated murder penalty. Second, we will look at the arguments in favor of and against the aggravated penalty of capital murder. Third, we will examine the current state of affairs through a comparative legal review of foreign jurisprudence on the aggravated punishment of capital murder. Fourth, the legal, moral, and religious perspectives on the aggravated punishment of capital murder will be discussed. Fifth, based on the above discussion, we will provide a direction on whether to abolish the aggravated penalty of capital murder.

Results: It is recommended that the aggravated punishment for survival murder be abolished as it violates the right to equality under the Korean Constitution. Even if it is abolished, the purpose of the punishment can still be realized through judicial modification.

Conclusion: In light of the meaning and legislative purpose of the provision that aggravates the crime of intentional homicide, it cannot be said that the legislative act of selecting a comparative standard, i.e., that intentional homicide is more severely punished than ordinary homicide in the Korean Penal Code, is unconstitutional. However, while the criminal laws have the same criminal offense of killing a person, there is a difference in the 'presence or absence of paternity'. The abolition of capital murder is consistent with the principle of proportionality. It would be contrary to the principle of proportionality to impose severe restrictions based on prosecutorial convenience. For these reasons, it would be a violation of the constitutional principle of equality, and even if it is not unconstitutional, it is difficult to see that it reflects constitutional values such as the principle of equality.

Keywords: Parricide, Infanticide, Aggravated Punishment, Principle of Proportionality, Principle of Equality

1. Introduction

In the U.S., Parricide accounts for 2% of all homicides, in the U.K. 1%, and in France 2.8%, and in Korea it is higher at about 4%, with about 30 cases a year. The Constitutional Court has made the following rulings regarding survival-related crimes. First, respect and love for the immediate survivors of the family is not a legacy of the feudal family system, but a value order that constitutes an essential part of our social ethics, especially in the case of Korea, which has inherited and developed a traditional culture based on Confucian ideas; therefore, there is a rational basis for the discriminatory treatment in light of the reason for the aggravated punishment based on the status of 'descent' and the validity of the degree, and the statutory provisions in this case cannot be said to violate the principle of equality in Article 11(1) of the Constitution. Secondly, since a criminal offense such as manslaughter with injury to existence cannot be considered to fall within the realm of constitutionally protected private life, and since the legislative purpose of the statutory provisions in this case is justified and there are reasonable reasons for the aggravation of the sentence, and since it cannot be said that the aggravated punishment distorts the private life of the family, or that there is unreasonable interference from outside, such as the imposition of filial piety or intervention in personal ethical matters, the statutory provisions in this case do not violate the right to freedom of private life under Article 17 of the Constitution. Third, there is no indication that the dignity and gender equality of each member of the family will be undermined by the aggravated punishment or that a humanized life will not be guaranteed, but rather that the aggravated punishment of patrimonial and anti-moral acts will further guarantee the dignity and value of individuals by protecting the natural and universal ethics of kinship and family in criminal law, and that a proper social order will be formed through this. The provisions of the law in this case do not violate Article 36(1) of the Constitution on the marriage and family system, nor do they infringe on the dignity and worth of the human person or the right to the pursuit of happiness. However, as the times have changed, the reasons for the crime of feticide have also changed. Therefore, a multifaceted review of the abolition of feticide is necessary. With the abolition of the infanticide provision, which reduces the sentence in certain cases when an immediate relative kills a non-relative, there is a public consensus on the abolition of infanticide based on the principle of equality[1].

2. Arguments in Favor of Enhanced Penalties for Parricide

Parricide is the crime of killing a member of one's own or one's spouse's immediate family (Article 250, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code). Immediate relatives are legal relatives, such as adoptive parents. However, unrecognized de facto wealth is not survivorship. Spouse means only a legal spouse, not a de facto spouse. Since it is required that there was an immediate relationship at the time of the murder, if an adopted child kills his or her adoptive parents after adoption, he or she is guilty of ordinary murder. On July 17, 2023, the National Assembly passed the abolition of the infanticide statute regarding the non-existence of immediate relatives[2][3]. The reason for the abolition of infanticide was due to a recent survey of infants born in medical institutions but whose birth registration was missing, which confirmed a number of cases of infanticide, and the critical public opinion on whether the punishment for murdering infants should be reduced because they are infants. As a result, the abolition of the aggravated punishment of the crime of murder for the survival of an immediate relative has been raised as a social topic. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the arguments in favor of the aggravated punishment of murder.

2.1. The traditional "filial duty" mentality

Korea has continued to impose aggravated penalties for the crime of infanticide from the past to the present, and the background of this legislation is Confucianism and traditional ideas that emphasize the "filial duty" of our society. Therefore, the aggravated punishment for intrafamilial

crimes rather than general murder is justified and does not violate the principle of proportionality[4][5].

