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Corresponding author\*  
E-mail: yyun0916 @naver.com

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## A Study on Implementation Plan for the South-North Korean Unification and Security Strategy

Jiwon Yun<sup>1</sup>

*Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

Youngjun Jo<sup>2\*</sup>

*Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

### Abstract

**Purpose:** The purpose of this paper is to think about the benefits and gains which unification will bring about in our reality as divided nations, understand the legitimacy for unification, and devised a strategy for preparing for unification. The purpose is to establish values and a desirable attitude towards the state while preparing for unification and analyzing the stature and future of the Republic of Korea.

**Method:** In order to come up with the legitimacy of unification, strategy, and what we need to do to prepare for unification, references such as books, academic journals, and dissertations related to unification were examined, and in order to derive empirical data for the stature of South Korea and the future, empirical studies were conducted for news and government data, etc.

**Results:** The strategy to prepare for unification is to induce North Korea not to make unreasonable demands by maintaining a strong security arrangement, such as by securing regular and irregular warfare capabilities, strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and joint operational capabilities, and adhering to firm principles rather than a principle of less appeasement policy not to mislead the public's perception of North Korea. Unification requires an agreement between the two Koreas, yet what is clear is that unification must be liberal and democratic based on a market economy, and it is also necessary to reach a national consensus. Furthermore, while expanding the breadth of mutual understanding between the two Koreas, close friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries must also be maintained.

**Conclusion:** Most of the people have a negative perception towards unification, and the MZ generation even demonstrate a cynical attitude towards North Korea. However, unification must be achieved in order to pursue development and prosperity while continuing the historical legitimacy of our people, and for stability in Northeast Asia and the world peace. In the process of pursuing unification, it should serve as an opportunity to properly establish the 'view of state' as well as the 'view of unification' or 'view of security' which have not been fully established in the consciousness of the people.

**[Keywords]** North-South Korean Unification, Legitimacy of Unification, Stature of South Korea, Security Arrangement, View of State

## 1. Introduction

Today, Korean society is experiencing extreme polarization in the era of COVID-19 and the 4th industrial revolution. Polarization is taking place across all areas, including values, regions, generations, and classes. Amidst such situation, most people forget what to expect from the state and what the state to be developed in the future should look like. People perceive that the benefits of the state are obtained almost automatically in their daily life, and hence, it is easy to be indifferent towards the desirable and correct appearance of the state. However, in terms of devotion and expectations for the country, the issue of "from what point of view should

we look at the country?” is crucial. Various positions have been continuously discussed as to what the desirable appearance of the state should be in terms of the times.

A desirable view of the state is that it may be claimed that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, a liberal view of state was agreed upon. The liberal view of the state places more importance on the guarantee of the private area independent of the state than the public area. The reason why the state exists is to guarantee individual freedom and rights. The Neutrality of the state power to guarantee freedom and rights is an important issue, yet in our reality, given the 68th year of the armistice, not the end of the armistice, we need to know that voluntary sacrifice and dedication are required for the development of the national community even when a liberal view of the state has been agreed upon.

Considering the stature and future of the Republic of Korea which we dream of, we need to consider our values and attitudes toward the state.

## 2. Legitimacy of Unification and the Key Implementation Strategy

### 2.1. Legitimacy of unification

Unification ought to be achieved in the interest of the development and prosperity of our nation while continuing the historical legitimacy of our people, which have formed a single nation state for thousands of years. Furthermore, for the stability of Northeast Asia and world peace, it must be viewed and promoted positively[1]. Unification will be an opportunity for us to take a new leap forward and grow further, and if the power of economic development and democracy we have achieved to date in the state of division plays a role as a medium, it will lay the foundation for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula and shape the economy, society and culture[2].

However, most people do not have a positive perception of unification. According to the results of an online survey of 1,000 men and women conducted from June 8, 2021 until June 12, 2021 through Global Research by Kookmin Ilbo (June 25, 2021), the country that the MZ generation hates the most is China (57.7%), and Japan is second (31.2%) and third is North Korea (12.6%). Many responses demonstrated an exclusive attitude towards outsiders, including refugees and immigrants, and a cynical attitude towards North Korea[3].

**Table 1.** MZ generation's thoughts towards North Korea.

Survey contents	Thoughts (%)
They are Korean compatriots.	17.1
They are a neighboring country.	19.7
They are a separate country having no relevance to us.	31.0
They don't interest us.	14.9
They are enemy to us.	17.3

Furthermore, as to the question of 'What do you think of North Korea?', as illustrated in <Table 1>, 31% of the respondents said that they are 'the same country as the South,' 14.9% said 'not interested'. 17.3% of respondents answered 'enemy country' 19.7% answered 'neighboring country,' while only 17.1% considered 'Korean ethnicity'. It is noteworthy that the younger the age group, the lower the response rate of 'Korean ethnicity'. Only 10% of 18-24 year-olds think of North Koreans as 'Korean ethnicity', and they also said that 'North Korea and

South Korea are separate countries and do not feel the need for unification, and sometimes think of North Korea as a state subordinate to China.'

Following, as for the question of 'What do you think about the North-South Korean unification?', as illustrated in <Table 2>, 'opposed' (54.2%) surpassed 'agreed' (45.8%). However, there is a difference in terms of the answers between men and women for this question, with 54% of men in favor and 46% against the unification, while 63.2% of women opposed the unification. This difference between men and women is such that, men think that they will be able to seize opportunities if volatility increases in the process of unification, whereas women think that their situation or status in Korea may be threatened.

**Table 2.** MZ Generation 's thoughts towards the North-South Korean unification.

Survey contents	Men's thoughts (%)	Women's thoughts (%)
Absolutely in favor	7.6	4.6
In favor	46.4	32.2
Against	32.4	46.3
Absolutely against	13.6	16.9

As demonstrated by the survey results, the view on North Korea and the North-South Korean unification is very negative, yet unification is a mission of the times which we must achieve without exception, and it is necessary to establish a correct 'view of state' and 'view of unification' for the future of the Republic of Korea. The following factors will be crucial for establishing the legitimacy of unification.

### 2.1.1. Legitimacy in terms of the national history

Our people have maintained a single state system in the geographical space of the Korean Peninsula for a long time and have continued a long historical tradition of five millennia as a single nation[4]. However, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, we lost sovereignty following the invasion of the Japanese imperialism, and in the process of the end of World War II, the artificial division was made according to the logic of the great powers, causing division as North and South for 70 some years thereafter. For us as a single nation, the division is an abnormal reality that separates the nation and promotes confrontation and conflict. Unification must be accomplished as soon as possible to restore the 'authenticity' of our nation.

### 2.1.2. Legitimacy in terms of the socio-economic aspect

Resolving the pain and sufferings of separated families from a humanitarian point of view is the first issue to address and the realization of basic human rights[4][5]. For the reunification of separated families, unification must be achieved without exception. The division has significantly deepened the heterogeneity of the two Koreas across all areas, and is also confusing the national identity. Unification is urgent to restore the national homogeneity, and in order to prevent the waste of national capabilities, and take off globally in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is necessary to overcome division which causes the waste of national capabilities due to mutual distrust, conflict, antagonism and confrontation.

### 2.1.3. Legitimacy in terms of security and politics

The dictionary meaning of national security is to protect national security from danger, crisis, invasion, and aggression[6].

The Korean Peninsula is not yet free from the fear of war since it is in a state of armistice where the war has not ended. If a war recurs on the Korean Peninsula, there will only be a result

of ‘annihilation of the nation.’ Unification will provide us with an opportunity to take another leap forward, prosperity and development along with peace. In particular, the unification of the two Koreas will eliminate the threat of war in Northeast Asia, relieve tensions of the region, and significantly contribute to world peace. It is considered that the unified Korea of the future and the peaceful unification may also be achieved by recognizing the existing political environment and utilizing the creative abilities of Koreans.

#### **2.1.4. Legitimacy in terms of the future development**

Unification will help expand the space for our people to be active throughout the Korean Peninsula, and will also serve as an opportunity to further accelerate our nation's prosperity and development by consolidating national capabilities. In order for our nation to take a leap forward towards a world-class nation, we must end division and achieve a unified nation based on inter-Korean cooperation and reconciliation. Unification will bring about new growth engines for the entire Korean Peninsula and also enable greater economic growth to be expected by securing new markets[7].

### **2.2. Implementation strategy for the unification**

Numerous countries and peoples have developed while repeating the history of rising and fall, and some of them have faded away from the face of the planet earth forever, while others have been divided, separated, and reunified. Unification should be pursued under 3 basic premises based on the foundation of enhancing public interest and social dialogue[8].

#### **2.2.1. Normalization of the Inter-Korean relations**

For the unification of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of inter-Korean relations is important, and the inter-Korean relations must be managed stably through building mutual trust. The pure humanitarian aid for the vulnerable, such as infants and pregnant women, should be pursued independently of politics, while practically solving the problems of separated families, POWs, and abductees. Among the contents of the agreements of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> inter-Korean summit, it is necessary to first check on the areas which may be pursued and establish a culture of implementing the agreement between the South and the North. Furthermore, it is necessary to lay the foundation for building an economic community to ensure that North Korea can develop self-reliance, support international investment in the North Korean region, and expand cooperation in accordance with the inter-Korean trust and progress for denuclearization.

#### **2.2.2. Start small and grow big**

It is important to start with anything small, such as by presenting a vision for the unification and promoting the pure humanitarian aid and economic and environmental communities, and also creating a foundation for unification. Through 3 summits in 2018, it was declared that “the need to end the long-standing division and confrontation as soon as possible, boldly usher in a new era of national reconciliation and peace and prosperity, and more actively improve and develop the inter-Korean relations”[9].

In particular, the two Koreas agreed to connect the Gyeongui Line and the East Sea Line, which are symbols of the inter-Korean exchanges[2][10]. However, ever since, nothing has materialized, and to the contrary, even the inter-Korean joint liaison office in Kaesong was destroyed by North Korea on June 16, 2020. Hence, rather than playing with words and declarations, they must reinstall the joint liaison office according to the progress of the inter-Korean relations, establish the cooperative governance between the state, local governments and the private sector[11], promote the national community events with participation from all strata of society, jointly advance into international competitions, while conditions should be created to ensure that the agenda discussed at the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> inter-Korean summits, such as family

reunions, connection and modernization of railways and roads on the East Sea Line and Gyeongui Line, may be promoted each individually.

### **2.2.3. Practical preparation for the unification**

It is necessary to prepare various scenarios to cope with sudden changes in circumstances such as those in North Korea[12]. When the opportunity for unification comes, it is necessary to secure the national economy and financial foundation so that the cost of unification may be covered without difficulty, and accumulate separate financial resources for the unification. It is necessary to spread a consensus for the unification at home and abroad and also have the people's capacity to prepare for the unification practically.

First, it is necessary to make practical preparations, such as by promoting the unification-related education which contributes to national unity, such as by developing content for the unification-related future generations and devising a comprehensive unification financing plan. Furthermore, it will be necessary to strengthen the cooperative system in preparation for the unification among the relevant ministries, establish and operate a consultative body among the 4 neighboring countries, and continue close communication and cooperation with the international community, including the United States, to ensure that the 'Process of Peace on the Korean Peninsula' can be promoted with the support of the international community[13].

## **3. Stature of South Korea and the Future of the Republic of Korea**

### **3.1 Stature of South Korea**

The Republic of Korea successfully hosted the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 2002 World Cup, and the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. It also hosted the three major international events, the Summer Olympics, the World Cup, and the World Expo. The Republic of Korea became the 6th country to host four major sporting events (Olympic Games, World Cup, F-1 Auto Race, World Athletics Championships). In the case of Taekwondo, the national sport, as of 2018, as evidenced by 209 member states of the World Taekwondo Federation and 10,023,090 black belt holders, Taekwondo today is loved as a global sport beyond Korea's traditional martial art[14].

In particular, in 2018, Korea joined the 30-50 clubs, which has only been achieved by 7 countries in the world. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) changed Korea's status from a developing country to a developed country on July 2, 2021, and it is the first time in 57 years since its establishment that a specific country's status has been changed. Korea has the world's 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy and has been invited to the G7 summit for the 2<sup>nd</sup> year in a row, reflecting its elevated status in the international community. Korea became the first country to become a developed country since UNCTAD was established in 1964.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which is an affiliate of the United Nations, announced in September 2021 that Korea ranked 5th in the Global Innovation Index (GII), as the highest level ever, and ranked 1<sup>st</sup> in Asia. Of the 81 detailed indicators, 9 indices, including design applications and high-tech exports, ranked 1<sup>st</sup> in the world.

Korea's economic rank rose to the 10<sup>th</sup> in the world in 2020, and its national income per capita (GNI) surpassed that of Italy (USD 32,200) among the G7 for the first time last year after exceeding USD 30,000 in 2017. Korea is a country which has developed rapidly from the bottom of the world to the highest, from the edge of the world to its center in just a few decades. This is a groundbreaking history which we have accomplished in a short period of half a century, which took 200 to 300 years in the western world.

Approximately 100 years ago, Korea, once known as a 'country of hermits,' has now become the world's 7<sup>th</sup> largest exporter and the 5<sup>th</sup> largest trading power in the world in terms of total trade. Based on its elevated national status, the Republic of Korea demonstrated its diplomatic power by participating in the G7 Summit held in the United Kingdom in June 2021 despite the COVID-19 situation. In addition, it is actively contributing to world peace by dispatching 1,038 soldiers (as of November 2020) to 14 regions, including sending peacekeeping forces to conflict zones around the world, such as Lebanon, South Sudan, UAE, and Haiti[14].

### **3.2 The future of Korea**

Those who witnessed the devastating ruins of the Korean War never expected that the Republic of Korea would ever rise again. Foreign veterans of the Korean War who have visited Korea cannot help but marvel at the rapid development and growth of the Republic of Korea, which was turned into ashes, and are thrilled that the blood and sweat they shed were worthwhile[15].

If and where the North-South Korean unification was accomplished considering the potential of North Korea, according to the 'World Economic Report 2019' of the Center for Economics and Management Research (CBER) of the UK, in the 2030s, the GDP of a unified Korea would surpass the UK and France to become the 6<sup>th</sup> largest in the world. After unification, the production inducement effect which spreads to South Korea following the unification is estimated at KRW 81 trillion per year and KRW 37.4 trillion in terms of the added value per year, and the employment inducement effect is estimated to be approximately 656,000 people per year[16].

North Korea is rich in terms of natural resources, excellent labor, and mineral resources such as uranium, zinc, and lead, whose worth are 140 times the gross domestic product. While there are uncertainties and unification costs associated with the unification, the economic area will be expanded by accelerating the development of the North Korean border region based on the stability of South Korea and forming the economic area of the Korean people in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The unified Korea is expected to form a huge economic area by integrating North Korea's rapid growth and South Korea's synergies[15][17]. Moreover, when the unified Korea is achieved, the population will reach 77 million, thereby surpassing France (65 million), UK (67 million), and Italy (60 million). As a result, Korea will play a key role in the international community as a power close to Germany, France, and the UK.

## **4. Security Strategy Plan for the Unification**

Currently, there are negative thoughts about the unification in South Korea, and most North Koreans are not so knowledgeable about the external situation. Hence, South Korea's thinking must change, and efforts must be made to help resolve the hostility between North and South Korean residents and also prevent ethnic differences[18]. The main security strategies to be pursued for the unification are summarized as follows.

### **4.1. Maintain a firm security arrangement**

For the peace and unification of the entire Korean Peninsula, it is important to maintain a strong security arrangement above everything. In order to prevent North Korea from posing a threat with nuclear weapons and missiles, it is necessary to prepare countermeasures such as by strengthening the nuclear deterrence in a clear division between enemies and allies, while simultaneously equipping regular and non-regular warfare capabilities, and strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and combined operational capabilities[13][19].

In particular, there is a possibility that North Korea will continue to engage in various provocative activities such as attack on the ROKS Cheonan, shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, and the

terrorism of major facilities. Hence, it is necessary to maintain a strong ROK-U.S. alliance system during the peacetimes and boldly punish North Korean provocations through the cooperation with the international community. The weak must be aware of the friendship of the victor's power on its own, then the peaceful coexistence and dialogue can take place.

#### **4.2. Maintain the relations with North Korea with a firm principle**

Meanwhile, we have made an excuse for North Korea to make unreasonable demands in its favor by losing consistency in terms of the policy against North Korea, by suggesting a change in its position on the issue of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), reducing military training at the request of North Korea, and providing aid to North Korea for domestic political purposes. thereby allowing North Korea to make excessive demands in their favor [20].

Rather than a principled appeasement policy, firm principles should be adhered to on issues such as humanitarian aid, North Korea's provocations, economic exchanges, and the ROK-U.S. We need to induce North Korea not to make unreasonable demands and not mislead the public's perception of North Korea. Immediately before the 1<sup>st</sup> inter-Korean summit in 2000, there were provided hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, tours of Mt. Kumgang, and huge cash support through the Kaesong Industrial Complex project.

There is no doubt that the money provided was used for North Korea's nuclear and missile development. In September 2021, the Ministry of Unification decided to provide KRW 10 billion for private organizations' North Korea projects. However, we should not expect that our kindness and support will bring about changes in North Korea. When providing aid to North Korea, except for pure humanitarian aid, it is necessary to check whether the military power is strengthened and whether it is used for the North Korean communist regime. A principled attitude toward North Korea is necessary, such as closely examining the effects of aid to North Korea and the appropriateness of the scale of aid.

#### **4.3. Derive a national consensus on the future of unification**

Last year, North Korea's economic growth rate was estimated to have declined the most in 23 years since the 'March of Hardship' in 1997, as their GDP fell by 4.5% and foreign trade fell steeply by 73%. At the closing ceremony of the 6th Secretariat Congress, Kim Jong-un declared that he would resume the March of Hardship to overcome sanctions against North Korea, and the situation in North Korea is such that he will strengthen resident control and internal crack-down.

As for the unification, consultation between the two Koreas is inevitable and there is a target of North Korea, yet what is clear is that unification must be a liberal democratic unification based on a market economy. Some people are concerned about the huge cost which is often incurred in the process of unification, yet it should be recognized that the unification is more likely to create new opportunities than the costs [21]. In order to properly promote the unification, we need to reach a national consensus, and at the same time, make an effort to share the perception of unification as one, beyond the conflicts between generations, groups, and regions.

#### **4.4. Expand the breadth of mutual understanding between the North and South Korea**

In terms of socio-cultural aspect, it would be necessary to broaden the scope of mutual understanding between the two Koreas. In the case of Germany, social integration has proven to be difficult given economic factors, yet we must understand that, in preparations for the unification, efforts must first be made to establish and revitalize an inter-Korean economic community to establish a foundation for the mutual understanding. If we leave the current state of heterogeneity as it is, we cannot expect an inner integration or genuine harmony to take place. The sense of national community of the Korean people is the string which connects us, the greatest cause for unification, and the source of the driving force for the unification. Values

which can psychologically converge North and South Koreans and a sense of community such as fraternity and fateful bonds as a single nation ought to be cultivated.

#### **4.5. Maintain close friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries**

For unification, there must be no outside intervention or interference, and if relations with neighboring countries are not smooth, it may be hindered in financing unification costs and attracting investment. It should be noted that the unification process can be made much easier if neighboring countries support it. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries, and the ROK-US alliance and friendly relations with China are important. A cautious approach is needed to utilize the multilateral security system in Northeast Asia for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula. On the contrary, there is a possibility that neighboring countries will provide an excuse for official intervention in the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Rather than changing the current six-party talks system to a multilateral security system, it is expected that it would be desirable to maintain it as a loose dialogue mechanism as it is now.

### **5. Conclusion**

As the song goes, “Unification is our wish, our wish in our dream is also the unification,” we have blindly believed that unification must come true and it will come true. However, Koreans are looking at the unification passively and sometimes from the standpoint of a bystander rather than an active awareness of what to do and how with the unification method. Until now, conflicts and ideological problems between the South and the North have been used as a means to maintain or acquire the regime, and the resulting heterogeneity and hostility between the North and South have significantly contributed to the dichotomous formation of the people's view of North Korea. For us, North Korea is a target of military confrontation, yet it is a partnership through which we must cooperate to form a national community[22].

Our strong sense of identity as a single nation causes us to dream of unification toward building a prosperous community. We have overcome countless crises to date to protect our state and people. Hence, in order to understand the crises and issues facing the state and people, and also build a country which the people dream of, all of the people must gather their wisdom and strength together. Unification is the task of the Republic of Korea and of ours living to-day[23].

At the 4<sup>th</sup> inter-Korean summit, President Moon Jae-in said, “This is the beginning, yet it will not be another beginning of the past, but a completely new beginning. Just as each step becomes more difficult from the moment the top of the mountain is visible, the road toward completing a complete denuclearization and a complete peace on the Korean Peninsula will never be smooth.” This is the beginning, and it will never proceed smoothly, yet it is the most important time to never give up and to take one step forward at a time.

Master Chaeho Shin said, “A people which forget history cannot be regenerated,” and as Winston Churchill said, “A nation that forgets its history has no future,” knowing our history is essential, and it should not be forgotten. Our history is a path we are proud of, while there have been painful moments in the history of the Korean people, and it also points us to the direction we need to mobilize in the future. Based on our interest in history, we need to properly develop the ‘view of unification’ and ‘view security,’ which have not yet been fully established in the consciousness of the people, as well as the ‘view of the state.’

As John F Kennedy famously said, ‘Ask what you will do for your country before asking what your country will do for you’, it is important to have a mindset that you can do something for your country. We need the right values and attitudes for the country.

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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	JY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li></ul>
Corresponding Author*	YJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li></ul>

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Corresponding author\*  
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## The Effects of Company Commanders' Leader Prototypicality and Army Prestige on Platoon Leaders' Identification with Their Company and Army

Seongik Ahn<sup>1</sup>

Yeungnam University, Gyeongsan, Republic of Korea

Yooshin Im<sup>2\*</sup>

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea

### Abstract

**Purpose:** In a military context, economic exchange has limitations to motivating their member, especially first-line military officers because they risk their lives in an extreme situation and the value of one's life cannot be evaluated easily. Rather than an economic exchange approach, we adopted social identity theory to explore the way to motivate first-line military officers. Based on social identity theory, we tried to find several ways to motivate first-line military officers.

**Method:** We collected data by the survey. Before hypothesis testing, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and calculated Cronbach's alpha to see the validity and reliability of the measurement. After verifying there is no problem in terms of validity and reliability of the measurement, we tested the hypothesis with a structural equation model.

**Results:** The effects of company commanders' leader prototypicality and army prestige on platoon leaders' identification with their company were proved to be statistically significant. And again platoon leaders' identification with their company was shown to have a significant effect on platoon leaders' identification with the army. Furthermore, army prestige influences not only platoon leaders' identification with the army via identification with the company indirectly but also directly.

**Conclusion:** Because of the difficulties of evaluating one's life even in the military context, the economic exchange approach has limitations in motivating first-line military officers. In the academic field, the social exchange approach is adopted as the alternative approach to economic exchange. Rather than the social exchange perspective, we adopted the social identity perspective which emphasizes the identification of self-interest and organizational interest to explore the way to motivate first-line military officers. The result of this study showed that some characteristics of middle-level military officers and the external image of the whole military organization, namely, the Korean Army have significant effects on organizational identification, which means that these two factors can be regarded as possible tools for motivating first-line military officers.

**[Keywords]** Identification, Prototypicality, Prestige, Social Identity Theory, Social Identification Theory

## 1. Introduction

For a nation to sustain itself, countless elements are required. Among the required elements, one of the most important elements may be an army. On the one hand, the army is necessary to protect the lives of the people, on the other hand, it is required to increase people's interest. From every aspect, the military is indispensable to the country. Like any other organization, the military organization needs members who contribute to it for its goal. It is critical for organizational success to attract competent members and motivate them to achieve their goals[1][2].

Typical organizations adopt the economic approach that they compensate monetarily to the people who contribute to achieving organizational goals. They usually provide compensation

according to the extent to which their members contributed. By doing so, they secure fairness within the organizations and maintain their members. Furthermore, they also motivate their members to involve in organizational goals more. Almost all organizations adopt this kind of economic approach for attracting, maintaining, and motivating their member, and military organization is not exceptional either. Military organizations attract, maintain, and motivate their members with this kind of economic approach[3]. However, there is a big difference between general organizations and military organizations. We can find the difference by looking simply into the roles of soldiers.

For military organizations to achieve their goal, their members, that is, soldiers inevitably confront the situation to kill enemies or to be killed by enemies which most people want to avoid. In the case that the members have to kill enemies, they can be motivated to carry their mission with more compensation although they are reluctant to do so. In other words, the economic methods are applicable for this case. However, the economic methods are difficult to apply for the case that they risk their lives. Thinking simply, it seems to make sense to compensate more in return for sacrificing their lives. To apply this approach, what matters is how much to compensate. To judge the extent to which they who are to sacrifice their lives for the organization are rewarded, first of all, the price of life should be evaluated. As we believe generally that the value of life is infinite, the evaluation of one's life is extremely difficult. In the end, there are limits to applying an economic approach for military organizations even though they adopt it like other kinds of organizations.

