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A Study on the Utilization of the National Occupational Competency Standards for the Development of Security Field

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Abstract

Purpose: In Korea's industrial sites, the state standardizes the skills required to perform duties and supports to foster the field-oriented talents, yet the use of the National Occupational Competency Standards in the security industry is very inadequate.

Method: In this study, the current status of the security industry and the operation of the National Occupational Competency Standards are reviewed, and the National Occupational Competency Standards for the development of the security industry are conducted based on the interviews with the experts applying to the security industry using the National Occupational Competency Standards towards the efficient use of the Standards.

Results: In the security industry, the National Occupational Competency Standards are not functioning properly given the dual contents provided by the existing Security Services Industry Act and the new National Occupational Competency Standards. Accordingly, it is required to change the legislative system which can more actively utilize the Security Services Industry Act and National Occupational Competency Standards and further improve the National Occupational Competency Standards.

Conclusion: For the development of the security industry, this study presents the following conclusions. First, in the security industry and the NCS-based education system, the curriculum of the Security Services Industry Act and the education system of the NCS must be unified to reestablish the curriculum. Second, the classification of the duties of the Security Services Industry Act and the level of the NCS according to the occupational rating must be reestablished in a systematic and progressive direction by comprehensively examining the industrial reality and foreign cases. Third, it must be redeveloped as a comprehensive and efficient model by collecting the opinions of experts in each field for the inspection of the security industry and the NCS-based system.

Keywords: Security Industry, Security Services Industry Act, National Occupational Competency Standards, Security Guard Training, Security and Guard

1. Introduction

Human beings have developed their own capability to defend and protect themselves in order to promote individual physical security after birth[1].

Such a desire for safety is manifested as an increase in the people's desire for safety along with the various social problems behind the industrial development and economic revival. Accordingly, the security industry is taking a large leap forward.

Recently, the issue of safety has spread and shared not only in Korea but also around the world[2][3].

Based upon the establishment of standards for each industry classification, which has been raised across various industries, the government invests a tremendous amount of money to

develop the National Occupational Competency Standards and utilizes them for the industrial sites and education.

The government has established the National Competency Standards(NCS); hereafter, “NCS”) to shift the theory-oriented education towards the practicality-oriented education, aiming to realize a competency-oriented society, and is also developing and operating a curriculum to establish and settle the NCS[4].

The occupational competency standard refers to the practical performance capability required for the worker to effectively perform his or her duties within the job[5].

There is also a risk that the results of the NCS development may not be appropriate for the relevant industrial site due to problems such as the selection of an appropriate development institution, the appropriate composition of 12 people, and the level of agreement[6][7].

Accordingly, in this study, the operational status of the NCS in the field of security is examined and the problems drawn based on the opinions of experts in this regard are analyzed. In addition, the purpose of this study is to present a developmental plan for the analyzed contents.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Status of the security industry

Many studies in the United States find the foundation of the development of private security in the police's incompetence and the fear of crime[8][9][10][27][28].

In Korea, the security industry has achieved a rapid development as the demand for private security has increased together with the industrial development under the stable operation of the national police[11][12][29][30].

In their study called for changes in how private security is viewed by the privatization of the government-led security system, and by improving its self-capabilities, taking some of the power away from the government, and by private/public collaborations[13][14][15][16][17].

In Korea, the Security Services Industry Act was enacted in 1976, and the private security sector has achieved such a remarkable growth through various international events.

Table 1. Current status of security companies(unit: companies).

	No. of entities	Facility guard	Convoy guard	Personal protection	Machine guard	Special guard	Total
2020	4,438	4,355	29	603	146	132	5,265

Note: National police agency.

Table 2. Current status of security guard(unit : people).

Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
No. of security guard	147,049	156,066	158,020	157,774	164,014

Note: National police agency.


If the security work is expanded, it will lead to greater growth, and it will be able to contribute to advancement and specialization as it will not only stimulate the economy but also promote the globalization of the company[18][19].

2.2. Understanding the national occupational competency standards

What are the National Occupational Competency Standards?

The National Occupational Competency Standards” refers to the state’s systematization of the knowledge, skills, and literacy required to perform duties in the industrial field by industry sector and level[31].

Figure 1. National occupational competency standards.



In the National Occupational Competency Standards, the security industry may be viewed as a job definition for each subcategory of security and guard.

Security is a combination of any and all safety activities which prevent and respond to various risks to protect the property, life, and body of a specific customer[32].


Guard is the job of protecting the life, body, and property of the person being guarded from against various harm and assisting them in maintaining their honor and dignity[32].

3. Research Method

3.1. Frame of the research

In order to realize the purpose of this study, the basic data were collected through the literature analysis related to the research data, and based on the collected data, expert interviews were conducted to derive the improvement plans.

Figure 2. Research process.



3.2. Research participants

In order to carry out the purpose of this study, as for the research participants who participated in the expert interviews, 4 managers of security companies were selected by using the National Occupational Competency Standards as the research subjects.

As of December 2021, there are 4,438 security companies, yet among them, the number of institutions using the National Occupational Competency Standards tool is small, and hence, the managers of 4 institutions were selected as the participants in this study, and the study was conducted accordingly.

Table 3. Research participants.

Name	Gender	Age	Academic background	NCS activity related field	Position
JJH	Male	42	University graduate	Training, recruitment	Manager
KBM	Male	56	Community college graduate	Recruitment, promotion, training	Director
LJS	Female	44	University graduate	Training, education	General manager
PSH	Male	51	University graduate	Training, recruitment	Executive director

4. Research Result

The State shall formulate the National Skill Standards and endeavor to establish and implement necessary policies so as to make qualifications managed and operated on the basis thereof[33].

Furthermore, despite the fact that the government establishes a qualification system based on the National Occupational Competency Standards and uses them [34], given the contents of the Security Services Industry Act, which may be said to be the real law of the security industry, and the dual contents, the qualifications related to the security industry are not managed and operated amicably[20][21][22][23][24].

In the security industry, it is required to establish an education system which maximizes the effectiveness of education by unifying the NCS-based education system with the curriculum of the Security Services Industry Act.

The opinions of the research participants through the expert interviews are summarized as follows.

Expert JJH

“If there is an incentive such as the mandatory hiring of security guards who have completed a course evaluation type qualification course like a security instructor, the security association will try to carry out the courses in accordance with the NCS somehow.”

Expert KBM

“When the NCS program was designed, it was evaluated that there are many parts made around the university situation as the NCS was created with a focus on the university professors. From the perspective of a training institution other than a university, it is difficult to keep up with the problem of inadequate budget.”

Expert LJS

“It is very difficult to operate the NCS training course given the excessive equipment conditions which are far from the reality of the industry.”

Expert PSH

“The security guard training in the security industry is divided into the general security guard and the special security guard and training is conducted, and hence, the relatively small proportion of the general security guard is personal protection service, guard service, and the machine security work security guard are not receiving adequate education. Hence, it is thought that a more effective education system may be formed if the Security Services Industry Act's security guard training is improved by classifying the NCS by level according to the occupational rating.”

Expert KBM

“The NCS' capability unit, capability unit element, and training standards are made at a level which is too difficult for the elderly facility security guards, who account for more than 90% of the security industry, and hence, there is a difficulty for the field security guards to use.

5. Conclusion

One of the basic roles of the government is ensuring safety of the people [25].

In Korea, the police centric public security and private security to supplement this have achieved much development.

Scholarship on crime prevention and safety had tended to focus on the role and effectiveness of law enforcement responses [26][35].

The security industry is at a point in time where it is required to find ways to develop the current system along with the quantitative growth. In this respect, it is intended to present a progressive improvement plan using the security and guard fields of the National Occupational Competency Standards system to address the problems related to education of the security guards, which have been suggested in many studies.

First, in the security industry and the NCS-based education system, the curriculum of the Security Services Industry Act and the education system of the NCS must be unified to redevelop the curriculum.

Second, the classification of the duties of the Security Services Industry Act and the level of the NCS according to the occupational rating must be redeveloped in a systematic and progressive direction by comprehensively examining industrial reality and foreign cases.

Third, it must be redeveloped as a comprehensive and efficient model by collecting the opinions of experts in each field for the inspection of the security industry and the NCS-based system.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	JH	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on the Integration Plan for the North and South Korean Police Systems in Preparations for the Unification

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Abstract

Purpose: To compare and analyze the differences in the purpose, class structure, and the organization of the police in North and South Korea. Thereafter, an analysis was performed as to how West Germany and East Germany completed their integration, each of which had adopted different police systems, among the overseas cases. The purpose of this analysis is to present a standardized integration plan for the integration of the North and South Korean police organizations and the integration of police laws based on this analysis.

Method: Based on a review of the previous studies related to the integration plan of the North and South Korean police after unification, a case analysis of how the police force was operated and integrated during the unification process in Germany, and a comparison of the purpose, class structure, number of people, and organizational structure of the North and South Korean police. The differences between the North and South Korean police organizations and police laws were analyzed accordingly.

Results: As examined in the case of police integration in Germany, it was possible to recognize the different circumstances, such as the history and purpose of the police in North and South Korea, and find out the issues that could arise in the process of integration, so that the Koreans could come up with a plan for integrating the police organization and the police system between the two Korea.

Conclusion: After the unification, for the unification of the South and North Korean police, transfer to general administrative agencies, such as railways and resident registration, which the North Korean police are in charge of, will need to be strengthened.

Keywords: North Korean Police, Social Safety, Police System, Police Law, Police Integration

1. Introduction

The concept of police may be classified into the concept of police under the continental law and the common law, where the continental law police are formed based on the scope and nature of their activation on the premise of sovereignty. It may be said that the North and South Korean police have developed around the continental legal system. The police force in South Korea began after liberation in 1945, yet the enactment of the Police Act in 1991 served as an opportunity for its revolutionary development, such as the independence of the National Police Agency as an external agency of the Ministry of the Interior. It may be said that the North Korean police also began after liberation. Immediately after the liberation, the security in North Korea was maintained by the Soviet Army. With the establishment of the North Korean regime in 1948, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which exercised its police function, was absorbed into the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is a part of the Cabinet. After division, West Germany was a federal state consisted of 11 states with autonomy, and each state operated its own police system. Whereas, East Germany's police organization established a centralized control system over the whole

country as a national police system. As such, West and East Germanies, each of which had adopted different police systems, attempted to draw implications through the case analysis on what processes and systems were available to integrate them. The main job of the South Korean police is to protect the lives and property of the people, yet the North Korean police may be seen as security guards for their Party and their leader. The South Korean police are strongly recognized for their independence in their work, but the North Korean police have a political bureau belonging to the Workers' Party within their Ministry of Social Safety, which monitors and controls the Social Security Agency, and hence, does not guarantee work independence. Furthermore, the South Korean police organization is consisted of the National Police Agency, provincial and local police departments, police stations, and police departments and police patrol stations. The police class in South Korea is consisted of 11 classes, whereas the police class in North Korea is consisted of 21 classes. As such, the differences were analyzed by comparing the North and South Korean police systems and police laws.

Hence, in this study, the issues which may arise in the process of the police integration were derived by analyzing the police system between the North and South Korea based on the case of police integration in Germany. Based on which, it is intended to present the basic data for the enactment of the Integrated Police Act, which guarantees the basic rights of the people and the procedural transparency.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Previous studies

The following is a review of previous studies related to the integration plan of the North and South police after unification. First, Yoonho Lee(1993) compared the police system in North and South Korea in preparations for their unification for the first time in "Inter-Korean Unification and the Police" [1]. Dongryeol Yoo(2001) analyzed the transition process, function, and organizational system of the North Korean police in the "Analysis of the North Korean Police System" [2]. Jeongbae Park(2015) presented a plan to reduce the police force in North Korea after the unification and foster a unified police force through the establishment of the Graduate School of Unification in the "Unification Plan for Legislative Unification of Police Manpower Integration in preparations for Unification" [3]. Jinhyeok Kim(2017), in the "Measures to train Security Personnel in North Korea After Unification," suggested the improvements in the recruitment of police officers, reinforcement of unification education, and establishment of North Korean police training programs through the establishment of the North Korean Police Agency in North Korea after unification [4]. Yoonchang Shin(2017) claimed that the 3-step process of preparing, implementing, and finalizing the inter-Korean police in the "Comparison of inter-Korean security systems and integration plan for unification" should be followed as a plan to integrate inter-Korean police, and in the implementation stage, after analyzing the prediction of the security demand, the establishment of the foundation for a centralized national police was suggested [5]. Seongho Jae(2017) presented conditions for reappointing police personnel during unification, restructuring of the North Korean police, dispatch of the South Korean police, and the need for reforming the laws and regulations in the "Measures for Re-appointment of Police Forces in North Korea During the Unification" [6]. Seonwoong Cho(2019) presented the task of integrating the inter-Korean police organization legislation and the inter-Korean police operation legislation in "The Tasks for the Integration of the Inter-Korean Police System" [7]. Yeongyun Jung(2019) compared the current inter-Korean police system with the police law in "A Study on the Cooperation Plan of the Inter-Korean Police in Preparations for Unification," then presented a plan for cooperation between the North and South police in preparations for unification [8].

2.2. The German case of the police integration

Newly born after division, West Germany was a federal state which consisted of 11 states with autonomy, and each state operated its own police organization and carried out police activities appropriate to the local circumstances under the Basic German Law. In West Germany, the federal level of police power was utilized in the cases which required the federal government to deal with, such as international criminal investigations. In order to carry out its duties, the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency, the Federal Border Service, and the Federal Constitutional Protection Agency were established under the Ministry of the Interior to play their roles. The East German police organization abolished the state itself in 1952 as a national police system and introduced the concept of 'provincial' to establish a centralized system of control over the whole country. The East German police were very powerful and had a high status, and their scope of work was very wide. They were in charge of the tasks closely related to the residents' life, such as resident registration and corrections, and was able to have strong control over the residents. In 1990, 45 years after division, East and West Germany formed a unified state, yet Germany suffered political, social, and cultural turmoils for a considerable period of time following the unification due to insufficient preparations for unification. In particular, from the viewpoint of West Germany, the mass immigration of East German residents, which began full fledgedly in the 1980s, caused instability in security. According to the unification treaty, all public officials in East Germany were subject to re-examination, and they were dealt with in the form of early retirement, dismissal, and continued appointment after re-education after undergoing a rigorous examination of qualifications for public service. All high-ranking police officers in East Germany (supervisor level and above) were replaced by those from West Germany. In the case of low-ranking police officers, if they passed the qualification examination, they were allowed to continue serving as a police officer after completing certain training [3].