Today, the vast majority of foreign countries have either eliminated or abolished aggravated penalties for survivor crimes, including survivor murder. If we look at comparative law, the Anglo-American legal system, which is centered on the Common Law, has never imposed aggravated penalties for crimes against humanity, such as murder and manslaughter, and the same is true for most countries, including China. However, when it comes to the crime of murder for survival, which is a representative provision of crimes for survival, some countries still have such provisions, and some countries even have aggravated penalties for the murder of not only survival but also non-siblings or spouses. There are also countries that have deleted their existing regulations on subsistence killing, which is just a difference in legislation based on the historical background and socio-cultural differences of each country. Here are some examples of foreign legislation on assisted suicide First, France still has an aggravated penalty for murder. In this case, the object of the offense is the legal or de facto lineal descendant or adoptive father or mother. Unlike ours, the French Penal Code(Article 221-4) also punishes the murder of a minor by an immediate relative and even provides for aggravated penalties for spousal homicide by a de jure or de facto spouse. This is because it recognizes spousal homicide as a more serious offense than ordinary murder. Second, Taiwan has enacted an aggravated penalty provision for sustained murder(Article 272 of the Penal Code) since the enactment of the Penal Code in 1935, i.e., the statutory penalty for sustained murder is death or life imprisonment, whereas the statutory penalty for ordinary murder is death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for more than 10 years. Third, Germany abolished the law of murder with intent to kill(Article 217 of the Penal Code) in 1941 [6][7].

2.2. High social condemnation consensus

There is good reason to believe that infanticide should be highly socially condemned compared to ordinary murder in light of its heinous nature. Parents and children are in a position of guarantor to help and protect each other, and the killing of a parent by a child is a travesty and an ethical and moral responsibility that should be highly condemned.

When a child is born, the first environment he or she encounters is the family, and parents are the first people he or she experiences. In the relationship with parents, to which we automatically belong, children learn to adapt to the environment, recognize their roles centered on their relationship with parents, and grow as members of society. In other words, the form, process, and content of the parent-child relationship extends to social relationships and becomes an important factor that directly affects the child's personality formation and emotional development. Parent-child relationships vary depending on the society and culture to which they belong. In particular, Korea is a country with a strong Confucian tradition among East Asian Chinese character cultures and a particularly strong blood consciousness. In addition to this, the relationship between parents and children in Korea is characterized by the fact that they perceive each other as one, and they see themselves as part of a whole called "family" and see their children as an extension of themselves[8][9].

2.3. Appropriate statutory penalties for parricide

However, the Korean Penal Code has been amended to provide for the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years, resolving the issue of specific disparity in sentencing[10][11].

2.4. Aligning with the equality principle

The survival killing provision of the Korean Penal Code cannot be said to violate the principle of equality because it is an arbitrary legislation that is out of balance in the penalty system. The killing of a parent by a child is highly reprehensible regardless of whether the child is from the East

or the West, and the statutory punishment is not so severe as to violate the right to equality as the statutory punishment is abandonment.

2.5. Reviews

The argument in favor of aggravated murder in Korean criminal law is problematic because it emphasizes the traditional Korean idea of filial duty and does not take into account the motives for murder, which are: first, murder due to insanity, second, murder due to child abuse, and third, murder due to profit in the form of a family feud. Here, the argument in favor of an aggravated punishment for sustained murder is weak, as sustained murder by insanity and parental child abuse account for 70% of the cases.

Table 1. Number of occurrences of parricide.

Years	Number of occurrences	Arrested	Remand opinions/decisions		
			Prosecution/arraignment	Non-prosecution/non-sentence	Others
2017	24	25	22	3	
2018	42	44	38	6	
2019	35	45	22	22	1
2020	28	35	24	11	
2021	25	25	22	3	
Total	154	174	128	45	1

Note: Includes murder, attempted murder, aiding and abetting, and premeditation and conspiracy.

3. Arguments Against Enhanced Penalties for Parricide

In terms of the types of crimes, sustained murder can be categorized as "paternal," "maternal," or "foster," depending on the target. It can also be categorized as juvenile sustained homicide or adult sustained homicide, depending on the age of the offender. Juvenile sustained homicide can be further divided into (1)sustained homicide due to childhood abuse, (2)sustained homicide due to serious mental illness, and (3)sustained homicide due to antisocial behavior. Adult homicides can be categorized into (1)homicides due to paranoia and psychosis, (2)homicides due to altruism, and (3)other types of homicides such as selfishness, jealousy, impulsivity, and personality disorders. The victim's injuries are usually concentrated around the head, face, and neck because the perpetrator is extremely excited or angry at the time of the murder. The main injuries were to the head and neck, and in cases of assault deaths, the victim was assaulted on the face, especially the eyes. The most common weapon used was a knife, such as a kitchen knife, followed by indiscriminate assaults and blunt objects such as baseball bats and hammers. Murders with knives often involved indiscriminate stabbings to the head, face, or neck, and sometimes involved the dismemberment of a parent's body or near dismemberment of a limb. In particular, survival homicides associated with schizophrenia were brutalized by the use of knives and a high number of confessions, but few survival homicides were planned, concealed, or disguised. On the other hand, murder for money was often premeditated, and in the case of accidental killing by violence or verbal abuse as well as premeditated crimes, the case was often concealed by methods such as arson or