In this vein, in the management of military organizations, new approaches beyond the existing economic approach which relies on monetary compensation for attraction, maintenance, and motivation of human resources should be explored. According to these practical needs, traditionally, military organizations have emphasized mental education that can make up for the shortcomings of the economic approach. This study is going to try a new challenge that can widen the way to motivate the members of the military organization from the social identity theory[4][5].

According to social identity theory[4][5], people have several identities that define themselves, which can be divided into two groups. One is the identity that defines themselves apart from social belongings and the other is the identity that defines themselves on the social belongings. People may define themselves using only their own characteristics except for the social category they belong to. For example, we may define ourselves using physical characteristics like height, weight, the color of eyes, and so on. In contrast, we may define ourselves using social categories that we belong to. For example, when we introduce ourselves to a stranger, we usually use hometown, the schools that we graduated from, the workplace that we work for, and so on. At the early developmental stage of this theory, the researchers focused on the fact that there is a social identity that can be distinguished from self-identity. As the theory developed, the researchers widened the area of research interest. Gradually, they got interested in the effect of identifying their identity with a certain social category like an organization. This process is called identification. The more people identify with an organization, the more they are willing to contribute to the organization voluntarily because they identify the interest of the organization with their own interest[6]. This means that the identification with an organization has the same effects of motivating organizational members to contribute to the organization. In that the person who is once identified with the organization contributes to the organization boundlessly, the motivational effects of identification with the organization are more powerful than extrinsic motivation. As the knowledge about the effects of organizational identification accumulates, the research interest move to exploring the factors that enhance organizational members' identification with their organization[5][7].

This study will explore the way to enhance military members' identification with their military organization, adopting the social identity theory or organizational identity theory which were

developed mainly in a non-military context. Especially, this study focus on platoon leaders' identification with their company and army. The platoon leader is in the first position that is given to the officer candidates who finished official military education and training. Accordingly, the establishment of their identity as a military officer is weak and the development of their identity as a military officer is critical both for their career success and for the military organization[8][9]. Because platoon leaders carry out their job mainly within their company, we assumed that platoon leaders' identification with their company is strengthened first and next the strengthened identification with their company will influence platoon leaders' identification with their whole military organization, namely, the army. In the process of development of two kinds of platoon leaders' identification, we paid attention to two independent variables. One is leader prototypicality which is often investigated leader factor that can influence organizational identification. The other is organizational prestige which is one of the organizational variables that is known to influence organizational identification.

## **2. Literature Review and Research Model**

### **2.1. The development of social identity theory**

Social identity theory started from a minimal group experiment that was conducted to investigate intergroup differentiation[10]. The researchers were interested in the reason why people make a group with a minima cue even when making a group is not beneficial to the group member and the ingroup favoritism happens. After success in testing that minima cue that does not contribute to newly created group economically, making social category or group with minimal cue is accepted as natural in human behavior. Based on these findings, Tajfel first introduced the concept of social identity and define it as "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership"(p. 292) [11]. As theory developed, the researchers got interested in the developmental process of social identity. Tajfel and Turner suggested social-psychological processes that consist of social categorization, social comparison, and social identification[12].

This theoretical development took place mainly in European psychology and they focused on academic interest. After the 1990s, American management researchers started to get interested in social identity theory and applied this theory to a more practical field. One salient movement was to narrow down the scope of social categories. As mentioned above, the original theory tried to discover why humans make social categories and segregate each other and considered the broad and high social categories like ethnics, nations, religion, and so on. But the American management researchers tried to apply this theory to the organizational phenomenon. For example, Ashforth and Mael narrowed down the scope of the social category to the organization and suggested organizational identity theory[5]. Mael and Ashforth did not suggest only theory level research but also conducted an empirical study that proved their proposed conceptual model[7]. They collected data for their empirical study by survey and also developed survey items, which are still being used by almost all organizational identity theory researches.

In 2000, the Academy of Management Review published a special issue on organizational identity and this special issue accelerated the studies on organizational identity and organizational identification. In 2005, Rikett published a meta-analysis study that compared organizational identification and other relevant concepts and concluded like the following[13]. First, Organizational identification is correlated with various attitudinal or behavioral variables that are used by organizational behavior researches. Second, Organizational identification is empirically distinctive from affective commitment which seems to be very similar. Third, the items of Ashforth and Mael are in wide use. Looking into Rikett's meta-analysis study more deeply, we can see that organizational identification has various positive effects on organizations. First,

Organizational identification correlates with positive attitudinal variables like affective commitment, occupational attachment, workgroup attachment, job satisfaction, organizational satisfaction, intent to leave, and so on. Second, Organizational identification has significant effects on positive behavioral variables like absenteeism, in-role behavior, and extra-role behavior. Furthermore, in 2006, the Journal of Organizational Behavior also published a special issue on organizational identity and they focused on finding the difference between organizational commitment and organizational identification. Since then, organizational identity and organizational identification became central topics in organizational management research.

## **2.2. Emergent of organization identification theory**

As mentioned above, the empirical study of Ashforth and Mael[14] is one of the first systematic empirical studies. They tested their conceptual model that predicts the consequence and antecedents of the identification with the school or alumni. After graduation, one may keep their interest in their school and try to contribute to their school voluntarily. But the others may lose their interest in their school and be reluctant to contribute. Ashforth and Mael thought that the more identified with their school or alumni associate, the more they are inclined to contribute to their school. Furthermore, they explored the factors that strengthen alumni's identification with their school. To test their hypothesis, they also invented survey items that measure organizational identification and another relevant concept. Inconsequent, they succeed in proving that the identification with their school increases alumni's voluntary contribution and finding the antecedents of organizational identification like organizational prestige, organizational distinctiveness, and intra-organizational competition.

To identify with an organization means to define themselves borrowing the nature of the organization. In other words, to identify with an organization means to identify their own identity with organizational identity. Owing to this nature of organizational identification, the person who is identified with their organization shows the tendency to regard the interest of their organization as their own. Accordingly, those who are identified with their organization try to contribute to the organization because they believe that the success of an organization is their own success. These kinds of social phenomena can be found easily. Simply, let's think of the expression of the sports fan who is watching the scene of their team beating the opposing team. What matters for my income if my cheering team win or not? But whether my cheering team win or is defeated influence us much. The strength of influence becomes more as the more identified with the cheering team. So it is comparatively easy to understand why organizational identification promotes members' pro-social behavior to their organizations.

## **2.3. The antecedents of organizational identification**

The reasons or the conditions in which someone becomes identified with organizations are very complicated and many researchers are trying to discover them. After intensive review, Hogg and Terry suggested the model for the self-categorization process that explains the consequence and antecedents of social categorization[14]. They coined the term, self-categorization, to explain the reason and process of identification. They argued that self-enhancement motivation and uncertainty reduction motivation take a critical role to accelerate identification. Although there is no benefit to identifying with an organization superficially, if looking in more deeply, those who want to identify with a certain organization can increase self-esteem or reduce the certainty about themselves by identifying with the target organization. In short, when people regard certain organizations seem to help enhance their self-esteem or reduce the uncertainty about themselves. When these arguments are applied for the empirical study of Ashforth and Mael, the independent variable of organizational prestige corresponds to self-enhancement motivation and intra-organizational competition corresponds to uncertainty reduction motivation.

Furthermore, Hogg and Terry emphasized the role of leadership in building organizational identification[14]. When a new organization is created, at least, more than one person take the role to make the cognitive boundaries of the new organization that make it distinct from other organization. This process starts from building up the prototypicality of the organization, which founders of leaders of the organization create and strengthen in most cases. Hence, the prototypicality of the leader, which means the extent to which the leader reflects the proper organizational image, is also a very important factor for developing organizational identification.

## 2.4. Research model and hypothesis

As discussed above, organizational identification is a very useful concept not only for the usual organization but also for military organizations. Rather, Considering the unconditional effects of identification with an organization, the usefulness is much more in the military organization than in any other type of organization. Although the importance of organizational identification is valid across all the ranks in the military, this study focuses on platoon leaders' identification with their company as an immediate military unit they belong to and identification with the army as the whole military unit. As most platoon leaders carry their job belonging to their companies, they will recognize the whole army through companies. In other words, in their cognition, the image of their companies reflects the image of a whole military unit, namely, the army. Because of this reason, we expected as following.

H1: platoon leaders' identification with their company will have a positive effect on their identification with the army.

The work condition itself of each company across the whole army will not very different. But we can expect the difference of company commanders will be big. As the stage of the career of platoon leaders is very short and their self-image as a military officer is not concrete yet, they may suffer from worry about future career success and wondering what the right ways of military offer are. Borrowing the idea of Hogg and Terry, there is enough possibility for platoon leaders to suffer from the uncertainty about self-identity as a military officer and wish to reduce this kind of uncertainty. If platoon leaders recognize their company commanders as prototypical as successful military officers, the sense of belongingness to the company under the prototypical leader will drive them to reduce their sense of uncertainty about themselves as military officers. So, we expected as following

H2: The prototypicality of company commander will have positive effects on platoon leader' identification with his or her company


As mentioned above, organizational prestige is very important for the development of organizational identification from the perspective of self-enhancement motivation. The public judgment about killing people, even though the people are the enemy, will be divided into two radically different judgments. One group may emphasize the behavior as killing a human and conclude it negatively. One group will evaluate their behavior very honorably on the assumption that they will be harmed by enemies if they do not commit murder. Although all the military members confront the ultimate situation like killing or being killed, they as military members are supposed to think of that issue. In the process of their thinking, social support is critical. If they feel they are being supported by society, they will enhance their self-esteem and enjoy belongingness to military organizations. Organizational prestige is one of the most representative pieces of information about how society thinks of its organization. So we can expect that platoon leaders' perception of army prestige in the society will influence their identification with his or her company.

H3: Army prestige will have a positive effect on platoon leaders' identification with the company.

H4: Army prestige will have a positive effect on platoon leaders' identification with the army.

As above, we suggested a total of three hypotheses. If denoted in the picture, our research model is like the following.

**Figure 1.** Research model.



### 3. Research Methods

#### 3.1. Data collection

As mentioned above, this study focused on platoon leaders among military organizational members and collected data with questionnaires. We sent enveloped questionnaires with return envelopes to 400 platoon leaders. Total 303 returned answers (return rate = 75%). After excepting an insincere response, 296 were included for analysis.

#### 3.2. Measurement

This study asked answers to point one out of 7 Likert scales (1=" do not agree at all", 4=" neutral", 7=" agree very much"). The survey items were selected from peer reviewed and published journal articles. All of them were validated and adopted widely by a large number of studies.

**Platoon leader's identification with Army:** This study adopted 5 items that were used in Mael & Ahforth's(1992) study[7]. This study changed the referent following the context of this study.

**Platoon leader's identification with his or her company:** This study adopted 5 items that were used in Mael & Ahforth's(1992) study[7]. This study changed the referent following the context of this study.

**Organizational prestige of Army:** This study adopted 7 items that were used in Mael & Ahforth's(1992) study[7]. This study changed the referent following the context of this study.

**Leader prototypicality of company commander:** This study adopted the 6 items which were used in Gienssener, Van Knippenberg, & Sleebos' study(2013)[15].

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Construct Validity and Reliability

To confirm the construct validity, this study conducted confirmative factor analysis with a structural equation model. Before confirmative factor analysis, we first conducted exploratory factor analysis for items refinement. We selected some items that showed higher factor loadings to non-relevant factors. In the process of conducting structural equation model analysis for confirmative factor analysis, we also excluded some items that decrease the model fit. Finally, we included 4 items for leader prototypicality, 5 items, organizational prestige, 4 items for identification with the company, and 4 items for identification with the army in confirmative factor analysis. The results are like <Table 1>. The recommended fit index satisfied the criterion and each factor was all significant statistically. With these results, we concluded that there is no problem from the perspective of validity.

**Table 1.** Model fit index of confirmative factor analysis.

Model fit index	$\chi^2$	d.f.	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
Values	266.049	113	.951	.960	.071

Based on confirmative factor analysis, we also see the reliability of measurement by calculating Cronbach's alphas. As shown in <Table 2>, all the Cronbach's alphas of variables satisfied the criterion. After checking there is no problem in measurement by seeing validity and reliability, conducted correlation analysis and structural equation model analysis for the hypothesis test.

**Table 2.** Reliability.

Variables	Leader prototypicality	Organizational prestige	Identification with company	Identification with army
Chronbach's alpha	.975	.709	.873	.892

### 4.2. Correlation analysis

The median of each variable is 4 because this study adopted a 7 Likert scale. The means of all the variables are higher than the median. Especially, two types of organizational identification are very high, which mean that all low-ranked military officers are well trained in term of attitude to the military. All the variables except Army prestige are over 5.6. On the contrary, army prestige which means their perception about how the society sees the army is lower comparatively.

The correlation between the organizational identification is highest compared with other correlations ( $r=.566$ ,  $p<.01$ ). The correlation between two independent variables is second highest ( $r=.338$ ,  $p<.01$ ). The correlations among independent variables and dependent variables are lower than the previous two correlations but all statistically significant.

**Table 3.** Mean, standard deviation, and correlation.

No.	Variables	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Age	23.581	2.572						
2	Gender	.033	.180	-.211**					
3	Education	1.007	.086	-.020	-.225**				

4	Leader prototypicality	5.678	1.388	.060	.013	.043			
5	Army prestige	5.030	1.383	.054	-.070	.023	.338**		
6	Identification in company	5.621	1.045	.002	.033	.073	.236**	.206**	
7	Identification in army	6.027	1.012	-.040	-.046	.008	.249**	.389**	.566**

Note: \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01.

### 4.3. The result of structural equation model analysis

This study conducted structural equation model analysis for the hypothesis test. we set the model like <Figure 1>. Adding to it, we included age, gender, and education as control variables in the model. The model fit index is like <Table 4>. As all the model fit indexes satisfy the recommended criterion, we see the significance of each.

**Table 4.** Model fit index of structural equation model analysis for the hypothesis test.

Model fit index	$\chi^2$	d.f.	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
Values	291.877	153	.954	.963	.058

**Table 5.** Result of structural equation model analysis for the hypothesis test.

Path			Coefficient	S.E.
Identification with company	→	Identification with army	.954**	.191
Leader prototypicality	→	Identification with company	.139**	.044
Army prestige	→	Identification with company	.111*	.045
Army prestige	→	Identification with army	.193**	.045
Age	→	Identification with company	-.004	.018
Gender	→	Identification with company	.055	.257
Education	→	Identification with company	.434	.530
Age	→	Identification with army	-.024	.019
Gender	→	Identification with army	-.300	.278
Education	→	Identification with army	-.439	.569

Note: \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01.

Hypothesis 1 predicted the path between platoon leader's identification with company and platoon leader's identification with the army. The path is statistically significant as this study predicted (b=.954, p<.01). The path of hypothesis 2 which predicted the effects of Leader prototypicality on platoon leader's identification with the company is also statistically significant (b=.139, p<.01). Hypothesis 3 and 4 predicted the effects of organizational prestige of the army. First, the effect of organizational prestige of the army on platoon leader's identification with the company is statistically significant (b=.111, p<.05). And next, its effect on platoon leader's identification with the army is also statistically significant (b=.193, p<.01). At least statistically, All the hypotheses that this study proposed were supported.

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

### 5.1. Summary

At first, this study points out the characteristics of military organization that make it difficult to attract, maintain, and motivates their members. Therefore, the management of military organization has to figure out further solution beyond the traditional economic approach that compensation according to the extent to which their members contributed. Most of military organizations try to find out other better solutions including mental education.

In this vein, this study tried to accelerate such efforts from the perspective of social identity theory or organizational identification theory. According to social identity theory or organizational identification theory, the person who is identified with a certain organization takes the goal of the organization as their own and voluntarily contributes to achieving the organizational goal. As the effects of organizational identification are also very useful, this study explored some promising ways to enhance military members' identification with their military organizations.

This study thought that developing identification with military organizations are most necessary for platoon leader and focused on the possible factors that can influence platoon leaders' identification with their military organizations. Based on the theory, we expected the leader prototypicality of company commando as platoon leader' immediate supervisor and the organizational prestige of army as the whole military organization will increase platoon leaders' identification with their companies. Furthermore, this study expected also that the organizational prestige of army and platoon leaders' identification with their companies will increase platoon leaders' identification with the army. All four hypotheses were supported statistically.

### 5.2. Implications

Reflecting the history of war, winning or losing a war seems to depend on physical and monetary factors at a single glance. However, if we look a little deeper into the issue, we can find easily that there are some more important factors beyond physical and monetary factors[16][17]. To highlight this problem, this study argued that the economic approach for maintaining and motivating military members has critical limits owing to the difficulty in evaluating the price of life. Providing appropriate compensation is indeed fundamental to promoting organizational justice and the extrinsic motivation of military members. Nevertheless, as the members of military organizations confront the situation that they have to sacrifice their lives voluntarily or to kill alive life of enemies, the management of military organizations should help them overcome the situations.

As mentioned above, the more identified with organization, the more take organizational goal as their owns. It means that organizational identification increases the possibility of members' voluntary contribution to their organization. Identifying with military organizations can help solve the problems of military organizations mentioned above. As a result, the management of military organizations has enough reason to explore the ways to promote members' identification with military organizations. This study suggested two ways to promote members' identification with military organizations based on theory and proved them empirically. One is leader prototypicality and the other is organizational prestige of the army. This study also proved the effects of the antecedents empirically. With these results, this study can give practical implications as followings.

The activity for the military organization to promote members' organizational identification can be directed in two ways; externally and internally. In short, the organizational prestige of the army corresponds to the external way and leader prototypicality corresponds to the internal way[18][19]. Generally, before one decides to enter an organization, he or she considers many factors and one of the important factors is their social image when they enter the organization.

When they think the membership of the organization contributes to enhancing their social image, they are willing to join the organization. As organizational prestige means the extent to which society views the organization positively, the higher organizational prestige is, the higher it will enhance their social image. Furthermore, organizational prestige not only promotes the entrance of new members but also strengthens members' adherence to the organizational goal. Hence, the management of military organizations has enough reason to invest more in refining the organizational prestige of the army.

Most newcomers to an organization may feel ambiguous about their future in the organization and what they are expected to do exactly. As argued in social identity theory, when membership of a certain organization helps them define their own identity, they are more identified with the organizations[20]. Leader prototypicality can contribute to enhancing newcomers' organization. First, leader prototypicality strengthens the organizational identity and makes it clear that the organization becomes more distinct from others. This increased distinction helps the new members reduce their uncertainty about themselves by joining. Second, the leader with strong prototypicality can influence the new members directly. As argued in social learning theory, most people learn through vicarious learning even without direct stimulus. Company commanders' prototypicality can give guide what behaviors or the ways of thinking in the unit are proper and reduce the uncertainty about themselves. In this vein, the management of military organizations must try to enhance middle-level officers who can take the role of bridge between a fungal organization and a private organization.

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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	SA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> </ul>
Corresponding Author*	YI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis, and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> <li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li> </ul>

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## A Study on the Development Direction for Innovative Transformation of the ROK Army Education and Training

Yongkwan Kang<sup>1</sup>

*Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon, Yeongcheon, Republic of Korea*

Yooshin Im<sup>2\*</sup>

*Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

### Abstract

**Purpose:** This study was carried out to derive the implementation direction of education and training to foster individuals and units that will surely win when fighting the enemy by further leaping up the level of education and training for the army in an uncertain security environment and various threats.

**Method:** This study was conducted through literature analysis on education and training of the ROK and US military, and through interviews and discussions with education technology experts, human resource development experts, army headquarters, education command practitioners, commanders, and staff of field units, and school unit instructors.

**Results:** For the army's education and training to take off, we need to expand the scope of education and training, and establish a philosophy and foundation for education and training based on the developed educational theory (learning science). Moreover, we need to implement four directions: developing educational human resources, establishing a scientific learning system, creating a learning-based environment, and optimizing unit and individual learning.

**Conclusion:** The four implementation directions for the leap forward in army education and training are the development of educational human resources, the establishment of a scientific learning system, the creation of a learning-based environment, and the optimization of the unit and individual learning. First, educational human resource development includes 'development of all members' competency', 'performance of instructor's role as a learning facilitator', 'expansion of awareness that a leader is an educator', 'management of education experts', and 'professional enhancement through increasing civil-military compatibility'. Second, the establishment of a scientific learning system consists of 'applying learning science', 'designing an optimal education and training course', 'learning based on advanced science and technol', 'inducing learning motivation', and 'establishing a systematic evaluation concept'. Third, the creation of a learning-based environment consists of 'providing a practical education and training environment', 'supporting modern education and training', and 'development of a learning management system'. Fourth, optimizing unit and individual learning is 'education and training for adaptability development', 'Self-development', 'school education', and 'unit training'.

**[Keywords]** Learning Science, Core Competencies, Development of Educational Human Resources, Establishment of the Scientific Learning System, Creation of Learning-Based Environment


## 1. Introduction

Since its foundation, the Korean military has been applying a founding unit and exhibition-type education and training system that mainly imitates the U.S. military, and has been trying to develop an education and training system consistent with the Korean situation since the U.S. military took over training rights in the late 1960s. Since the Army has maintained tension with the enemy for nearly 70 years since the ceasefire, it has always been asked to foster combatants who can fight and win the enemy through strong education and training under the banner of

"Fight Tonight" and maintain their readiness for battle at all times. For this reason, it is also true that all commanders and executives have been striving to realize the operation of units where education and training are the top priority[1]. However, while always feeling the responsibility and burden for education and training, the results of education and training were judged as the number and time of training or administrative-oriented rather than as an improvement in combat power. Considering the rapidly changing security situation and existing enemy threats, it is no longer possible to wait and see the Army's education and training take place formally outside of its essence. At this point when the Army wants to achieve innovation with all its might, all members of our Army need to look back and reflect on the reality of education and training.

Looking at education and training domain, in the operational domain(unit training), the Army first conducted founding unit-type training in the field of unit training but judged that it was limited to maintaining a balanced combat readiness throughout the year, and in 1978 "mission-oriented training" was conducted. After that, in 2004, 'battle mission-oriented training' was applied to preferentially train essential training tasks that affect combat missions. Such a system change mainly refers to the training system of foreign forces, showing that there was a lack of research on the training concept suitable for our situation. Next, in the field of school education, the Army has stably conducted Combined Arms Exercise since the establishment of the Education Command(1981). However, the educational system and control method were frequently changed, and the issue of the connection between school education and field training was constantly raised. Lastly, in the self-development domain, the prevailing perception was that the self-development field should be conducted under individual responsibility compared to the organizational development of training and school education. However, in recent years, as the importance of elite executives has been emphasized, the role of commanders or managers in preparing self-development conditions has been emphasized <Figure1>[2][3].

**Figure 1.** Three domains of education and training.



As discussed above, the Army stipulated that unit training, school education, and self-development should be classified as the main areas of education and training and maintained a complementary relationship, but these three areas did not develop interconnectivity under a systematic concept. Most of the army members invest a lot of time and effort repeatedly experiencing three areas of education and training during their military service, and if the connection between the three areas is insufficient, the effectiveness of education and training will be lower than that of investment time and effort. To improve this phenomenon, it is necessary to integrate three areas of education and training under the philosophy of education and training and the keynote[4].

Meanwhile, since World War II, the U.S. military, which greatly influences us, has developed education and training in connection with the military, industry, academia, and research institutes in private universities. In addition, education and training based on research (theory) are

thoroughly conducted, such as introducing pedagogy theory to field manuals and using it for actual education and training, as well as developing and using it in an optimized form reflecting the specificity of the military[5]. The Korean military has also been continuously promoting the development of education and training, but efforts to incorporate the pedagogy theory of society into the military were relatively insufficient. This raises the need to incorporate scientifically studied pedagogy theory into military education and training.

To fundamentally overcome the limitations of army education and training, this study was conducted through literature analysis, interviews, and discussions with educational technology experts, human resource development experts, Army headquarters, education command practitioners, and field unit instructors. The research results can be summarized as educational human resource development, scientific learning system construction, learning-based environment creation, and unit and personal learning optimization, and the details are described below <Table 1>.

**Table 1.** Summary of the development direction for innovative transformation.

Educational human resource development	Competency development of all members
	Performing as an instructor as a learning facilitator
	Spreads the perception that leaders are educators
	Education expert management
Establishing a scientific learning system	Application of learning science
	Optimal education and training course design
	Based on cutting-edge science and technology learning
	Motivation for learning
	Establishing a systematic evaluation concept
Creating a learning-based environment	Provide practical education and training environment
	Modernized education and training support
	Development of a learning management system
Optimization for unit and personal learning	Education and training to develop adaptability
	Self-development
	School education
	Unit training

## 2. Educational Human Resource Development

The talent model pursued by the Army is the "Character, Competence, and Commitment." Here, "Character" means character and being, "Competence" means professional knowledge and ability, and "Commitment" means an honorable and noble service posture to the state[6]. In common, all members of the Army are constantly participating in education and training to develop individual competencies. In this respect, all members of the Army can be said to be educational and human resources carrying out a common task of education and training. In any organization, the competence of the organization's human resources is a decisive factor that determines the success or failure of the organization. The level (competence) of army education and human resources will determine the level of education and training in the army, which will soon affect the combat capabilities of the entire army. Accordingly, the Army should make every effort to equip and utilize all necessary human and material resources so that all educational human resources in the Army are more mature.