Examining the police integration process in the Berlin area, the facilities and equipments of 11 police stations in East Berlin and 27 police stations operating thereunder remained intact. Following the organizational integration, there was also a human level integration in which police officers from West and East Germany were exchanged and assigned to each police station in Berlin. In 1990, some police officers from West Berlin were exchanged for the East Berlin area, and some police officers from East Berlin were exchanged for the West Berlin area. Together with such personnel arrangement, the East and West Berlin police officers were mixed in the patrol cars, and 425 police stations were installed in the East Berlin area for security stability, and efforts were made, such as by deploying the veteran West Berlin police officers. This was considered to have contributed to the adaptation of police officers from East Germany to the new system. In the process of integrating the police between North and South Korea, it ought to be noted that West Germany took over the East German police powers under the Unification Treaty, but did not try to reorganize the East German police organization in the West German police system, yet instead maintained the East German police infrastructures to the extent possible to resolve the chaos. Furthermore, it is claimed that the East German police officers took measures such as exchange work so that they could promptly adapt to the new system and the West German police organization. Naturally, there will be limitations in applying the case of police integration in Germany, which is a federal system, to the case of South and North Korea. Analyzing how West Germany used its police force to overcome the chaotic situation of unification and through what process to achieve police integration with East Germany would have great implications for achieving police integration in the future [9].

2.3. History of the North and South Korean police

2.3.1. Changes in the South Korean police

The inception of the South Korean police started after the liberation in 1945, but it was the enactment of the Police Act in 1991 that which served as an opportunity for the dramatic development. The history of police in South Korea was classified as the period from the liberation

of 1945 until before the establishment of the government in 1948 as the period of the U.S. Military Government. During this period, the area of police activity was reduced compared to the Japanese colonial period due to the depolicing work, yet it played a major role in laying the foundation for the founding of the nation. However, the liquidation of the pro-Japanese police during the Japanese colonial period was insufficient. The characteristics of the police after the establishment of the government in 1948 and before the enactment of the Police Act in 1991 may be seen as the period when the police began to operate from an independent position for the first time in history as an independent country. For the first time, the police, who had served during the colonial rule and military administration, were tasked with protecting the life, body and property of the people as well as the existence and well-being of the nation. After the enactment of the Police Act in 1991, a characteristic of the police was such that the National Police Agency was established as an independent external agency belonging to the Minister of the Interior, and the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency was upgraded to an independent administrative agency. In order to reflect the will of the people and realize political neutrality, a police committee was established to deliberate and decide on major policies related to police administration. In 1996, it was transferred to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (currently, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) of the Korea Coast Guard, and in 1999, 'hearing control' was introduced in each police station across the country. In 2000, the 'Cyber Terror Response Center' was established in the National Police Agency to actively respond to cyber crimes. In 2006, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province Autonomous Police was launched. In 2021, the autonomous police system was implemented across the nation.

2.3.2. Changes in the North Korean police

Immediately following the liberation, the security in North Korea was maintained by the Soviet Army. The Soviet Army, which began to invade North Korea in 1945, ordered the dismantling of all armed units in North Korea, and for security order in each region, a "security force" with a stipulated number of people was organized in consultation with the Soviet military command and placed under the command of the Security Bureau [10]. After the establishment of the North Korean regime in 1948, the Internal Affairs Bureau of the North Korean People's Committee, which exercised its police powers, was absorbed into the Ministry of Home Affairs, which may be said to be the first North Korean police organization. Immediately after the establishment of the regime, North Korea established the Central Security Caucus School under the Ministry of Home Affairs to train police officers, and Prime Minister Kim Il-sung said, "The mission to protect the government of the Uri Party and the Republic, protect the lives and property of the people, and maintain social order" and suggested the mission of the North Korean police. During the formation of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1951, North Korea integrated the Political Security Bureau and other divisions to achieve independence for social safety. Social safety is evaluated to make wartime security work more efficient, such as controlling dissident resistance forces during war. Separated and independent from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Social Safety was incorporated into the Ministry of Home Affairs in October 1952 after 1 year and 7 months. The function of social safety was transferred to the Political Security Bureau. The reason as to why social safety was integrated into the Ministry of Home Affairs was because it caused confusion in the security work due to the coexistence of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 1962, North Korea newly established the social safety department and transferred the police work, which is a central function of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Hence, the Ministry of Home Affairs carried out management of land, forests, and lakes, etc., and the Ministry of the Interior was renamed the Ministry of Land Management in 1964 and disappeared from the Cabinet [11]. The Ministry of Social Security was renamed as the Ministry of Social Security in 1972 when the Cabinet was reorganized into a government official with the adoption of the new North Korean Socialist Constitution. In 1973, the Political Security Bureau under the Ministry of Social Security was separated and became independent as the National Political Security Agency. Accordingly,

the Ministry of Social Security carried out police duties such as maintaining public order, and the Ministry of National Security and Security divided the roles of the secret police by having them perform the duties of the secret police such as political inspection of North Koreans and state institutions[12]. In 2020, North Korea renamed the 'Ministry of People's Security' to 'Social Safety' in accordance with the 'Order on Reorganization of the Military Command System to Match the Mission and Mission of the Security Agency.' Furthermore, the 'People's Internal Affairs Army', an armed force directly under the Ministry of People's Security, was changed to 'Social Security Army.'

3. Integration Plan for the North and South Korean Police System

3.1. Comparison of the South and North Korean police system

The key task of the South Korean police is to protect the lives and property of the people, while the North Korean police defend and defend the Party and the leader. Although the South Korean police are strongly recognized for their independence in their work, there is a difference in that the political bureau belonging to the Workers' Party of Korea exists within the North Korean Police Department of Social Safety, which monitors and controls the Social Security Agency and does not guarantee work independence. The South Korean police organization is consisted of the National Police Agency, provincial and provincial police agencies, police stations, and police departments and police patrol stations. In South Korea, there is the Police Officer Duty Execution Act, whereas in North Korea, the People's Security Enforcement Act and the Administrative Punishment Act exist. South Korea is divided into legislative, judicial, and executive branches according to the separation of powers. The police organization operates under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security under the executive branch, yet in North Korea there are legislative bodies such as the Supreme People's Assembly, prosecutors' offices and courts, and the Cabinet, judicial bodies, and administrative agencies. However, it may be said that it is far from the principle of separation of powers as all institutions are under the supervision and control of the Workers' Party of Korea, and many of the members are concurrently serving[13]. The South Korean police rank is consisted of a total of 11 ranks, which are magistrate chief, magistrate assistant chief, magistrate, police officer, superintendent, sergeant, lieutenant general, inspector, sergeant, sergeant, and police officer. Yet in North Korea, the police ranks are consisted of 17 ranks which are chasu(for social safety), commander-in-chief at the rank of commander, chief of staff, lieutenant general, commander-in-chief, lieutenant general, lieutenant general, lieutenant colonel, lieutenant general, lieutenant assistant captain, senior captain, lieutenant, second lieutenant, sergeant, sergeant major, sergeant major.

Table 1. Ranking structure of the North Korean police.

Head of state	Commanders	Officers		Lieutenant warriors	
				Sergeant	Soldier/warrior
Chasu	Chief commander	Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Special sergeant	Upper ranked soldier
	Assistant commander	Second lieutenant	Second lieutenant	Sergeant	Middle ranked soldier
	Mid commander	Third lieutenant	Third lieutenant	Assistant sergeant	Bottom ranked soldier
	Commander	Fourth lieutenant	Fourth lieutenant	Staff sergeant	Warrior

There are a total of 120,000 police officers in South Korea, including police officers and compulsory police officers.

It is estimated that there are approximately 180,000 North Korean police or social safety agents. There are 80,000 pure security guards, 80,000 engineers from the 7th and 8th bureaus, and 20,000 guards from the Guard Training Bureau. In particular, although not a member of the National Security Agency, the number of civilians(workers) working in organizations under the

social safety agency is about 120,000, and the total number of people is estimated to be around 300,000, respectively[14].

Table 2. The size of the social safety agency's personnel.

Social security agency		80,000 people
Social safety army	General bureau 7	50,000 people
	General bureau 8	30,000 people
	Security training bureau's security guards	20,000 people
Total		180,000 people
Citizens		120,000 people
Total		300,000 people

3.2. Integration plan for the North and South Korean police organization

The Social Safety, Agency which may be called the North Korean police organization, does not have the highest goal of protecting the safety and human rights of the people, but instead, aims to protect the security of the North Korean system by controlling the lives of the people. In a unified North and South Korea, where individual rights and freedoms must be guaranteed to the maximum based on a free and democratic basic order, the current North Korean police organization may be said to be a factor that should be generally excluded. In other words, based on the current South Korean police system, transplanting a new police organization into the North Korean region may be said to be the biggest task of integrating the two Koreas. There are factors that must be considered in order to reliably implement these tasks. The duties performed by the police in South Korea are stipulated in Article 2 of the Police Officer Duty Execution Act, and the organization is organized accordingly. However, if you look at the organizational system of social safety, you can see that the tasks related to railways and resident registration are also being performed by general administrative agencies or special judicial police, not by the current police in South Korea. In light of which, in the fields where there may be excessive restrictions on the general life of the people, the police should transfer their duties to general administrative agencies rather than take charge of them.

It would be necessary to consider introducing the recently introduced autonomous police system to North Korea as well. Implementing a self-governing police system that matches the situation in North Korea would be easy to obtain cooperation from the residents and also to provide appropriate security services to the North Korean residents[15]. In the early phase of the unification, maintaining the national police system for the North Korean region and gradually transferring it to the autonomous police system is considered a desirable method. After unification, it is considered very difficult to maintain security in North Korea with only South Korean police force, and it may be said that the use of North Korean police force is inevitably required[16]. Hence, it would be necessary to apply the same process that Germany went through when re-appointing the former East German police officers to the re-appointment of North Korean police officers. The re-appointment of North Korean police officers, that is, the Social Security Agency, will have to go through a re-examination. In the process of re-examination, they ought to be able to be re-appointed only if they demonstrate a thorough understanding of the free and democratic basic order and reflects on the police officers who were controlling and oppressing human rights in the past. The re-education of the re-appointed North Korean police should also take place at the same time. The most important education which ought to be given is to respect the basic liberal and democratic order, to respect the people's basic

rights, and to understand the rule of law. Furthermore, education on the legal knowledge required to perform police duties should be provided at the same time[17].

3.3. Integration plan for the North and South Korean police legal system

As a general issue facing the North Korean police system, the clearness of the punishment rules is not guaranteed and control is applied to all areas of residents' lives, and hence, the human rights of North Koreans are highly likely to be violated. Furthermore, there are few procedural restrictions on the handling and enforcement of law and order violators[18]. Hence, the main discussion should be on how to integrate the police action system so that such factors are consistent with the guarantee of the basic rights of the people as much as possible, the ideological value of a unified nation, and the practical rule of law[19]. Since the South Korea led unification was assumed, it may be said that it is clear that a unified police action law should be enacted and that South Korea's legal system should be the main content. Since the People's Security Enforcement Act was enacted for the purpose of maintaining the North Korean system and controlling the people, it is necessary to specify the basic rights and human rights of the people as its sole purpose in enacting the Integrated Police Action Act. Furthermore, transparency in the procedural aspect should be strengthened[20]. The People's Security Enforcement Act has a strong character in terms of excessively restricting and controlling the behavior of residents, and some regulations are too comprehensive and vague in meaning, thus violating the predictability of the people against the principle of clarity. Hence, it is necessary to newly establish detailed requirements for such regulations. Under the People's Security Enforcement Act, there is no obligation to notify the right of refusal to make a statement, and one cannot refuse to accompany them voluntarily. Furthermore, it is pointed out as an issue, such as the security personnel being able to detain a means of transportation without a warrant[21]. When the Integrated Police Action Act is enacted, it is necessary to review these procedures and the lack of requirements in general to ensure the rights of the people. Examining the issues with the Citizens Registration Act, the government office that conducts civil registration is a social safety equivalent to that of the Korean police, and hence, it has a strong controlling character. When the Civil Registration Act and the Resident Registration Act are enacted, the police agency will have to abolish the civil registration business and transfer the competent department to a general administrative agency.

4. Conclusion

Examining the transition process of the police in North and South Korea, the police in South Korea started after liberation, but it was the enactment of the Police Act in 1991 that led to epochal development, such as the independence of the National Police Agency as an external agency. It may be said that the North Korean police also started after liberation. With the establishment of the North Korean regime in 1948, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which exercised police functions, was absorbed into the Ministry of Home Affairs, and it may be said that the Ministry of Home Affairs was the first official North Korean police organization. Before the reunification, West Germany was a federal state consisted of the states with autonomy, and each state operated a police system. In West and East Germany, which operated different police systems, a case study was conducted to find out what processes and systems were used to integrate the police. Analyzing the differences between the North and South Korean police, the South Korean police aim to protect the lives and property of the people, while the North Korean police focus on the security for their Party and their leader as their key tasks. The North Korean police have a political bureau belonging to the Workers' Party of Korea within the police organization to monitor and control police officers, and hence, their work independence is not guaranteed. Furthermore, the North Korean police are closely related to the military, and the rank

system is different from that of the South Korean police. Based on such analysis of the differences between the police in North and South Korea, a plan for the integration of the police between the two Koreas was suggested. First, as a way to integrate the police system between the two Koreas, the North Korean police must transfer their duties to a general administrative agency because they are in charge of railway-related matters and resident registration. In the early stage of unification, the autonomous police system should be introduced gradually while maintaining the national police system for the North Korean region. In order to utilize North Korean police personnel, they must be re-appointed after re-examination. The next step is to unify the inter-Korean police system. Since the unification assumes the South Korea-led unification, the South Korean legal system should be enacted as one of the main police operation laws. In enacting the Integrated Police Action Act, it would be necessary to specify for the purposes of guaranteeing the people's basic rights, and the transparency in terms of the procedural aspect will need to be strengthened. Furthermore, there are many flaws in the North Korean Police Action Act, such as incomplete procedures and requirements, and hence, it would be necessary to review such matters in general and create new provisions towards the direction of guaranteeing the rights of the people.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	NB	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Implications of the Ukrainian Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

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Abstract

Purpose: This paper intends to examine the background of Putin's invasion of Ukraine and to find out the implications of the Ukrainian situation on the Korean Peninsula. President Vladimir Putin has long ruled Russia by turning it into a powerful totalitarian country. At the heart of Putin's neo-Eurasian policy are the construction of the Eurasian Empire, the establishment of centralization, opposition to Western values, and hostility to the United States advocating Russia's religion and traditional values. Influenced by Lugin's philosophy, Putin had a huge vision to build a Eurasian empire to undermine U.S. hegemony by integrating former Soviet countries with Eastern Europe and putting EU countries under the protection of Russia.