dark burial, and sometimes disguised as accidental death. The majority of homicides were committed in isolation, and factors that increased the likelihood of homicide included excessive alcohol consumption during the commission of the crime and a history of violence, such as repeatedly assaulting parents[12][13][14][15].

Table 2. Whether each country has an aggravated penalty for parricide.

No aggravated murder penalties	Anglo-American countries such as the United Kingdom and United States, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Russia, China, etc.
Repeal of the aggravated murder rule	Germany(1941), Austria(1974), Japan(1973)
Aggravated penalties for capital murder, non-capital murder, and spousal homicide	France, Italy, Argentina, Taiwan, etc.

3.1. Violating personal dignity

Article 36(1) of the Korean Constitution states that "Marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the state shall guarantee them." In addition, human dignity and free expression of personality are the core values of the Constitution, and the democratic basic order forms the basis of the constitutional order. Not only does this naturally affect family life, but family life is a component and foundation of social life and national life, which cannot be properly realized unless these constitutional values and order are upheld in family life. In other words, the aggravated punishment of subsistence killing should be abolished as it harms the equality of family life and the dignity of individuals. The family system guaranteed by the Constitution is based on democratic family relationships in which all family members are respected equally as individuals with human dignity. Consequently, such discriminatory treatment cannot be reconciled with the democratic family relationship or family system guaranteed by the Constitution. The Korean Criminal Code's subsistence killing penalty discriminates against those who kill their immediate family members, thus hindering society's basic morals for maintaining free and peaceful community life. The aggravated punishment of subsistence killing is not necessary to protect through the strongest and final means of punishment[16][17][18].

3.2. Based on an authoritarian, patriarchal family

Parents and children are obligated to support and cooperate with each other. Recently, the rule that reduced the punishment for the murder of a non-sibling by an immediate family member was abolished. In other words, infanticide was punished with a reduced penalty if the immediate family member had special extenuating circumstances such as concealment of the crime, anticipation of the inability to raise the child, or other extenuating motives, but this rule has been abolished. However, it is still an aggravated offense if an immediate non-family member kills an immediate family member. In the case of killing an immediate relative, it is unjustifiable to aggravate the punishment based solely on the formal status of the relationship, without asking about other circumstances, such as parenting, protection, or the formation of an attachment relationship. This is still based on feudal ethics, and the purpose of the discrimination is to maintain an authoritarian and patriarchal family order based on the dominance-submission relationship between parents and children, which is not justified[19][20].

3.3. Equal rights violations

It is not reasonable discrimination to punish a person who kills another person, or a person who has no legal relationship with the perpetrator but has a special relationship with the perpetrator, with a general murder offense and an aggravated punishment for the killing of an immediate relative. The law was enacted in light of Confucian ethics from ancient times before the separation of morality and law. It is important to keep in mind that the law is based on morality and that the rules of law should be the "minimum necessary". The main difference between law and morality is enforceability. Laws can be enforced by organized state power, but morals are not, and their implementation is left to the conscience. The goal of law is justice, and the goal of morality is good. It is undesirable for the law to get involved in moral matters[21][22].

Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court has consistently held that legislators are granted freedom of formation as long as it does not violate the principles of accountability or proportionality, it is not systematically or logically valid to justify the criminalization of subsistence killing by invoking the legislator's freedom of formation. Rather, there is nothing particularly problematic, legally or emotionally, in applying the current statutory punishment for survivor's murder, which is essentially the same as survivor's murder. However, it can be said that the crime of survival murder, which is not based on the ruin of the family, such as the abuse of the surviving spouse or the surviving child, or the mental abnormality of the surviving child, violates the principle of responsibility and proportionality in that it is punished more severely than ordinary murder, even though it is less responsible or illegal than ordinary murder due to its structure. In this respect, when dealing with the constitutionality of capital punishment in the future, it seems that it would be more effective to apply the principle of proportionality rather than the principle of abstract equality to derive the constitutionality of capital punishment. Moreover, even if the law of subsistence killing is abolished, the responsibility and illegality of subsistence killing can be sufficiently reflected through sentencing in the process of applying the law of ordinary murder[23][24].