## 2.1. Competency development of all members

The situation on the battlefield is so severe that it can be called a "continuation of uncertainty" that it is difficult to predict[7]. Therefore, on the battlefield, soldiers encounter various problem situations that they have not experienced before, and it is almost impossible to solve these problem situations in a simple knowledge or formal way. Therefore, soldiers should be able to accurately understand problem situations and devise creative solutions based on their capabilities such as critical thinking, creative thinking, and adaptability. In addition, education necessary for military members today, where various technologies and weapon systems are emerging, should not be a way to increase the amount of knowledge, but to creatively utilize knowledge to solve problems and develop the ability to respond immediately to new situations[8][9].

As a result of education and training, the Army should focus not on knowledgeable learners (individuals + units), but training learners with the competencies necessary for mission performance. Learning is a continuous process performed through school education, unit training, and self-development in the army. Knowledge, skills, and attitudes internalized through learning finally appear in the form of observable and measurable 'competencies' Capabilities.

Members with competencies<sup>1</sup> will be able to actively cope with uncertain situations, form effective teamwork with their surrounding comrades, and solve various battlefield problems [4]. The competencies of individuals and units must be systematically managed in the competency management system. In other words, the degree of acquisition of competency and competency required according to the position, mission, and characteristics of each individual, team, and echelon on the system is clearly calculated, so individuals must be able to check their degree of competency acquisition. As a result, the commander should be able to clearly check the level of competence of each individual, echelon, and entire unit. Through these functions, individuals and units will clearly understand what to train to acquire or maintain the required competencies. In addition, the competency management system presents clearly not only acquired competencies but also lost(forgotten) competencies, so individuals and units should be able to identify what needs to be retrained[10].

## 2.2. Performing as an instructor as a learning facilitator

What is the role of instructors in learner-centered education and training pursued by the Army? If the role of instructors in educator-centered education was an instructor who conveys knowledge, the role of instructors in learner-centered education can be said to be a facilitator. Facilitators require much more complex and high-quality abilities as well as lectures. First, facilitators should be able to elicit the active participation of learners in classes(training). Instructors should be able to study how to induce active participation of learners and use various teaching and learning methods in combination as needed. Second, facilitators should strive to implement individualized learning. To implement individualized learning, instructors should identify the characteristics of learners' level, interest, and needs, prepare educational content optimized for them, and apply teaching methods. Third, facilitators should be able to induce learners to learn interestingly by studying learning motivation induction theory and applying it to classes (training). Fourth, facilitators should actively provide scaffolding<sup>2</sup> between educators

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<sup>1</sup> The nine core competencies pursued by the Army are self-directedness, adaptability, composite fitness, digital literacy, communication, collaboration, critical thinking, creative thinking, and Problem-solving. Each competency is in a relationship that affects each other organically rather than independently.

<sup>2</sup> Scaffolding originally means "a facility that temporarily installs equipment and materials at a construction site," and pedagogically means "the teacher does not immediately give an answer when a learner faces difficulties in solving a problem, but provides help or hints to help the learner overcome the difficulties on his or her own".

and learners in class, and between learners and learners. Several studies have revealed that learners who have experienced problem solving through scaffolding can effectively overcome similar problem situations when given[4][11].

### **2.3. Spreads the perception that leaders are educators**

As an educator, all leaders of the Army are responsible for encouraging their subordinates' learning motivation, providing optimal learning conditions, and providing timely teaching, coaching, and mentoring. In addition, the leader should always show the example of learning, inducing subordinates (department members) to participate in learning naturally [6]. In particular, the head of the school unit or the commander of the field unit should have pedagogical knowledge and perspective to check and guide the educational content expertise and teaching methods of instructors for each subject.

In addition, all members of the Army should recognize the entire military service as a "one long curriculum" and maintain an attitude of learning at all times for maturity and self-development in individual tasks. Learning takes place even in standardized situations such as education and training at school units or camps (formal learning), working hours, a spare time during work hours, and after work hours (informal learning). To achieve effective learning, it is desirable that there are always educators who can provide appropriate teaching, coaching, and mentoring to learners. In formal learning conducted in the army, the instructor in charge exists as an educator, but in informal learning, the leader must play the role. Here, "leader" means a person who plays the role of a commander or department head (team leader) among executives.

### **2.4. Education expert management**

Private educational institutions (universities, research institutes, etc.) and companies have established education and training departments such as teaching and learning centers and talent development centers to foster academically outstanding talents and organizational performance (profit). The reason why society's education theory continues to develop is that educational outcomes become visible. In other words, the achievements of education appear and compare with academic achievements, entry (employment) rates, and operating gains. As an example of an advanced military, the U.S. military first established a cooperative system with private universities and opened a military research center to accumulate expertise for the development of education and training based on thorough research (theory). Since then, a behavioral and social science research institute has been established in the military to develop military education and training based on research and theory[5].

On the other hand, in our military, the results of education and training are weak in terms of visibility into victory or loss in battle or productivity (benefits), so, indeed, education and training areas are not noticeable and development has been slow. Under these conditions, the military needs to actively accept the advanced theory developed in the private sector and apply it creatively. The Army should select and train educational experts and use them as civil-military compatible talents to incorporate the developed theories of society into the military, as well as develop various theories into forms optimized for military needs(branch, mission, etc.). The Army should develop the Army's education and training scientifically and systematically by selecting or training education experts with long-term plans and placing them in various education-related policy departments, institutions, school units, and field units.

## **3. Establishing a Scientific Learning System**

### **3.1. Application of learning science**

The Army needs a more scientific approach to education and training. First of all, education

and training should be systematically developed by applying various teaching and learning methods, teaching system design, evaluation system, and learning motivation induction methods studied in pedagogy to education and training. In addition, it is necessary to consider how to effectively connect the ever-developing advanced science and technology and scientific equipment with human-centered education and training. Members of the Future Army will wear advanced equipment in a synthetic battlefield environment and train with artificial intelligence and digital trainers[8]. Accordingly, a new phenomenon of human-machine interaction will occur, and collisions or friction may occur in this process. To prepare for this, the Army should establish a scientific training system optimized for human characteristics through collaboration with experts in its fields such as educational technology, neuroscience, computer and information science, ergonomics, and behavioral psychology.

### **3.2. Optimal education and training course design**

Changes in enemy threats, the development of new weapon systems, changes in the doctrine, and new combat patterns require changes in school education and unit training. Accordingly, the Army should be able to systematically develop a new education and training course that reflects the demand for change.

Education and training is an organized process conducted to achieve the goal of changing human behavior(knowledge, skill, attitude). The meaning of an organized process means that the entire process of education and training must be systematically designed based on scientific principles. In educational technology, systematic education and training design has been studied for a long time, and as a result of the study, various Institutional System Design (ISD) models have emerged. The ADDIE model, which is the basic model among the teaching system design models, consists of five stages of 'Analysis-Design-Development-Implementation-Evaluation'. To design systematic instruction (education) and training, the Korean Army also needs to use the logical procedure of the ADDIE<sup>3</sup> model in the instructional design of school education and the training design of field units[12].

### **3.3. Based on cutting-edge science and technology learning**

The Army should maximize the learning effect by creating and training a dynamic operation transition landscape based on advanced science and technology, and individuals, teams, and units should be provided with differentiated education and training at each level. Learning using advanced science and technology that the Army intends to implement has the following characteristics. ①Learners can access the necessary information and learning content anytime, anywhere. ②Simulation functions create numerous problem situations necessary to train learners, and learners develop the ability to creatively utilize knowledge in the process of solving them. ③Learners can be connected to the Army network anywhere using the network app of personal learning tools (PCs, smartphones) with the help of professional learning-facilitators such as experts and artificial intelligence, and do desired learning (school education, unit training, self-development). ④Learners and teams in different positions can simultaneously access the system to participate in the same training. ⑤Learners can quickly access their learning content through search engines and information stores with commercial speed and reliability. ⑥The operation method of advanced learning tools is very simple, so the time for learners to learn the operation method should be minimized. ⑦The learning management system combined with artificial intelligence analyzes learning patterns of individuals and units, manages

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<sup>3</sup> Through world war I and II, the U.S. military needed an education and training system suitable for efficiently training many soldiers in a short period of time. Accordingly, the university of Florida developed an ADDIE model that can integrate educational design, measurement, and evaluation beyond traditional teaching theory and distributed it to the US military. The ADDIE model was first applied in American military training in the 1950s, and in the 1960s, it was stably settled in the military.

the level of competency (acquisition, maintenance, reduction, disappearance), and provides optimized learning programs. ⑧Learners can easily create learning content using learning tools on the network and share them with colleagues. ⑨ Using LVCG technology, individuals and units can repeatedly train in an environment similar to actual combat. ⑩The LVCG-based training system implements all categories of training, from individual training to large-scale unit training, and can implement joint training in conjunction with the alliance's system with fully interoperable systems. ⑪Under the scientific learning environment, the combat power of individuals and units is objectively evaluated, and accordingly, accurate complementary needs are derived[4][5].

### 3.4. Motivation for learning

The Army has previously emphasized that "clear goals should be set before the implementation of education and training, but training methods will be delegated by echelon and strict evaluation" as a motivation method for education and training[2]. Motivation through the delegation and evaluation of training methods is also necessary, but at this point in time when the Army is trying to establish a learner-centered education and training system, the "motivation method considering the characteristics of learners" should also be considered. Soldiers(learners) enlisted today are very familiar with the digitized environment.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, providing them with an education and training environment based on VCG can be a good way to motivate them. For example, soldiers who experienced combat in a battlefield environment in a game before joining the military are likely to train with a similar sense of immersion in the battlefield environment provided by scientific training after enlistment[5].

### 3.5. Establishing a systematic evaluation concept

The Army emphasizes creating a climate of "training in the way of fighting and evaluating" and maintaining combat readiness at all times[2]. All educators (instructors and commanders) and education and training policy officials in the Army should be able to plan education and training and effectively utilize the evaluation results with a clear understanding of the purpose and function of the evaluation.

The Army should establish a "standard" that learners (individuals and units) must reach through educational training through systematic research processes. These criteria should be observable and measurable, not abstract. Objective evaluation is possible when specific and clear criteria are set, so the side effects of varying evaluation results depending on the evaluator can be minimized. In school education, after completing a specific curriculum, it must be set and evaluated based on specific knowledge, skills, and behaviors that learners must have. Field units should prepare and evaluate specific standards to confirm the achievement of individual tasks selected as mission essential task lists (METL).

## 4. Creating a Learning-based Environment

The learning-based environment that the Army intends to establish is an environment in which learners can become a learner-centric in the three areas of school education, unit training, and self-development and train practically. If the learning-based environment is high-quality based on advanced science and technology, all learners (individual+unit) in the Army can reduce the time to plan education and training (preparation of educational materials/school materials, cooperation, creation of a training environment, etc.), and dramatically increase actual training

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<sup>4</sup> In the process of deriving an educational model, the U.S. Army judged that the motivation for learning would be limited if the existing analog education method was applied to today's digital generation had characteristics such as visualization and informatization ability, multitasking ability, high-tech use ability, and sociality.

time. As a result, individual and unit combat capabilities will be improved, and the Army's combat readiness will be strengthened.

#### **4.1. Provide practical education and training environment**

The effectiveness of education and training is the highest when education and training are conducted in an environment most similar to the actual battlefield. To this end, Kyobo materials that can describe practice must be continuously developed, and all LVCG advanced technologies such as scientific live training, simulation technology, virtual and augmented reality, and game training must be actively used for education and training. Education and training using VCG<sup>5</sup> technology not only overcomes the problems of "friction with civilian elements due to practical training" and "lack of training grounds" currently facing the Army, but can also be a breakthrough that can create high effects at low cost. The Army should develop a hyper-confirmation training environment that can describe not only enemy situations but also political, social, and cultural situations so that school units, field units, and individuals who need training can participate immediately[8][9].

#### **4.2. Modernized education and training support**

The performance of education and training is greatly influenced by educational and training support factors such as budget,<sup>6</sup> equipment, training ground, and ammunition required for education and training. However, in reality, compared to the emphasis on education and training, the education and training budget is insufficient, so the establishment of a science and training system and securing a training ground that the Army intends to promote are very limited[13]. In addition, despite the continuous deployment of newly-energized equipment in field units, school units are limited in timely education and training due to the priority of supply. Army policymakers and decision-makers should have a reasonable and long-term perspective on the field of education and training support and strive more for timely support.

The education and training support system (materials, facilities, budget, etc) should be developed by the purpose of creating a learner-centered education and training environment. To this end, education and training support officials should provide optimized support by closely analyzing the training concepts, training goals, requirements, and characteristics of individuals and units who are the subjects of education and training before development. The Army needs to develop advanced learning promotion tools using technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data, which are rapidly developing due to the influence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. For example, if artificial intelligence speakers, digital tutors, and learning support apps that can communicate naturally with people are developed for military use and used for school education, unit training, and self-development, learners (individual+unit) will be able to learn with no time and space limit.

#### **4.3. Development of a learning management system**

A learning management system (LMS) is a system that enables all learning activities such as sharing learning content online, communication between educators and learners, a collaboration between learners, the input of learning history, learning evaluation, and provision of feedback. Universities, private educational institutions, or the military in developed countries are already using the learning management system[14]. Our Army is developing the Army Education

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<sup>5</sup> The Army's scientific training environment is expected to consist of a synthetic training environment (STE) that fully integrates virtual reality, war game simulation, and games.

<sup>6</sup> Of the 46.6971 trillion won in defense expenditure in 2019, the education and training budget of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was 612.2 billion won, accounting for 1.3% of the total defense expenditure. Among them, the army education and training budget is KRW 279.6 billion, accounting for 0.59% of the total defense expenditure.

and Training Management System (ATMS) as a learning management system. Under the learning management system, all learners (individuals + units) of the Army will be able to learn cooperatively while sharing useful knowledge (information, know-how, experience, etc.) they each have without time and space limitations. The shared knowledge is automatically classified and stored by the subject, so that learners can access the knowledge they need at any time.

As remote education using the learning management system is effectively implemented, online and offline classes will be flexible in school education according to the characteristics of the subject. While conducting offline classes, instructors and trainees can communicate smoothly through text or video, and trainees will perform group activities smoothly through collaborative functions such as discussion rooms and wiki.

In the field unit, through the learning management system, individuals will be able to check their current learning status, and the unit commander will be able to check the level of learning (training) of the entire unit by monitoring the learning status of the unit. In addition, the commander may contact instructors for each subject in the unit on the learning management system to direct or distribute specific training. Training results are provided to commanders through automated training records and statistical analysis, so commanders can identify weaknesses of individuals and units and plan additional training.

## **5. Optimization for Unit and Personal Learning**

### **5.1. Education and training to develop adaptability**

Future threats faced by the Army can arise in combination by various actors such as state, non-state, and quasi-state organizations in multi-domain in addition to traditional spaces[7][15][16]. For the Army to succeed in operations under such complex and uncertain circumstances, it must be able to cultivate "adaptation" and complete new missions in any region, even if it is given a new mission that has not been experienced before.

Despite uncertainties in the battlefield environment, each unit identifies what tasks to complete. To complete a single mission, it is necessary to be able to perform various tasks. Nevertheless, there are various restrictions such as training ground, time, and cost to train all tasks. In this situation, training is centered on essential tasks, but adaptability can be developed by diversifying the conditions of training. For example, adaptability can be developed by training one task but giving various conditions such as day and night, bad weather, and changes in terrain and enemy situations[17].

### **5.2. Self-development**

#### **5.2.1. Exploring areas to be supplemented**

All members of the Army acquire military knowledge necessary for individual mission performance through school education, and master the knowledge acquired through unit training through action. Nevertheless, if there is a lack in performing an individual's mission at an excellent level, it should be supplemented by utilizing the individual's available time. Therefore, all members of the Army must first accurately find out what needs to be supplemented in performing their duties according to their position through self-evaluation, peer evaluation, objective measurement data, etc.[18].

#### **5.2.2. Curriculum design and implementation**

All members of the Army should be able to set their own learning goals as self-directed learners. In addition, it is necessary to be able to find the human and material resources necessary to achieve learning goals, organize learning contents, and learn by oneself. In addition, it should

be possible to continuously develop the self-development process by evaluating one's learning outcomes and feeding them back on one's own.

### **5.2.3. Learning attitude**

The learning environment of the Army is gradually becoming more advanced. Accordingly, all learners in the Army will be able to easily find the desired learning content at any time they want through small devices such as smartphones. The important thing is for learners to have an attitude of learning anytime, anywhere.

## **5.3. School education**

### **5.3.1. Curriculum design considering educational goals**

When designing a curriculum, the goal of the entire curriculum should be established in consideration of the consumer's 'field needs' and 'learner's characteristics (interest, aptitude, etc.), and the goals of the individual subjects constituting the curriculum should be established in connection with the overall curriculum. Instructors of individual subjects should determine in-depth whether the subject's goal contributes to the achievement of the goal of the entire curriculum. When this structure is in place, all subjects are organically linked to each other and can be consistent.

### **5.3.2. Providing tailored curriculum**

A customized curriculum should be provided that considers learners' experiences and levels. To this end, diagnosis of learners' experiences and levels (pre-evaluation, assignments, interviews, etc.) must be preceded before the start of the curriculum.

### **5.3.3. Learner-centered class progression**

Classes should be conducted in a way that learners collaboratively solve problems. At this time, as a facilitator, the instructor should play a role in helping learners think correctly about the learning content and understand the context well[2][19].

### **5.3.4. Applying the best educational method**

When selecting or developing an educational method, it should be decided by referring to the learning pyramid<sup>7</sup> that represents the relationship between the educational method and the learning effect[20], but various educational methods should be flexibly applied in consideration of the characteristics of each education subject.

### **5.3.5. Flexible "face-to-face and non-face-to-face education" application**

In consideration of educational goals, educational effects, and learner conditions, convocation education (classroom class) and non-calling education (remote education) should be flexibly implemented.

### **5.3.6. Utilizing cutting-edge technologies to increase learning effects**

Technologies such as learning support applications, virtual environments, simulations, and games that can be used to increase learning efficiency (learning effect over time) are used for education.

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<sup>7</sup> As a result of experimenting with the efficiency (memory rate) by learning method at the National Training Laboratories (NLT), 5% efficiency was found to be listening, 10% reading, 20% audiovisual classes, 30% demonstration, 50% discussion, 75% practice, and 90% teaching others.

### **5.3.7. Cultivating the mindset of lifelong learning**

Learners should have a lifelong learning (learning over the entire service period) mindset that it should be constantly carried out not only in school units but also in field unit life and personal time[19].

## **5.4. Unit training**

### **5.4.1. Essential task-oriented training based on mission**

For the unit to complete its combat mission, it must train various tasks required to complete the mission from normal times. However, in reality, it is very limited to train all of the tasks according to various missions within the available time for each unit. Therefore, each unit should select only essential tasks and train intensively, but under various conditions. Mission-based education and training means analyzing current and expected missions in the future and training essential training tasks first to maintain mission performance capabilities at all times[17].

### **5.4.2. Training to reach the required level (standard)**

Training is always conducted according to the level of demand (standard) set for individual and unit tasks. The level of demand (standard) refers to the level of proficiency required to achieve a task. Mastery refers to the ability to immediately perform tasks under any conditions. The commanders are responsible for clearly knowing what criteria are required to achieve the mission and training the unit to achieve the desired level (standard) [17].

### **5.4.3. Training under an environment similar to the actual operation**

Training should be conducted in a situation similar to the "operational environment experienced when performing actual missions." The commander should create extreme situations such as night and bad weather, and train by operating opposing forces. To this end, the commander must construct a training environment in consideration of 'Operational Element (PMESII-PT)' and 'Tactical Element (METT-TC)'[9][17].

### **5.4.4. Periodic diagnosis of training level**

The training level of the unit can be changed under the influence of various factors such as the number of training sessions, the rate of personnel replacement, and the deployment of new equipment. Therefore, the commander should periodically diagnose the training level of the unit to identify areas that require improvement in training level, and plan and implement training to supplement it[17].

### **5.4.5. Training to operate equipment at all times**

Combat power can be exercised normally when all equipment is available at all times. Therefore, equipment operation training is an important part of the additional training plan. There must be objective measurement indicators for equipment operation training. The commander should ensure that his subordinates are clearly aware of the importance of managing equipment[17].

## **6. Conclusion**

This study began with a sense of question, "How can we take the level of army education and training further and foster individuals and units that win when fighting enemies?" amid uncertain security environments and various unpredictable threats. In order to find the best answer,

interviews and discussions were conducted in collaboration with education and training literature analysis, education engineering experts, human resource development experts, education and training policy officials, field unit commanders and staff, and school unit instructors.

As a result of the study, it was concluded that in order for the Army's education and training to develop rapidly, four implementation directions should be realized: education and human resource development, scientific learning system construction, learning base environment creation, and individual learning optimization[21][22]. In the future, it is predicted that the results of this study will be reflected in Army education and training policies and systems, regulations, doctrines, and guidelines, contributing to the leap forward in Army education and training.

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## 8. Appendix

### 8.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	YK	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	YI	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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## The Implementation Strategy of A4P(A4P+) and the Implications for Korean Military's Participation in UN PKOs

Hyokyung Kang

Korea National Defense University, Nosan, Republic of Korea

### Abstract

**Purpose:** The United Nations recently announced A4P+, a priority for the implementation of A4P following A4P to emphasize the qualitative improvement of peacekeeping operations and the sharing of responsibilities among related actors. In this paper, I will consider the A4P+ priorities to be implemented for UN peacekeeping operations between 2021-2023 and draw implications for the Korean military deployment policy in peacekeeping.

**Method:** To this end, Literature analysis centered on official documents published by the United Nations related to A4P and A4P+, was conducted, and military-related data were referenced among various data on the United Nations web page.

**Results:** A4P and A4P+ presented areas and tasks to be implemented in peacekeeping operations by the UN, member states, regional organizations, and host governments related to the deployment of UN personnel. Upholding A4P and A4P+ are WPS(Women, Peace, and Security) and data-driven and advanced technologies. All stakeholders in Peacekeeping must do their commitments in eight areas of A4P and prepare for the materialization of A4P through A4P+ priorities based on the two. Member states providing military and police are responsible for providing their competent peacekeepers to field missions for their safety and security and mandate implementation. Peacekeeping operations emphasize high-tech and information collection systems for effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping, TCC/PCC should read and reflect the changes required from the UN into their deployment policy.

**Conclusion:** Korea should do its commitment pledged to the UN to contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. First, Korea shall contemplate its deployment policy, focusing on how and what it can implement A4P+ within a limited period. Second, Korea needs to re-consider the current participation of military and equipment. Qualitative expansion in Korea's participation rather than quantitative one should be prioritized first.

**[Keywords]** Action for Peacekeeping Plus(A4P+), Peacekeeping Operations(PKO), UN Security Council, Multilateralism, TCC/PCC(Troop Contributing Country/Police Contributing Country)

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background of action for peacekeeping(A4P)

In March 2018, The UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the Action for Peacekeeping(A4P) initiative at the Security Council meeting on collective action to improve peacekeeping operations.

A4P is not only a consistent effort of the United Nations to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations which is an invention created by the United Nations but also a strong request from it to urge the substantive participation and commitment of member states. So far, the need for reform of the UN itself as well as UN peacekeeping operations has been steadily

raised within the UN, from member states, and even by other international organizations. The United Nations has accepted the demand of member states and other related actors cooperating with UN activities, reviewed field activities on its own, and made efforts to review and implement improvement plans. Examples include the comprehensive review of peace operations, including peacekeeping operations in the peace and security pillar, in the "An Agenda for Peace" by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations(Brahimi Report)" under Secretary-General Annan and "the High-level Independent on Peace Operations(HIPPO)" under Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Indeed the Action for Peacekeeping intended to strengthen peacekeeping by promoting collective action by all peacekeeping stakeholders, including the Security Council[1].

The A4P announced by the Secretary-General differs from previous reports and declarations in that it deals with the methodological aspects of selecting tasks from the United Nations to field missions for the success of peacekeeping, a key UN security activity. Action for Peacekeeping Plus(A4P+) includes more practical and realistic methods to implement Action for peacekeeping(A4P), allowing field missions to operate limited budgets and personnel economically and effectively in conducting mission mandate.

The performance evaluation method for UN peacekeeping operations is a pending issue that has been developed not only by scholars but also within the United Nations. So far all of the efforts at the UN drew pictures to look at them from a long distance. It is notoriously difficult to measure success and failure in peace operations. In 2010, Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman published a 234-page book entitled *Evaluating Peace Operations*, elaborating the myriad ways in which scholars can how the country developed in the years after the peacekeepers departed[2].

Korea has increased its participation in UN PKO since its first deployment in Somalia in 1993. Moreover, the Korean military is expanding its scope of activity areas not only to the UN but also to multinational cooperation. Especially in the middle of hoping to expand the activities in the UN, Korea needs to read the present trend of UN PKO and re-consider Korea's deployment policy consistent with the UN. In this regard, Korea participating in UN peacekeeping operations needs to pay attention to A4P+ guiding how to strengthen the effect of its deployment following the efficiency and effectiveness of the current UNPKO. Since the release of A4P, there were few studies dealing with the latest changes of UN PKO and proposed the development of Korean PKO. Especially those who were not able to suggest what the military should do and what practical actions must be taken before military deployment in UN peacekeeping. In this study, I will first look at the core of A4P, and A4P+ which is the A4P implementation strategy. Then, I will examine what more specific actions Korea should apply to the military participating in PKO for raising effect through A4P+, centering on capability improvement, WPS, and the introduction of technology.