Method: This paper analyzes the political implications of Ukraine's crisis on the Korean Peninsula by using Tucker's political leadership processes. Robert C. Tucker suggests the political leadership process as an authoritative diagnosis of the situation, preparing policy alternatives to solve problems, and mobilization of support to achieve it. Russia implemented a gray zone strategy to achieve its goal of restoring the lost territory in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Results: North Korea successfully launched allegedly a Hwaseong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on March 24, 2022. North Korea can also try to provoke hybrid warfare by benchmarking Russia, and the expected types of provocations are information warfare, cyber warfare, diplomatic warfare, and special warfare by demonstrating nuclear capability. The threat to hybrid warfare by North Korea includes nuclear weapons, special forces, and cyber-attacks by the strong centralized command control.

Conclusion: First, the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is expected to be difficult. Under the Ukrainian crisis, China and Russia are working together to keep the global influence of the United States in check. The United States cannot seek China's cooperation in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Because the United States is preparing a secondary boycott on China which helps Russia. Secondly, the arms race between the two Koreas will accelerate. North Korea, using Ukraine as a lesson, is stepping up its test-firing of ICBM and tactical nuclear weapons tests to strengthen its self-defense capabilities. In preparation for such heightened tensions in North Korea, South Korea needs to cooperate with the US and maintain close cooperation with its allies. Third, we should prepare for the possibility of North Korea imitating Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. North Korea is likely to carry out intelligence warfare, cyber warfare, diplomatic warfare, and special warfare using gray zone strategies.

Keywords: Ukrainian Crisis, Hybrid Warfare, Neo-Eurasianism, Greyzone, Strategy

1. Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Putin declared a special military operation against Ukraine. Special military operations, not a declaration of war, imply that Ukraine will not be regarded as an independent country. Russia and Ukraine have historically identified with the former Soviet Union. The

reason for the military operation is to protect residents of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, a pro-Russian rebel occupation.

"Russia, a descendant of Rome that prioritizes the community, has no choice but to confront the U.S. individual and materialism, a descendant of Carthage," Alexander Lugin, who greatly influenced Putin's political vision of the revival of Eurasianism, said in his paper. "To defeat evil, a conservative revolution must take place in Russia."

President Vladimir Putin has long ruled Russia by turning it into a powerful totalitarian country. At the heart of Putin's neo-Eurasian policy are the construction of the Eurasian Empire, the establishment of centralization, opposition to Western values, and hostility to the United States advocating Russia's religion and traditional values. Influenced by Lugin's philosophy, Putin had a huge vision to build a Eurasian empire to undermine U.S. hegemony by integrating former Soviet countries with Eastern Europe and putting EU countries under the protection of Russia.

This paper intends to examine the background of Putin's invasion of Ukraine and to find out the implications of the Ukrainian situation on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, Chapter 2 will briefly describe the resurrection of neo-Eurasianism and Russia's gray zone strategy. Chapter 3 will illuminate on implications of the Ukrainian crisis on the Korean Peninsula in terms of arms competition. Chapter 4, suggests a policy alternative for South Korea.

2. Resurrection of the Neo-Eurasianism and Russia's Gray Zone Strategy


Conservatism in Russia is the exact opposite of conservatism in the West. Neo-Eurasianism, dubbed Russia's imperialist conservatism politicized by Dugin, advocates state power and says individuals should obey and serve the state. Neo-Eurasianism encouraged the Ukrainian War for the integration of the Eurasian Empire. Alexander Dugin has stressed the vulnerability of Russian sovereignty caused by the encroachments of a hostile west^[1].

Neo-Eurasianism is a national movement to maintain Russia's identity against the U.S.-centered single system. Dugin emphasizes that Eurasianism can overcome the limits of U.S.-centered Atlantism and resolve the world's diverse political, cultural, religious, and racial conflict^[2]. Dugin emphasizes that there is neither a past nor a future because Atlantis accepts everything in the world in the present and the moment. They suggest that neo-Eurasianism is more important than Atlantism due to its priority on the coexistence of individual religion and ethnicity.

The reason why these neo-Eurasianism-based political ideas are dangerous is due to their blind support and love for Putin. Dugin argues that Putin should be supported entirely because he is the ideal leader. In this context, neo-Eurasianism is a Russian variant of an imperial ideology centered on European conservatives. Russia has to take initiative to secure leadership in Eurasia to restore the Soviet Union.

Robert C. Tucker suggests the political leadership process as an authoritative diagnosis of the situation, preparing policy alternatives to solve problems, and mobilization of support to achieve it^[3]. This paper analyzes the political implications of Ukraine's crisis on the Korean Peninsula by using Tucker's political leadership processes <Figure 1>.

Figure 1. Analysis of framework.



Putin believes that, unlike western liberalism, Russia should be revived through its laws and morality. He colluded with the Orthodox Church of Russia, criminalized homosexuality, and rejected the liberal ideas of the West. Putin saw the former Soviet Union as being stained with Western ideology and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets around Russia by joining NATO as a security threat to Russia. Alexander Dugin, who served as Putin's political brain, encouraged the invasion of Crimea and the annexation of the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine. The international political implications of Putin's invasion of Ukraine are as follows[4].

First, in terms of international politics, Russia's invasion of Ukraine stems from Putin's ambition to prevent NATO from moving eastward and change the security order in Europe. Second, the Ukrainian region is the former territory of the Soviet Union, and the floating port of Ukraine is the main strategic base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Third, Putin regards the Ukrainian region cannot be separated from Russia because of Soviet nostalgia.

Against this backdrop, Russia implemented a gray zone strategy to achieve its goal of restoring the lost territory in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The gray zone strategy is a method of absorbing separate areas by using strategic tools including faits accomplis, cyberattacks, political disruptions and support for insurgencies, public influence campaigns, and other attempts to skirt the established red lines that may lead to war[5]. It is disguising trained soldiers as civilians and infiltrating them into the target areas to form an anti-government group and declare an independent state. Russia is reuniting with the independent republics. Since annexing the Crimean Peninsula by force in 2014, Russia has approved the independence of the anti-government republics of Luhansk(LPR) and Donetsk(DPR) in Donbas, eastern Ukraine, and has implemented disarmament against Ukrainian government forces attacking independent areas in the name of protecting residents in the region[6]. After failing to negotiate with Western countries related to the Ukrainian crisis, Russia preemptively attacked military infrastructure in major Ukrainian cities with missiles and conducted military operations to disarm them in the early morning of Feb. 24, 2022. A special military operation is executed under the name of protecting residents living in the Donbas independent region. Russia's strategic goal to occupy Ukraine has not been achieved even about six months after waging war. Russia is facing deepening international isolation due to international economic sanctions and sky-rocketing war costs. The NATO secretary-general Stoltenberg says Russia-Ukraine War may last for a long time[7]. Depending on the outcome of the war in the future, the world order could shift from the U.S.-China bipolar system to the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral system.

3. Implications of the Ukrainian Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

About six months have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine, but Russia is suffering huge military losses without achieving its military goal of disarming Ukraine, and isolation is deepening in the international community. Putin's invasion of Ukraine has further enhanced the alliance between the United


States and NATO, and Ukraine maintains its war sustainability with supplies from NATO member states. The U.S. led economic sanctions against Russia, consolidating its global leadership while joining not only Europe but also major countries such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in sanctions against Russia <Table 1>.

Table 1. Major state's sanctions against Russia[8].

US	The Russian oil and gas embargo
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia
	Banning financial transactions of Russian sovereign wealth fund
EU	Russian steel import ban
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia
	No new investment in the Russian energy sector other than nuclear power
	Banning the export of luxury goods
UK	The Russian oil embargo
	Sanctions against 370 Russians including politician
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia
Germany	Freezing Nord Stream 2 gas project
South Korea	Retraction of treating the most favored state
	Block export of strategic goods
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia
Japan	Retraction of treating the most favored state
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia
Switzerland	Banning the export of luxury goods
	Blocking SWIFT international payment network to Russia

It has been more than six months since Russia invaded Ukraine, but the battle situation has been stalled and Russia's "short-term landslide scenario" of defeating the Ukrainian capital Kyiv in a few days turned out to be a failure <Figure 2>.

Figure 2. Russia-Ukraine crisis[9].



About 20 Russian generals commanding the invasion of Ukraine, seven of whom have already died on the front line within a month of the war. As Russia's supply system is insufficient and there are loopholes in Russia's strategy for tank warfare, the Russian occupation area is not expanding. As the battle continues, the human and physical damage on both sides is increasing, and the humanitarian crisis is becoming serious due to the growing civilian damage. The Russian leadership is poised to step up its military offensive against the eastern part of the country to quickly complete the armistice negotiations. As the arguments of both Russia and Ukraine are parallel, no progress has been made in the armistice negotiations <Table 2>.

Table 2. The fifth round of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine[10].

Russia	Ukraine
Abandonment of Ukraine's entry into NATO, demilitarization, and neutralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As a condition of neutralization, international security agreements offered by the United States, China, Britain, and France - The Security Agreement is abide by a charter of Article 5 of the NATO, in which an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against them - Once the security is guaranteed, there will be no foreign military presence in Ukraine
Officially accept Crimea as Russian territory	- Join EU
Official recognition of the independence of Donbas, Luhansk, and Donetsk	- Need to negotiate for 15 years regarding Crimea's status

If the armistice is reached through a mutual compromise, it will be separated into the western and the east, raising the possibility of a fundamental change in the Ukrainian political system in the form of an incomplete new federal state. In this chapter, I would like to illustrate the implications of the Ukrainian crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

3.1. Peace process on the Korean peninsula

The Ukrainian crisis is likely to form a Cold War structure between North Korea-China-Russia VS, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan due to conflicts between US-Russia over Ukraine amid intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China. North Korea is currently supporting Russia by shifting the responsibility for the Ukraine crisis to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). North Korea's move is interpreted as an attempt to keep the U.S. in check by strengthening ties with Russia. Recognizing that Ukraine caused a crisis by giving up its nuclear weapons, North Korea will apply the Ukrainian crisis to the rationalization of strengthening its nuclear force. North Korea successfully launched allegedly a Hwaseong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on March 24, 2022. The missile has flown a distance of 1090km for 67 minutes, rising to a maximum altitude of 6248.5km, and if the warhead weight is less than one ton, the maximum flight distance is estimated to be more than 15,000km[11].

Kim Jong Un stressed that he will continue to strengthen nuclear deterrence capability. He is willing to thoroughly prepare for a confrontation with the U.S. in the long term perspective. Chairman Kim wrote in the launch order, "Shoot bravely for the great honor of our country and the people[12]." North Korea is also expected to launch SLBMs and satellites to strengthen its defense capabilities proposed at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of DPRK. North Korea is also expected to develop a solid-fuel engine ICBM and deploy short-range tactical ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, and cruise missiles in the future.

North Korea's move expresses its intention to further delay the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula for the future peace process on the Korean Peninsula and drive it to nuclear arms control between the U.S. and North Korea[13]. Due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, North Korea seems to have scrapped the moratorium, shifting to an offensive mode against the U.S. and forcing U.S. concessions and calculation changes. North Korea's missile test can be interpreted as an attempt to increase bargaining power in negotiations with the U.S. Therefore it will serve as a barrier to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula[14][15][16][17]. North Korea will try to test the U.S. by taking advantage of the Ukrainian crisis. Even though North Korea violates a moratorium, they know that Russia and China may not agree with the US position to give sanctions on North Korea. The Ukrainian crisis represents South Korea's setback in the "New Northern Policy" and it is expected to be a decisive obstacle to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.

3.2. Arms race

The effectiveness of unmanned aerial vehicles and anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainian military in the process of advancing into Kyiv has many implications for future battlefields. A guerrilla attack by Ukraine drones paralyzed the advance of the Russian convoy by destroying the leading tanks and rear ones. This enabled the Ukrainian military to effectively respond to the Russian offensive as the U.S. reconnaissance satellite informed the Ukrainian military in advance about Russia's military movement.

In the future, North Korea is expected to further enhance drones and anti-tank weapons. The South Korean military is also expected to deploy more drones and anti-tank weapons on the front line[18].

In April 2022, the South Korean government expanded the existing Army Missile Command to the Army Missile Strategy Command and announced a legislative reform of the Air force anti-air defense missile command into an Air force missile defense command. It also reviewed the establishment of a strategic command by considering the establishment of an organization against North Korean nuclear missile threats.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said, "We completed the military reconnaissance satellite design" at the 8th congress of the Workers' Party in January 2021. He revealed his willingness to push for a major research project to develop reconnaissance satellites, including unmanned reconnaissance planes, that can secure the ability to collect information and conduct precise reconnaissance ." North Korea's five strategic weapons proposed to counter external threats include the enhancement of the artillery accuracy within the 15,000-kilometer range, the development of ballistic missiles(ICBM) using solid fuel, the possession of nuclear submarines, and SLBM, deployment of hypersonic weapons and the production of ultra-large nuclear warheads.

3.3. Responding to hybrid warfare

In the future, North Korea is more likely to apply the Hybrid War to the Korean Peninsula just as shown during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. At the time of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian military combined regular warfare, special forces, rapid response forces, and irregular warfare units. It also carried out operations centered on hybrid warfare that utilizes political warfare, information warfare, criminal activities, and non-military means. North Korea can also try to provoke a type of hybrid warfare by benchmarking Russia, and the expected types of provocations are information warfare, cyber warfare, diplomatic warfare, and special warfare by using the gray zone strategy[19][20]. There are six points in North Korea's hybrid warfare styles on the Korean Peninsula.