3.4. Increase in parents abusing children

Parental abuse of children has been on the rise in recent years. We should consider the reality that the number of cases of domestic violence on the part of parents is increasing. The previous section on survival killings shows that mental illness and parental abuse play a large role. It would be unrealistic to impose aggravated penalties without considering these circumstances in a case where self-defense is inevitable. In the case of capital murder, it is sufficient to impose a severe sentence based on the culpability at trial[25][26].

4. Legislative Direction on Aggravated Peticide

4.1. Social status

There is no disagreement that the equality clause of the Constitution applies regardless of how the relationship between descent and non-descent is identified, as long as the prohibited grounds for discrimination in Article 11(1) of the Constitution are viewed as exemplary. The crime of descent murder stipulates that the 'direct descent of the person or spouse' is a constitutive element of the crime. These are all social statuses that are prohibited grounds for discrimination under Article 11(1) of the Constitution. Social status refers to a person's long-term, not temporary, position in society.

The rationale for the aggravated punishment of intentional homicide is not the aggravated liability for non-persons, but the objective fact of killing one's own or one's spouse's direct lineal descendants, which is identified as an illegal aggravation to protect social and ethical behavioral values. The argument for the abolition of the old offense of subsistence murder was also raised in

the 1992 Proposed Criminal Code Amendment Bill. However, on the grounds that it would be contradictory in the criminal law system to abolish the relevant provisions on the grounds that the statutory punishment for subsistence murder is severe while maintaining the aggravated punishment provisions for other subsistence crimes, an amendment was proposed to slightly reduce the statutory punishment by adding seven years of imprisonment to the provisions of subsistence murder, which was reflected in the Third Amendment to the Criminal Code in December 1995.

The sentencing guidelines for murder with intent to kill include special and general aggravating factors. In light of this, the current sentencing guidelines have a special aggravating factor of "surviving victim," which facilitates aggravated punishment for surviving murder, but there is no special aggravating factor (behavioral factor) for "non-victim," so it is quite difficult to elicit aggravated punishment for non-surviving murder under the current sentencing guidelines. Therefore, if sentencing factors are accepted together as aggravating factors without discrimination, each of these statuses can be balanced in importance, and one methodology is to abolish liability punishment for ordinary murder if it is possible [27][28].

4.2. Considering abolition of capital punishment

The position in favor of aggravated punishment for murder of a living being is that respect and love for living beings means the ethics of human security and the basic ethics of social life, so even if the crime of murder of a living being has its origins in the feudal patriarchal system in history, even from today's perspective, it can only be considered that the blameworthiness, which is the essence of criminal responsibility, is greater than that of simple murder. The lower limit of the statutory penalty is only two years compared to simple murder (five years), so it cannot be considered unduly discriminatory. ③ If there is a legal reason for a reduction in the penalty, such as voluntary surrender, a sentence of probation can be imposed with two reductions, including a reduction in the penalty. ④ The legislative intent of the aggravated punishment provision for surviving murder is not to provide special protection for surviving relatives, but to specifically condemn the cruelty of non-siblings, and the special protection for surviving relatives is only a reflexive benefit of this. The problem with the constitutional theory is that enforcing moral principles by reflecting them in the law, even if law and morality are distinguished, cannot completely eliminate the ethical element in determining liability. In addition, the law does not impose morality, but merely increases the sentence based on the aggravation of the responsibility due to the familial relationship. It is a discriminatory result that surviving victims are more protected than ordinary victims. The intent of the law is to protect surviving victims, and even if surviving victims receive greater protection as a result, it is only a reflexive benefit.

The view that argues for its abolition is that the aggravated punishment for infanticide is a remnant of feudal and anti-human patriarchy and is unreasonable discrimination against human dignity. The ethic of non-killing is a voluntary ethic and cannot be enforced by law. Since there are many cases where the reprehensibility of the murder is not great, it is sufficient to punish the murder by the statutory penalty of ordinary murder. ④ It is argued that the lower limit of the statutory penalty for murder is seven years, which severely limits the sentencing discretion of judges so that probation cannot be imposed even in cases of mitigation [29][30].

Upon review, the abolition of capital murder is more reasonable and justified.

5. Conclusion

Just as the question of law and morality is the unresolved Cape Horn of legal philosophy, the question of the aggravated punishment of capital murder may be the eternal problem of legal philosophy that our society needs to solve. However, criminal law should be applied as a last resort.

There is no problem in determining the sentence even if the penalty is abolished, and the motivation for murder is often mental illness and parental abuse, so the penalty should be abolished. All citizens are equal before the law according to the developmental stage of human life by limiting the range and time that can be allowed for abortion[31].