## **1.2. Importance of multilateralism centering on UN**

The nature of war is not new, because being a violent act of clash of wills between two actors, what is new in the 21st century is the means that these actors incorporate in the execution of the war, allowing the effects of these means, develop new forms of confrontation[3]. Nevertheless, recent wars, in other words, do not arise only between the two actors. The conflict pattern in the post-Cold War became even more complex. In the post-cold war era, regional disputes and armed conflicts occurred by the factors like ethnicity, race, religion, territory, resources, etc., which lie hidden under the order of the cold war. New types of regional conflicts, such as territorial sovereignty, resource nationalism, and separate independence movement, have appeared in the third world. International disputes led to consumptiveness such as military collision and terrorism regardless of their intention[4].

Recently, new forms of threats have threatened global and national security. Terrorism that has emerged since the 2000s is an example. Violence such as terrorism occurs when there is a gap between the value expected by a particular individual or group and the ability to realize that value. According to Piazza(2006), many scholars who studied terrorism considered material poverty important as the cause of terrorism, but as a result, absolute and relative poverty did not have a significant impact on the occurrence of terrorism. Piazza studied the causes of terrorism from 1986 to 2002 based on poverty-related variables in 96 countries(such as poverty, inequality, inflation, unemployment, etc. and explained that social divisions related to relative deprivation had a greater impact on terrorism than poverty-related variables. Hoffman(1998) defined terrorism as an intentional act of causing political change and fear through violent acts, means, and threats based on violence[5]. What is the correlation between terrorism and peacekeeping? In 2004, The UN Deputy-SG warned of the danger that the war on global terror may cause states to lose sight of the needs of UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the demand for Peacekeeping troops increased after 9/11 in 2003. 16 UN peacekeeping operations working at the end of 2004 strongly required more cooperation among states in the UN[6].

From 2020 to the present, COVID-19 is threatening the world. As the crisis that began in the health sector expands to political, economic, and social crises, it is a serious security threat to the international community. The liquidity and uncertainty of the global security environment are increasing due to the global spread of COVID-19[7]. With the emergence of new forms of international peace and security threats, not only individual countries but also the entire international community are threatened by the threats. In the dimension of humanitarian aid, the Pandemic made member states realize the need for multilateralism to overcome it together.

Because of this, multilateral international organizations have taken central positions in democracy and defense around the world[8]. A universal organization, the UN as the epicenter of global multilateralism remains a source of hope and a challenge for the future of humanity[9]. Today, the COVID-19 crisis is spreading rapidly due to the openness and mobility of the international community as one of human security and poses a major threat to humanity. Due to the imbalance of related substances such as vaccine development, quarantine system, medicines, and masks, there is a serious gap in response between developed and underdeveloped countries. In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the international community wants to strengthen cooperation and solidarity to contribute to the construction of a bright future for Mankind[10].

## 2. Reform of Peace and Security Pillar

In the post-Cold War era, changes occurred in the international environment of the 21st century, including changes in the form of conflict, rapid globalization, and the emergence of new security threats. Among these, reforms in the Security Council and peacekeeping that are responsible for the peace and security pillar have been continuously raised.

In 2017, Secretary-General Guterres submitted the "Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar report of the Secretary-General" to the General Assembly. In December, the General Assembly adopted the UN peace and security reform[11]. The purpose of the restructuring is to organically integrate and cooperate with the tasks of the relevant departments responsible for peace operations, including peacekeeping.

Reform of peace and security pillar Undergoing reorganization of the Secretariat, UNSG António Guterres, at the Security Council Meeting on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations, launched the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) in 2018[12]. It emphasized the sharing of political responsibilities of the UN, member states, TCC/PCC, host counties, and others and their collective efforts to pursue the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping opera-

tions. The UNSC reform was powerless to perform its functions and duty to safeguard international peace and security since the Cold war, as well as to resolve many large-scale armed conflicts since the Cold War[13]. Discussions on the reform of the Security Council continue. However, there is still no consensus on the increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members, regional arrangements, and exercise of veto power.

## 2.1. UN efforts for peacekeeping reform

Reform on peacekeeping has also been discussed in earnest since the 1990s from the Brahimi report that recommended changes in overall peace operations in 2000 to the current A4P and A4P+ to implement it. The concept of security differs from country to country and when member states participating in dispute resolution seek specific interests, the performance of the troops is thwarted by the cynical and selfish conduct of their government. Countries will join a peacekeeping mission for reasons for specific, but selfish, national interest, such as the financial allowances granted by the UN[14]. Therefore changes for the evolution of peacekeeping did not come easily around until the late 1980s. the achievements of UN peacekeeping forces between 1948-1988 were modestly successful, overall. Actions for peacekeeping reforms came out with the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on the action in security crises since the end of the Cold War[15].

## 2.2. Relevance of action for peacekeeping(A4P) and action for peacekeeping plus(A4P+)

The A4P mentioned by the UN Secretary-General in the Security Council in 2018 is not a new initiative. It once again reminded the international community of the various challenges faced by peacekeeping and problems of field missions and re-emphasized the cooperation to solve that problem. That is, A4P is a call of the UN on the Member States, the Security Council, host countries, troop, and police-contributing countries, regional partners, and financial contributors to renew their collective engagement with UN peacekeeping and mutually commit to reaching for excellence[16]. Gathering various stakeholders and putting them in global activities to resolve common concerns present that A4P is the instrument of UN multilateralism and collective actions to resolve conflict centered on the United Nations.

**Table 1.** Eight areas of improvement by collective action for peacekeeping(A4P)[16].

Area	Goal
① Politics	Advance political solutions to conflict and enhance the political impact of peacekeeping
② Women, Peace and Security	Implement WPS agenda
③ Protection	Strengthen the protection provided by peacekeeping operations
④ Safety and Security	Improve the safety and security of peacekeepers
⑤ Performance and Accountability	Support effective performance and accountability by all peacekeeping components
⑥ Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace	Strengthen the impact of peacekeeping on sustaining peace
⑦ Partnership	Improve peacekeeping partnerships to enhance collaboration and planning
⑧ Conduct of Peacekeepers and Peacekeeping operations	Strengthen conduct of peacekeeping operations and personnel

As can be seen from <Table 1>, 8areas of A4P is not a new concept. They have been considered often for reform of UN peace operations, including peacekeeping. However, in this case, the selection of the words is more refined. Setting goals to achieve in each area gives actors clearer


messages to implement. Responsibilities to be shared by a single member state, the Secretariat alone, and both member states and the Secretariat were clear by implementing tasks. WPS, Protection(of Civilians), and Safety and Security are commitments shared by member states and the Secretariat.

Also, cooperation with regional organizations has been a core element in resolving conflict. If the meaning of cooperation from a regional organization was to support UN and UN peacekeeping in the past, partnership with a regional organization now is a necessary condition and consolidation for successful peacekeeping. ⑦ is related to the support from NATO and OIF as well as cooperation with AU and EU, which are major regional organizations in peacekeeping. The core content of A4P means that for successful peacekeeping, member states with different capabilities and levels, Troop Contributing Country(TCC)/Police Contributing Country(PCC), and other partners must constantly strive to demonstrate capabilities fulfilling the UN's standards.

How different are A4P and A4P+? They are not a respective concept. The goal of A4P+ is to practically fulfill the shared commitments of each actor in promoting eight areas with A4P+ deliverables. Deliverables of A4P+ are the things that stakeholders can carry out. What the UN DPO(Department of Peace Operations), the implementation department, should do to accelerate the implementation of the A4P agenda with the support of member states. A4P+ selects and implements priorities at the DPO level for the development of all A4Pagendas [17]. Therefore, this requires coordination and cooperation with relevant departments of the UN secretariat such as DOS(Department of Operational Support), DPPA(Department of Political and Peace-building Affairs), member states, and field mission missions.

A4P+ priorities consist of seven areas. These seven priorities are to derive and overcome specific challenges that hinder, undermine, and slow the development of the A4P agenda implementation. The most distinctive part is fundamentally to utilize information collection systems from UN HQs to field levels. Evaluation systems to calculate visible and non-visible outcomes are emerging as a critical element about A4P and A4P+ because the determination of A4P+ priorities is based on the assessment, results, and collective analysis for UN peacekeeping.

**Figure 1.** Relevance of A4P and action for peacekeeping plus(A4P+)[17].



Each of the seven A4P+ priorities spans several, if not all, A4P commitments and any effort to address any of the seven A4P+priority areas will have positive multiplier effects across several

A4P commitments[17]. Simply speaking, the A4P+priorities will be conducted during 2021-2023 for 3years. Those have concrete desirable results with designated actors of the UN Secretariat or UN system. Department of Peace Operations(DPO) as a leading actor interacts and supports other relevant departments and external partners in charge of some of the A4P+ priorities.

### 2.3. A4P Implementation strategy(A4P+) for the effectiveness of PKO

UN peacekeeping operations have gradually decreased, and 12 missions are currently active, and the peacekeeping budget has also decreased to about \$6billion. Budget reduction entailed reform of peacekeeping operations. The budget cut demanded the UN headquarters strengthen the overall cooperation of the UN family, including UN agencies, funds, programs, regional organizations, and departments of the Secretariat. Mutual support between member states is highly encouraged arranged by the UN. Complementarity among member states is a win-win strategy for them and the UN.

There are two critical foundations to uphold A4p+ priorities as well as A4P. The first one is Women, Peace and Security(WPS). The second one is Innovative, Data-driven, and Technology-Enabled Peacekeeping. In a peacekeeping context, WPS agenda can help UN peacekeeping resolve conflict, strengthen people-centered approaches, and drive sustainable, inclusive and long-lasting peace outcomes. Peacekeeping operations must accelerate technology in the field to improve safety and security, protection and analysis of operation barriers. What should be implemented in the A4P+ priorities over three years from 2021 to 2023 can be summarized as follows.

**Table 2.** A4P+ priority requirements for 2021-2023[18].

Priority	Implementations of priority
Collective coherence behind a political strategy	Increase political dialogue and engagement with UN partners for common political strategies of peacekeeping
Strategic and operational integration	Internal Integration of planning and reporting between military, police and civilian in the peacekeeping context
Capabilities and mindsets	Improve uniformed capabilities, progress on operational and tactical peacekeeping intelligence, and promote meaningful participation of female
Accountability to peacekeepers	Improve the safety and security of peacekeepers, improve camp protection, provide reliable medical support
Accountability of peacekeepers	Encourage member states to dispatch peacekeepers highly disciplined, assess regularly peacekeeping performance
Strategic communications	Continue to communicate with all key audiences and stakeholders
Cooperation with host countries	Commit to a clear and open dialogue with host countries and communities

In order to strengthen base protection and protect peacekeepers in Priority 4(Accountability to peacekeepers), high technology should apply to the introduction of protective equipment, education, and training with simulated circumstances for peacekeepers. Military, police, and civilian peacekeepers working in the field are increasingly in contact with local populations and communities. At the site, it is required for field missions to strengthen the integrated measures and capabilities necessary for the performance supported by joint operations of military and police or non-UN security forces. To improve the performance of peacekeeping operations, the mission and the UN headquarters should regularly evaluate the results of the mission performance and derive essential measures for insufficient performance.

Accountability of peacekeepers is about what the United Nations and TCC/PCC should do to make excellent peacekeepers participate in peacekeeping. First, to reduce the capability gaps among TCC/, it is required to establish common standards of the United Nations for the competence of peacekeepers and support the training process for them. A4P+ is also helpful to continue to reinforce their capabilities by operating an evaluation system that evaluates the performance capabilities of the military and police. While the UN monitors a framework of progress against the seven A4P priority areas, UN DPO reviews the implementation of the A4P+ plan regularly through implementation assessment of leadership in DPO and field missions. It means that the monitoring and implementation system continue to operate from UN headquarter and field mission level. However, member states and peacekeeping partners, including regional organizations are indispensable to UN efforts to implement A4P+implementation.

### **3. Required Uniformed Capability in PKO Related to A4P+**

The success of peacekeeping in each mission means fulfillment of its mandate given by the Security Council. Problems these days at the mission level are that there are too many mandates to conduct in one mission. Mandates that do not take into account the capabilities of each component of the mission are likely to fail. In particular uniformed personnel such as military and police may be key players. Implementation of A4P+ priorities is to remove specific challenges in order to reach the A4P agenda.

The UN demands military and police capabilities suitable for the evolving peacekeeping environment since the launch of A4P. Peacekeeping missions are expected to perform multiple, simultaneous, and independent tasks in the poorer environment with complex mandates and limited resources. Field missions should be able to communicate more with local populations and explain their mandates and activities to them for successful operations. command and control, communications, situational awareness, and interoperability between other troops from different states. It also must have increased the level of force protection for their safety and security. The safety and security of peacekeepers should be guaranteed in frequent contact with local people and field tasks.

However, various UN data assessing the capability of uniformed personnel present that all troops and individually deployed personnel after training in their country do not always reach the required level that the UN want.

Military contingents from member states must be fully trained under the policies of the United Nations Secretariat, including the requirements for deploying troops and the mission CONOP. In the case of individually deployed peacekeepers, they must raise the capabilities of division-level or brigade-level staff as essential military skills during their pre-deployment training. In the event of deployment of a military contingent, there are capability gaps among personnel even in the same national contingent. Therefore, the UN emphasizes the importance of pre-deployment training courses in each country in training and capacity building. At the same time, in order to narrow the gap in the quality of the training of countries, the UN encourages each country to operate programs to cultivate trainer competencies or support bilateral or multilateral training programs between member countries.

Since each mission has a different operational environment, the peacekeeping mission should pay special attention to mission-specific pre-deployment training.

For example, the peacekeeping mission in Mali(MINUSMA) requires IED and UXO training necessary to military contingents before deployment because IED and UXO(Unexploded Ordnance) jeopardize soldiers' lives and hinder operations on the ground. Military and police peacekeepers in the South Sudan mission(UNMISS) are required to take a training course preparing for working

with riverine units around the river and training on civilian protection during the pre-deployment course. The Main task of uniformed peacekeepers in multidimensional peacekeeping missions is to protect civilians. In this regard, they need to take the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course (CPOC), along with the pre-deployment training course. If necessary, member states can help contribute to building the capabilities of uniformed peacekeepers bilaterally or multilaterally coordinating those courses with other states by providing trainees with funds or facilities to hold such as UN courses in their country.

Due to the budget cuts and the decreased number of authorized troop ceilings by a mission, the UN is diversifying the functions of troops dispatched and strengthening the types and performance of Contingent-Owned Equipment(COE). Namely, Rapid Deployable Unit, Force Reserves Companies, Special Forces, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Force, and Attack Helicopters are required for implementing given mandated tasks [19].

Intelligence-led operations are more critical as UN missions expand into complex environments facing multiple threats. Missions should establish an intelligence system that operates throughout the mission to enable the acquisition, management, analysis, and dissemination of information that supports leadership decision-making. To this end, well-trained and experienced intelligence officers, surveillance, and reconnaissance units are equipped with experts, equipment, and tools.

Enabling units such as engineering, transportation, signals, aviation, and medical units are the UN's 'wishful' ones. They are considered as the mission's backbone by UN in areas with limited transport infrastructure and insufficient local resources. Most of these units with expertise functions do not have self-protection ability. They have to get protected by military or police troops while conducting their duty. Now the current capability requirement for them demands that these deployed units will have to have the ability to protect themselves. Infantry or FPU(Formed Police Unit)cannot afford to protect all units with a lack of protective equipment, including those units. There are too many tasks required of infantry or FPU to protect enabling troops.

Force protection is the most prioritized capability for the safety and security of the military and police. TCC/PCC and UN should continue to make efforts to equip IEDs of main threats to force protection, the establishment of mine detection and removal system, acquiring mine-resistant vehicles, and fire detection and warning systems integrated with bases' C3(operations centers). The application of advanced technologies is essential in areas such as communication networks, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, and force protection measures. For example UAV, counter-mortar radar systems, satellite imagery, visual surveillance equipment, and remote sensors have become necessities for uniformed personnel to perform their tasks effectively in peacekeeping missions. The introduction of high technology into field missions is inevitable for effective and efficient peacekeeping in the field although the process requires much effort from member states and also takes much time to operate the system properly.

Gender mainstreaming is always at the center of the UNPKO. According to the Secretary-General's Gender Parity Strategy, the UN set a goal to ultimately reach the ratio of women deployed individually and members in military contingents up to 15 and 25 percent of all military peacekeepers by 2028.

The proportion of uniformed women has been increased gradually but still, it is not nearing the stated goal. Missions with the lowest percentage rates of individual female military personnel – and therefore the greatest need – are MINUSCA (10.5 percent), MINUSMA (9.4 percent), and UNIFIL (9.2 percent). On police, as of April 2019, 14 percent(goal: 20%) of all police serving in UN peacekeeping operations are women [19]. The proportion of women in the UN police has increased significantly compared to the military. All these actions related to the above are being

implemented in WPS.

The increase of simple figures of women in PKO cannot accomplish gender balance and equality. The UN requires women peacekeepers to have the capabilities to match field task performance at the same time as the proportion of women increases. Like FMOC(Female Military Officers' Course), the UN directly operates training courses for women peacekeepers, or member states host the courses on behalf of the United Nations.

In the case of the leadership of uniformed commanders, military and police commanders are required to have much operational and training experience, and ethics. Commander's leadership has an important impact on the success or failure of the mission in the field when the host government or the parties to the conflict do not fully agree with the presence of the mission and freedom of action. Currently, TCC/PCC sends approximately 3,500 individual peacekeepers to the UN. The United Nations wants member states to select and send skilled and qualified officers in military planning, United Aircraft System (UAS), Counter-Improved Explosive Devices (C-IED), logistics, GIS, Image Analysts, defenses sector reform, and civil-military liaison.

The most important thing to UN for peacekeeping is the matter of having peacekeepers with specialized and high-performing capabilities. Just observing and monitoring activities required of peacekeepers are not matched with handling current conflict situations. More engagement with local populations and even armed groups is needed to reach the success of the mission's operation. Engagement activities of uniformed personnel bring the provision of information, path to communicate parties to the conflict and civilians, shaping friendly conditions of peacekeeping, and others. On the other hand, more security and safety concerns around peacekeepers occur that demand more protection equipment. To this end, member states have to sustain a certain standard and review how to protect their soldiers deployed while pursuing a successful peacekeeping operation.

#### 4. Conclusion and Considerations

A4P+ is a strategy necessary for evolving peacekeeping operations and must be implemented first.

It does not mean presenting a new implementation strategy, but the development of tasks that have been carried out. In addition, the goal is to successfully achieve a peacekeeping mandate through coordination and cooperation between stakeholders, i.e., giving each actor a clear commitment and implementing it.

Korea can also prioritize several issues in implementing A4P+ priorities. First of all, its attention should be paid to strengthening the capabilities of military peacekeepers. They need to have the capabilities necessary for autonomous force protection, contact with residents and collection of information, and integrated activities with police and civilian components. It is also a way to strengthen its capabilities by sharing training programs with other countries with extensive experience in a specific mission. As in the present, regional-oriented exchange programs have limitations. Above all, peacekeepers should have mindsets to overcome challenges and endure poorer conditions for peacekeeping.

Korea's troop deployment region is South Sudan and Lebanon. Korea deploys infantry and engineering contingents and individual military officers composed of 536 people[20]. If the characteristics of the units deployed for each mission are different, the Korean military may review what functions each unit will reinforce considering A4P+ priorities. For example, infantry units can reinforce information collection functions or engineering units can strengthen their force protection functions by introducing modernized equipment to replace troops, away from the manpower-oriented mission.

About WPS, increasing female peacekeepers and the cultivation of their competence is a big trend of the UN. If the ratio of women's participation is relatively small in a particular mission, the UN will have to emphasize TCC/PCC to deploy more female peacekeepers into that mission. What I emphasize in this paper is that the ratio of women's participation in UN peacekeeping should be considered by each mission. However, still Korean military tends to look at the women's proportion as the whole number of its all participating missions. Korean military has to review the number of female peacekeepers number deploying to missions, and then more women will have to be selected and deployed to the particular mission which has the lowest number of Korean females.

In general, there are units and equipment that peacekeeping missions want to have essentially. They include the Rapid Deployment Units, Special Force, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Forces and Attack Helicopters described earlier. This means that on-site peacekeeping operations must respond more quickly and immediately to specific situations. This is because peacekeeping operations need to exert much greater influence on local populations and the host government to form conditions for themselves to find political solutions. A4P+ will continue to evaluate the results of the implementing mandate of field missions and adjust the plan by reflecting the requirements of member states into the field. In consideration of these changes, Korea's peacekeeping policy should also be adjusted.

Overall, the UN requires more commitments from member states to make PKOs successful. The commitments in the military are largely divided into several parts. They lead to states' considerations for PKO.

First, peacekeepers have to be more competent with capabilities before deployment. The more engagement with the population securing their safety and security, and joint operations with different countries gradually increased, the Korean military needs to think about how we provide the more skilled peacekeepers. Additionally increasing joint operations with different levels' troops (military, police, or even host country's security forces) is likely to fail if they do not make an effort to narrow the work capability gap. How to train them to adapt to evolving peacekeeping environment is the key point before and after deployment.

Second, UN pursues active, effective, and efficient PKO with various enabling units beyond regular infantry formation. The size of deployed troops may be one of the measuring contributions of states in peacekeeping. Now, it is time to turn the focus on the quantity-centered troops into the qualitative unit with high-tech equipment. In addition to contributing the equipment itself to the peacekeeping mission, it is also important for deployed peacekeepers to equip high-functional equipment or systems. It can also be a consideration to contribute different types of units to other missions as well as the mission when they require them.

Third, peacekeeping intelligence based on high technology will play a key role as the most basic source. UN claims data-driven and technology-enabled peacekeeping through A4P+. The military is working at the tactical level, interacting local population as human intelligence. Military activities must be conducted focusing on and obtaining reliable information and intelligence to ensure effective operations. Also, leadership has to set up a mindset of how to provide information and utilize intelligence in military operations. When speedy delivery of intelligence through a system can contribute to strategic and operational integration from a mission to UN HQ, operational readiness and response of military will have to accelerate.

UN integrates diverse efforts from the UN system and outside of it into peacekeeping. Emphasis on the integration among relevant actors is nothing new. UN has carried out until now since it involved in peacekeeping. Something new is that A4P+ shows methodological matters for us to materialize our commitments suggesting the same standards from specific requirements of the UN.

In this paper, I contemplate actions for peacekeeping and the current trend that UN wants to share the burden with other actors. How to measure the accomplishment applied by A4P+ priorities and studies on the effect of the implementation on peacekeeping operations should continue.

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## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	HK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li><li>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></li></ul>

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Corresponding author\*  
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## Republic of Korea's Role in Contributing to Human Security in Korea and Asia

Hongje Cho<sup>1</sup>

*Korea National Defense University, Nonsan, Republic of Korea*

Sangjung Park<sup>2\*</sup>

*Korea National Defense University, Nonsan, Republic of Korea*

Yooshin Im<sup>3</sup>

*Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

### Abstract

**Purpose:** This research aims to contribute to the sustainable development, sound security and economic development of Asia by analyzing the actual situation of human security challenges in Republic of Korea (ROK) and Asia and establishing a cooperative mechanism between countries in the region. Epidemics, disasters, terrorism, organized crime and drug problems, including Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19), are international issues that cannot be solved by the efforts of a specific country alone, and are a threat to domestic human security.

**Method:** In today's world, the interaction between human behavior and nature, especially the environment and climate, continues. The most notable example of artificial disasters that has changed the way humans see the world is Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2). This study analyzes ongoing human security threats and the international community's efforts to respond to them. Finally, this research suggests an alternative to the international community.

**Results:** The current pandemic crisis is unfortunate and unprecedented. The emergence of the deadly virus has not only baffled every country, but has left a grim mark on the world. The post-COVID-19 pandemic, along with the onslaught of the virus, presents a number of challenges: governance breakdowns, massive unemployment, economic crises, immigration predicaments, global supply chain disruptions and, most importantly, security restructuring.

**Conclusion:** This study proposes a way to establish a regional cooperation mechanism between Republic of Korea and Asia to mitigate human security threats. In particular, it analyzes the current situation of human security issues in the region and introduces ROK's role in promoting and protecting human security in Asia. In addition, this research analyzes non-traditional security factors such as infectious diseases, drugs, organized crime, terrorism, and cyber-terrorism to suggest ways to establish a regional cooperative mechanism between Republic of Korea and Asia to mitigate human security threats.

**[Keywords]** Human Security, Fourth Industrial Revolution, Cooperation Mechanism, Covid-19 Pandemic, Non-Traditional Security Threats

## 1. Introduction

Infectious diseases, disasters, terrorism, organized crime and drug problems, including COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease-19), are international issues and domestic human security threats that cannot be solved only by the efforts of a particular country [1].