First, the threshold of war and the possibility of denial. There is a possibility of local provocation, which is just before 'the threshold' that does not go to war. Hybrid war is a method of attacking the opponent by denying it without reaching the threshold of an armed attack or war or turning it into a 'self-fabricated scenario' without leaving any clear evidence. Second, it is an expansion advantage. North Korea already has a means of nuclear vehicle by succeeding in launching a new type of inter-continental ballistic missile(ICBM) called "Hwaseong-17". According to a report jointly released in 2021

by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Land Institute, North Korea is expected to have about 242 state-of-the-art nuclear weapons by 2027. North Korea could threaten the use of such nuclear weapons, prevent U.S. involvement and use coercive tactics against South Korea. Third, It is an information war that uses South Korea as North Korea's nuclear weapon hostage. It may be coercive diplomacy. Fourth, it is brinkmanship, which means a technique to deliberately provoke military tensions to get a favorable position from the opponent. As seen in the Ukraine crisis, North Korea's confidence as a nuclear power could make a miscalculation that it could push the U.S. under the assumption that the U.S. will avoid confrontation with North Korea if the crisis worsens out of control. Fifth, North Korea is estimated to have about 200,000 special units. North Korea's special forces are as threatening as nuclear weapons. Their emergency missions include the establishment of a second front line in rear strategic areas in South Korea, the destruction and disturbance of C4ISR between South Korea and the U.S., and a surprise attack on islands in the West Sea. North Korea's special forces can be used as a useful tool for hybrid warfare. Sixth is cyber warfare. We need to pay attention to the fact that Russia is trying to paralyze Ukraine's national functions before military attacks. North Korea has been fostering cyber warriors since the 1990s and has about 7,000 professionals[21].

North Korea has taken more than 2 trillion won by mobilizing hackers to secure governing funds. According to an analysis by Park Dae-Ro, North Korean hackers take 2 trillion won by hacking <Table 3>[22].

Table 3. North Korea's hacking organization[23].

Hacking organization	Target of attack	Purpose
Lazarus	Government, finance, broadcasting	Social chaos, information extortion, financial gain, etc
APT 38	The global financial industry, cryptocurrency exchange, Swift (SWIFT)	
Scarcruft(APT37) & kimsuky	North Korean defectors, politicians, unification-related researchers, government agencies, and financial firms in charge of specific affairs	
Andariel	Domestic finance, defense, private companies, security solution companies, and government agencies	

The threat to hybrid warfare by North Korea includes nuclear weapons, special forces, and cyber-attacks by strong centralized command control[24][25][26][27].

4. Conclusion

The Implications of the Ukrainian crisis on the Korean Peninsula are as follows. First, the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is expected to be difficult. Under the Ukrainian crisis, China and Russia are working together to keep the global influence of the United States in check. The United States cannot seek China's cooperation in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Because the United States is preparing a secondary boycott on China which helps Russia.

Second, the arms race between the two Koreas will accelerate. North Korea, using Ukraine as a lesson, is stepping up its test-firing of ICBM and tactical nuclear weapons tests to strengthen its self-defense capabilities. North Korea has conducted the successful test-firing of SRBM, a new type of tactical guided weapon on April 16, 2022.

In preparation for such heightened tensions, South Korea needs to cooperate with the US and maintain close cooperation with its allies. Third, we should prepare for the possibility of North Korea imitating Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. North Korea is likely to carry out intelligence warfare, cyber warfare, diplomatic warfare, and special warfare using gray strategies. North Korea is expected to follow suit with Pakistan's way of becoming a nuclear weapons state.

If North Korea has hundreds of nuclear warheads, it is feared to carry out a coercive strategy on South Korea with nuclear weapons. South Korea needs to draw lessons from the Ukrainian War, apply it to the development of its self-defense capabilities, and come up with a counter-strategy that can offset North Korea's nuclear weapons by strengthening its asymmetric weapons. Due to the Taiwan dispute and the Ukrainian crisis, South Korea's involvement could become a reality. It is inevitable to expand the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in South Korea as Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy should keep China and Russia in check, and flexible countermeasures are needed against the possibility of pressuring South Korea's contribution at the alliance level such as quad cooperation. It is required to maintain military readiness posture by strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Make a significant contribution to the collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Ukraine and Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Present and Future Implications

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Abstract

Purpose: The war crimes allegedly committed against the civilian population in Ukraine by Russian military forces has generated multiple detrimental outcomes. Due to these war crimes, Russia was suspended from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) as of April 2022. Russia's alleged war crimes currently are undergoing thorough investigations by the UNHRC's Commission of Inquiry. The current humanitarian situation in war-devastated Ukraine has been somewhat under researched.

Method: This paper employs the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) theory to examine the present and future of potential application of R2P in Ukraine. Based on resources from the R2P and human rights related research by the US government, the UN and its agencies, scholars, and experts, This article analyzes the failure of Russia to observe the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants as required by the Geneva Conventions, war-affected citizens in Ukraine, as well as potential application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its implication that the international community has a duty to protect civilians against Russian aggressions.

Results: The paper finds that the potential application of R2P in Ukraine will likely face some operational challenges within the UNSC, the potential application of R2P seems feasible as it is both legitimate and justifiable action in accordance with the international law. The actual application of R2P should however carefully be considered since the nature of use of force- often does more harm than good. The potential application of R2P might result in more harm to civilians if additional casualties are generated.

Conclusion: The international community should employ additional countermeasures such as added economic sanctions. Pressure should be brought to bear until Russia decides to refrain from war and negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. The potential application of R2P in Ukraine should therefore be most carefully considered and maybe used as a last resort, to avoid and prevent a potential Third World War in coming months.

Keywords: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Humanitarian Law, Human Rights, Ukraine, Russia

1. Introduction

The Ukraine-Russian war, beginning in February 2022, is perhaps the largest European armed conflict since the Second World War. The Russian illegal aggression against Ukraine clearly is a substantial threat to the international peace and security, as well as to democracy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been deemed to be unjust, has violated the principle of distinction, undermined human right to life of Ukrainian civilian populations[1]. Indeed, Russian war crimes may have reach to the level of genocide as has been evidenced in the cities of Ukraine[2][3]. The first war crimes trial of Russian invasion was held in Ukraine[4]. Currently, the UNHRC is investigating the alleged crimes[5]. The US President, Joe Biden, stated, Russian President Putin is a "war criminal," and that he should be subjected to a war crimes trial[6]. Russia has been suspended from the UNHRC for their war crimes and human rights violations in the Ukraine since April 2022[7].

There has been number of recent studies done on the impact upon global economy of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, there has been less research done regarding the human rights, humanitarian situation in the war-devastated regions of Ukraine. This paper analyzes the current human rights situation in Ukraine, as well as the potential application of Responsibility to Protect(R2P) to the war in Ukraine.

2. The Responsibility to Protect(R2P) Theory and Practice

The evolution of the Responsibility to Protect(R2P) doctrine began with the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility(ICISS) of 2001[8]. It endorsed humanitarian intervention, by explicitly stating that the international community should, "...take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it"[9]. Simply put, the declaration on the Responsibility to Protect(R2P) can be interpreted as a collective duty to use force to intervene humanitariously or engage in humanitarian intervention when the targeted state(or human rights norm-violating state) is failing to protect its population[10]. Moreover, at the World Summit in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/1 in regards to the R2P, which included, "...clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity"[11]. The UN Security Council in early 2006, the UNSC then adopted Resolution 1674[12] which reasserted and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 from the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, stated that, "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," and commit to take collective actions through the UNSC, in accordance with the Charter, Charter VII to protect population in armed conflict situations[13]. In 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/63/L80 Rev.1, again embracing R2P, which was supported by 67 member states, including China while only seven member states rejected the resolution[14][15].

The unanimous adoption of these resolutions is largely seen as an international effort to ensure the past failures in taking collective actions to protect civilians from horrific atrocities, particularly, in the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, would never be repeated in the future[16]. Since then, over the past two decades, the international community particularly by using R2P, has successfully provided protection for the civilian population in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, and partially succeeded in Congo, South Sudan, and Central African Republic[17] [18][19][20]. However, there have been serious failures in taking prompt and adequate actions against mass human rights violations in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Myanmar, as well as Syria[17][21].

The case of Syria has been difficult. The relevant UNSC resolution was not passed. It failed to get full supports within the UNSC[52]. Major human rights norm violating countries, such as China and Russia[22], both of whom possess veto power in the Security Council and both of which are themselves major human rights violators voted against it. These facts makes it difficult to reach consensus on R2P in specific cases despite the best efforts of the western powers such as the US, UK, and France to take global responsibility to protect civilians against human rights violations and atrocities.

Although there is much more work to be done, efforts to consolidate R2P is, plainly in progress. In 2015, for instance, the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency(ACT) group had been proposed the Code of Conduct in regards to the UNSC's action against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, was later submitted to the UN Secretary General, and supported by over 100 member states as well. The Code of Conduct explicitly stated that state parties, "pledge in particular not to vote against a credible draft resolution before the Security Council on timely and decisive action to end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes"[23]. China and Russia, however, were once again absent in supporting this Code of Conduct. Although the

doctrine is not legally binding, the R2P doctrine is powerful one as it has appeared in more than 80 UNSC resolutions, 50 UNHRC resolutions, and 13 UNGA resolutions since its inception[24].

The Russian invasion of Ukraine since early 2022 is posing a substantial threat to the international peace and security. Russia's invasion of Ukraine as well as its threats to neighboring countries such as Finland and Sweden, which are seeking NATO membership are in clear violation of international law. The primary charge for the initiation of a war is "crimes against the peace," and is in clear violation of the UN Charter of 1945[25]. Russia has no rights to intervene or harm the sovereignty of other nations for any reason whatsoever.

Russia and Ukraine both agreed and signed to the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. By signing the Budapest Memorandum, Russia; in particular, agreed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine," and to "refrain from the threat or use of force" against Ukraine[26]. Furthermore, Russia has committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in many areas of Ukraine, including Bucha. Russia should therefore, face international condemnation as well as appropriate punishments.


Camp et al.(2022) argue that the application of R2P to protect the Ukrainian civilian population from Russian aggression is justifiable and necessary[24]. The application of R2P to the situation in the Ukraine, however, faces operational challenges as reaching the consensus on R2P within the UNSC is highly unlikely due to both Russia and China's vetos, which was the major challenge in terms of applying R2P to the cases of Myanmar and Syria in the past. The application of R2P in Ukraine will most likely be faced challenges as long as Russia and China has veto powers to oppose them within the UNSC. Consolidating the effectiveness of its R2P doctrine should therefore be continued to minimize the operational challenges. The UNSC member states should discuss the potential application of R2P by other means as the international community has the duty to protect civilian populations at risk.

3. The Human Rights Consequences During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Upon the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the International Court of Justice, in a provisional measure on Ukraine V. Russia case, requires Russia to suspend military actions against Ukraine immediately[27]. Despite this important ruling by the ICJ, Russia's military actions against Ukraine continue, resulting in vast casualties, and loss of lives for both sides.

What is more problematic is that Russian military forces have allegedly targeted civilian population in Ukraine, particularly in Bucha, Irpin, and Mariupol. Plainly, if the allegations prove to be true, the intentional targeting of civilians constitutes a war crime. An OHCHR report indicated that, as the <figure 1> below indicates, from February to May 2022, more than 4,100 civilians had been killed, and up to 4,900 injured, both of which consisted of men, women, and children[28]. Furthermore, over 8 million civilians had been displaced; over 6.5 million people had fled to neighboring nations. The refugee flow is currently on the rise. More than 40 percent of the total population in the conflict-affected areas such as Luhanska, Chernihivska, Khersonska, and Donetsk etc. as well as the displaced populations are subject to food insecurity, are unable to access basic health and other essential services[29]. The UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Joyce Msuya said in a recent UNSC meeting on the current situation in Ukraine that, "...this war continues on its destructive path. The intense fighting is causing immense human suffering. Civilians- particularly women and children-are paying the heaviest price" [30].

Figure 1. Civilian casualties(individual cases verified by OHCHR), per age and sex from 24 February to 15 May 2022.




Note: The united nations human rights office of the high commissioner. Situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian federation. The united nations(2022).

In a city of Mariupol, for instance, there have been over 600 people evacuated from Azovstal steel plant since Russian military forces took over the place. Whether there are additional civilians still there is largely unknown. Those people, if any, who were left behind are suspected to be in dire straits with no basic necessities such as electricity, water, and food[31][32]. The remaining civilian populations in Kharkiv, and up to 10,000 civilians in Izyum are also facing grim circumstances as 80 percent of both cities have been destroyed by Russian military forces[33][34]. There have been more than 280,000 vulnerable civilians under Russian's forcible occupation of Kherson since March 2022[34][35]. About 70,000 civilians still remaining in the city of Melitopol are also at risk where Russian military forces have reportedly intercepted food and medicine in the region[36].

Allegedly, the gravest instances of genocide, and other war crimes have been evidenced in the cities such as Kyiv, Chernihiv, and the Sumy Oblasts, including Bucha, Irpin, and Mariupol. In many villages in these regions, Ukrainian authorities continue to find countless civilian bodies; both buried and not burned[37]. In addition, there has been a significant damage to critical infrastructure such as transportation, health facilities and residential infrastructures. As a result, the human right to life of the most vulnerable, and conflict-affected civilian population in Ukraine have been undermined.


It has been alleged by various media services, NGO's and agencies of the UN that Russian military forces have been intentionally targeted Ukrainian infrastructures. As <Figure 2> below indicates, up to 180 medical facilities, 230 educational facilities were damaged by Russian military forces from February to May 2022[28]. During this period, 34 places of worship were destroyed, and 40 damaged by Russian military forces as well, which indicated in the <Figure 3> below[28]. Furthermore, as of the mid-August, the WHO's data indicates that approximately 662 health related facilities have been attacked, resulting 195 civilian deaths and 285 civilian casualties in Ukraine so far[38].

Figure 2. Medical and educational facilities impacted by hostilities(cases verified by OHCHR), from 24 February to 15 May 2022.



Note: The united nations human rights office of the high commissioner. Situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian federation. The united nations(2022).

Figure 3. Places of worship impacted by hostilities(cases verified by OHCHR), per religious affiliation and level of damage, from 24 February to 15 May 2022.



Note: The united nations human rights office of the high commissioner. Situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian federation. The united nations(2022).

The UN and its related agencies, along with neighboring nations have undertaken to provide humanitarian assistance to those conflict-affected civilian populations in Ukraine. UNICEF, for instances, has assisted 2,080,362 people in urgent need, to get access to basic health services, 2,134,335 people to get clean water, 612,744 children to get mental health supports[39]. Humanitarian efforts, however, have been significantly challenged by the continuation of Russian aggression and the destruction of critical facilities. The humanitarian response capacity for conflict-affected civilian populations in urgent need within the Ukraine has thus been degraded[29]. Under these circumstances, there is greater danger of potential outbreaks of various infectious diseases, including the COVID-19, which may put additional members of the civilian population at risk[40]. Indeed, the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic has been the existential threats to human rights and security for citizens in many parts of the world[41][42][43][44][45][53].