Despite the fact that the presence or absence of 'patrimony' plays an important role in the existing murder of survivors, the actual review of 'patrimony' is difficult to list specifically due to the unclarity of the concept. Therefore, rather than placing an ambiguous concept as a new mitigating factor, we believe that placing the preceding patrimonial act of survivorship, i.e., 'provocation of the victim', as an aggravating factor will prevent it from being applied unfavorably to the perpetrator who lacks patrimony and implement a reasonable sentence without the need to establish a new patrimony factor. Furthermore, it would be necessary to include "victim being a spouse" as an aggravating factor in the sentencing guidelines. Spousal homicide is a crime that harms the constitutionally protected family as well as the specificity of the relationship and the trust based on it, and it should be punished as aggravated as surviving or non-surviving homicide, and when surviving, non-surviving, and spousal factors are included as aggravating factors, each of them will be balanced in importance.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	KP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on the Effects of Local Police's Perception of Crime Prevention Activities on Police Trust

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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine how the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police, centering on Suwon City, have an impact on police trust, and to suggest ways to secure the reliability of the autonomous police activities in the future.

Method: In this study, 320 copies of the meaningful results obtained through the survey conducted on the citizens of Suwon were analyzed. For the analysis, the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police were set as an independent variable and trust in the police was set as a dependent variable.

Results: As a result of analysis on the impact of crime prevention activities (patrol, crime prevention environment creation, order maintenance) of autonomous police on police trust, it was found that patrol and crime prevention environment creation had a significant effect, and order maintenance No significant effect was found.

Conclusion: In order to actively prevent crime, it is necessary to support visible police activities, such as strengthening intensive patrols using foot patrols, motorcycles, and patrol cars, as well as supporting technical equipment for effective arrest. CCTV has a very useful value in that it can be used as an efficient means of arresting criminals by filling the public security vacuum caused by insufficient police manpower at the present time and converting data into a database. In addition, more practical equipment support should be provided by securing the police's own budget to expand the development and expansion of a customized work system tailored to the local situation and to strengthen cooperative public order such as autonomous security guards and child guards.

Keywords: Autonomous Police, Crime Prevention Activities, Police Trust, Patrol, Crime Prevention Environment

1. Introduction

Based on the law enacted in December 2020, the Act on the Organization and Operation of National Police and Autonomous Police, the autonomous police system was expanded and enforced nationwide on July 1, 2021 to provide public security and administrative services in close contact with residents' lives are doing In the autonomous police system, autonomous police affairs are commanded and supervised by city and provincial autonomous police committees, and local police affairs are stipulated for life safety, traffic, women, children, the elderly, and security for local events.

As one of the measures to promote practical local autonomy, the need for full-scale implementation of the autonomous police system has been constantly raised, and it has reached the present. In addition to the distribution of police authority, the provision of public security services considering the characteristics of the region is continuously required. In continuing the implementation of the autonomous police system, the role of the autonomous police is to reflect the demand for decentralization of police administration and enhancement of democracy, and to ensure that there is no gap in the safety of people's lives [1].

However, the current autonomous police system can be seen as conducting autonomous police activities in the provinces as a part of the national police system. Autonomous police system refers to a form of police system that allows local governments to have all police-related authorities, such as police personnel, affairs, and finances. does not exist.

In the case of the United States, the autonomous police system is based on three criteria: ① limited authority, ② local control, and ③ fragmented law enforcement. is implementing the autonomous police system by securing responsibility for the operation of the police organization[2].

Korea's autonomous police system is different from the existing autonomous police system, so it is necessary to establish autonomous police activities for each region. Rather than uniform police activities centered on the national police, regionally customized autonomous police activities suitable for regional characteristics should be carried out.

In this study, we examine how the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police, focusing on Suwon City, have an impact on police trust, and suggest ways to secure the reliability of the autonomous police activities in the future.

2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

2.1. Autonomous police activities

In modern society, the police is generally a public service that protects the life, body, property and freedom of the people, guarantees their interests, and performs crime prevention and law enforcement to maintain public order and peace in society[3].

From an institutional aspect, the police can be divided into a national police system and a self-governing police system depending on who is the subject of police authority, the operation of the police organization, and the exercise of personnel rights[4]. In the case of the national police system, the police authority is part of the state power. Since it is exercised as a part of the local government, the authority and responsibility for maintaining the police resides with the state, and in the case of the autonomous police system, the authority and responsibility for maintaining the police resides with the local government because the police authority is exercised as part of the local government.

The autonomous police system is a system that autonomously carries out security duties based on the will of local residents, and can be called the police system of common law countries. Its main content is to function for the purpose of service administration for residents. In terms of police actions that are closely related to the daily lives of local residents, such as mainly security police action and maintaining public order and crime prevention in the region, it is desirable that the local police under the direction of the head of the local government perform the role. Those who want to change the current national police system, in which the same police force is directly under the state's control, can be called the self-governing police system. In other words, the self-governing police can be said to be 'the police for the local residents that fit the realities of the region'.

In the process of introducing and stabilizing the autonomous police system, demands such as decentralization of police administration and enhancement of democracy must be reflected, and there must be no vacuum in public safety. In particular, it is necessary to respond to residents' demand for public security by securing connectivity between local administration and public security administration, and to provide public security services suitable for the characteristics and environment of the region.