What Duke Metnich, a 19th-century diplomat and Austrian prime minister, famously said in the 21st century. When Wuhan sneezes, the whole world catches a cold. Ten years have clearly made a tumultuous start. It is the culmination of human activity that has led us to a new era-human tax.

This era relates to human behavior and its lasting impact on nature - both the environment and climate. The most notable example of artificial disasters that have changed the way we view the world is SARS-COV-2 (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2).

The current global crisis is both unfortunate and unprecedented. The emergence of the deadly virus not only caught every country off guard, but also left a bleak mark all over the world. Along with the onslaught of the virus, there are various post-economic challenges: crumbling government, massive unemployment, the collapsing economy, the plight of migrants, the collapse of the global supply chain, and most importantly, revising the contours of security [2].

Therefore, it is intended to contribute to the continued prosperity and development of mankind in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution by analyzing human security threats and suggesting possible alternatives in the international community through joint efforts and counter-measures of the international community [3].

In particular, it grasps the theoretical analysis and status of human security challenges in Korea, a mid-sized country in Asia, and analyzes the role of human security promotion and protection in Asia, including Korea. In addition, by studying infectious diseases, drugs, organized crime, terror and cyber terrorism, This research is to suggest ways to establish a cooperative mechanism between Korea and Asia to address human security threats

This study aims to contribute to Asia's continued development, sound security and economic development by analyzing the actual conditions of human security challenges in Korea and Asia and establishing a cooperation mechanism among countries in the region.

## **2. Human Security Threats and the Role of the Middle Power**

### **2.1. Current security threat situation**

Today, the world still has military and traditional security threats such as war. In addition, new security threats such as infectious diseases, hacking, fine dust, and terrorism are increasing. Such security threats are called non-traditional security threats (emerging security) or human security threats [4][5]. And this is a typical security threat i) Health and security, infectious diseases ii) Climate change, fine dust iii) Cyber security, data security, post-human threats [6][7] iv) Nuclear safety, energy security v) Population security, immigration and refugee security, social security vi) Massive natural disaster.

The most controversial of these security threats is the risks and shocks posed by COVID-19 Pandemic in health security and infectious diseases. COVID-19 will serve as an opportunity for environmental and health issues to be imprinted as intrinsic variables, and fine dust and global warming have also been a concern, but it is recognized as a crisis 10 years later and 100 years later. In contrast, COVID-19 is an infectious disease as a threat to immediate survival. COVID-19 is also causing a change of order from an international security perspective. In terms of international politics, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Post-Cold War order were formed, and post-modern order was formed through the September 11 terrorist attacks. And Covid-19 is heralding the formation of a new order in terms of human security concerns.

### **2.2. The role of human security and middle power**

With the COVID-19 crisis, the global strategic environment today faces a new phase in the liberal international order. The United States' abandonment of leadership and the conflict between China and Russia, other powers, are intensifying. It is possible to establish a "third zone" in solidarity with countries that share the same will, not countries that are forced to make choices amid the U.S.-China hegemonic conflict [8]. The "central" countries, including Korea,

which has no hidden intentions and conditions and has ability and trust, should aim for a space of value and cooperation amid each other's disconnection and isolation. Filling the gap in the G2 will buffer conflicts between the U.S. and China, while helping countries in blind spots where damage will be enormous in the midst of their own lives[9].


Furthermore, human security issues such as COVID-19 pose new challenges to traditional national-centered models underlying strategic decision-making. In particular, the response of the three superpowers (United States, China, and Russia) to the recent COVID-19 crisis and the leadership shown by the second powers (Britain, Brazil, India and Japan) is not desirable. This security environment is giving room for a new factor in the formation of international order. Among them, the Middle Power is emerging as a new player in the formation of international order. In particular, Korea has attracted global attention in overcoming the COVID-19 crisis and is striving to promote human security in the world's development and conflict areas. Based on this, this study will explore ways to contribute most to the promotion and protection of human security in Southeast Asia, where many countries and communities are facing the dual challenges of conflict and the resulting underdevelopment and physical unrest. Mid-sized countries lack "force" to move other countries in the direction they want through military or economic resources. However, it is different from a small or "inefficient system" that has little or no impact on other countries. These are potentially "institution-impact systems", which can have a significant impact within narrower policy areas or in conjunction with other policy areas[10]. Maximizing their relevance and impact requires a choice of some of these midsize countries' powers in terms of policy priorities and geographic regions. That means pursuing niche diplomacy (niche diplomacy) identified by Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister and founder of the international crisis group[11].

Newly emerging or active mid-sized economies, including East Asia and Europe, are shifting to "Humanitarian Intervention[12]" or human-centered diplomacy (human security approach) taken by the international governance agenda to exert a lot of influence through niche diplomatic activities. Among them, Korea has emerged as the most prominent and influential mid-sized country in the world. Human security was discussed at the U.N. Development and Cooperation Organization in 1994 and is a concept that focuses on human individuals and reduces or eliminates threats in past national-centered security concepts. Peace and security have long been key objectives of global governance and essential elements of human well-being. In particular, the recent health crisis is affecting the most seriously socially and economically vulnerable population, as shown by the COVID-19 epidemic death rate. In many countries, people with existing undiagnosed chronic diseases can die of lack of attention and treatment without treatment. Poverty therefore acts as a further threat to health and security. Many of the government's border containment policies show increased unrest among vulnerable individuals and groups in line with rising domestic violence and suicide statistics. Clear skies caused by border blockades or closures and the environment caused by clean water resources and mortality from health problems are likely to be lowered, but experts are now finding a link between the seriousness of the effects of pollution and disease. Concerns are also being raised about the massive non-biotic waste produced, used and discarded in terms of masks and personal protection equipment (PPE). Finally, the poor are most vulnerable to the consequences of environmental destruction, poverty makes sustainable development difficult, and natural disasters will be exacerbated by environmental destruction. A vicious circle can therefore continue beyond the scope of state-centered security models and policy decisions. Traditional security issues involve threats to the existence of states. It is also rooted in national sovereignty and identity. Thus, with limited trust and deep historical conflicts, countries prefer to rely on "self-help" or bilateral military alliances for Northeast and Southeast Asian countries that have resisted sovereignty or collective security initiatives. In addition, cooperation in the field of human security is highly likely because it is less relevant to existential threats to state entities. In this regard, the nature of the drastic change in peace construction and development cooperation in the 21st century

presents a "good opportunity" in the national interest for mid-sized countries like Korea to do something that is normatively right and beneficial. It also offers the opportunity to cooperate with each other and provide leadership in regional diplomatic networks in Asia (including North-east and Southeast Asia). Southeast Asia is a region heavily affected by colonization, ideology and national wars. At international governance level, security organizations in the region tried to minimize the worst signs of conflict between countries by emphasizing no intervention. Domestic governance emphasized the nation's interest and strength in terms of security and macroeconomic growth through large projects. Despite dramatic advances in economic development and governance, major challenges to human security persist, some of which are exacerbated by national security and development policy decisions. The most serious challenges are conflict, poverty, environmental degradation and "natural" or "natural-inducing" disasters. COVID-19 is becoming one of the most vulnerable security threats.

Koreans are very aware of the possibility of damage caused by infectious diseases such as COVID-19. According to the 2021 National Security Awareness Survey, the following is as follows.

**Figure 1.** Possible damage caused by non-military threats - infectious disease.



On the possibility of damage caused by infectious diseases, 73.2 percent of the general public and 80.0 percent of experts said it was "large."

The response to the possibility of damage from the [general public] infection was 73.2%, which is 68.9% higher than the 'less'(4.3%). \_ [general public - year-on-year] Compared to 2020, 'large' decreased by 4.6% p (77.8% in 2020) and 'less' by 1.4% p (5.7% in 2020). The response to the possibility of damage caused by infectious diseases is 80.0%, which is 75.0% higher than 'less'(5.0%).

In particular, Southeast Asia has become the main target of South Korea's soft power, diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives. Korea has consistently concentrated 30% of the Public Development Assistance (ODA) that forms the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Among the weakest and poorest developing countries, ASEAN countries have the greatest security and development challenges, and can therefore benefit the most from partnerships with South Korea. Thus, the interest of vulnerable groups in countries affected by conflict and Korean policymakers increases understanding of these complex interactions. South Korea's "New Southern Policy," which was announced during President Moon Jae-in's visit to three Southeast Asian countries in November 2017, is trying to raise the relationship between Korea, ASEAN countries and India to the same level. In particular, Korea's response to the COVID-19 is considered a successful best practice in the international community. Its status as a mature democratic

country is imprinted on the international community, including transparent and rapid information sharing, the highest level of medical system, creative diagnosis and quarantine measures, and advanced citizenship that enabled voluntary participation in society as a whole. In the wake of the incident, South Korea should seek ways to expand its role and contribute to non-traditional security to enhance its national image and status. Korea's response to the COVID-19 crisis is considered a successful best practice in the international community. Its status as a mature democratic country is imprinted on the international community, including transparent and rapid information sharing, the highest level of medical system, creative diagnosis and quarantine measures, and advanced citizenship that enabled voluntary participation in society as a whole. In the wake of the incident, South Korea should seek ways to expand its role and contribute to non-traditional security to enhance its national image and status[13].

Therefore, this study will first examine the policy platform of Korea's mid-sized countries. Next, an analysis of the success and failure of Korea's human security support will be conducted in CLMVIP (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines) countries in Southeast Asia, and cooperation between vulnerable individuals, groups and Asian countries will be feasible and seek ways to provide a comparative advantage. This will contribute to the co-prosperity of Asia and the world. Among human security threats threatening the order of security and economic cooperation in Asia, we will identify and present solutions to the current status of infectious diseases, drugs, human trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and refugee issues. The Korean government has been seeking its responsibility and role as a competent mid-sized country in the international community that can contribute to Northeast Asia and world peace and prosperity, and is seeking a joint response to transnational threats such as large-scale natural disasters, infectious diseases, drugs and refugee issues as part of measures to strengthen cooperative diplomacy with the U.S. and other neighboring countries. However, discussions on specific means of achieving these foreign policy objectives have not been actively carried out.

### **2.3. Response direction**

In the future, various types of non-traditional threat factors such as Covid-19 will continue to emerge and evolve. In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, Korea is recognized for its ability and role as a trusted mid-sized country in the international community. It is an opportunity to enhance the national crisis by expanding its role more actively in the local and international community. Transnational organized crime, including COVID-19, drugs and human trafficking, is spreading further around the world, and it is inappropriate to respond only to certain countries. Only regional and global responses can be effectively responded to[14]. The UN Convention on transnational organized crime was signed in 2000, and now on the 22nd anniversary of its signing, there should be a review of implementation as well as information sharing on organized crime. In particular, individual countries overlooked issues outside their borders to protect their sovereignty and were passionate about defending their territory. Today's world

If the scope of the police force stops within borders, international organized crime will be free across borders. In this regard, cooperation on information sharing and judicial enforcement is essential to combat international organized crime. Since international organized crime is carried out by the power of the market, the response is to paralyze the market function rather than a direct impact on the organization that committed the crime. Strengthening security and the rule of law are essential for illegal traders through the weakest channels of control - corruption, instability and underdevelopment. Organized crime offenders are motivated by profit, so the key to preventing organized crime is to cut off their funds. In other words, the government should prevent illegal flow of funds by preventing slush fund transactions at overseas banks and tracing owners of funds through real transactions that block unofficial and illegal money flows and enable money laundering.

There is also the aspect that recently developed extensive open trade leads to international organized crime. Over the past two decades, along with a lack of norms, reckless growth policies, and Internet and free trade transactions, these have misled the economic and financial systems. In this regard, more attention is needed today to prevent the trade of illegal goods by crime.

Currently, transnational crimes such as drug crimes and illegal immigration are increasing in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, its response relies solely on classical criminal justice cooperation. Okay, because the classic criminal justice system itself has a lot of problems. We need to come up with a new strategy to effectively respond to national crime. All. To this end, Phil will strengthen the traditional criminal justice system in the short term. I have yoga. The medium-term strategy is to form a multilateral criminal justice cooperation treaty between Southeast Asian countries. It is desirable to make a decision. There's a growing awareness of transnational crime among Southeast Asian countries. The response system is based on a bilateral treaty, but based on a multilateral treaty. One joint response is not being carried out. Cracking down on crime quickly and efficiently in response to increasingly globalized crimes. In order to do this, Southeast Asian countries, Southeast Asian countries, and Korea, China, and Japan will cooperate. I can't help it. In order to sign the Multilateral Criminal Justice Cooperation Treaty, each country will have to do so. It is necessary to support the Criminal Justice and Cooperation Treaty legally and institutionally by revising domestic laws. I'll do it. For example, the Criminal Justice Cooperation Treaty between Southeast Asian countries and Korea, China, and Japan. If concluded, a treaty that integrates criminal extradition would be more desirable. I am. And in the long run, multilateral criminal justice across Southeast Asia. It needs to be developed into a treaty. The long-term strategy is a joint crime struggle organization based on the East Asian community. It is necessary to review the installation of. Maintaining peace and security in East Asia. The most effective way to do this is to transfer some of the punishment rights of each country. It is to establish a crime control organization. Prevention of transnational crime in Asia. The fact that there are various policy consultative bodies to suppress and suppress it is a matter of fact. To build a more effective and efficient framework for my criminal justice cooperation. It has meaning as an entirely approach. So this is what happens in East Asia. In order to effectively respond to transnational crime, we need to create a bilateral treaty between countries. A country that cares and benefits from responding to transnational crime, not form. A joint crime control body should be set up in the form of a multilateral treaty between the countries.

### **2.3.1. Establishment of bilateral and multilateral cooperation system**

As transnational crime increases, the need for international cooperation is increasing today. Types of bilateral cooperation in the field of criminal justice include criminal justice cooperation in consultation, extradition, enforcement of criminal judgments, and transfer of international prisoners. International criminal law cooperation in consultation generally involves investigation, prosecution, and prosecution in criminal cases. An agreement made by another State at the request of one State in relation to judicial proceedings. I mean Joe.

However, there are various implications for the specifics of international criminal justice cooperation. I am used as a maze. Criminal justice cooperation in consultation is the god of criminals throughout criminal justice. Except for extradition, which focuses on the acquisition of soldiers, he is not guilty at the trial stage. Certification, acquisition of evidence, or preparation for proof. The collection of data, exchange of information, delivery of documents related to litigation, etc. at the investigation stage. I can say that the contents are all about inter-state cooperation. To this end, multilateral agreements such as the Schengen Agreement in Europe should also be considered urgently. However, in the process of establishing a bilateral treaty or multilateral treaty, there may be difficulties due to sovereignty issues, so first of all, a memorandum of understanding with Korea and ASEAN countries. By signing (MOU), we can also consider gradual development.

### **2.3.2. Expansion of human exchange**

The prosecution told Cambodia and Vietnam in March and June 2008, respectively It has opened a 'cooperative liaison office (LOCIG)'and strengthened the cooperation system. Supreme Prosecutors' Office drugs The Department of Organized Crime has been working in Asia for three years since 2007 to help combat drugs It has received \$1 million in funding from the ASEAN Secretariat. Like this The spread of information exchange and the influence of the global community will further spread transnational crime It is expected enough. Therefore, the mutual exchange of judicial experts and police officers I'll have to step up cooperation with Ryu. In particular, Korea has established a 'integrated computer system for drug information' in the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, Vietnam and Cambodia, and is transferring drug and organized crime departments and drug crime administrative techniques. In addition, the Korea Criminal Policy Research Institute and the UN Drug Crimes Bureau (UNODC) Asia-Pacific Center are exporting Korea's excellent legal culture with a business agreement ceremony for the joint implementation of the Asia Just program in Bangkok, Thailand in July 2009. Through these efforts, the ability to prevent and respond to transnational organized crime in the region should be developed.

### **2.3.3. Establishment of information sharing system through network formation**

Whenever an annual meeting of the UN Crime Prevention Committee is held, organized crime or crime is committed by each country When the database of each country is interconnected by establishing a database related to the crime organization The key is being discussed in depth in the UN Strategy It is a simple demonstration of the share. In response, Korea shall also prescribe matters necessary for Article 8 of the Act on Reporting, Use, etc. of Specific Financial Transaction Information (Exchange of Information between Foreign Financial Information Institutions, etc.), recognizing the importance of the information exchange system And we're working closely with the U.S., China, Japan and many other countries around the world I'm doing it, but the scope of information exchange so that it doesn't lag behind the pace of openness and globalization And by continuously expanding the content, there's no room for criminal gangs to hide their illegal funds I'll have to be a kid. The National Intelligence Service so that information on international drug trafficking can be collected and distributed in a timely manner The intelligence activities of the NIS (National Intelligence Service) should be continuously strengthened.

Of drug crimes if you think about internationalism, there's a lot of foreign intelligence gathering in the tracking of drug supply chains I would not overdo the emphasis on my share. The NIS is also a spy recognizing the importance of drug production and smuggling in countries around the world and North Korea. It focuses on collecting, analyzing, and disseminating about tracking of illegal drug supply chains, but stops for perfect preparation. The NIS is a state agency that specializes in collecting and analyzing information, especially is the best in the field of tracking of illegal drug supply chains. It's the International drug administration, because it's sending circles to the world's components. There is much room to contribute to the detection and tracking of organizations. Moreover there should be no gaps in the National Intelligence Service's spying on North Korea, as the possibility of the inflow of North Korea's drugs into Republic of Korea through immigrations is higher than ever due to the simplification of customs procedures and the expansion of inter-Korean exchanges. Therefore, on the one hand, the government should continue to supplement the NIS's overseas intelligence activities and strengthen cooperation between investigative agencies at various levels and the NIS to ensure that state agencies keep pace.

## **3. Conclusion**

COVID-19 is the most influential virus in human security compared to other viruses that have

emerged. COVID-19 has shown that most future threats will be invisible threats. Countries are not prepared for biological terrorist attacks. Ammunition to fight bioterrorism is not the same military force as traditional threats, but a technology that can detect the spread of infectious diseases as quickly as possible. Countries can use artificial intelligence to identify, control, and suppress the spread of viruses. Excellent healthcare systems with sophisticated technology can detect viruses early to save more lives and prevent them from affecting other lives such as society and economy. Bioterrorism attacks can occur at any time without notice, but countries must be prepared with strong national security resilience[15].

In addition, Korea, as a mid-sized country, should analyze its role in terms of human security and establish a cooperative mechanism as a public good to respond to human security challenges that threaten the existing cooperative order in Asia in order to establish sound security and economic order and contribute to the development of Asia and the global community. Although the concept of human security was first proposed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994, it is a concept that has been controversial since then. The early days of the discussion focused on the universal achievement of freedom from poverty or hunger through international development and cooperation, but the western powers unilaterally imposed subjective values such as the establishment of normative control means of development and cooperation and human rights on the Third World, and the practical application of this concept was accepted as a restriction on the sovereignty of Third World countries. We believe that Korea can breathe new life into human security, which has been tarnished by this conceptual debate or coercion of conditions. At the same time with the universal distribution of K-defense in the international order, which is feared to decline due to their own priorities, it can seek human security as an ordinary noun by providing practical help without "will" and "conditions" to developing countries that are having difficulty in quarantine [2].

And it could lay the foundation for South Korea's foreign and security policy on human security threats in the Asian region (such as infection, drugs, human trafficking, organized crime, terrorism) and present a new milestone in South Korea's foreign and security policy, which has been upgraded to the status of a beneficiary country from the status of an aid recipient. And it will contribute to the establishment of a network to respond to human security threats such as infectious diseases, refugees, pirates, terrorism and disaster disasters in Korea and Asia. The results of this study seem to be part of a very meaningful work in terms of security and strengthening Korea's diplomatic power. By providing the research results to international organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the United Nations, it will contribute to achieving two objectives: diplomacy and national security. This will contribute to strengthening Korea's role as a mid-sized country and forming soft power to promote the New Southern Policy.

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## 5. Appendix

### 5.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	HC	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	SP	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	YI	-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Corresponding author\*  
E-mail: pgy556@daum.net

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## A Study on the NCO Basic Trainings to Improve Immediate Field Task Performance

Sangjung Park<sup>1</sup>

*Korea National Defense University, Nonsan, Republic of Korea*

Daegeun Lee<sup>2</sup>

*Republic of Korea Army, Gyeryong, Republic of Korea*

Gyunyeol Park<sup>3\*</sup>

*Gyeongsang National University, Jinju, Republic of Korea*

### Abstract

**Purpose:** This research aims to analyze the current status of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Basic trainings at the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) NCO Academy and to suggest improvement options for immediate field task performance.

**Method:** This study is to identify the capabilities of smart NCOs required in the era of the 4th industrial revolution. It also reviews previous research on 'NCO Comprehensive Development Plan 2.0' and 'NCO Strategy 2030' for the future of the military in connection with 'Defense Reform 2.0'. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, surveys are mainly conducted through online surveys and non-contact interviews with the NCO experts.

**Results:** This research would propose a training course development plan based on the internal efforts of the NCO Academy and a survey of 678 soldiers including junior and senior NCOs and company commanders. It is necessary to realistically adjust the goals of the courses to achieve the basic combat skills and capabilities as a junior NCO. The current NCO basic course period needs to reduce from 18 weeks to 12 weeks and also the junior NCO leader course period needs to extend from 20 weeks to 25 weeks depending on the each refined training goal.

**Conclusion:** The future of the army may depend on the smart NCO's immediate field performance which is the core of the combat capabilities of tactical units. Therefore, the NCO basic training environments and programs of the ROKA NCO Academy should be substantially improved.

**[Keywords]** NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), Field Leadership, 4th Industrial Revolution, NCO Comprehensive Development Plan 2.0, Immediate Field Task Performance

## 1. Introduction

The 4th Industrial Revolution is bringing about leaps and bounds not only in economy, culture, and education, but also in the defense realm. With the advent of the population cliff along with the reduction of troops in accordance with the defense reform 2.0, the need to foster smart warriors skilled in warrior platforms, drone-bots, manned and unmanned complex combat systems, and hyper-connected networks is increasingly being raised.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK) Defense Reform 2.0, various and rapidly changing aspects such as army-oriented military restructuring, reduction of troops, reduction of military service period, emergence of population cliffs, spread of a social atmosphere that values human rights appeared. This has a great influence on fostering smart Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) for the future Army[1][2].

Recently, fostering irreplaceable smart combat NCO with Immediate Field Task Performance has become a major concern. In particular, Acquisition of good NCOs and substantial trainings

is considered increasingly important. Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) NCO Academy has been doing its best to develop Immediate Field Task Performance[2]. Improvements have been made in various areas such as training goal, curriculum, period, and drill-instructor sergeant system, as well as increasingly emphasizing reflection from combat unit's field training requirements.

This study is to examine the current status of NCO Basic course and junior NCO leadership course at ROKA NCO Academy and suggest ways to improve Immediate Field Task Performance based on the requirements of field units[1][3]. The survey is conducted mainly on online surveys and non-contact interviews with expert groups due to COVID-19.

## 2. Strengthening NCO Capabilities Suitable for the Future Battlefields

Changes in the 4th industrial revolution are rapidly taking place throughout the social system. In hyper-connected network environments such as artificial intelligence (AI), high-speed Internet, cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT) and big data, autonomy and convergence are underway across all areas of society. Futurists predict that the advanced technology is currently being tested and partially applied in each field in its early stages, but as it enters the mid-term stage after 2030, it will be advanced and widely applied to human real life[1][4].

In the future battlefield, AI+ICBMS convergence technologies such as robots and AI of the 4th industrial revolution will be applied, and many combat mission prayer will be replaced by intelligent robot combatants from human combatants[2][5].

The modern war is applying the concept of precision strike using C4I, but the future war will be evolved into a five-dimensional war, including cyber warfare and space warfare, as high-tech advanced technologies such as satellites, precision-guided munition (PGM) drone-bots and warrior platforms are being used in the military areas[2][6].

ROK Army is developing plans to replace combatants with AI and machines by combining up-to-date advanced technologies to prepare to the lack of military manpower resources in advance. By developing warrior platforms and drone-bots first, ROKA is seeking ways to maximize combat effects while minimizing casualties. The plans include warrior platform, Army TIGER System 4.0, and establishment of drone and robot systems[7].

The Army is promoting the NCO comprehensive development 2.0 and the NCO Strategy 2030 to enhance the role and mission of irreplaceable smart combat NCO as the backbone for ROKA's combat power in tactical units[5][8]. In the past, ROKA NCOs performed tasks focused on unit management as passive and auxiliary beings. On the other hand, current and future NCOs should be able to play a pivotal role as the subject of combat preparation and training to demonstrate actual combat power performance. Nevertheless, there seems to be some atmosphere in which they are not properly devoted to education and training. It is difficult for them to focus on practical education and training, which is their original task, as they still focus on unit management-oriented work[2][9].

The NCO Strategy 2030 aims to be the center of military combat power, and is proud of being right, competent, and dedicated. To this end, NCOs should be reborn as a combat warrior in individual and small unit combat technology, a leader in action, and a connector in the commander-enlisted soldiers, people-military, past-future.