Whether Russian forces have committed genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes are currently under investigation by the UNHRC. The UN General Assembly adopted the UNHRC's draft resolution on "Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression" in March 2022[46]. The resolution strongly urges Russia to "...immediately end its human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in Ukraine, calls for the strict observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the protection of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," as well as "swift and verifiable withdrawal of Russian Federation troops and Russian-backed armed groups from the entire territory of Ukraine"[46]. More importantly, the resolution established an independent international commission of inquiry for the prompt investigation of all cases of human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law by Russia [46]. Moreover, as of April 2022, the UNHRC suspended Russia from that human rights body for alleged war crimes in Ukraine[47][51]. Ninety three member states voted in favor of the suspension[47]. The suspension of Russia was remarkable in so far as it was only second time in the UNHRC's history that a state member was suspended. The first suspension was of Libya in 2011[47][54][55]. The US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, had strongly condemned Russia's war crimes in Ukraine. He stated, "By suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, countries around the world chose to hold Moscow to account today for gross and systematic violations of human rights in its premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war of choice against Ukraine"[48].

4. Conclusions and Some Implications

Russia Has allegedly failed to abide by both the international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. Russia has been undermined Ukraine's sovereign decision-makings[61], and refused to recognize Ukraine as an independent state[62]. Russia's ambitious plan to invade Ukraine is also reportedly failing as they are facing strong resistance from the Ukrainians with the support of the international community. The current Russian aggression against Ukraine is in other words, an outcome of failure of deterrence strategy of the west[56][57][58][59][60].

As previously stated, although the potential application of R2P in Ukraine will likely face some operational challenges within the UNSC, the potential application of R2P seems feasible as it is both legitimate and justifiable action in accordance with the international law. The actual application of R2P should however carefully be considered since the nature of use of force- often does more harm than good. The Ukrainian people, and not the advancement of the Western geopolitical interests, should be the primary concern. The Ukrainian civilian population has suffered extensively at the hands of Russian armed forces. The potential application of R2P might result in more harm to civilians if additional casualties are generated. Realistically speaking, the best possible option for the international community would be to maintain military aid to Ukrainian military forces so that they can continue to defend themselves from Russian authoritarianism. The US have perhaps been the most active provider of various security assistance programs to Ukraine since 2014[49][63][64]. The Biden administration has announced multiple rounds of military aid to Ukraine since early 2022. During only the month of June 2022, the military aid package to Ukraine exceeded up to 1,000 million dollars[50]. The latest military aid package to Ukraine comprised 550 million dollars[49]. Other European nations have also actively provided military aid.

At the same time, the international community should employ additional countermeasures such as added economic sanctions. Pressure should be brought to bear until Russia decides to refrain from war and negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. The most stringent sanctions should be imposed against Russia as retaliation for Moscow's hostile behaviors. The potential application of R2P in Ukraine should therefore be most carefully considered and maybe used as a last resort, to avoid and prevent a potential Third World War in coming months.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	JC	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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India-Pakistan Long-Term Conflict -War, Terrorism, and International Relations-

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Abstract

Purpose: Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been at war, competing for nuclear weapons, and at odds with terrorism. The cause of the conflict between the two countries begins with the recognition of the substance of Muslims due to the British separation of the Indian subcontinent. The Indian government's political discrimination against Muslims led by the National Congress has resulted in Pakistan's independence promoted by the Islamic League, and since the independence of Pakistan, the two countries have maintained a conflict at the expense of many people.

Method: There were four wars between the two countries. The war provocation was by Pakistan. Among them, we will look at the three wars that Pakistan started, and analyze the results of the Indo-Pakistan war and international relations. It also looks at how state-sponsored terrorism and nuclear development are affecting both countries in situations of military and economic asymmetry.

Results: In the 20th century, the people of the Indian continent united to escape British colonial rule. However, as the political conflict between Hindus and Muslims was expressed, it was divided into two countries during the independence of independence. The fact that the territory was divided and no clear border was drawn for the Kashmir region became the seed of conflict. In addition, as India developed nuclear weapons due to security concerns about neighboring countries, Pakistan also attempted to develop nuclear weapons, and the conflict between the two countries reached its peak. The interested countries of the two countries adopt diplomatic and military policies of support and acquiescence according to their calculation methods.

Conclusion: The conflict in the Indian continent is a typical legacy of colonial rule. The great powers used ethnic confrontation to rule the colonies, and the borders were drawn by compromise between the great powers without the consent of the local indigenous people, causing conflict in the future conflicts. The Indian continent has not deviated from this formula either. At this point, the intervention of the great powers could induce a temporary ceasefire rather than coordinating a lasting peace. The problem of ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination that is not resolved domestically is bound to be a long-term task.

Keywords: Kashmir Conflict, Nuclear Development, Terrorism, National Congress, Muslim League

1. Introduction

India and Pakistan, which were born as two independent states in 1947 from British rule, have been sharply divided over the conflict on the brink of independence, a distinct religious background, and border issues in Kashmir that arose after independence. Therefore, these two countries have been enough to attract the attention of the two pillars of the Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet Union. In particular, Pakistan is said to be a buffer for Afghanistan, but it has been in a position to feel threatened by the former Soviet Union's expansion strategy, and has continued its uncomfortable relationship with neighboring India since its

foundation. Pakistan, which is relatively inferior to India in terms of overall national power as well as national defense, had to resolve its national defense through an alliance with a foreign country, which motivated the U.S. and China to compete with Pakistan today [1].

The two countries had four military conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1991. The causes of the war are the Kashmir conflict and the East Pakistan conflict. Pakistan was defeated in the war against India in December 1971, and East Pakistan was humiliated by its separation from Bangladesh, which led to the construction of nuclear weapons.

The international community's image of Pakistan is largely negative. A failed state, a terrorist-infested state of Islamist extremists, a political disorder, has become a hotbed for Islamic extremists and fundamentalists as they continue to conflict with the nuclear-armed state, bordering Afghanistan and India [2]. The Indian-Pakistan Kashmir dispute is unlikely to be resolved in an extreme way, but there is no sign of a resolution, and the 1999 summit (Lahore Declaration) provided an opportunity for peace stability and mutual cooperation, but there was no follow-up [3]. Since 2000, the conflict between India and Pakistan has entered a long-term phase with numerous terrorist attacks, including New Delhi Capitol bombings.

In this paper, we examine the separation process, war, nuclear weapons competition, and terrorism between the two countries to examine the causes and aspects of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

2. Separation of India-Pakistan and Political Functions

After the introduction of Islam to India, until British colonial rule, there was little confrontation between Hinduism and Islam. However, through colonial rule, Britain used a split-governance strategy by turning the Islamic and Hindu cultures of the Indian continent into a confrontation. Initially, the British government indirectly ruled Muslim rulers, but in 1857 it began to dominate directly in the wake of the Sepoy revolt. Muslims were feeling a double conflict between Britain and Hindus for treating them differently. The Indian National Congress (National Congress) was established in 1885, but Muslims were excluded, and Muslims formed the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) in 1906. Muslims cooperated with Britain in World War I and World War II, in which Britain tried to continue its Hindu-Muslim division-governance strategy by implementing friendly policies against Muslims. However, the independence decision of the Muslim League was made in 1940, as the British strategy was dominated by Muslims.

The Indian National Congress (Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, and Central Provinces) formed a state cabinet in July 1937. Meanwhile, M.A. Jinnah of the Muslim League, who had no majority in any state, was greatly angered by Nehru's claim to "stand in line behind the National Assembly," and had to ask for M.K. Gandhi's help to discuss ways to participate in the relatively Muslim rule of United Provinces, Punjab, and Bengal. The National Congress excluded the Muslim League from all government posts and appointed Muslims as ministers from among its members. This political move by Gandhi was the starting point for a direct separation between Hindus and Muslims, India and Pakistan. Nehru had an antipathy to Jinnah, and the cooperative atmosphere between the National Congress and the Muslim League disappeared and a coalition government was not formed [4][5].

Muslims living in India began to oppose the Hindu-led political agenda, claiming to be politically marginalized, and this conflict created riots. A series of events occurred in Bengal and Bihar, killing each other between Hindus and Muslims.

Meanwhile, Gandhi opposed the participation of Indian troops in World War II in Europe, arguing that India should become an independent country. More than 50 Indian political leaders, including Gandhi, expressed their opinion that the British government could not cooperate in

the war, which resulted in the resignation of the six-state cabinet. Taking advantage of the weakening influence of the National Assembly, the Muslim League and Jinnah declared the construction of a Pakistani state (Pakistan Resolution or Lahore Resolution) at the Muslim League Conference in Lahore in March 1940.

Lahore's resolution was against the federal plan stipulated in the Indian Governing Law (1935), in which Muslim-majority areas should be divided into independent states, each unit should have autonomy and sovereignty, and in Muslim-majority areas, religious, cultural, economic, and political rights and interests should be protected. The Muslim League's claim to establish an independent state (Pakistan-Land of Pure) with a large number of Muslims in the northwestern and eastern regions was implemented seven years later. The basis of the identity of Pakistan's national state was Islam [6].

Born on 31 December 1906 in Dhaka, East Bengal, the Muslim League started as a cooperative group with the British government, but maintained a confrontational relationship with the National Assembly [7].

Britain implemented secessionary policies from the outset to dominate India. The British government enacted the Indian Council Act in 1909 to ensure Muslim participation in politics. The British colonial strategy was to weaken India's resistance to Britain by providing political space for Muslim groups opposing Hindus in India [8].

The Muslim League did not insist only on the National Congress and the conflicting fruits. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, also attended the National Assembly for reconciliation between Hindus and Muslims. However, another Muslim organization (Indian Musalman Association) was formed, which maintained a cooperative relationship with the National Congress. Since then, due to the disagreement between Jinnah and the National Assembly, the Muslim League has chosen its own path.


During the 1916-1922 period, Indians united in the independence movement from England, regardless of sectarian interests. Due to the cancellation of the Bengal division in the United Kingdom, Muslims were affiliated with Hinduism. Jinnah abandoned sectarian separatism and maintained close ties with the National Assembly. As a result, the politically majority National Assembly allowed a separate election system claimed by Muslims, but the Muslim League complained about the high proportion of participation in the National Assembly in Muslim-majority areas. The incident triggered by the conflict between Hindus and Muslims is the 'Moplas' Rebellion'. Moplas attacked government agencies with discontent with the Hindu ruling class and the British government, but was subdued. The attack on Moplas, who declared the caliphate, would have been a indignity for Muslims.

Conflicts between Hindu and Muslim camps, which began in earnest after the 1937 local elections, began to sharpen in the wake of the declaration of "Redemption Day" in 1939 and the resolution of the Muslim League in Pakistan in 1940. After formalizing the separation of Pakistan, Jinnah began to organize India's Muslims more politically and pay keen attention to economic plans for the region that would become Pakistan in the future. After the announcement of the Pakistan resolution, Jinnah understood the economic situation of Muslims. In addition, the All India Muslim League established Pakistan as a country at its annual meeting in 1943 to promote economic development plans. Although this strategy failed in the early stages, it led to the cooperation of Muslim merchant groups, further strengthening Muslim unity and independence [9].

Muslim capitalists in India have cooperated with Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League in full support. They were aware of falling behind in competition with Hindu capitalists, and were afraid that Muslim capitalists' position in India would be further narrowed if Indian National Congress and non-Muslim capitalists colluded in the future. As Hindu capitalists grew to the

point where they could no longer deal with each other, they exerted enormous influence in politics and economics, and in the process, the intensity of rejecting Muslim capitalists was also increasing. In addition, as non-Muslim capitalists, who initially opposed the separation of India-Pakistan, actively supported the separation of India-Pakistan along with the formation of a strong central government led by the Indian National Congress over time, the stance on the separation of Muslim capitalists became stronger.

Figure 1. The territory of India and Pakistan at the time of independence.



On 3 June 1947, he drew a line between what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh, and became independent under the name of India. Pakistan was founded on August 14, 1947. Muslims living in India were forced to move to Pakistan and Hindus living in Pakistan because the subjects of the separate state construction were based on religion. In just three months from August to November 1947, refugee trains moved about 2.8 million refugees across the border to India on a total of 673 occasions. Poor people were forced to move on foot. More than 12 million refugees were forced across Punjab to Pakistan and India, where their property rights were forfeited, slaughtered, looted, and raped during the migration, and more than a million people died in mutual violence. The refugees were forced to live as neighbors after the migration [10].

The biggest challenge occurred in the process of independence of India and Pakistan. Smaller Raja kingdoms in Kashmir were concerned about whether to belong to India or Pakistan, and the British left it to the autonomous will of the Raja kingdom. Seventy percent of the population was Muslim, and the king was Hindu. The king's choice was India, which led to a resident uprising. India emphasizes that the king's choice should be respected, and Pakistan's logic of protecting its people clashed, and eventually war breaks out. In the case of the Junagarden Kingdom in Gujarat, the king was Muslim and the people were predominantly Hindu. India incorporated the kingdom of Junagarden into India by force.

The separation of India and Pakistan is a legacy of British colonial rule and is the result of political confrontation and discrimination between religious factions within India. The conflict that emerged during the process of independence has not been resolved, especially in Kashmir, which has led to nuclear competition.

3. Indo-Pakistan War

3.1. Poonch rebellion and Kashmir conflict

The Indo-Pakistan War of 1947-1948, or the first Kashmiri War, was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1948 over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir^[11]. Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir was facing an uprising by Muslims in Poonch and lost control of the western part of the kingdom. On 22 October 1947, Pakistan's Pashtun tribal militia crossed the border. The war was initially a battle between Jammu-Kashmir's forces and militias in border tribal areas adjacent to the Northwest Frontier region. On 26 October 1947, after the incorporation of the Jammu and Kashmir regions into India, Indian forces were airlifted to the state capital, Srinagar. British commanders initially refused to intervene in the conflict, citing Pakistani troops joining India.

Prior to 1815, the region, now known as "Jammu and Kashmir", consisted of 22 small independent states (16 Hindus and 6 Muslims) carved out of Afghanistan's Amir-controlled territory, combined with the territory of small local rulers. They were collectively called "Punjab Hill States". On 3 June 1947, it was decided that British India would be divided into two separate countries, the Pakistan Autonomous Region comprising a Muslim majority and the Indian Autonomous Region comprising the rest. Two provinces, Punjab and Bengal, which have a large Muslim majority, had to be divided into two governments.

In the Pakistan-India First War, both armies had British commanders. The two commanders were in contact during the battle, and during the war, the British commander of the Indian Army declared surrender to the Pakistani army. Hari Singh is determined not to join either Indian or Pakistani rule. The Punjab area consisted of five districts, each with a different religious distribution, so Hari Singh did not want to be incorporated into one country.