Police affairs are divided into national police affairs and autonomous police affairs, and command and supervisory authority is distributed for each office, and the police committee of the metropolitan government directs and supervises the autonomous police affairs. It is divided into those related to life safety, traffic, security, and investigation in the jurisdiction.

Autonomous police affairs are performed by the head of the city/province police agency and are commanded and supervised by the city/province police committee, and investigation affairs are commanded and supervised by the head of the National Investigation Headquarters. According to Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Police Act, autonomous police affairs can be divided into life safety activities for local residents, traffic activities, and traffic and safety management related to crowd gathering events. Affairs related to life safety activities include patrol and facility operation, resident participation method activities, emergency rescue support, tasks related to social protection, prevention of home/school/sexual violence, maintenance of social order, guidance and enforcement, etc. Affairs related to traffic activities include violation of traffic laws, traffic safety facilities and equipment, traffic safety education and publicity, traffic activities involving residents, and traffic-related permits and reports. Matters related to multi-group events refer to affairs related to congested traffic and safety management.

Investigation services include juvenile crimes, domestic violence and child abuse crimes, traffic accidents and related crimes, public obscenity and crimes related to trespassing to public places for sexual purposes, crimes related to basic order, and crimes related to runaways and missing children. It is stipulated that life safety, traffic activities, and activities related to group events are stipulated by city/province ordinances, and matters related to investigations are stipulated by Presidential Decree.

The purpose of the self-governing police system is to provide a variety of customized security services tailored to the local characteristics from the perspective of citizen-centered and citizen safety, and the focus is on improving the perceived safety of citizens[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]. Therefore, in this study, in order to practically respond to citizens' demands for safety, we propose patrols, crime prevention environment creation, and maintenance of order as autonomous police activities in the field of life safety to prevent crimes in areas closely related to citizens.

2.2. Police trust

The etymology of trust is 'trost' in German, which means 'comfort', but it is used interchangeably in various meanings depending on the academic background and research field. In the social sciences, the concept of trust can be defined as an expectation or belief that other people will behave in a predictable way as 'confidence about the quality and characteristics of a person or thing or the truth of a statement'[17].

Trust in police is a broad concept that encompasses values, attitudes, perceptions, efficiency, fairness, etc., and it is not easy to define it uniformly, so no consensus definition of trust in police has been drawn[18]. Lee Su-chang(2014) defined police trust as the public's positive attitude towards the police or the evaluation of whether police activities meet the public's expectations based on the concept of trust in the government. Taken together, police trust is the support of citizens for a police organization or a series of police activities. It can be defined as an attitude or perception of satisfaction and acceptance[19].

Trust in the police is a subjective evaluation index for whether the police are performing their roles well as the agents of the citizens, who are the subjects of power[20], and at the same time, it is also used as an important evaluation index in the evaluation of each police office in the actual police department[21][22]. In addition, trust in the police is not only the foundation of police legitimacy, but also the driving force for citizens' support for the police and voluntary cooperation[23][24][25]. In other words, trust in the police is not simply a matter of legitimacy,

but also has a great practical meaning in that it is a social resource that can effectively maintain public order at a low cost by inducing support, cooperation, and voluntary compliance of citizens.

On the other hand, in previous studies, trust in the police is mainly measured using the method of surveys targeting citizens, which can be mainly divided into single-question methods and multiple-question methods. The single-item method measures trust in the police with a single question in the form of 'How much do you trust the police?'. In contrast, the multi-item method measures police trust by integrating multiple questions on satisfaction, fairness, efficiency, promptness, kindness, and responsiveness[18][22][23][24][26][27][28][29][30][31].

Therefore, this study aims to find out the citizens' trust in the crime prevention of the Korean autonomous police. In addition, various factors that explain police reliability are empirically analyzed.

2.3. Autonomous police activities & police trust

Research on police trust began with similar studies on police image and satisfaction with police activities. Among them, studies have been conducted centering on the confidence model in which trust in the police is set as the independent variable and fear of crime as the dependent variable, and social conditions related to crime such as the crime rate and the responsibility model of trust in the police[32].

In addition, in a study approached with instrumental and expressive visual models, the instrumental visual model represents citizens' perceptions of the traditional security activities of the police, and the expressive visual model represents the relationship between the degree of safety citizens feel in social life and trust in the police[20][28]. Regarding these two approaches, Pyo jung-hwan(2017) analyzes that Koreans generally have a low level of trust in the police. In addition, research was conducted on the relationship between demographic variables such as age, gender, education level, and marital status and police trust. In the case of demographic characteristics, groups with high household income generally showed high trust in the police[21][33][34], whereas Jang Hyun-seok(2013) found that the group with low household income showed high trust in the police. There is also a research result that trust is high[20]. Looking at these preceding studies, it is difficult to find studies on crime prevention, trust in police organizations, and trust in police officers, which are the basic activities of autonomous police.