In order for the Army to foster NCO as the backbone of its tactical combat power and as top combatant in future battlefields, conditions and systems must be prepared to focus entirely on their education and training[10]. Moreover, NCOs should develop their job competencies through self-learning. In other words, they have to make hard efforts so that they can clearly recognize

what they have, what they need to know, and how to act in order to perform roles for each position.

Again, they are the backbone of the ground forces' combat power. They are a group that demonstrates field leadership and are the key to determining the success or failure of the construction of the first-class army beyond its limits[5][7][11]. A good warrior is a NCO with the right character, warrior temperament, and leadership. A competent warrior is a NCO with both military knowledge and expertise. A dedicated warrior is a NCO who strives to develop capabilities, exert influence, and complete his duties.

NCOs should have a vision of a combative and proud figure embodied in dedication to their country and initiative of combat. A smart NCO can be defined as a warrior who is well-versed in the advanced military technology of the 4th industrial revolution and is knowledgeable and dedicated[11][12].

They are small unit combat commanders, drill and training instructors, combat equipment management experts, unit managers to maintain combat readiness, and combat-oriented unit traditional successors. In order to transform the 4th Industrial Revolution and improve Immediate Field Task Performance, the educational paradigm of NCO should also be developed in the direction of strengthening their job capabilities. Competency consists of knowledge, skill, attitude, value, etc., and is strengthened through personal experience through education and training and their positions[2][13].

Among the Army's future high-tech platforms, the systems with the highest connection to NCO's combat missions are the warrior platform and drone-bot combat system. The warrior platform, a personal combat system, consists of wearable devices such as AI and hyper-connected functions to maximize combat power[3][14]. The drone-bot combat system is the core of the manned and unmanned combined combat system. By replacing human soldiers with drone bots, the Army can improve its combat capabilities in high-risk areas and minimize damage to combatants. Therefore, education should be urgently implemented so that these two combat systems can be effectively utilized.

In addition, the future NCO should develop into an LVCG-based education and training expert. The Army is affected by the proficiency of enlisted soldiers due to the shortened military service period. In addition, due to the increase in civil complaints due to field training noise, dust, and bad weather, practical training is being restricted[2][10][15]. In order to overcome these challenges, the Army is developing a combat simulation training system that applies the Synthetic Training Environment (STE) and is creating a KCTC-type science training center capable of realistic combat shooting and tactical movements. Therefore, NCO should have the ability as a tactical training expert along with the establishment of an LVCG-based scientific education and training system[3][16].

### **3. Improvement of Junior NCO's Immediate Field Task Performance**

#### **3.1. Immediate field task performance for junior NCOs**

ROK Army is striving to build a first-class Army that exceeds its limits by linking 'Defense Reform 2.0' with advanced technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution[5][11]. There is a growing demand for expanding the role of NCO due to a decrease in the number of military soldiers, limitations in manpower structure, and shortening of military service period.

Recently, there has been a demand from field units for the improvement of Immediate Field Task Performance of junior NCO. Immediate Field Task Performance literally means responding promptly and immediately to each situation at tactical units[8][16]. Therefore, it can be defined

as the ability to perform the mission immediately according to the tactical unit's environment and mission. Efforts to develop the capabilities of junior NCOs are being reviewed throughout the NCO basic course and junior NCO leader course under the ROKA NCO Academy. In particular, while actively reflecting the needs of field units, improvements have been made in various areas such as educational goals, curriculum, period, and drill-instructor system and they are being devised.

### 3.2. The goal, period, and subject Improvement of the NCO basic trainings

The NCO training system has continuously changed according to the needs of the times. The junior NCO leader course, which was conducted after completion of the NCO basic course, was also conducted as a 20-week convocation training at the Army NCO Academy within two years after being commissioned, but has been improved to proceed with the junior NCO leader course immediately following the NCO basic course [1][7].

As a result of self-analysis of the curriculum of the ROKA NCO Academy, the focus has been on the number of training programs rather than the curriculum that develops the competencies required by field departments. In particular, the training period for junior NCOs is over-organized for 18 weeks, and the educational goal is also higher than the goal of the school education regulations, Army regulation 340, as it requires the ability to qualify as a squad leader [3][16].

The Army NCO basic course is 7 weeks longer than the 11 weeks of naval and air force training, resulting in relative disadvantages such as delay in commission appointment, extension of mandatory service period, and lower payment. The problem is that the training goals and curriculums of the NCO basic course and the junior NCO leader course of the NCO Academy are the very similar and the learning contents are somewhat overlapped. Therefore, it is necessary to realistically improve the training goals, training periods, and curriculums of the junior NCO trainings by raising the awareness of service and accepting the demands of the field.

NCO basic course and junior NCO leader course need to be distinguished. The NCO basic course should be conducted mainly on militarization programs as a junior NCO, and the junior NCO leader course needs to be improved focusing on having the capabilities as a squad leader [2][9][15].

Also, NCO basic course needs to be improved by shortening the training period to meet the training goals in order to resolve the relative discrimination compared to other military forces. On the other hand, the junior NCO leader course should extend the training period to 25 weeks to focus on developing the ability to perform positions in consideration of the squad or team leaders. Such improvement measures can be applied as shown in <Table 1>.

**Table 1.** Improvement of the NCO basic course and junior NCO leader course.

Category	NCO basic course	Junior NCO leader course
Goal	Basic skills as a combatant and ability to carry out battles.	Elite combat squad leader, capable of performing his/her duties.
Periods	12 weeks (-6 weeks)	25 weeks (+6 weeks)
Upright personality and leadership	Military law, Roles and responsibilities of NCO, military etiquette, Personality development camp, Sexual violence prevention program	Mental consulting program, Overcoming combat stress, Military consulting. * Army Chief Staff Meeting, gender-sensitivity, roles and responsibilities of NCO
Physical capacity	Basic physical fitness, Physical fitness test, Tactical march (10, 40km)	Physical fitness test, Combat physical fitness training, Mountain physical fitness training, Tactical march (20-40km)

Skills to operate weapons and equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Drone-bot combat execution system</li> <li>· Expansion: Organizer, communication and monitoring equipment, etc.</li> </ul>	Personal weapon shooting, SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon), drone-bot combat performance system *Communication and monitoring equipment
Combat skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Certification of qualification as the combat squad leader.</li> <li>· Improvement: Personal weapon.</li> <li>· Expansion: Mines, barbed wire, combat injuries, etc.</li> </ul>	Treatment of injured persons, certification of qualification as a combat squad leader. *Mines/barbed wire
Battle command leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Expansion: Small unit combat, KCTC training.</li> <li>· New: local provocation counter operations</li> </ul>	Small unit combat, KCTC combat training, and operations to local provocation
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Safety culture, introductory education (5 subjects including integrity subjects, etc.)</li> <li>· Expansion : Field practice, commander's time.</li> <li>· New: Teaching method, evaluation introduction education</li> </ul>	Unit management, introductory subjects (5 subjects including integrity), military life guidance, etc.

In the squad battle course, only the basic tasks required as combatants are mastered in the training course, and in connection with small unit combats, Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) combat training, and local provocation in the junior NCO leader course. Delete the 20-kilometer tactical march during the NCO basic course and cultivate individual marching skills mainly for 10km and 40km[8][10]. In the junior NCO leader course, the individual evaluation of marching ability will be drastically deviated from the individual evaluation of marching ability to strengthen marching leadership such as squad command, tactical situation measures, and guidance before, during, and after marching through 20km and 40km tactical marches. KCTC combat training in the junior NCO leader course reflected for the first time in year 2021 guarantees conditions for pre-coordination and teamwork with field units by realistically reflecting training preparations and maintenance time such as war games and topographic reconnaissance.

If the training goals of the NCO basic course are adjusted and the training period is shortened, the junior NCO leader course can be expanded from the current 20 weeks to 25 weeks[5][12][14]. When the training period is adjusted from the current 18 weeks to 12 weeks, it is necessary to reinforce the ability to perform the position of the squad leader in the junior NCO leader course. Adjusting the curriculum according to the shorter training period is as shown in <Table 2>.

**Table 2.** Improvement plan of NCO basic course subjects.

Category	Current	Improvement
Squad battle	Combat skills + Squad leadership / 90H	Transfer the squad leadership task from NCO basic course to junior NCO leader course / 40H
March and physical training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· March (10, 20, 40km) x 2 times + Squad leader leadership skills / 74H</li> </ul>	Development of basic skills /40H * Use their daily physical training time
Personal weapons	Shooting ability + guidance / control ability / 44H	Reinforcement of control and guidance skills in junior course / 36H
Commander's time	22% / 164H of the total curriculum * Preparation for the completion ceremony, pre-learning, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Reduced to 10% of the total curriculum / 52H</li> <li>* Focusing on the key points</li> </ul>

Reinforcing measures to improve Immediate Field Task Performance in the NCO's basic trainings is an essential task of the Army to enhance the unit's tactical combat capability, not an option[3][16].

A shortcut to accommodating the demands of field units and developing junior NCO's Immediate Field Task Performance requires a process of being aware of themselves like what ability they should have. Currently, due to the COVID-19, the existing field on-job-training program is not in progress. If the junior NCO leader course is increased instead of shortening the training process, it is necessary to actively consider extending field on-job-training program from the current one week to two to four weeks. Junior NCOs are trained for one week when they first commissioned, and using this period, they can save time and their efforts. To this end, the 'ROKA NCO Academy combat development department' should be reinforced first, and the study of the combat doctrine of small units should be added. Based on this, education and training should be developed, and the requirements of field units should be reflected in the necessary requirements[3][13][15]. Of course, efforts should also be made to actively collect opinions from field units.

### 3.3. Ensuring the conditions conducive to NCO trainings

Now, the Academy has 18 NCO basic courses a year, and that is currently heavy to operate with the current number of people. In the current system, the burden on drill instructors (DI) is increasing day by day as they are in charge of both military discipline and training. Each DI is in charge of 20 to 30 people, which leads to excessive burden and poor professionalism. In particular, there is a lack of meeting time and research and development (R&D) time for training improvement, resulting in differences in training contents between instructors. There is a phenomenon in which excellent NCOs avoid applying for training instructors due to the heavy workload of the training.

Therefore, the role of the instructor in the NCO basic course should be divided into training instructor and tactics instructor as shown in <Table 3>.

**Table 3.** Improvement of drill instructor's role.

Category	Current	Improvement
Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Five DI per company</li> <li>· Training for 30 persons per DI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Three DI per company (The remaining two will become tactical instructors)</li> <li>· Training for 40-50 persons per DI</li> <li>· Organize 25 to 30 additional tactical instructors (support 18 companies)</li> </ul>
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Both discipline and training</li> <li>· All subjects (17 subjects) in charge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· DI: discipline and basic training.</li> <li>· Tactics instructor: combat skills.</li> </ul>

In addition, the shortening of the training period means that the DI's training preparation period increases. If drill instructors use this extended period efficiently, they can fully strengthen their instructor capabilities. Gathering appropriate feedback from field tactical units, acquiring a variety of teaching skills, and studying doctrine can provide good training for junior NCO.

## 4. Enabling Feedback for Better NCO Trainings

In order to teach and produce competent junior NCO with Immediate Field Task Performance, above all, the requirements of military departments of colleges, Reserve Non-commissioned Officer's Training Corps (RNTC), and field units must be interconnected. Due to COVID-19, the demands of field units has been not properly reflected in ROKA NCO Academy's training pro-

gram, and Efforts at the ROKA NCO Academy to collect feedback from field units were also insufficient. As a result, over the past two years, there have been only 26 field unit requirements and only 6 field unit visits[6][16].

Perhaps for this reason, according to the 2020 field survey conducted by the ROKA NCO Academy, there were severe gaps between training institutions and field units for junior NCOs. Junior NCOs complained that their units are in charge of just simple tasks, not training and field leadership. In particular, they emphasized that only about 30% of what they learned in training can be used in the field, asked to reinforce basic subject practical training, small unit management, and SAW(Squad Automatic Weapon) skills. Additionally, junior NCOs often struggle with commanding soldiers of a similar age due to their lack of career and experience.

To reflect the demands of the field tactical units, a survey was conducted in order to improve the Immediate Field Task Performance of junior NCOs. As shown in <Table 4>, a total of 763 junior NCOs, first sergeant, and company commander of the three front line corps were surveyed for two weeks from September 13, 2021 (Mon) to September 24 (Fri). As a result, it reveals the result of the survey on key subjects for improving the Immediate Field Task Performance and subjects need to be added to NCO basic trainings.

**Table 4.** Key subjects for improving the immediate field task performance.

Current	Improvement
① Small unit combat (276)	① Crew-served weapon (32)
② Personal Weapons (268)	② Leadership (29)
③ Physical training (255)	③ Special Qualification training(SQT) (28)
④ Map reading (237)	④ Small unit combat skills (20)
⑤ First aid (216)	⑤ Preparations for KCTC (20)
⑥ Military personality education (216)	⑥ Administrative work (17)
⑦ Military knowledge, Military law (207)	⑦ How to consult (12)

Currently, due to the full schedule for NCO basic trainings, data surveys and research activities on the Immediate Field Task Performance of junior NCOs have not been properly conducted. Compared to the Officer Basic Course (OBC), the NCO basic trainings absolutely lacks training time and practical opportunities, especially leadership and personality areas. Therefore, an in-depth analysis process is needed as to whether the tasks taught in the NCO basic training course or junior NCO leadership course are properly educated[1][12][16].

In addition, it is necessary to conduct regular research by reinforcing the formation of a combat development office in ROKA NCO Academy, to develop research on the field leadership by Chungyongdae Research Institute or the leadership department in Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon (KAAY). As a result of the research, it was found that it was necessary to provide field demands to training instructors (DI) and tactics instructors and to actively utilize the results.

## 5. Conclusions

As the COVID-19 pandemic prolongs, individual and unit training of combat units is not being conducted properly. With the advent of the era of population cliff, the available manpower for the military is becoming increasingly scarce, and the social atmosphere that values human life is increasing day by day. Nevertheless, according to Defense Reform 2.0, the army-oriented reform of the military structure and reduction of troops is proceeding as planned. NCO are high-tech warriors in future ground battles that operate warrior platforms, drone-bots, and un-

manned systems in combat, and are key talents to perform small unit combat and field leadership. Therefore, the evolutionary development of NCO combat capabilities is a demand of the times for the future of the army.

In recent years, the demand of field tactical units for improvement of Immediate Field Task Performance is increasing and ROKA NCO Academy is also actively addressing the needs of field tactical units to foster innovation in Junior NCO training courses (NCO Basic Course and Junior NCO Leader Course).

In this study, a training course improvement plan was presented based on the efforts of the ROK Army NCO Academy and a survey of 678 people (including junior NCOs, first sergeants, and company commanders). First, the training goal was realistically adjusted to the level of basic military knowledge and combat performance for junior NCOs. Second, the current NCO basic course period will be shortened from 18 weeks to 12 weeks and the junior NCO leader course will be extended from 20 weeks to 25 weeks according to the adjustment of the training goals. Third, depending on the training goal, some subjects in each curriculum are deleted or the training time is shortened. Fourth, the current instructor system is divided into drill instructors and tactical instructors. Finally, the junior NCO trainings should be bolstered supports and strengthened the warrior platform, drone-bot system and MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) equipment as quickly as possible. From a long-term perspective, the training departments need to seamlessly improve and innovate in the three cycles of training, maintenance and training preparation.

The future of the ROK Army depends on the smart NCO's capabilities, which is the core of combat power at tactical units. In particular, the improvement of the Immediate Field Task Performance of junior NCOs is a key competency who shares their joys and sorrows with privates. Therefore, the junior NCO training environments of the ROKA NCO Academy should be substantially improved. In addition, It is necessary to improve the awareness and working conditions of the field tactical units of junior NCOs so that they can work with pride as representatives of the Republic of Korea Army.

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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	SP	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	GP	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	DL	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Corresponding author\*  
E-mail: yyun0916@naver.com

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## The Reality of the Barracks Culture of the Korean Armed Forces of Generation MZ and the Search for Alternatives

Junhyeok Seo<sup>1</sup>

*Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

Jiwon Yun<sup>2\*</sup>

*Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

Youngjun Jo<sup>3</sup>

*Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea*

### Abstract

**Purpose:** The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of Generation MZ in the reality of the Korean armed forces where most of the enlisted soldiers are Generation MZ, and consider the task of improving the barracks culture for them.

**Method:** Literature study and empirical data were carried out including books, academic journals, and dissertations related to the barracks culture's improvement and generation MZ in order to analyze the justification and promotion strategy of barracks culture improvement and a barracks culture improvement plan appropriate for the characteristics of the military organization and Generation MZ.

**Results:** In order to improve the barracks culture appropriate for the characteristics of Generation MZ, the Korean armed forces need such measures as the strengthened authority and responsibility of the soldiers and allowed use of mobile phones. Furthermore, as a measure to establish military discipline, punishment for human rights, security, and negligence related issues need to be strengthened. Generation MZ lack personal experiences, and hence, group counseling ought to also be facilitated. Such policies targeting Generation MZ will be meaningful policies for the Generation Alpha who will enlist in the military in the future.

**Conclusion:** Given the nature of the Republic of Korea, which has adopted the conscription system, the military ought to be able to play the role of the last public education institution. The military ought to be able to help the Republic of Korea take a large leap toward becoming a world-class nation by recovering the hopes and dreams which Generation MZ, called the Generation of 7 Losses, lost, and developing on their own. If the military promoted barracks culture improvement can create synergies in tandem with the independent and enterprising characteristics of Generation MZ, the Republic of Korea will not only be able to take a new leap forward comparable to the miracle of the Han River, but will also become a leading nation qualified to spearhead the future of the world.

**[Keywords]** Barracks Culture, Military Organization, Generation MZ, Soldiers of New Generation, Soldiers' Human Rights

## 1. Introduction

When it is determined that a member of an organization has failed to act in conformity with and accepted the values or norms of the organization, or when it is determined that there is an imbalance in terms of the behavioral patterns of interpersonal relationships or the organization's environment, the relevant member would be said to be in a state of maladaptation. Most of the soldiers comprising the current military are Generation MZ[1]. Generation MZ, who live in the military as soldiers, have the consciousness that they are serving only for a certain period of time as mandatory service, and they are in conflict with the special organizational culture of

the military given numerous difficulties[2]. Most of the soldiers of Generation MZ are emotionally sensitive and fall into later phase of adolescence, which is a life cycle by which they are dissatisfied with the existing order[3]. In this psychologically unstable period, all soldiers are very likely to face psychological conflicts and maladjustment[4].

Generation MZ often have different standards of satisfaction for each individual unlike previous generations, and their acceptance of personal sacrifice for organizations is generally lower than those of the previous generations. Furthermore, since they are sensitive towards the value of fairness, military commanders and those who have to command a large number of troops at the same time control the soldiers of Generation MZ who rebel against even minor issues, and feel personal emotions which the soldiers easily resist[5]. This can lead to the barracks conflicts. Such issues make the soldiers feel difficult in military life, and at the same time, the trauma and barracks conflicts they feel are socially reproduced and negatively influences the cultural foundation of society, requiring sacrifice from the Korean society[6]. It is essential to improve the barracks culture which can help alleviate the difficulties experienced by Generation MZ, meet the needs of the increased society, and also improve the combat power of the military. Accordingly, in this study, after examining the characteristics of the Korean military organization and Generation MZ that soldiers of Generation MZ face, the present conditions of the Korean military's barracks culture are sought to be examined and improvement measures are sought to be presented.

## **2. Military Organization and the Characteristics of Generation MZ**

### **2.1 Characteristics of the military organization**

The purpose of the organization called military is to prevent war in advance in order to protect the people's lives and property, and respond to security threats, including war, in the event of emergency. Hence, while the structure of the military organization may resemble that of a social organization, several different characteristics can be observed. The general characteristics of the military organization can be roughly classified into four categories. These are the absoluteness of the organizational purpose, authoritative and hierarchical organization, collectivity of the organization, and the coercive and normative nature of the organization[7]. Examining each characteristic, first is the absoluteness of the organizational purpose. The military's activities are focused on protecting the people's lives and property. The military has the legal authority for the use of 'violence' for carrying out their activities to protect the people's lives and property, and unlike other organizations in society, the importance of values and norms such as loyalty, devotion, honor, and unity are emphasized. Based on such characteristics, the members of the organization are united and highly cohesive.

Second, military is an authoritative and hierarchical organization. Another characteristic of the military organization is that it maintains a strong and authoritative hierarchical order system. In the military, responsibilities and authorities are assigned according to their rank and position, and tasks to be performed are determined accordingly[8]. Hence, even if the commander, or his or her superiors die, the agency task system is clear. Furthermore, subordinates are obligated to obey orders from their superiors, and even within the same class, there is a characteristic that there is a hierarchy provided by laws and regulations.

Third is the collectivity of the organization. The members of the military organization share a sense of unity with the organization's goals, and based on which, they perceive the organization as a group, unlike other organizations of society[9]. It strengthens the sense of solidarity within the military organization and offers justification for group actions. Hence, it carries the characteristics of controlling or limiting the individuals' desires or activities.

Fourth are the organizational compulsion and normative nature. In general, organizations may be classified into compulsory organizations, normative organizations, and utilitarian organizations. A coercive organization is a type of organization where members act reluctantly because the authority of the organization originates from coercive power, whereas a normative organization is a type of organization where members participate in the organization's activities based on such normative values as honor, recognition, and respect. A utilitarian organization is an organization where the authority of the organization is exercised through rewards for actions, and is also an organization whose members have such a great desire to pursue economic rewards for themselves. The military organization has a normative character in terms of goals and values, yet carries on a coercive character in terms of command and leadership. The military organization has different characteristics from the general organization of society, and the detailed classification is illustrated as follows.

**Table 1.** Comparison of the characteristics of social and military organizations.

Classification	Society	Armed forces
Goal	Individual purpose oriented	Common purpose oriented
Sense of purpose	National welfare oriented	Social stability
Scope of activity	Vastness	Narrowness
System	Democratic	Active
Structure	Liberal	Closed
Discipline	Equivalence	Absolute
Life	Heterogeneity	Unity
Interpersonal relationship	Horizontal relationship oriented	Vertical relationship oriented

Note: Kang JS & Chung WH. The influence of military organizational culture on organizational effectiveness korean association for organizational studies (2019).

According to <Table 1>, the military organization is an organization which prioritizes organizational goals rather than individual needs, and command and control are much stronger than general social organizations, and the military members are determined by rank and position, unlike organizations in society where the relationship between superiors and subordinates is determined by academic background and age. It is characterized as an organization that forces leaders and subordinates to lead by example and sacrifice. The military is a group which exists to pursue a common purpose and satisfy the purpose of protecting the lives and property of the people. Hence, members of the organization are required to have a sense of belonging, responsibility, mission, and spirit of dedication and service to the organization[10].

## 2.2. Key characteristics of generation MZ

The largest reason that the emergence of Generation MZ comes as a shock to the military organization compared to the previous generation is that it demonstrates a big change from the previous generation in the light of the existing generational change[11]. The past generations made significant efforts to adapt to the military organization, but Generation MZ seem to have difficulty assimilating into the military organization with facility. It may be said that this appearance is different from previous generations. Since they prioritize individual satisfaction rather than being conscious of the views of others, the standards of success and happiness that each individual pursues are different[12]. They question the society's stereotypes, and if society is not what they want it to be, they try to change it. Their appearance is also different from those of the previous generations who tried to adapt to society. They believe that society can change

with their active participation. Generation MZ has a strong repulsion against the fragmentary and uniform experiences pursued by the previous generations, and are interested in pursuing special experiences that are highly sophisticated and differentiated from others[13].

The most prominently observed characteristics of Generation MZ is fairness[14]. They are particularly sensitive towards fair compensation[15]. They have an opinion that ‘it is natural for those who are well compensated to do much work.’ The reason as to why they are so sensitive towards the fairness of compensation is that, first, they have grown up in an era of economic stagnation and low growth since the currency crisis, preferring visible rewards of the present to uncertain future rewards. Second, in the midst of fierce competition, the value of fairness was the same as survival for them. This will be a feature which can be observed in the upcoming ‘Alpha generation.’ Finally, it is so because they have the experience of being able to accuse unfairness at any time online and easily gather people who agree with their opinion.

**Table 2.** Characteristics by generation in Korea.

Classification of generation	Generation of baby boomers	Generation X	Generation of millennials	Generation Z
Year of birth	1950-1964	1965-1979	1980-1994	Since 1995
Share of population	28.90%	24.50%	21%	15.90%
Use of media	Analog centric	Digital migrant	Digital nomad	Digital native
Tendency	Post war generation, ideological	Materialism, competitive society	Globalization, empiricism	Realism, ethics centric

Note: <https://kostat.go.kr/> (2021).

The emergence of Generation MZ is a new challenge and opportunity for many countries around the world. They have the ability to lead the consumption of others. They have the potential to become a generation which will lead the world in the future in that their ‘choices’ and ‘motivation of choice’ lead to social attention. In summary, Generation MZ are familiar with digital culture and IT devices[16]. They are very independent, optimistic, and willing to express their opinions[17]. They also have a clear tendency to act according to their judgement rather than the standards of others. They prefer bilateral communication and want to actively participate in work and tasks[18]. They are positive, have high autonomy and self-esteem, and a spirit of challenge, and have characteristics that value flexibility in thinking, social consciousness, social justice, and civic duty[19]. Above all, they are very sensitive towards the process of compensation. Hence, based on the understanding of such characteristics of Generation MZ, it is necessary to create an appropriate military culture to unlock their potential, and at the same time, achieve the purpose of military existence[20].