In fact, Muslims in Kashmir supported the Muslim conference, while Hindus in Jammu preferred to merge with India. It was concluded that it is desirable to maintain an independent system rather than follow either view on the two views. Although Muslims who fought in World War II returned, most of the soldiers were unemployed, and the high tax on the residents of Mahajara caused discontent among the Puntis. Rumors of Pakistan's establishment were also spreading, and the government ordered Muslims to abandon their weapons. Discontent was also building as no remuneration was given for the disarmed soldiers.

In August 1947, when India and Pakistan were about to become independent, Maharaja preferred to become independent of the new territory. All major political groups in the country

supported Maharaja's decision, except for the Muslim Conference, which declared its membership in Pakistan on 19 July 1947. The Muslim Conference formed a close alliance with the All India Muslim League.

It was during Operation Gulmarg that Pakistani forces formally intervened in Jammu and Kashmir. With the implementation of the operation, on October 3, Muslim leaders declared the interim government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Rawalpindi.

On 6 October 1947, an uprising against the Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir broke out in the Poonch jagir, an area bordering the Rawalpindi district of West Punjab and the Hazara district of the North-West Frontier Province in the future Pakistan.

On or around 6 October, the armed rebellion started in the Poonch district. The fighting elements consisted of bands of deserters from the State Army, serving soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave, ex-servicemen, and other volunteers who had risen spontaneously. The rebels quickly gained control of almost the entire Poonch district. The State Forces garrison at Poonch came under heavy siege[12].

Facing an impending collapse, the Maharaja acceded to the Indian Union, following which India air-lifted troops to defend Srinagar on 27 October. From this point on the tribal invasion and the Poonch rebellion proceeded in parallel. On 27 October, a Kashmir Liberation Committee was established, headed by the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. By the committee's decision, Pakistan's cavalry attacked government forces in rebel areas with armored vehicles.

Maharaja called for military support from India. India has set conditions that Kashmir can receive support only when it joins India. Maharaja responded, and the Indian government admitted that the princely state would join India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it. Pakistan refused to recognize Kashmir's accession to India, claiming it was acquired by "fraud and violence."

The Indian army launched a counterattack and gradually expanded the occupied territories. In 1948, Indian forces began to gain an upper hand over Pakistani forces. Poonch was occupied by Indian troops, and India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the terms of the ceasefire set out in the United Nations resolution, and Pakistani troops withdrew. India emerged victorious as it successfully defended most of the contested territory, including the Kashmir valley, Jammu, and Ladakh.

3.2. War of 1965 – second Kashmir conflict

The Kashmir region consists of seven regions, which are predominantly Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist, except for Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, which China has virtually ruled and refused to include in Kashmir <Table 1>.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War was a skirmish between Pakistan and India between April 1965 and September 1965. The conflict began after Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, designed to infiltrate troops in Jammu and Kashmir and trigger a revolt against Indian rule, which immediately contributed to the war. Prior to the war, the United States and Britain were major material allies of India and Pakistan as major suppliers of military hardware and foreign development aid. In the 1960s, Pakistan received \$700 million in military aid from the United States by signing a defense agreement in 1954 that greatly modernized its military equipment. During and after the conflict, India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perception that Western powers lacked support for their positions. This sense of betrayal increased as the embargo on U.S. and British military aid was imposed on the other side. As a result, India and Pakistan formed closer ties with the Soviet Union and China, respectively[13].

Table 1. National stances in Kashmir.

Administered by	Area	Population	% muslim	% hindu	% buddhist	% other
India	Kashmir valley	4 million	95%	4%	-	-
	Jammu	3 million	30%	66%	-	4%
	Ladakh	0.25 million	46%	-	50%	3%
Pakistan	Gilgit -baltistan	1 million	99%	-	-	-
	Azad Kashmir	2.6 million	100%	-	-	-

The Pakistan Patrol began patrolling the Indian-controlled territory in January 1965, and on 8 April 1965, the two countries were attacked by each other's bases. Pakistan believed that Kashmir's population was generally dissatisfied with Indian rule and that the resistance movement could be ignited by a small number of infiltration. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement through a covert infiltration called Operation Gibraltar in Gibraltar. Operation Gibraltar was the code name for a military operation planned and implemented by Pakistani forces in the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965. The strategy of the operation was to covertly cross the Line of Control (LoC) to support the uprising against the occupation of India by the Muslim majority of Kashmir.

In August 1965, Pakistani troops disguised as local soldiers entered the Indian-controlled Jammu and Indian-controlled Jammu in Pakistan and infiltrated the Kashmir Valley to rebel against the Muslim majority of the Muslim majority. However, the infiltration strategy was discovered by the Indian army. After the invasion of Pakistan and its discovery, India responded by deploying more troops in the Kashmir Valley, and Indian forces launched attacks on infiltrators operating in the region. On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a massive offensive called Operation Grand Slam in India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, triggering the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. Operation Grand Slam was a key military operation in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. This attack is an attack on the important Akhnoor bridge of Jammu and Kashmir, controlled by India. The bridge was intended to cut off the logistics of Indian troops in India. The two operations were unsuccessful due to the presence of Indian troops. The Indian army was sent to a new front across the sensitive state of Punjab, threatening Pakistan, which was forced to retreat by Indian forces.

In this war, both sides mobilized the largest tanks since World War II, and the loss of Pakistani troops was greater than that of Indian troops. In three weeks, the second Indo-Pakistani war ended in a truce due to the U.S. government's embargo on U.S. ammunition and the mediation of Soviet peace negotiations. However, India was in a position to deal serious damage to the Pakistani capital Punjab when the ceasefire broke out and control the expansion of Pakistan in the Pongchi region, a strategic region of Kashmir.

Pakistan determined that the people of Kashmir would rebel against India and cooperate or surrender to Pakistan, but it was a misjudgment. The people of Kashmir rather fought against the Pakistani regular army. During the war, pan-Arab countries supported Pakistan, while China supported Pakistan's position, but the United States and Britain criticized Pakistan, and the Soviet Union took a neutral stance. Through this war, the positions of the great powers and Islamic countries were clearly revealed[14].

Pakistanis in East Bengal also criticized West Pakistan for its reduced finances and inadequate provision of security to East Pakistan to mobilize war funds. East Pakistan's political leaders

demanded greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which led to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and the Bangladesh Liberation War.

3.3. War of 1971 - East Bengal conflict

On December 3, 1971, India and Pakistan were involved in the Third War. The war lasted 13 days, and as a result of the war, Bangladesh became independent[15]. This war originated from the conflict between West and East Pakistan. Conflicts between West and East Pakistan arose in 1950 with the Popular Language Movement, 1964 with mass protests in East Bengal, East Bengal, East Bengal, 1969. There is India in the middle of the two areas, and the distance between them is more than 1,600 km. From the beginning, cultural integration between the two regions was difficult. East Bengal was a territory of India after 1858, but after 1947 it was incorporated as a state of Pakistan.

West Pakistan was a multi-ethnic society, and East Pakistan was a major Bengali society. It had religious differences as well as racial differences. Despite the distance problems, West Pakistanis enjoyed control of East Bengal[16].

In early March 1971, approximately 300 Biharis were slaughtered in riots by Bengali mobs in Chittagong alone. The Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its deployment of the military in East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated its military crackdown. President Yahya Khan called on the military – which was overwhelmingly led by West Pakistanis – to suppress dissent in the East, after accepting the resignation of Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the chief of staff of the East-Pakistani military[17].

Mass arrests of dissidents began and, after several days of strikes and non-cooperation, the Pakistani military, led by Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The government outlawed the Awami League, which forced many of its members and sympathisers into refuge in Eastern India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25/26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am(as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. Operation Searchlight, followed by Operation Barisal, attempted to kill the intellectual elite of the east.

On 26 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman of Pakistan Army declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

In November 1971, the Indo-Pakistani War seemed inevitable. In November 1971, thousands of people, led by conservative Pakistani politicians, marched through Lahore and across Pakistan demanding "destroy India." India responded by initiating a massive build-up of the Indian Army on the western border. On the evening of December 3, Pakistan's Air Force launched a surprise pre-emptive strike on 11 airfields in northwestern India, including Agra, 480 kilometers from the border. The air strikes officially began the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971. Indian forces launched large-scale air, sea and land attacks on Pakistan on all fronts. Prior to the start of the war, the Indian Army was well organized on both fronts and had a numerical advantage over the Pakistani Army.

When the conflict began, the war immediately shifted to the military and diplomatic advantage of India and its Bengal rebel allies. On 23 November 1971, the Indian Army infiltrated the Eastern Front and crossed the East Pakistan border to join the Bengal Nationalist Alliance. Faced with insurmountable losses, Pakistani troops surrendered in less than two weeks, and psychological fears spread to the military leadership of the Eastern Command. The Indian Army surrounded Dhaka and issued an ultimatum to surrender on 16 December 1971. Pakistan called for a unilateral ceasefire, and the Indo-Pakistani war ended. The end of the war was Pakistan's greater loss of troops and East Pakistan's independence - the birth of Bangladesh.

4. India and Pakistan Competition for Nuclear Development

The decisive background behind India's nuclear development drive was its defeat in the 1962 China-India war. He opened nuclear departments at universities in India and sent many students to study nuclear power, and conducted the first nuclear test on May 15, 1974. The Soviet Union and the United States responded to India's nuclear test with acquiescence and weak sanctions. The Soviet Union wanted to keep China in check, and the United States wanted to maintain smooth relations with India, the big third world country. Meanwhile, the Indian government experienced the deterrence of nuclear weapons during the war with Pakistan. In the Indo-Pakistani war, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier combat team led by the USS Enterprise(CVN-65) to the Bay of Bengal. The Soviet Union responded by sending a nuclear-armed submarine from Vladivostok, Vladivostok, to track the US task force. Stimulated by the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program, India has rapidly realized the need for nuclear development[18].

Indira Gandhi authorised the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre(BARC) to manufacture a nuclear device and prepare it for a test. The 1974 nuclear test was given the operational name Smiling Budha. The experiment was carried out in strict secrecy, and Gandhi ordered government ministers and military commanders to keep it secret. The Indian government has declared that Smiling Budha is a peaceful nuclear test and has no intention of using the nuclear program for military purposes. As India's nuclear test succeeded, the nuclear dice in South Asia was thrown. The NSG was formed in response to India's nuclear test, which decided to require IAEA safeguards to regulate India's international nuclear trade[19].

In response to India's nuclear test in April 1998, Pakistan conducted an underground nuclear test. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Summary is in effect, preventing a regulated range of nuclear tests[20]. India refused to join the treaty, saying the nuclear club wanted to monopolize nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are also developing missiles to carry nuclear weapons[21]. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons after India conducted nuclear tests in 1974 after losing the Kashmir conflict in 1965 and the Bangladesh War in 1971. The United States opposed the development of nuclear weapons, but did not take any action against Pakistan's nuclear development in the wake of the Soviet-Afghan War.

When Israel conducted a nuclear test in 1979, the United States signed a nuclear technology sharing agreement with Pakistan and declared a joint nuclear warhead in 1982. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia funded Pakistan to conduct a nuclear test. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear test, but lifted them under the pretext of the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's nuclear development was led by Abdul Qadir Khan, who attempted nuclear technology cooperation with Libya, Iran and North Korea after its success[22][23].

From the late 1980s, uranium enrichment technology and centrifuge designs and parts were transferred to Iran, and in the 1990s, the same technology was delivered to North Korea and Libya. Khan worked as a researcher FDO in Amsterdam, Netherlands, and learned the core technology of nuclear weapons, and returned to Pakistan in 1976 to become the director of the nuclear research institute. On 28 May 1998, Khan's public nuclear test was successful. Investigation, surveillance and sanctions pressure from the United States and Britain forced the Pakistani government to put him under house arrest until 2009. Khan is said to have frequently visited China to obtain missile technology to carry nuclear warheads. North Korea also provided uranium enrichment technology in exchange for the provision of Rodong missile technology, which had a significant impact on North Korea's nuclear development. The uranium enrichment technology connection provided the cause of North Korea's second nuclear test by allowing North Korea, which previously had only plutonium reprocessing capabilities frozen by the 1994 Geneva Agreement, to secretly develop uranium-based nuclear weapons[24][25].

There is also an opinion that reconstruction of the nuclear test treaty should be carried out because the nuclear test in India and Pakistan has been carried out despite the threat of economic sanctions by advanced countries. On the other hand, it is argued that nuclear test competition may be a strategy to deter war in the region where rival countries exist, but this will only lead to continued arms competition rather than resolving the conflict[26][27].

In particular, it will cause security instability in areas where disputes continue, and will be used to maintain the authoritarian system instead of reducing interest in economic development in poor countries.

5. The Growth of Terrorist Groups in Pakistan and the Outbreak of Islamic Terrorism in India

5.1. Causes and trends of terrorism

The main background for the growth of terrorists in Pakistan is the influx of Wahhabism, which developed in Saudi Arabia. The failure of the Pakistani government's economic growth has affected the people's fascination with Islamism, creating an environment where the government does not have an exclusive status in arms management and where ordinary citizens can easily acquire and use weapons. In addition, the state of national tension that emerged through independence from India and separation from Bangladesh had sufficient elements of terrorism in that the conflict had continued without a clue to resolution.

Until the 1980s, terrorism in India by Pakistan's Salafi group was not a common occurrence, but events began to mark the beginning of terrorism in the 1990s and have increased rapidly since 2000. From 2000 to 2021, 108 terrorist incidents occurred. The major terrorist attacks that drew international attention were 277 people killed and 975 wounded in the 2005 Delhi attacks, the 2006 Varanasi attacks, the Mumbai train bombings and the Margaon bombings. In India as a whole, numerous terrorist incidents occurred, resulting in 260 to 800 deaths every year, and 500 to 2,100 injuries.

Terrorism in India poses a grave threat to the Indian people. Compared to other countries, India faces a wide range of terrorist groups. Terrorism found in India includes Islamic terrorism, separatist terrorism, and left-wing terrorism. Islamic terrorism is believed to be linked to Pakistan.

5.2. Terrorist attacks by Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan

There have been more than 108 terrorist incidents in India since 2000, of which many were killed and wounded, mainly by the Pakistani Islamic terrorist group.