Hypothesis 1: Autonomous police patrol activities will have a (+)positive effect on police trust.

Hypothesis 2: Autonomous police's activities to create a crime prevention environment will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.

Hypothesis 3: Autonomous police's activities to maintain order will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Research model and hypothesis

In recent years, in Korea, as the demand for security has gradually increased and the contact between the police and residents has increased following the destruction of the autonomous police system, cooperation between the police and residents has become an indispensable factor in coping with crime problems. However, residents' cooperation with the police is possible only when residents can trust and feel close to the police, but it seems that the police and residents have not yet reached a mutually organic relationship in our society. Therefore, accurately grasping the consciousness of the residents is very important for managing the image of the police and performing their duties smoothly.

In this context, many democratic countries have come to pay much attention to the consciousness and attitude of the people toward the police. This, in the end, is directly related to the perception that it is possible to obtain sufficient trust, support, and cooperation from the residents only when it is accurately grasped how the general public perceives and evaluates the police, and through this, the smooth execution and development of police work can be pursued.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between crime prevention activities of autonomous police and police trust. Therefore, in this study, the dependent variable was trust in the police, and the independent variables were constituted by the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police such as patrolling, creating a crime prevention environment, and maintaining order. And demographic characteristics were composed of gender, age, education, and occupation.

As described above, if the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable and the components for each variable is schematized, a research model such as <Figure 1> can be presented, and the hypotheses are presented in <Table 1>.

Figure 1. Research model.




Table 1. The hypothesis of the research model.

Hypothesis	Autonomous police's crime prevention activities will affect trust in the police.
Hypothesis 1	Autonomous police patrol activities will have a (+)positive effect on police trust.
Hypothesis 2	Autonomous police's activities to create a crime prevention environment will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.
Hypothesis 3	Autonomous police's activities to maintain order will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.

Table 2. Measurement of variables.

Patrolling	Patrol activities in the area When 112 is reported, the police are dispatched to the scene Resident participation in crime reduction activities Intensive patrol of crime-prone areas according to the season
Creating a crime prevention environment	CCTV installation Street light installation Safe return activity Convenience store emergency call
Maintaining order	Traffic enforcement Environmental crime enforcement Enforcement on school violence Police questioning
Police trust	Responsiveness Kindness Fairness Swiftness

3.2. Data sources

In this study, an empirical study was conducted through a self-administered questionnaire survey to identify the relationship between self-governing police activities and police trust for community problem solving. This survey was conducted for a total of 345 citizens of Suwon from March 2nd to March 15th, 2023, and a total of 320 of them were used for the final analysis, excluding insincere response data.

3.3. Description of variables

Responsiveness, kindness, fairness, and promptness were used as indicators for the dependent variable, police trust, and as independent variables, the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police were patrolled, crime prevention environment created, and order maintenance indicators. The survey items consisted of patrol activities in the area, When 112 is reported, the police are dispatched to the scene, Resident Participation in Crime Reduction Activities, Intensive patrol of crime-prone areas according to the season for patrol, CCTV installation, street light installation, safe return activity, Convenience store emergency call for crime prevention environment, and traffic enforcement, environmental crime enforcement, enforcement on school violence, police questioning for maintaining order.

3.4. Statistical analysis

The statistical analysis was performed using SPSS 29.0. First, a correlation analysis examined the relationship among the variables. Second, to verify the validity of the variables, a factor analysis was conducted, followed by a calculation of Cronbach's α through a reliability analysis. Third, a regression analysis identified the causal relationship between Autonomous police's crime prevention activities and Police trust.

4. Results

4.1. Feasibility and reliability analysis

In this study, the validity of the construct validation scale of survey items refers to how accurately the measuring tool measures the concept to be measured, and reliability refers to the ability to obtain the same measurement value when the measurement is repeated for the same concept.

For this purpose, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed for each item. The principal component analysis method was used, and the rotation of the factor matrix was based on the results of the varimax rotation method among orthogonal rotation methods. As a result of analyzing the validity and reliability of social capital and organizational commitment measurement scales, overall, the factor loading of all items on the corresponding scale exceeded 0.6, and as a result of reliability analysis, Cronbach's alpha coefficient of all scales showed a relatively high reliability of over 0.8. Factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which indicates the amount of variance explained by a factor, were selected. In the case of factor loadings, the factor loadings were generally higher than 0.5, indicating a significant variable.

And the KMO value, which indicates the degree to which the correlation between variables is explained by other variables, was generally high at .913, and the Bartlett sphericity test value, which indicates the suitability of factor analysis, was 3710.766 and the significance probability was .001., it can be said that the use of factor analysis is appropriate and there are common factors.