### 3. A Consideration of the Korean Armed Forces' Barracks Culture

According to the government’s administrative affairs audit related data released in 2019, the number of inappropriate personnel for active duty service in the military increased from 1,057 in 2015 to 2,279 in 2018. Psychological maladjustment accounted for over 80% of the cause of inappropriateness for active duty service. A member of the National Assembly and the National Defense Committee, Byunggi Kim claimed that soldiers are experiencing rapid environmental changes and distress, which makes them susceptible to mental illness. At the same time, he claimed that the number of soldiers treated for mental illness in military hospitals surged from 14,661 in 2015 to 18,573 in 2018. Furthermore, a member of the National Assembly and the

National Defense Committee, Seongjoon Park claimed that over 30% of soldiers in the military are suffering from one or more mental health issues, and claimed that, "It proves the fact that the Ministry of Defense is not able to come up with measures of improvement given that mental illness of the military soldiers are deteriorating despite the status survey conducted each and every year." The structural factors which make it difficult for the soldiers to adapt to the military have surfaced with the term 'maladaptation' [21].

The improvement of the Korean armed forces' barracks culture thus far may be seen as an incomplete success in numerical terms. As a result of the regular status survey, the number of barracks' violence and barracks' absurdity such as beating and acts of atrocity decreased, and the living conditions of soldiers, creation of conditions for self-development, and the welfare of the soldiers such as increase in sick pay enhanced due to the improvement of barracks facilities. Furthermore, the barracks management and unit management system such as the operation of the suicide and accident prevention system, operation of the interested soldier management system such as the development and operation of various inspection tools, and the improvement of the treatment system for the inappropriate for service have also been developed. Furthermore, the legal norms for human rights related protection such as the enactment of the Framework Act on Military Status and Service, and the feeling of resistance of military commanders and officers against human rights values was alleviated. However, as violations of the basic rights of soldiers such as verbal violence, invasion of privacy, private sanctions, and sexual violence still exist, it is now the time for fundamental changes and reform.

The soldiers of Generation MZ experience isolation from society and the fear towards the military organization [22]. What the soldiers enlisting in the post adolescence period ought to learn at the stage of development is to learn interpersonal skills to form new human relationships, and to be recognized by others, be inspired with courage, and redefine their self-concept. The barracks culture that the military ought to pursue is an environment where the soldiers can activate their own physical and emotional energy to indirectly express their desires and inner feelings to encourage self-exposure. The opportunity to practice self-control in such an environment reduces the risk factors that make members resist or embarrass them in the future society they will experience. The members fostered in such an appropriate environment can help to activate positive transference in society and make the whole society work as a therapeutic alliance [23]. If the military creates a holistic educational environment in a compassionate environment, the soldiers of Generation MZ could resolve the negative internal emotions of the private learning institute related culture [24][25]. Furthermore, through their self-receptive self-growth, they would be able to control the psychological pain they had in the past and their emotions that were dominated by passive emotions, thoughts, and actions. If they do, they will psychologically provide them with change and growth, and will have the opportunity to continuously grow while actively controlling their responses to external stimuli.

#### **4. Barracks Culture's Improvement Plan for Generation MZ**

As examined earlier, the members of the military are being replaced by those of Generation MZ. Meanwhile, the bad practice of barracks in the Korean armed forces is still present, thereby forcing the members of the military to suffer.

Based on the characteristics of Generation MZ, it is necessary to create a barracks culture that does not cause inconvenience for anyone to demonstrate their combat power, and at the same time, it is necessary to change the reality where the existing barracks's bad practices are eroding the Korean armed forces' fighting power. It is intended to now consider such.

#### **4.1. Permission of the use of mobile phones and the activation of anonymous reporting app**

The largest characteristic of Generation MZ is that they are familiar with the use of IT devices and have such a strong dependence thereto [26]. Before enlisting in the military, most of the Generation MZ live in an environment where they could contact others online whenever they chose to do so. Hence, the situation where they are restricted in terms of the use of IT devices makes them feel a great sense of disconnection, thereby causing a great stress on themselves. Hence, just as officers freely use mobile phones, the use of mobile phones ought to be completely allowed for the soldiers. This will be a useful channel of communication for the soldiers who had to endure amidst the unreasonable barracks culture to date. This may further lead to security issues and dissatisfaction among officers over the short term, but is an issue that ought to be considered for the soldiers of Generation MZ and their human rights.

#### **4.2. Practical improvement of the cyber knowledge information room**

In the field of barracks culture of the National Defense Reform 2.0, the expansion of cyber knowledge information room has also been included. However, the cyber knowledge information room currently used by the soldiers is rarely used except for the lanterns for learning at night after the soldiers were allowed to use mobile phones on the premises. The reason as to why the soldiers do not use the cyber knowledge information room is that it is difficult to communicate smoothly with others by using the cyber knowledge information room's personal computers. The soldiers of Generation MZ built friendships with friends and social experiences through computer games. It is at this point where games need to be allowed in the cyber knowledge room available for the soldiers. As they did before their enlistment, if the military guarantees a window through which they can naturally communicate with the world in the old way, it can help alleviate their sense of disconnection they feel from their military life and relieve the distress of military life on their own [27].

#### **4.3. Strengthened criminal punishment related to human rights, security, and false accusation**

Among the characteristics of the battlefield is uncertainty. The strict military discipline is absolutely needed in order to respond in a timely manner to situations on the battlefield which change every split second. Hence, the issue of criminal punishment for the members of the military organization for maintaining military discipline is also an issue that ought to be considered. The human rights of the soldiers are also important, but more important is the military's purpose, the combat power. The reality is that the members of the military have avoided criminal punishment or received a lighter punishment by the determination of a compassionate commander. However, in order to establish the military discipline, it is necessary to take the measures to strengthen the penalties of the military's Criminal Act for the human rights violations, security violations, and the acts of false accusation. This can be expected to bring about the effect of making the members of the military become aware of the military's strictness regarding the human rights violations among the soldiers. They would be able to communicate freely, but will also be reminded of the value that ought to be respected as security. In particular, by declaring the will to strictly govern the members of the organization who reject the demands of legitimate superiors and make false submissions, it will be possible to guarantee the lawful command and measures of the commanders and officers.

#### **4.4. Strengthened powers and responsibilities of soldiers**

Soldiers have been discriminated against by and from the officers. After physical training and working hours, the officers were able to freely change their combat uniforms and wear whatever they chose to, but the soldiers could not. While the officers were able to move freely in and out of the unit, the soldiers had to form a comradeship and act to prevent accidents. Hence, the freedom to act alone has been suppressed, and the officers were free to carry their mobile

phones, but the soldiers could not. However, this reality does not match the characteristics of the soldiers of Generation MZ. The soldiers of Generation MZ prefer the organizations that are independent and the ones they can lead. The soldiers ought to also be reminded that if they do not do the right thing, they will be subjected to due punishment. This may be a way to improve the 'organizational commitment' of soldiers in terms of creating a culture appropriate for Generation MZ, and may also be a way to give themselves an opportunity to act as subjects in an organization called the military. This will be a necessary social experience for the inexperienced soldiers of Generation MZ.

#### **4.5. Facilitation of group counseling**

Most of the barracks conflicts arising in the Korean armed forces are derived from the culture of bullying[28]. Hence, in most cases, the units where the barracks conflict occurs are divided into a small number of assailants and victims, and a large number of bystanders. A bystander is a member who tolerates the assailant's actions and implicitly consents to the assailant's actions. The reason as to why they could not stop the assailant even when they knew that they were wrong is because they know empirically that they can change from the status of a bystander to the status of a victim at any time. In the Korean armed forces' barracks conflict, the victim is not a specific person. In the extreme, arrows can be aimed at anyone. Hence, the everyday anxiety of 'tomorrow is my turn' is making the barracks conflict deeper than ever. This means that the barracks conflict can be changed in a form that is difficult for officers to identify. Hence, the barracks conflict of the Korean armed forces cannot be resolved by separating the victim from the assailant and treating the victim's heart. This is why a program which can treat all members is necessary[29].

Group counseling is a dynamic interpersonal process which includes conscious thoughts and actions, and therapeutic functions such as purification, mutual trust, caring, understanding, acceptance and support, with a focus on permissive reality[30]. Group counseling is a realistic group therapy program for the Korean armed forces' barracks conflict, and provides an interactive experience necessary for the soldiers who undergo the later phase of the adolescent period and who need social experience[31]. Furthermore, group counseling is an effective treatment program for the vast majority of the soldiers who experience maladaptation but are reluctant to receive treatment programs from the barracks counselors because of the stigma of individual counseling. Above all, it is economic and efficient in that many members may be influenced by the treatment program in the reality where the absolute number of the counselors specializing in the barracks life is inadequate[32].

### **5. Conclusion**

The soldiers of Generation MZ are independent and active. However, they are not able to demonstrate their talents in an authoritative, hierarchical, and coercive organization called "military." Since they have grown up as 'digital natives,' they need to have a digital environment which is the same as their living quarters. Forcing the old-fashioned analog environment for the purposes of security upon those who made friends and felt a sense of identity in a digital environment is like forcing a vegetarian diet on a carnivore. Generation MZ enlisting in the military are mostly high school graduates, and hence, if they are educated on security, they will take full advantage of their freedom. Because they are 'digital natives,' while they are familiar with digital as such, they also have the dark scars imposed by the Korean private learning institute's culture. They have been exposed to excessive competition and have always had to be compared with their classmates, and they could only survive by winning the competition. Furthermore, they experienced the harsh reality of being weak and strong in the 'bullying culture' through the sacrifices of their friends. For this reason, for the soldiers of Generation MZ, the military

ought to provide a place of education which enables the provision of holistic education. They have grown physically, but lack the holistic skills to balance their intelligence, emotions, and will. Hence, the military ought to help them achieve growth beyond inadequacy via programs such as group counseling.

The Jaein Moon administration selected the improvement of the barracks culture among the top 100 national tasks[33]. Furthermore, in the National Defense Reform 2.0, the improvement of the barracks culture was included among the 6 largest tasks[34]. This is probably because the military and society shared the recognition that the environment where the soldiers live is directly related to the military's combat power and is also an important social issue. For such countries as the Republic of Korea which maintains the conscription system given the characteristics of the security environment, the barracks culture is an important issue which requires a national consensus as it may lay out the cultural foundation of the country. Generation MZ in Korea are called the Generation of 7 Losses, namely, the losses of employment, marriage, childbirth, house, interpersonal relationship, dream, and hope. They believe that they do not have the "privilege to work hard and achieve through dreams" which the previous generations had. However, they have the power to escape from the trap of low growth, and only they can become the protagonists of the new era of hope for the Republic of Korea. The Korean armed forces ought to operate as the last public educational institution, just as the Israeli military[35]. It ought to be a place for taking a leap forward where young adults may regain their strength and pursue dreams and hopes[36]. Generation MZ are an independent and progressive generation[37]. The same would be true if and when they perform their duties in the military. We ought to not limit and control their possibilities in the name of Generation MZ. If the human rights of the soldiers are respected, and if a barracks culture where they can act as subjects can be established, it is believed that the Generation MZ of Korea will likely become a generation capable of breaking out of the military's nest and taking a leap forward.

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# 7. Appendix

## 7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	JS	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	JY	-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	YJ	-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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## The Increased Defection of North Koreans Following the Collapse of the Market Economy Due to the Kim Jong-Un Regime's Military Reinforcement

Hoyeun Youn<sup>1</sup>

Daewon University College, Jecheon, Republic of Korea

Bongjun Choi<sup>2\*</sup>

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

Sunggu Jo<sup>3</sup>

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

### Abstract

**Purpose:** In this study, North Korea's recent military advancements including supersonic missile test launch and long-range missile test, and systematic, widespread and terrible human rights violations in North Korea including 'genocide, murder, enslavement, torture, detention, rape, forced abortion, sexual violence and discrimination based on politics, religion, race and gender, forced mobilization of residents, enforced disappearance, and intentional extension of starvation' have been practiced, while the North Korean defectors have fled to South Korea every year in search of freedom, and the perception and attitude towards job satisfaction by gender and age have been analyzed for the police officers serving in the security police organization, which is recognized as the most closed police organization for police officers by age and gender. Based on which, it is intended to discuss policy measures to create an organization which can increase the job satisfaction of the security police with a new organizational culture which matches the ever evolving military advancements in North Korea and the human rights crisis.

**Method:** In this study, 100 police officers serving in the security department who have work experiences related to the North Korean defectors were surveyed based on the self-administration method by using the South Korean police officers as a group in 2020 in order to analyze the perception and attitude towards the job satisfaction based on gender and age targeting the police officers serving in the security police organization.

**Results:** As a result of the analysis performed, across most of the questions with statistical significance for the gender of the security police managing the North Korean defectors due to the ever evolving military advancements in North Korea and the human rights crisis, the male security police officers turned out to have a relative more positive evaluation of the level of job satisfaction than the female police officers. Furthermore, in terms of age, the positive perception and attitude of the older age group is high across most of the questions, whereas the negative perception is relatively high for the age group in their 20s. Regarding the relationship between gender and age, it turned out that the males in their 50s and above and females in their 30s demonstrated the highest positive perception and attitude for the job satisfaction.

**Conclusion:** In conclusion, first, the culture within the security police organization needs to be improved and will also need to be transformed into a security police organization which can fully demonstrate the potential and creativity of the security police through the fairness of personnel management. Second, it is very urgent to enact laws (rules) to ensure the organizational stability of the security police. Third, it is necessary to secure the equipment and professional manpower to acquire the security resources, and strengthen the specialized education. In order to be renewed as a new security police which responds to the rapidly changing security environment, the number of young security police officers needs to be increased, and the young police officers need to derive new ideas and be involved in collecting, analyzing, and producing information related to the various crimes (including multiple crimes) against the North Korean defectors toward becoming leaders on their own as they respond to police policies and decision-makers with the measures for the safe settlement of the North Korean defectors and crime prevention, whereby the job satisfaction of the security police will be further developed into a more progressive organizational culture.

## 1. Introduction

North Korea has been very active. In the aftermath of the unexpected COVID-19's spread last year, North Korea has delayed its provocative actions against South Korea and the United States for a while. Now, however, it seems that they are warming up to get paid the expensive nuclear weapons related ransom[1]. While the Defense Department of the US also warns against destabilizing the Korean Peninsula, early in the morning, North Korea fired an improved ballistic missile into the East Sea. Furthermore, "the newly developed tactical guided missile accurately hit a target 600 km off the East Sea," and such weapons system "has a great significance in deterring various military threats existing on the Korean Peninsula." It also reconfirmed the fact that "in particular, the missile weight was enhanced to 2.5 tons, and the low-altitude flight was reconfirmed," as North Korea showed off that it is among the tactical nuclear weapons which are difficult to intercept[2].

Furthermore, the recent North Korean Human Rights Commission within the United States pointed out the fact that the 'organized, widespread and horrific human rights violations' are taking place in North Korea, stating that 'genocide, murder, enslavement, torture, detention, rape, forced abortion, sexual violence and discrimination based on politics, religion, race and gender, forced mobilization of residents, enforced disappearance, and deliberate prolongation of starvation' were reported[3]. "Such serious human rights violations and acts of atrocity are exacerbated by the North Korean authorities' total closure of borders, domestic travel restrictions, and restrictions on the import of humanitarian aid," the US State Department spokesperson said. Furthermore, the majority of the people suffer from hunger and a severe shortage of basic necessities. Fortunately, however, due to the COVID-19, the number of the North Korean defectors who entered into South Korea last year turned out to be approximately 200, which is a fifth of that of the previous year. It has been analyzed that the movement restriction measures in each country due to the spread of COVID-19 have been influential[4].

According to the North Korean defectors' count released by the Ministry of Unification, the number of the North Korean defectors last year is a fifth compared to 1,047 people in 2019 and 1,137 people in 2018 who defected North Korea and entered into South Korea[5].

An official from the Ministry of Unification explained that, "The significant decrease in the number of the North Korean defectors last year is largely due to the impact of COVID-19." The North Korean defectors generally cross the North Korean border and enter into South Korea after staying in third countries including China and Southeast Asia, and last year, doing so seemed difficult as each country enforced movement restriction related measures due to COVID-19 along with the border control by North Korea and China[6].

The North Korean defectors continue to attempt to enter into South Korea due to North Korea's continued military advancements and human rights violations against their residents, and the future of the nation would depend on how the South Korean society embraces the North Korean defectors[7]. When the active protection and support measures are in place for the North Korean defectors, it can be a cornerstone of the social stability and unification of the North and South Korea, and if such is not feasible, South Koreans and North Korean defectors alike are prone to struggles, if not other forms of sadness. Hence, the importance of the security police has emerged for their safe settlement and protection in South Korea [8].

Meanwhile, since the security police has maintained a highly specialized separate path called "security police," there has been a strong tendency to deploy a large number of older male police officers with experiences and knowledge in the security affairs. Furthermore, given such

organizational characteristics, it is apparent that the security police organization has a much stronger closed organizational culture than other organizations[9].

Hence, the security police organization requires a more active, voluntary and open organizational culture than the other police organizations. This is because the security police can be renewed as a new, open and active organization which conducts various new security activities for the North Korean defectors according to the evolving realm of security, rather than as an organization which only arrests security related criminals such as spies as in the past[10][11].

Accordingly, in this study, based on such awareness of the problem, the perception and attitude towards job satisfaction among police officers serving in the security police department who manage the North Korean defectors who are constantly attempting to enter into South Korea due to the North Korean military advancements and human rights violations against residents are sought to be analyzed. In particular, this study intends to pay attention to gender and age among various variables. This is because the security police organization may be the most closed organization for the young police officers and female police officers.

Based on which, the difference in the job satisfaction according to gender and the job satisfaction according to age are sought to be validated, and based on the results of this study, it is intended to suggest the necessary efficiency measures to enhance the job satisfaction.

## 2. Research Method

### 2.1. Research subjects and sampling method

In this study, among police officers in the security department as of 2020 who had experience in work related North Korean defectors, 100 trainees in the Police Human Resources Development Institute were surveyed via self-administration method. Among the collected survey questionnaires, 91 were selected as valid samples, excluding those whose answers were incomplete or missing.

**Table 1.** The general characteristic of the research subjects.

	Description	N(%)	Total
Gender	Male	61(67.0%)	91
	Female	30(33.0%)	
Age	20s	7(7.7%)	91
	30s	28(30.8%)	
	40s	30(33.0%)	
	50s or older	26(28.6%)	
Education	High school	14(15.4%)	91
	Junior college	30(33.0%)	
	College	43(47.3%)	
	Graduate school	4(4.4%)	
Rank	Policemen/women	1(1.1%)	91
	Senior policemen/women	19(20.9%)	
	Assistant inspector	18(19.8%)	
	Inspector	29(31.9%)	
	Senior inspector	14(15.4%)	
	Superintendent	10(11.0%)	
Employment path	General recruitment	75(82.4%)	91
	Special recruitment	5(5.5%)	

	Police academy	2(2.2%)	
	Police cadet	9(9.9%)	
	Other	0(0.0%)	
The total length of service as a police officer	5 years and less	13(14.3%)	91
	6-10 years	32(35.2%)	
	11-15 years	13(14.3%)	
	16-20 years	13(14.3%)	
	Longer than 20 years	20(22.0%)	
The length of service at the security department	2 years and less	16(17.6%)	91
	3-5 years	56(61.5%)	
	6-10 years	17(18.7%)	
	Longer than 10 years	2(2.2%)	
The number of police officers in the organization	10 or less	18(19.8%)	91
	11 or more and 15 or less	42(46.2%)	
	16 or more and 20 or less	24(26.4%)	
	More than 21	7(7.7%)	
Service location	Tier 1 areas(big cities)	80(87.9%)	91
	Tier 2 areas	11(12.1%)	
	Tier 3 areas(rural areas)	0(0.0%)	

## 2.2. Measurement tool

In this study, a method appropriate for each validation method was selected to increase the content validity of the questionnaire and validate the construct validity. The content validity was secured based on the consultations with related experts in order to select the questionnaire's questions appropriate for the purposes of the study, and the reliability of the questionnaire questions turned out to be the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient of .852.

Furthermore, the open ended questions were included in order to secure the data which were not included in the questionnaire after the closed ended questionnaire's questions.

**Table 2.** The questions.

	Questions
Q-1	I'm satisfied with my current job and position as a police officer.
Q-2	I don't think what I do is something anyone can do with ease
Q-3	I have considerable discretion in performing my job.
Q-4	I think that the division of duties and the relationship of authority and responsibility among the organizational employees are clarified and efficient work assignment is made.
Q-5	I don't think the salary level is low compared to my job.
Q-6	I think I'm treated better than others of similar skills.
Q-7	The space where I work has a pleasant atmosphere and I get along well with my colleagues like family.
Q-8	My boss helps me out a lot with my job.
Q-9	I want to further grow, and if an opportunity, I would like to be promoted.
Q-10	I've never heard my commander or superior nagging much.
Q-11	My commander or superior lead the staff by setting example rather than by direct control.
Q-12	Given the same salary, I would like to get an easier job than the difficult like that of police.
Q-13	If I usually pull all nighter or work even on holidays, I would want to get a different job no matter how much I get paid.
Q-14	I think I'm being well compensated for what I'm doing.

## 2.3. Data processing and the analytical method

The data processing for this study was conducted by performing the SPSS 23.0 Program, a statistical package program, and the statistical validation was performed according to the purpose of data analysis as follows.

First, the frequency analysis was performed to examine and understand the general characteristics by using the SPSS/PC+23.0 program.

Second, to verify the reliability of the questionnaire, the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was calculated.

Third, the t-test was conducted to examine and understand the difference in the followership of leaders according to gender.

Fourth, the one-way ANOVA was performed to examine and understand the difference in the followership of leaders according to age.

## 3. Research Results

### 3.1. Differences in the job satisfaction of security police according to gender

**Table 3.** Differences in the job satisfaction of security police according to gender.

		N	M	SD	t-value	sig
Q-1	Men	61	3.7541	.69895	-.088	.074
	Women	30	3.7667	.50401		
Q-2	Men	61	3.8033	.65370	-.212	.485
	Women	30	3.8333	.59209		
Q-3	Men	61	3.4262	.88429	-.948	.077
	Women	30	3.6000	.67466		
Q-4	Men	61	3.2787	.98541	.057	.203
	Women	30	3.2667	.86834		
Q-5	Men	61	3.2951	.66694	.448	.028
	Women	30	3.2333	.50401		
Q-6	Men	61	3.2787	.71019	.297	.214
	Women	30	3.2333	.62606		
Q-7	Men	61	3.3443	.75023	.457	.836
	Women	30	3.2667	.78492		
Q-8	Men	61	3.4262	.66980	1.057	.991
	Women	30	3.2667	.69149		
Q-9	Men	61	3.8361	.91616	.183	.320
	Women	30	3.8000	.80516		
Q-10	Men	61	3.1311	.78476	-.013	.170
	Women	30	3.1333	.62881		
Q-11	Men	61	3.3115	.71974	.074	.654
	Women	30	3.3000	.65126		
Q-12	Men	61	3.3770	.77812	-.752	.235
	Women	30	3.5000	.62972		
Q-13	Men	61	3.3607	.68393	.181	.766
	Women	30	3.3333	.66089		
Q-14	Men	61	3.1967	.67872	.207	.327
	Women	30	3.1667	.59209		

Note: A: Men, B: Women.

<Table 3> illustrates the differences in the job satisfaction of security police according to gender. As a result of the analysis performed, it turned out that males were higher than females at the 5% level of Q-5. This signifies the fact that men among the security police are never less paid than women compared to their given job, and are far more satisfied with their job.

As a result of the differences in the job satisfaction according to gender, examining the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of Q-1, Q-2, Q-4, Q-6, Q-7, Q-9, Q-10, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, and Q-14, it turned out that males were higher than females.