First of all, the 2001 terrorist attacks in India's parliament began when gunmen entered the National Assembly using cars and exchanged gunfire with police. Two Pakistani-based militant groups(Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed) were blamed for the attack. The Indian government demanded that the Pakistani government freeze financial assets for the two groups and arrest the ringleader. Although the Pakistani government rejected the demand, Indian troops moved near the Pakistani border from December 20 to January of the Daeun year, raising tensions and sporadic clashes between the two countries. 400,000 Pakistani troops and 700,000 Indian troops confronted the border before gradually moving troops to the rear in June 2002. In 2001, more than 10 Pakistani gunmen infiltrated the port of Mumbai in small boats and attacked Indian citizens in downtown Mumbai, killing more than 200 people and wounding more than 300 others. All but one of the gunmen was killed, who were members of the suicide attack. Similar to this incident, the Mumbai terrorist attacks occurred again in November 2008. Ten

members of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked in southern Mumbai for four days, killing 175 people and injuring 300 others.

All but one of the gunmen was killed, who were members of the suicide attack. Similar to this incident, the Mumbai terrorist attacks occurred again in November 2008. Ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked in southern Mumbai for four days, killing 175 people and injuring 300 others. India's National Security Guard (NSG) wiped them out with Operation Black Tornado. Unlike the 2001 incident, the Pakistani government condemned the 2008 attack and promised to cooperate with the Indian government. But, contrary to the promise of the Pakistani government, arresting the ringleaders has not been amicably resolved. Indian and U.S. intelligence agencies also suspected that Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies had sponsored terrorists. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, claimed that more than 40 Indians were involved in the attack. It was later revealed that several Indians cooperated in the 2008 Mumbai attack.

Mumbai terrorism also occurred in 2003. On August 25, a car bomb killed 70 people and injured 250. A taxi bomb exploded at a jewelry market near Mumbai Devi Temple in central Mumbai. The attackers were recruited from the UAE by a Pakistani terrorist group.

On 29 October 2005, a bomb exploded in New Delhi on a market and a bus. The terrorist attacks in New Delhi were believed to have been caused by members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, but the Islamic Revolutionary Front (Islamic Inquilab Mahaz) claimed responsibility. Mahaz is one of the organizations involved in terrorist attacks against France, Americans, and other citizens in Karachi, southern Pakistan.

Pressure cooker bombs were placed on trains on the Western Line of the suburban ("local") train network, which forms the backbone of the city's transport network. The Pressure cookers bomb was designed to improve the performance of the explosion.

Terrorism occurring in India is classified as Islamic terrorism, separatist terrorism, and left-wing terrorism, but especially terrorism related to Pakistan is Islamic terrorism. The international community's assessment of the Pakistani government is very negative because of terrorism in India, which is tolerated or sponsored by the Pakistani government [28]. This is especially true because the means and targets of terrorism are indiscriminate attacks against an unspecified majority. Terrorism is also occurring in Pakistan, and anti-Christian terrorism spread in the early 2000s [29]. Pakistani officials claim these incidents occurred under the auspices of Afghanistan and India. However, the Indian government has denied the allegations, and the Afghan government has admitted to supporting the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) [30].

The Pakistani government has released a document that could refute India's denial of terrorism sponsorship. The data provided that there was Indian support for Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Balochistan Liberation Army and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

6. Conclusion

The long-term conflict between India and Pakistan emerged from the process of separation by the strategic interests of the great powers [31] domestically, it is the result of the failure of Hindu-centered politicians to embrace Muslims.

In the 21st century, India and Pakistan are avoiding full-scale war [32]. However, on 14 February 2019, more than 40 Indian police officers were killed in a suicide bombing in the Srinagar region of Indian Kashmir. Chinese intervention followed an attack by the Indian Air Force on 26 February and an attack by Pakistani forces the following day. As time went by, international opinion became unfavorable to China, Pakistan, and Russia. China was eventually forced to take a step back. After the war, India's Prime Minister Modi realized that it was difficult to stop China,

Pakistan, China, and Russia in Pakistan with only the existing Indian military forces, so he decided to keep the U.S. troops in India.

The Kashmir region is not only a confrontation between the two government forces, but also an infiltration area between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Qaeda is believed to have intensified the Kashmir conflict and expected the United States to look elsewhere. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, al-Qaida plotted to cause instability in the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, leading to a nuclear war. Al Qaeda has been constantly involved in conflicts in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and has used the support of extreme Muslims in the conflict zone to expand their power.

The 2019 conflict heightened nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan after India's defense minister announced that India may withdraw its so-called "no first use" policy that its nuclear weapons are used only in retaliation for nuclear attacks. Experts believe that conventional war or nuclear conflict will not occur just by fighting a war of words between India and Pakistan in a strong tone.

Behind India's declaration of non-use of nuclear wires was Pakistan's intention to ease tensions raised by a surprise hydrogen bomb test conducted shortly after India's hydrogen bomb test. But if India abandons its nuclear non-pre-use principle, Pakistan will see that India could attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities without warning, and in fact, if this situation is deemed imminent, Pakistan will use nuclear weapons first.

It would be seen as possible to attack, and in fact, if this situation is deemed imminent, Pakistan will use nuclear weapons first.

Even if the two countries use the word war and expand the war of words, it will not be easy to actually move it to military action. Even so, if tensions continue to escalate with the two sides continuing to mention nuclear conflict, the two countries could eventually change their nuclear weapons from normal to critical.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is not a dispute over Kashmir's jurisdiction, but a series of more than 70 years of accumulated ethnic clashes, and a series of unyielding confrontations between the two countries despite international mediation.

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8. Appendix

8.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Korea Provisional Government Police Organization and Activities

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Abstract

Purpose: The modern police of the Republic of Korea today were established in Shanghai on April 11, 1919 by the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, and moved to various areas of China for 27 years until the liberation of the country in 1945 for independence movement. In the face of such hardship, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea needs to be aware of the police organization and activities of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, which belongs to the Ministry of Interior as head of administration.

Method: The Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the head of the administration of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, confirmed through literature evidence that Kim Gu was the apex and tried to change the organization while breaking through the crisis. The police organization of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was active in 1919 with the Police Department and Yeong-Tong-je, 1923 with the Police Department, 1941 with the Guards, and with the 1943 with the Police Department, referring to the Baekbeom Ilji, the National History Compilation Committee, the National Police Agency documents, and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea data book.

Results: The focus of this study is to give the meaning of finding the issue of Police Day and the legitimacy of the police. The result suggested by this study was an opportunity to overcome the dark period of loss of the country signed by the Eulsa Treaty in 1910 by examining the organizational structure of the Police Department of the Korean Empire and the Police Department of the Provisional Government of the Provisional Government in the Joseon Dynasty.

Conclusion: It was judged that it could affect the continuity of the current Korean police, and research was conducted. Also, in response to the common truth that 'as long as there is a state, there is a police', the police organization of the Provisional Government did not change its name even during the Japanese imperialism period. It calls for the existence of a police that is directed towards

Keywords: Provisional Government Police Organization of the Republic of Korea, Police Department, Conscripted Police Force(Ui-Gyeong-Dae), Contact System(Yeong-Tong-Je), Guards(Gyeong-Wi-Dae)

1. Introduction

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established on April 11, starting from March 1, 1919, the catalyst for the 3.1 movement. Immediately after establishment, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea established a police organization through system preparation and established the Police Department in Shanghai, where the Provisional Government Complex is located. Accordingly, a joint control system was installed in local administrative agencies of the Provisional Government, and the establishment of local administrative agencies in Korea was accelerated.

At this time, the police organization of the Police Department was appointed as a police officer or a superintendent. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai and was active for 13 years, then in April of the 14th year of the Republic of Korea(1932), immediately after Yun Bong-gil's uprising[1], left Shanghai. The police organization and organization of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea has no choice but to deal with the 13 years of living in Shanghai of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea limited to the Police Bureau under the Ministry of the Interior of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. Research achievements¹ of the Provisional Government In the meantime, In relation to this, research was conducted with a high degree of importance on the organization, function and role of each department, and after that the official history of the Provisional Government Police has not been rewritten and the contents related to the Provisional Government were not described in the usually published Korean Police History, nor was it published as a research paper[2][3]. The Korean Police History(Lee Hyeon-hee, Deokhyeon-gak 1979), etc. It is true that the police history of the Provisional Government was only partially covered by police history researchers who majored in history[4].

Therefore, in this study, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, as it is the organization and organization of the police, deals with the organization of the Police Department on April 25, 1919 and the 'Security Officer and Inspector' organization belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Provisional Government, whose main tasks were domestic smuggling on December 1, 1919 of the same year., the 'Shanghai Korean People's Army Police Department', which dealt with the security preservation and espionage of Koreans' oppression starting from December 16, 1923, and the 'Gyeongmu Bureau' belonging to the Ministry of Home Affairs established on April 25, 1919 on March 30, 1943 The 'Security Division' was continued, and the description was limited within the scope, focusing on the 'Security Guard' established on October 17, 1941, which was in charge of security and security of government officials along with the organization's 'Security Division' want to.

Therefore, during the Joseon Dynasty, the right and left Podo Offices recommended the introduction of the modern police system and the police officer system following the Gapsin Coup in 1884, and the establishment of a police department as a part of the Gabo Reform in 1894 was recommended. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea established the Police Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs to protect the Provisional Government from Japanese imperialism and carried out police activities to protect the lives and properties of Koreans in China. It was April 25, 1919, the 'Korean Provisional Government Manual'. Articles of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea²[5][6] It includes a wide range of duties such as business, fire, fire, hygiene, newspapers, and magazines, so you can see the undifferentiated phenomenon between police work and general administration, which is common in modern countries, such as the breadth of the police work area

¹ Research on the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was planned at the government level in the early 1960s and started to be published as academic achievements in the mid-1960s. When the National History Compilation Committee published all five volumes of 'The History of the Korean Independence Movement' from 1965 to 1969, it laid the independence movement on an academic basis.

² 'Administrative Police Officer' is the first law of police operation in the Korean police, and it is only a mixture of the Japanese administrative police rules in 1875 and the summary judgment of false misdemeanor(1885) in Chinese characters. The 'Administrative Police Order' was enacted as the basis for the action. The 'Administrative Police Order' can be said to be a charter that collectively expresses the purpose of the police, the rules for the service of police officers, the conviction of police criminals, and the recruitment method of Soon-gyeom. The 'Administrative Police Order' consists of 5 sections: Section 1, General Rules, Section 2, Commander-in-Chief's Discipline, Section 3, Order of Duty, Section 4. The Left and Right Provincial Offices were merged by the 'Secretary Office Control Office', and the police work of the 5 Hanseong Departments was integrated, and a powerful Police Department was newly established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to take charge of all police affairs within the Hanseong Department. The Police Department Control Office is the first police organization law enacted at the time of the Gabo Reform in 1894. This united the police affairs of the 5 divisions of Hanseong and created the Police Department under the affiliation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to take charge of all police affairs within the Hanseong Department. In addition, the first 'police station' was established within the five characters of the Hanseongbu by the police officer, and the 'police officer' was appointed as the chief. A Japanese police officer, the police chief. depreciation. cervix. It was merely a transplant of the Japanese ones, such as changing the ranks of officers to police officers, police officers, gunsoons, and pure swords.

and the comprehensiveness of duty regulations[7].

On the other hand, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established on April 11, 1919, and on April 25 of that year, the 'Korea Provisional Government Charter' was enacted and promulgated. In the early days of the Provisional Government, a system was established and laws were enacted for administrative control over the central and local governments, while the internal police department, of course, progressed in organizational structures. It refers to the system or laws related to the division of members and duties, etc., and serves as a measure to reveal what goals the Provisional Government is setting and the directions to reach the goals. For this reason, it is the fact that where the independence movement or administrative agencies existed, there was a police organization. The need to review the role of the police organization and organization under the Provisional Government is necessary in that the police department and organization are local administrative agencies, providing a glimpse into the roles of the Ministry of Communications and the Transportation Bureau and the direction and goals of domestic activities set by the Provisional Government. there is[8].

2. Review of Previous Research

A look at the previous researches, reviews, or investigations on police-related topics of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea are as follows. In 1947, the Metropolitan Police Agency published 'The History of the Development of the Metropolitan Police after Liberation,' and in 1954, the Public Security Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs published 'The History of the Korean Police'. The provisional government police history was included in the police history for the first time among those written by Yong-guk Kim and Soon-ok Hong while writing the history of the Korean police in 'The History of Independence Movement' published in 1971[9][10]. From 1965 to 1969, the National History Compilation Committee published 5 volumes of "History of the Korean Independence Movement", and in 1972, the Ministry of Home Affairs published "Korean Police History". It was promoted from December 17, 1894, during which time, about 210 reform proposals were enacted and implemented[11][12]. At this time, the representative Daegan system such as Saheonbu, Saganwon, and Hongmungwan was abolished, and a powerful police agency, the Police Department, was established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to prepare an institutional device to regulate all activities of the general public and anti-government activities. It is a 'control office'. This served as today's Police Officer Duty Execution Act. Similar to the Gabo Reform, the Police Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea can say that it is a control similar to the 'Regulation of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea'[13]. A study on this found that in 2015, Yoon-Jeong Lee's Korean Police Department defined the provisional government police as an early organization and a late-stage organization for the Chongqing period. It is pointed out that the judicial police power is also a problem because the jurisdiction is also in exile, but the opinion of the researcher is that the government in exile as a people who has lost their country has historical significance, so it is playing a role as a national institution that separates the three powers, such as legislation and administration. Since legitimacy has been established, the judicial power has been entrusted to the French Concession, etc[14]. In addition, there are studies that study only the police department and the Transportation Bureau. Papers were constantly being reported. In this way, through the review of previous studies, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, which successfully overcame the chaotic period of the Korean Empire, which suffered from the loss of national sovereignty in 1910, was established in April 1919, including the Provisional Court under the Provisional Government of Shanghai, in name and reality, in August of that year, the judicial sovereignty. It provides an opportunity for recovery. This study culminates in studying the function of the police organization by illuminating the establishment organization of the police department under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

3. Korean Provisional Government Police System

3.1. Movement of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai and was active for 13 years, then left Shanghai immediately after the uprising of Yun Bong-gil in April of the 14th year of the Republic of Korea(1932). The first place they settled was Hangzhou, and Kim Gu and other members of the Provisional Government and their families lived in Jiaxing. The Provisional Government stayed in Hangzhou until November 17(1935), then moved to Jeonjang to avoid the Japanese pursuit, and then worked for about two years centered on Nanjing. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in the 19th year(1937) of the Republic of Korea, members of the Provisional Government who were active in various places gathered and lived in Changsha for a while, and then moved to Guangzhou in July 20(1938) and went to Sanzan Baiyuan. A formal office was established. It was because it was located in the southernmost tip of China, so it was relatively safe from Japanese air raids, and it was judged that it was a place where you could hear domestic news. However, the Provisional Government was attacked by a surprise attack by the Japanese army and moved to Foshan, about 25 km away from Guangzhou, and soon had to leave even there.