The results of regression analysis were conducted to analyze the impact of crime prevention activities(patrol, crime prevention environment, maintenance of order) of autonomous police on police trust.

The crime prevention activities of the autonomous police, patrol, and the creation of a crime prevention environment were found to have a significant effect on police trust at the significance level of 0.001, and the explanatory power of the sample regression was 50.4%. When comparing the influence of each factor on police trust, patrol($\beta=.502$) and crime prevention environment creation($\beta=.218$) appeared in the order. Maintaining order($p<.154$) did not appear to affect police trust.

Table 3. Results of regression analysis(dependent variable: police trust).

Dependent variable Independent variable	Police trust			
	b	Std.E	β	t
Patrolling	.586	.063	.502**	9.236
Creating a crime prevention environment	.235	.059	.218**	4.000
Maintaining order	.079	.055	.073	1.429
R ²	.504**			
F	107.006**			

Note: * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

4.2. Hypothesis test results

As a result of analysis on the impact of crime prevention activities(patrol, crime prevention environment creation, order maintenance) of autonomous police on police trust, it was found that patrol and crime prevention environment creation had a significant effect, and order maintenance No significant effect was found.

Through the above research results, the crime prevention activities of autonomous police that affect police trust can be summarized as patrol and crime prevention environment creation. In addition, the acceptance and rejection of the hypotheses set in this study are shown in <Table 4> below. 'The patrol activities of the H1 autonomous police will have a positive effect on trust in the police.', 'H2 autonomous police's activities to create a crime prevention environment will have a positive effect on trust in the police.' were adopted. 'The order maintenance activities of the H3 autonomous police will have a positive effect on trust in the police.' was rejected.

Table 4. Results of hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis	Autonomous police's crime prevention activities will affect trust in the police.	Δ
Hypothesis 1	Autonomous police patrol activities will have a (+)positive effect on police trust.	O
Hypothesis 2	Autonomous police's activities to create a crime prevention environment will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.	O
Hypothesis 3	Autonomous police's activities to maintain order will have a (+)positive effect on trust in the police.	X

Note: Abbreviations. O, Acceptance of the hypothesis; X, Rejection of the hypothesis.

5. Conclusion

In the case of citizens, a higher level of trust is formed in voluntary contact with the police, rather than involuntary contact with the police due to involuntary situations such as drunk driving, unsuspecting checkups, and traffic signal violations[27]. Therefore, in order for the police to expand community policing activities, citizen participation committees where citizens can voluntarily participate in police activities, private-centered crime prevention and comprehensive problem-solving activities, citizen-friendly police activities and various protection activities for the underprivileged, It is necessary to expand the strategy to achieve CO-production by expanding interactive communication with the local community or citizens through social media[35].

In the case of hypotheses 1 and 2 of this study, it was found that the perception of the crime prevention activities of the local police had an effect on the trust in the police. This result can be interpreted as the fact that the crime prevention activities of the autonomous police recognized by the citizens are as important as the patrol work style and the creation of the crime prevention environment. In order to secure trust in the police, it is judged that the role of police officers is also important along with the promotion of crime prevention activities of police organizations.

It can be seen that crime originates from the desire to commit a criminal act and the conviction that it can do so, and it is possible to commit a crime if either one of the criminal desire and the opportunity to commit is eliminated. As the duty of the police is to protect the life and property of the people, it is the mission given to the police to maintain the peaceful life of the people through crime prevention.

In order to actively prevent crime, it is necessary to support visible police activities, such as strengthening intensive patrols using foot patrols, motorcycles, and patrol cars, as well as supporting technical equipment for effective arrest. CCTV has a very useful value in that it can be used as an efficient means of arresting criminals by filling the public security vacuum caused by insufficient police manpower at the present time and converting data into a database. In addition, more practical equipment support should be provided by securing the police's own budget to expand the development and expansion of a customized work system tailored to the local situation and to strengthen cooperative public order such as autonomous security guards and child guards.

As the police's response to crime is directly related to the public's trust in the police, the National Police Agency needs to develop various policies and systems for crime prevention. In addition, efforts must be made to establish an appropriate system through periodic internal and external public safety monitoring.

One of the most basic activities of the police is crime prevention. Due to the nature of the role of the police, it limits the rights, duties and freedoms of the people to some extent, so public trust is an essential condition. The role of the police to improve the quality of life of citizens through police service, and trust through this, should not be limited to the police activity.

In the case of Hypothesis 3, which was rejected in this study, when police activities are exposed in public places where there are many residents, it gives residents anxiety that there is a crime problem in the surrounding area[36], resulting in a decrease in trust in the police. There is a possibility that it could not have had a positive effect, but the design of this study did not sufficiently explain it, so an in-depth analysis through follow-up studies is required.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	HL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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