However, it was not easy for about 100 members of the Provisional Government and their families to obtain transportation funds and transportation.

The Provisional Government appealed to the Chinese Nationalist Government for help, and as a result, members of the Provisional Government and their families arrived at Jiang in May 21, 1939, via Sanshui, Liuzhou, etc. there was. A total of 107 members of the Provisional Government and their families gathered here. In September 22nd(1940), most of the elements of the Provisional Government moved to Chongqing, the wartime capital, and were active until their return to Korea in 27(1945)[6].

Figure 1. The process of moving the provisional government of the Republic of Korea[15].



3.2. Police organization of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea

As mentioned earlier, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai and was active for 13 years, and then left Shanghai immediately after Yoon Bong-gil's uprising in April, 1932, in the Republic of Korea. The rest of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, which was active in Hangzhou, Zhenjiang, Changsha, Guangzhou, Userwu, Qijiang, and Chongqing, lived while avoiding oppression by the Japanese imperialists, and there was almost no police activity due to lack of cooperation with the country.

3.2.1. Police department(1919.4.25): police activities under the ministry of home affairs of the provisional government of Shanghai(1919.4~1932.4)

On April 25, 1919, the Gyeongmu Bureau was established as the Gyeongmu Bureau under the Ministry of Interior of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. When the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established, the contents of the organization of the police organization were included in the Manual of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. In the Shanghai period, the police consisted of the Central Police Agency, the Police Bureau, the local police organization, the Police Department, and the Korean People's Army Police Department[16].

The police organization was briefly reduced after the mid-1920s, but was strengthened again as the Chongqing Police Department was reorganized into the Police Department on March 10, 1943, and the 'Security Guard' was established on October 17, 1941 to take charge of the internal security and government security. The provisional government's police were responsible for guarding government officials and protecting the lives and property of Korean residents. In addition, he worked hard for the independence movement by collecting domestic and foreign information, and by searching for and executing Japanese spies. In particular, the bodyguards acted as watchmen protecting the Provisional Government building along with the escorts.

As such, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai and operated for 13 years, and then left Shanghai immediately after Yun Bong-gil's uprising in April of the 14th year of the Republic of Korea(1932).

3.2.2. Communication department (january 1, 1919): inspector/inspector of internal affairs of the provisional government of Shanghai (1919-1923)

It is stated that the purpose of the implementation of the interim government of the Republic of Korea is to "communicate among the people and complete the restoration project" in Korea.

Table 1. Positions of Gak-gun police officer / inspector general and military staff appointments under general control: reconstructed based on Kim Eun-ji's data[17].

Provincial/county office and police chief/supervisor position		Status of county office personnel I-n YeonTong je in 1920 <Talkpan, Finance mu sa Chang, Kyo Tong Sa Chang, Gyeong Mu Sa Chang, Inspector, Jang seo, Cha mui>							
Provincial county office	South pyongan province	Pyong yang 2		Jinnampo 2		Daedong2	Dragon river2		Sonchan2
	North pyongan province	Uiju 11	Jung ju 14	Yongbyon 2	Taecheon 2	Gu seong 10	Un san 2	Changseong 12	Kanggye 15
		Wee won 14	Cho san 14	Ja seong 10	Seoncheon 1	Hu Chang 14	Hee heon 3	Byeok-dong 11	Sak ju 20
	North hamgyeong province	Lee Won 10		Hoer yong 2		Ham heung 2			
	Hamgyeongnam-do	Heungwon 2	Jeong Pyeong 2	Sinheung 2	Gyeong seong 1	Deokwon 2	Yeongheung 2		

In other words, joint control was implemented as a way to achieve independence by communicating with the people in Korea and the provisional government in China to harmonize the opinions of the two countries. <Table 1> from the moment when the Provisional Government was established on April 10, 1919, through 'Ordinance of the State Council No. 1' on July 10 of the same year, YeonTong-je was formed in the form of a provisional government-style local self-government system[18].

3.2.3. Medical police university(1923.12.16.~1936): under the ministry of home affairs of the provisional government, the Shanghai citizens corps is tasked with preserving security and searching for espionage

As the 1st Police Officer, Kim Koo took office as the Interior Minister in 1923, and on December 17th of the same year, founded the Police Department, a security organization, under the Provisional Government under the Shanghai Korean Citizens' Corps. The College of Medicine became a path through which young zealots devoted themselves to the independence movement. On January 8, 1932, Doctor Lee Bong-cha threw a hand grenade at the Emperor in Tokyo, and on April 29, 1932, on April 29, 1932, Bong-gil Yun threw a bomb at the Emperor's Birthday Celebration Ceremony at Hongkou Park. In May 1935, Doctor Yoo Sang-geun and Choi Heung-sik In Dalian, Manchuria, a Japanese dignitary was also bombed. Also, in March 1938, Lee Jin-man and Lee Deok-jusa were dispatched to Korea to assassinate the Governor-General of Joseon, Noh Jong-gyun(1894-1939), as the 2nd commander of the police force, carried out special operations and served as the commander of the Korean People's Army and an officer of the police force by Byeong-in, protecting the Provisional Government and the Korean community[19]. It was also called. In 1931, Kim Gu and the Korean Patriotic Corps were organized and supported by Bongchang Lee. In 1935, he ordered Kim Chang-geun, a member of the Korean Patriotic Corps, to kill the Japanese consulate general in Shanghai and the police department. In 1935, he was arrested by the Japanese police while carrying out special duties in Shanghai, such as sniping and killing Lee Gap-nyeong, president of the pro-Japanese People's Association.

3.2.4. Police department(1943.3.30.~1945): affiliated with the ministry of interior of the provisional government, reconnaissance prevention and reconnaissance of rogues

Police Department(1943.3.30.~1945): Affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the Provisional Government, reconnaissance prevention and reconnaissance of rogues. The Police Department, which was established as the Central Police Agency of the Provisional Government of Chongqing with the promulgation of the Republic of Korea Subtlety Control System in 1943, executed all police matters under the Central Control of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in 1944. Prior to that, the guards, organized in 1941, the year after arriving in Chongqing, were organized as an official organization directly under the Ministry of the Interior under the Government Organization Act after 19434, and they were liberated while performing the task of protecting the Provisional Government[20]. National Police Agency(2018).

3.2.5. Guards(1941.10.17.-1945): serves as a member of the ministry of home affairs of the provisional government and provides security and security for the elements

Guards(1941.10.17.-1945): Serves as a member of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Provisional Government and provides security and security for the elements.

The Provisional Government, which settled in Chongqing after a period of movement in 1940, revised the control system and restored the police institution that had been on schedule[9].

Korea U.S. Provisional Government Data Collection National Police Agency(2018).

Korea Provisional Government Guards Regulations

Article 1 Guards shall be under the direct control of the Ministry of Home Affairs to represent all Inspectors.

Article 2 Guards shall have the following employees 1 Captain each a little crew.

Article 3 The general supervises the work of the unit under the direction of the head of the Ministry of Home Affairs and directs and supervises the employees of the department.

Article 4 The godfather assists the captain and, in the event of his absence, acts on his behalf.

Article 5. Members are engaged in incidental duties under the orders of the general.

The above data are in accordance with the enactment of 「Provisional Government Guards Regulations」, which became the legal basis for the establishment of the Guards on October 7, 1941.

This is an announcement announcing the official establishment of the Guard. At that time, Kim Gwan-oh(1901~1965) was the captain of the bodyguard and Daebu-ro.

Yu Pyeong-pa(1910-1947) was appointed. The guards are in charge of guarding the Provisional Government building and protecting the elements[21].

4. Korean Provisional Government Police Activities

4.1. Shanghai provisional government police activities

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea established a police organization under the Ministry of the Interior. As the central police organization, there were the Police Department and the Police Department, and as the local police organization, there was the Police Department affiliated with the Gyeongmu-sa Korean Citizens' Corps linked to the Yeoncheon Police Station. There was a special task force within the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, which had special task force organizations and agents who performed special tasks such as military fundraising, intelligence gathering, and fighting with enthusiasm. There were special task groups and agents to carry out special missions. Special task organizations included the local propaganda department, military preparation team, patriotism team, Byeongin volunteer corps, and the Korean Patriots Corps. did. In addition, if we look at the case of special police activities.

This is the case of Tae-gyu Han. Han Tae-gyu was from Pyongyang and was a spy under the Japanese colonial rule. On March 10, 1920, he was appointed and served as a lieutenant in the Provisional Court of Justice. Kim Gu trusted him to work in the Police Department.

French Concession a Korean woman, strangled by a rope, was found dead on the roadside. As a result of intuition that it was the internal affairs of the Police Department and a secret investigation, the culprit was Tae-Gyu Han, a member of the Police Department. The woman caught Tae-gyu Han's contact with the Japanese police and killed him. Han Tae-gyu was arrested by the French Concession Police and sentenced to life in prison, but disappeared after escaping. Even after that, Japan constantly tried to dismantle the Provisional Government by making spies, but our Police Bureau found them and punished them to protect the Provisional Government[22].

This is the case of Hwang Hak-seon. Hwang Hak-seon was a native of Haeju, Hwanghae Province, and lived in Shanghai before the independence movement. In order to dismantle the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, Japan bribed our compatriots and created spies. Kim Gu recalls the past when he executed spies when he was the chief of the police department. After arresting and interrogating the spy Hwang Hak-seon, it was discovered that he was plotting to assassinate members of the Provisional Government, including Nanael. Hwang Hak-seon tried to lure and kill elements of the Provisional Government by putting up a sign saying "Minsaeng"

As a young man who arrived, he slandered the newly established Provisional Government and instigated passionate young men like Na Chang-heon. An attempt was made to assassinate each government secretary and chief of the police. The Police Department arrested and executed Hwang Hak-seon, who received funds and plans from the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai[23].

Figure 2. Independent newspaper article on september 15 (1892).



Note: Independence movement memorial hall[24].

This is an independent newspaper article reporting the activities of the Provisional Government Police of the Republic of Korea in <Figure 2>, which gives a glimpse of the activities of the Police Department, which protects the security of the Korean community at the time and blocks the spies from interfering with the independence movement. The content of the article is as follows. "Recently, our Police Department has been carrying out agile and courageous activities³, and as a result of the recent months of almost anarchy, no one dared to interfere with the security with political ambitions and the lives of our compatriots. threaten propert.


I can't see the shadow of the haya." He said, "You can get a glimpse of the activities of the Police Department, which protects the Korean community and blocks spies from interfering with the independence movement.

This is the case of Kim Do-soon. Kim Do-soon, a 17-year-old boy, came to Shanghai following the provisional government correspondent dispatched to Korea and cooperated with the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai to arrest the correspondent. Kim Do-soon received 10 won for travel expenses from the Japanese consulate, and was inevitably sentenced to death even though he was a minor. Kim Gu wrote that this was a special event that could not be seen in an established, normal country. This can be said to be a severe warning against external forces trying to destroy the Provisional Government, such as the Japanese imperialist spies, through the scourge of workers in the early stages of the establishment of the Provisional Government[25]. This is an example of the supremacist. Kim Gu lured, arrested, and interrogated the high-level spy Seon Woo-gap when he was the chief of the police department. It is said that Kim Gu saw Seon Woo-gap confessing and repenting of his sins, and released him on condition that he would build an honorable service. He said that he would donate the documents he had spied on in Shanghai to the Provisional Government, but secretly fled to Korea four days later and went around praising the virtues of the Provisional Government. According to the

³ Harden robbers poduseochanpoduseochan: They cover their heads wildly like a drunken running away from fear and quickly hide.

Japanese documents, Seonwoo-gap was a Gyeongbu-bo(警部補) secretly smuggled by the Police Department and was harmed by Kim Gu in Shanghai[26]. This is Kang In-woo's case. Kang In-woo came to Shanghai as a Japanese police officer and confessed his mission to Kim Gu. In addition, it is said that Kim Gu made false data by saying that if he gave a false report, he would return to Korea and avoid responsibility. It is said that Kang In-woo returned to Korea and became the governor of Poongsan for his contribution[15].

Figure 3. People from gyeongmu-guk at the new year's celebration of the provisional government of the Republic of Korea[27].



Is the case of Jeong Pil-hwa. Jeong Pil-hwa was the eldest brother of Jeong Jeong-hwa, daughter-in-law of Ga-jin Kim, who was Minister of Home Affairs during the late Han Dynasty. Kim Ga-jin was a person awarded the title of baron, but after the March 1st Movement, he fled to Shanghai. The Government-General of Joseon thought that it was a shame for Japan that the baron participated in the independence movement, and secretly persuaded Kim Ga-jin to return home by sending Jeong Pil-hwa to Shanghai. The Police Department found out about this and secretly arrested Pil-Hwa Jeong, and as a result of questioning him, he was sentenced to death by hanging[28]. Even under the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, there were people from the Police Department in <Figure 3>, who did their duty as a police officer and the liberation of the country even in a distant country. From left: First Chief of Police, Kim Gu, First Chief of Police, Cheon Cheon-Yeo, Bodyguard of Police Department, and Police Department[29] Bodyguard Kim Hee-jun, Police Department Security Officer Kim Yeon-hee, Police Department Security Officer Kim Chul, Police Department Security Guard Jo Bong-gil, Police Department Guard Jang Won-taek, and on the far right are Police Chief Yeom Hang-seop[30].

As the Provisional Government Complex No. 321 in Habi-ro was closed, the Police Department was moved to another location. As of the end of February 1920, as of the current internal affairs staff, the following is the list of the head of the security affairs bureau, the head of the security department, and the bodyguards.

5. Conclusion

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea(1919.4~1945.11) was a period of turmoil in the Korean Empire and after the Japan-Chinese Treaty in November 1910, in Korea, Japan's legislative, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and military and police powers were deprived of assimilated into Japan by the weak or weak. Even in the face of persecution resisting, the government had no choice but to play a limited role as the government was established under the rule that the territory was occupied[31]. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established by laws and

systems and was able to exercise its police power without losing its police function. On April 11, 1919, after the promulgation of the establishment of the Provisional Charter of the Republic of Korea, revisions were made repeatedly, and on April 25, the first government organization, the 'Korean Provisional Government Charter,' was enacted. The police of the Provisional Government were largely transformed into the Central Police Agency, the Police Department, the Police Department, and the Guard, and the Police Corps as a local police organization were active.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Author's contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	JH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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