### 3.2. Differences in the job satisfaction of security police according to age

**Table 4.** Differences in the job satisfaction of security police according to age.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	Those in their 20s	7	3.1429	.69007	4.154	.008	D>A
	Those in their 30s	28	3.6429	.48795			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.8000	.48423			
	Those in their 50s	26	4.0000	.80000			
Q-2	Those in their 20s	7	3.4286	.78680	4.849	.004	D>A
	Those in their 30s	28	3.5714	.50395			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.8667	.50742			
	Those in their 50s	26	4.1154	.71144			
Q-3	Those in their 20s	7	2.8571	.89974	6.630	.000	D>A,B
	Those in their 30s	28	3.1786	.81892			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.5000	.57235			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.9615	.82369			
Q-4	Those in their 20s	7	2.4286	.53452	5.127	.003	D>A,B
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0357	.83808			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3000	.91539			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.7308	.96157			
Q-5	Those in their 20s	7	3.0000	.57735	5.117	.003	D>B
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0000	.38490			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3333	.54667			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.5769	.75753			
Q-6	Those in their 20s	7	2.7143	.75593	4.735	.004	D>A,B
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0357	.42879			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3667	.66868			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.5385	.76057			
Q-7	Those in their 20s	7	2.8571	.89974	2.305	.082	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.1429	.75593			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.4000	.62146			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.5385	.81146			
Q-8	Those in their 20s	7	3.1429	.69007	1.255	.295	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.2857	.59982			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3333	.66089			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.5769	.75753			
Q-9	Those in their 20s	7	4.4286	.78680	1.247	.298	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.7857	.83254			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.7333	.86834			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.8077	.93890			

Q-10	Those in their 20s	7	2.7143	.75593	2.168	.097	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0000	.76980			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.1333	.57135			
Q-11	Those in their 50s	26	3.3846	.80384	1.687	.176	
	Those in their 20s	7	3.4286	.78680			
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0714	.66269			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3667	.61495			
Q-12	Those in their 50s	26	3.4615	.76057	1.242	.300	
	Those in their 20s	7	3.7143	.75593			
	Those in their 30s	28	3.2857	.65868			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3333	.71116			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.5769	.80861			
Q-13	Those in their 20s	7	3.5714	.53452	.302	.824	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.3571	.67847			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.3000	.70221			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.3462	.68948			
Q-14	Those in their 20s	7	3.0000	.81650	2.323	.081	
	Those in their 30s	28	3.0714	.60422			
	Those in their 40s	30	3.1000	.54772			
	Those in their 50s	26	3.4615	.70602			

A: Those in their 20s, B: Those in their 30s, C: Those in their 40s, D: Those in their 50s

Note: A: Those in their 20s, B: Those in their 30s, C: Those in their 40s, D: Those in their 50s.

<Table 4> illustrates the differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to age. As a result of the analysis performed, at the 0.1% level, as for Q-3, those in their 50s turned out to be higher than those in their 20s and 30s, while, for Q-1 and Q-2, those in their 50s turned out to be higher than those in their 20s, and for Q-4 and Q-6, those in their 50s turned out to be higher than those in their 20s, and for Q-5, those in their 50s turned out to be higher than those in their 30s at the level of 1%, respectively.

It has been interpreted that the older the security police, the higher the job satisfaction and the satisfaction with their current job, position, and salary level as a police officer.

## 4. Conclusions and Discussion

As discussed earlier, in this study, the perception and attitude towards the job satisfaction according to gender and age were analyzed for the police officers serving in security police organization. The nature of the job of the security police, who manage the North Korean defectors who are constantly attempting to enter into South Korea due to North Korea's military advancements and human rights violations against their residents, may cause closedness among the young police officers and female police officers, and it might negatively affect their job satisfaction[12].

As a result of the analysis performed, first, it turned out that the male security police officers evaluated their job satisfaction more positively across most of the questions which were statistically significant in terms of gender. Furthermore, across most of the questions for which the statistical significance was confirmed in terms of age, the positive perception and attitude towards job satisfaction was evenly demonstrated among the elderly in their 50s as a whole.

Hence, such an analytical result demonstrates the fact that it is relatively more difficult for the female security police officers to adapt and perform their duties in the security police

organization compared to the male police officers[13][14]. Furthermore, the fact that the security police officers, who are young people in their 20s, evaluated the leaders relatively low across many of the questions also inferred the fact that the security police are primarily operated by the older male police officers with many experiences and seniority in the field of security field[15].

That is, among the security police's duties, the settlement support for the North Korean defectors and their safety management still account for such a high proportion of the traditional security police activities including security criminal investigation and espionage arrest, and hence, even within the security police organization, there may be a sense of rejection towards the female police officers or the young police officers[16]. It would also mean that even if female police officers and younger police officers are assigned to the security police department, it would not be easy for them to demonstrate their capabilities within the organization.

Hence, in order to improve the organizational culture for job satisfaction and to renew as a future-oriented security police organization which is in line with the new security environment, the following policy discussions will be necessary[17][18].

First, there will be a need for fairness in terms of the personnel management of the security police. The view of experts, who are outsiders of the security police, is also raising questions about personnel. Examining the personnel of the National Police Agency, only the security police are assigned, and most workers who do not belong to the non-security police are rarely observed[19]. In general, the personnel transfers within the administrative civil service organizations are carried out in consideration of the individual job capabilities and job performance. In the police organization, job performance for maintaining public well-being is naturally reflected in the personnel management, and in particular, talent is needed as one who will sincerely manage the North Korean defectors while recognizing them as the South Korean citizens[20].

Second, it is necessary to enact relevant laws (rules) to ensure the organizational stability of the security police. Recently, criticisms from the media and civic organizations such as the repatriation of a North Korean defector related to the security police provides a cause for the handling of business closely related to politics[21]. Political neutrality of civil servants is provided under the Constitution as a matter of obligation. However, there were times when such provision of the Constitution did not match the authority of the President, and hence, was privatized. What ought to be noted here is that the security police has gone through several governments and has been reduced to a representative organization which is closely related to the government and has not gained the trust of the people[22]. This may be seen as a result which is in line with the purpose of the rulers for national security while the inspection police of the Japanese colonial period went through the U.S. military government era to the security police they are today[23].

Third, it is necessary to secure the equipment and professional manpower to acquire the security resources and strengthen the specialized education. the modern society is living together in an overload of information, and everyone is faced with an era in which large scale data (BIG DATA) generated in a digital environment are utilized across all areas of life. Modern people, who have become accustomed to the use of information and communication technology, collect and utilize information with simple devices including mobile phones and laptops. However, the reality is that the information collection of the security police, which ought to maximize the competitiveness of public security, have not even reached the private sector at all[24]. Furthermore, it is serious for the incumbent security police to point out the fact that the level of specialization along with the equipment issue of the security police is outdated. The workload of the security police is expressed as 'reckless driving.' Given such a situation, frequent personnel transfers, anxiety about promotion, and a sense of relative deprivation based on the comparison

of duties with other police officers are not only making them unable to find the stability of the security police organization, but have also become an obstacle to their specialization [10]. Furthermore, it is necessary to strengthen the specialized education for the North Korean defectors. In line with the informatization and the knowledge based society, as a means of securing expertise for the security police, who are faced with various information due to North Korea's military advancements and the human rights crisis, specialized education is an organization's operational element which is natural and necessary [25].

Notwithstanding the importance of the task and role of the security police, it is the tendency of political power to face frequent organizational changes according to the government's tendency and be exposed to pressure to reduce the security police manpower, which is the most important security asset as well as the budget, as the wrong climate which determines the fate of the security police has continued [26]. However, recently, not only the national security from a traditional point of view, but also the individual security, human security, and political, economic, social, and environmental fields, etc., all issues are considered as a comprehensive concept of security, and hence, the role of women with a new perspective and skills to access security and the role of young people are far more emphasized [27].

Based on the policy recommendations above, sound criticism exists as the female police officers and young police officers renew as an evenly distributed organization, and when the leadership of the leader and the followership of the members are balanced and active interaction take place, the job satisfaction of the security police should also be changed [28].

Through a new and comprehensive approach towards the North Korean defectors entering into South Korea driven by the rapidly changing international order and human rights crisis in the 21st century, they will need to be renewed as a pivotal institution which maintains national security from against various security threats [29].

Furthermore, the future of the nation will depend on how the South Korean society embraces the North Korean defectors. The North Korean defectors are valuable forces of unification in the era of unification and may also be a measure of whether the social integration between North and South Korea will be achieved after the unification. That is, when the North Korean defectors can successfully settle in the South Korean society, they can become the cornerstone of social stability as well as the unification of North and South Korea. However, they are prone to suffering sadness of another kind if it fails, and due to struggles among the North and South Korean residents.

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## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	HY	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	BC	-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	SJ	-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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## Instability of the North Korean Regime and the Residents' Defection: A Plan for Enhancing the Capacity of Security Police for Their Settlement in South Korea -With a Focus on the Rank of the Security Police's Department of Service-

Woongshin Park<sup>1</sup>

Kyungnam College of Information & Technology, Busan, Republic of Korea

Jaeho Kim<sup>2\*</sup>

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

Sunggu Jo<sup>3</sup>

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

### Abstract

**Purpose:** Given the situation where it is expected that a plan of improvement for the North Korean refugee related support policy will be required in view of the recent incident of the North Korean defector returning to North Korea, which has become a problem in the South Korean society, the job satisfaction of the security police was surveyed based on the work area. This is because, given the situation where the security police perform various settlement related support activities as well as security tasks, which are their original duties, their job satisfaction can help improve the work efficiency and practically improve the settlement of the North Korean defectors.

**Method:** In this study, among police officers in the security department as of 2020 who had experience in work related North Korean defectors, 100 trainees in the Police Human Resources Development Institute were surveyed via self-administration method. Among the collected survey questionnaires, 91 were selected as valid samples, excluding those whose answers were incomplete or missing.

**Results:** First, the job satisfaction turned out to be higher as the number of employees of the police organization with which the police organization was affiliated increased, and second, the relationship between the division of work and authority and responsibility of the police working in large cities was clearer than that of the police working in small and medium cities, and as they are further classified and efficiently assigned, the commanders and superiors demonstrate a higher job satisfaction with the awareness that they are leading the staff by example rather than direct control.

**Conclusion:** As a result of the study of this paper, the status of the North Korean defectors who are experiencing considerable difficulties in adapting and integrating into the South Korean society was identified, and the internal job satisfaction of the security police who are practically responsible for their settlement support was surveyed. Since the end of the Cold War, the status and job satisfaction of the security police have declined due to political reasons where the systemic competition between the South and the North has not surfaced, and the survey of their job satisfaction may yield a plan of improvement.

**[Keywords]** North Korean Regime, Security Police, Rank, North Korean Defectors, Settlement

## 1. Introduction

The number of the North Korean defectors entering into South Korea after defecting North Korea, which had progressively increased since the end of the Cold War era, has declined since 2010. According to the 2021 Unification White Paper of the Ministry of Unification (unikorea.go.kr), the number of people defecting North Korea and entering into South Korea over the past 10 years has decreased by approximately 90% relative to the past decade. The reason for such decrease in the number of defectors may be attributed to the strengthening of

the border controls following the death of former Defense Chairman Kim Jong-il, yet the rigor of border control of North Korea, the most exclusive country in the world, has been the strongest ever. Furthermore, the situation in which the Kim Jong-un regime is managing the system in a stable manner, contrary to the general hope of the Korean people, seems to further promote the decline of the number of the North Korean defectors [1]. Given which, COVID-19, a recent global pandemic, is a factor which has closed the borders of many countries around the globe as well as those of the Korean Peninsula, which also has had a significant impact on the decrease in the number of the North Korean defectors.

Under such circumstances, the incident of the North Korean defectors returning to North Korea on January 1, 2022, presents the following provocative question to the South Korean society: "To what extent does the South Korean society want the North Korean defectors to settle down in the South Korean society, and how much are they interested in guaranteeing their basic rights?"

The South Korean society has used the current term of North Korean defector through the names of defector soldier, repatriate, and defector, etc., and the ideological thought of systemic competition during the Cold War era was rooted in the existing terms. However, since the end of the Cold War, the obstacles of systemic competition between the North and South Korea faded away, and it was believed that the South Korean society recognized them as a nation like itself, as partners in preparing for a unified Korea, and as the members of the same community [2]. However, the incident of return to North Korea in January requires a re-examination of the existing notion.

The reality is that the North Korean defectors have difficulties in adapting to the South Korean society because they had lived under different ideologies and political systems for the past half century despite sharing the same ethnic and historical identity with the South Koreans. Economic difficulties, socio-cultural differences (such as language, values, and economic views), lack of social networks, and health problems are generally pointed out for hindering their efforts from adapting to the South Korean society, while which not only hinder their settlement, but are also the factors which enhance the negative perceptions of South Korean society [3]. On top of which, such perception has the potential to trigger another return to North Korea by and of the North Korean defectors, which is not only a policy problem of the failure of the North Korean refugee related support policy, but also expands prejudices towards the North Korean defectors within the South Korean society, thereby undermining the sense of national community as a risk [4].

Hence, with this incident as an opportunity, it is necessary to review the current situation of the North Korean defectors and reexamine the support policy for the North Korean defectors.

Various perspectives may exist in this respect, yet the focus of this study is the perspective of the security police, who act as personal protection officers when the North Korean defectors settle in the local community. This is because the security police are not only responsible for policing and security, but also have the sufficient potential to build human ties with the North Korean defectors. Among which, this study seeks to examine and identify as to whether there is a difference in terms of the size of the police station where the security police serve, and if so, what the difference might suggest, and use it as an implication for the North Korean refugee related support policy in the South Korean society.

Furthermore, this study looks forward to the lives of the North Koreans whose freedom and human rights are guaranteed by the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship.

## 2. Research Method

## 2.1. Research subjects and sampling method

In this study, among police officers in the security department as of 2020 who had experience in work related North Korean defectors, 100 trainees in the Police Human Resources Development Institute were surveyed via self-administration method. Among the collected survey questionnaires, 91 were selected as valid samples, excluding those whose answers were incomplete or missing.

**Table 1.** The general characteristic of the research subjects.

	Description	N (%)	Total
Gender	Male	61 (67.0%)	91
	Female	30 (33.0%)	
Age	20s	7 (7.7%)	91
	30s	28 (30.8%)	
	40s	30 (33.0%)	
	50s or older	26 (28.6%)	
Education	High school	14 (15.4%)	91
	Junior college	30 (33.0%)	
	College	43 (47.3%)	
	Graduate school	4 (4.4%)	
Rank	Policemen/women	1 (1.1%)	91
	Senior policemen/women	19 (20.9%)	
	Assistant inspector	18 (19.8%)	
	Inspector	29 (31.9%)	
	Senior inspector	14 (15.4%)	
	Superintendent	10 (11.0%)	
Employment path	General recruitment	75 (82.4%)	91
	Special recruitment	5 (5.5%)	
	Police Academy	2 (2.2%)	
	Police cadet	9 (9.9%)	
	Other	0 (0.0%)	
The total length of service as a police officer	5 years and less	13 (14.3%)	91
	6-10 years	32 (35.2%)	
	11-15 years	13 (14.3%)	
	16-20 years	13 (14.3%)	
	Longer than 20 years	20 (22.0%)	
The length of service at the security department	2 years and less	16 (17.6%)	91
	3-5 years	56 (61.5%)	
	6-10 years	17 (18.7%)	
	Longer than 10 years	2 (2.2%)	
The number of police officers in the organization	10 or less	18 (19.8%)	91
	11 or more and 15 or less	42 (46.2%)	

	16 or more and 20 or less	24 (26.4%)	
	More than 21	7 (7.7%)	
Service location	Tier 1 areas (big cities)	80 (87.9%)	91
	Tier 2 areas (small/medium-sized cities)	11 (12.1%)	
	Tier 3 areas (rural areas)	0 (0.0%)	

## 2.2. Measuring instrument

The appropriate method for each verification method was chosen to increase the content validity and verify the construct validity of the questionnaire. Content validity was validated through consultation with relevant experts to adopt survey questions suitable for the purpose of the study, and the reliability of the survey questions was shown to be Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient .852.

**Table 2.** The questions.

	Questions
Q-1	I'm satisfied with my current job and position as a police officer.
Q-2	I don't think what I do is something anyone can do with ease
Q-3	I'm given considerable discretion in performing my work.
Q-4	I think that the division of duties and the relationship of authority and responsibility among our organization's employees are clearly delineated and efficient work assignment is in place.
Q-5	I don't think the salary level is low in view of my work.
Q-6	I think I'm treated better than people of similar skills.
Q-7	The space where I work has a pleasant atmosphere, and I think I get along close to my colleagues like my family.
Q-8	My boss helps me a lot with my job performance.
Q-9	I want to further grow with my job, and if there is an opportunity, I would like to get a promotion to be more productive.
Q-10	I've never heard my commander or superiors nagging at me much.
Q-11	My commander or superiors lead their staff by setting examples rather than by direct control.
Q-12	If for the same salary, I'd like to choose a comfortable and easy job rather than a difficult job like the police.
Q-13	If I usually work often over night or on holidays, I would think about changing jobs no matter how what the salary is.
Q-14	I think that compensation for what I do is appropriate.

## 2.3. Data processing and analysis method

The data processing of this study was performed by using the SPSS 23.0, a statistical package program, to perform statistical verification for the purpose of data analysis as follows:

First, frequency analysis was conducted to identify general characteristics using the SPSS/PC+23.0 program. Second, Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was calculated for the reliability verification of the questionnaire. Third, the one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine and understand the difference in terms of job satisfaction according to the number of employees of the police organization to which they belong. Fourth, the t-test was conducted to examine and understand the difference in terms of job satisfaction according to the police's working area (large city/small city).

### 3. Research Results

#### 3.1. Differences in the police's job satisfaction according to the number of affiliated employees

**Table 3.** Differences in the police's job satisfaction according to the number of affiliated employees.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	10 people or less	18	3.4444	.70479	2.711	.050	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.7619	.53235			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.8750	.61237			
	21 people or more	7	4.1429	.89974			
Q-2	10 people or less	18	3.3889	.60768	5.421	.002	C,D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.8095	.59420			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	4.0000	.58977			
	21 people or more	7	4.2857	.48795			
Q-3	10 people or less	18	3.0556	.93760	3.892	.012	D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.4524	.77152			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.6667	.70196			
	21 people or more	7	4.1429	.69007			
Q-4	10 people or less	18	2.7222	1.01782	6.150	.001	C>A,B D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.1429	.87154			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.7500	.73721			
	21 people or more	7	3.8571	.89974			
Q-5	10 people or less	18	3.0000	.59409	3.883	.012	D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.2381	.48437			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3750	.64690			
	21 people or more	7	3.8571	.89974			
Q-6	10 people or less	18	3.0556	.80237	1.729	.167	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.2381	.57634			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3333	.63702			
	21 people or more	7	3.7143	.95119			
Q-7	10 people or less	18	2.9444	.93760	3.368	.022	D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.2857	.70834			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.5000	.58977			

Q-8	21 people or more	7	3.8571	.69007	5.436	.002	D>A
	10 people or less	18	3.0556	.80237			
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.3095	.56258			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.5000	.58977			
	21 people or more	7	4.1429	.69007			
Q-9	10 people or less	18	3.7222	1.07406	.580	.630	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.8810	.83235			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.7083	.69025			
	21 people or more	7	4.1429	1.21499			
Q-10	10 people or less	18	2.9444	.80237	2.224	.091	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.0238	.71527			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3333	.70196			
	21 people or more	7	3.5714	.53452			
Q-11	10 people or less	18	3.1667	.85749	2.249	.088	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.2143	.68202			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.4167	.58359			
	21 people or more	7	3.8571	.37796			
Q-12	10 people or less	18	3.5000	.70711	1.137	.339	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.3333	.75439			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3750	.71094			
	21 people or more	7	3.8571	.69007			
Q-13	10 people or less	18	3.6111	.50163	2.020	.117	
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.1905	.70670			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3750	.71094			
	21 people or more	7	3.5714	.53452			
Q-14	10 people or less	18	2.8889	.67640	4.003	.010	D>A
	11 people or more~ 15 people or less	42	3.1190	.63255			
	15 people or more~ 20 people or less	24	3.3750	.49454			
	21 people or more	7	3.7143	.75593			

Note: A: 10 people or less, B: 11 people or more and 15 people or less, C: 15 people or more~20 people or less, D: 21 people or more.

<Table 3> demonstrates the differences in the police's job satisfaction according to the number of affiliated employees. As a result of the analysis performed, as for Q-2, 11 or more people and 15 people and less and 15 or more people and 20 people or less turned out to be higher at

the 1% level, and as for Q-4, 12 or more people turned out to be higher than 10 people or less, and 15 or more people and 20 people or less turned out to be higher than 10 people or less and 11 or more people and 15 people or less, and as for Q-8, 21 or more people turned out to be higher than 10 people or less. Furthermore, as for Q-3, Q-5, Q-7, and Q-14, 21 or more people turned out to be higher than 10 people or less at the 5% level, which is interpreted such that, the higher the number of employees in the police organization to which they belong, the higher the job satisfaction.

### 3.2. Differences in the police's job satisfaction according to their area of service

**Table 4.** Differences in the police's job satisfaction according to their area of service.

		N	M	SD	t-value	sig
Q-1	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.8125	.61816	2.234	.392
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	3.3636	.67420		
Q-2	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.8875	.59521	3.180	.416
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	3.2727	.64667		
Q-3	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.6000	.75641	3.930	.972
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.6364	.80904		
Q-4	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.4375	.86922	4.993	.004
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.0909	.53936		
Q-5	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.3500	.59746	3.314	.214
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.7273	.46710		
Q-6	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.3500	.65796	3.454	.334
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.6364	.50452		
Q-7	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.4250	.67082	3.878	.084
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.5455	.93420		
Q-8	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.4375	.63333	2.495	.334
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.9091	.83121		
Q-9	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.7875	.85231	-1.077	.453
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	4.0909	1.04447		
Q-10	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.2125	.72380	2.946	.509
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.5455	.52223		
Q-11	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.3625	.62122	2.067	.006
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.9091	1.04447		
Q-12	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.4000	.73948	-.616	.656
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	3.5455	.68755		
Q-13	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.3000	.68251	-2.008	.082
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	3.7273	.46710		
Q-14	1st grade area (large cities)	80	3.2500	.62642	2.585	.885
	2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities)	11	2.7273	.64667		

Note: A: 1st grade area (large cities), B: 2nd grade area (small to medium sized cities).

<Table 4> demonstrates the difference in the police's job satisfaction according to their area of service. As a result of the analysis performed, it turned out that, as for Q-4 and Q-11, the 1st grade (large cities) are turned out to be higher at the 1% level than the 2nd grade (small and medium cities) area. This demonstrates the fact that the police serving in large cities have a clearer division of work and authority and responsibility compared to those serving in small and medium-sized cities, and hence, they have an efficient work assignment, and also demonstrates the fact that commanders and superiors have a much higher job satisfaction with the awareness that they are leading the staff by setting examples rather than by direct control.

## **4. Discussion and Conclusions**

### **4.1. South Korean government's position on the North Korean defectors**

The South Korean government, too, allows all of the North Korean defectors to enter into South Korea if they express their intention to do so after defecting from North Korea and staying overseas as the South Korean citizens. This demonstrates the government's will for unification as well as guaranteeing the human rights. If and where a North Korean defector requests for protection from abroad, he or she is transported to the country, checked at the protection center, and would receive education needed for the family relationship registration and social resettlement at Hanawon, and will also be assigned a place to live in Korea. thereby beginning their life in South Korea. Until now, the settlement support policy for the North Korean defectors was led by the Ministry of Unification, yet as the number of the North Korean defectors increased, the central government, local governments, and the private sector cooperated as a new form together[5]. Furthermore, at the central government level, the Ministry of Unification negotiates and adjusts policies through the North Korean Defector Countermeasures Council, and at the place of residence level, local governments and regional adaptation centers offer their settlement related support services according to the characteristics and conditions of the North Korean defectors, and in terms of the private sector, local private organizations, medical institutions, religious groups, and volunteers are providing integrated support in connection with the North Korean Refugee Support Foundation and the regional adaptation centers.

### **4.2. Legislative grounds for the support for the North Korean defectors**

The support policy for the North Korean defectors varied in response according to the international political situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In the early phase, the ideological perspective of the systemic competition intervened in the aftermath of the Cold War, but since the end of the Cold War, it was changed to the perspective of humanitarian aid.

The first legal support policy for the North Korean defectors was enacted in April 1962, and the Special Assistance Act for the People of National Merit and North Korean Defectors," which grants the defectors the same status as those of national merit, treats them as the recipients of assistance, and seeks systematic support. Thereafter, the newly enacted Special Compensation Act for the North Korean Defectors in South Korea was enacted in January 1979. This Act regards the North Korean defectors as 'victims' who crossed the borderlines of armistice and chose liberal democracy and a market economy order, and was more systematic than before. It was intended to emphasize the superiority of the system through support. Thereafter, in June 1993, the North Korean Repatriates Act was enacted, which changed the number of the North Korean defectors from those of national merit to those with inadequate livelihood related skills and reduced the amount of support, such as by lowering the settlement money.

The modern support system for the North Korean defectors is the North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act enacted in January 1997 [6]. The Act changed the North

Korean defectors to 'defection from North Korea' instead of the existing concept of 'repatriation,' and began to focus on fostering self-support and self-reliance capabilities. As the number of the North Korean defectors increased in the 2000s, the 'North Korean Defector Countermeasure Committee' was established in March 2010 with the participation of various related ministries including the Ministry of Unification and the National Police Agency, and at the same time, the 'North Korean Defector Support Foundation' was also established to offer systemic and comprehensive support for the North Korean defectors.

#### **4.3. Problems of the current North Korean defector related support policy**

The government's various support policies extended for the North Korean defectors have had their effectiveness, yet as the number of the North Korean defectors entering into South Korea steeply increased due to the worsening economic situation in North Korea, the budget and manpower were limited. As a matter of fact, as the number of the North Korean defectors increased to approximately 30,000, the South Korean government also faced difficulties in actively providing support for the North Korean defectors in general. It also raised the controversy of discrimination between the North Korean defectors and the socially and economically vulnerable class of the South Korean society.

As such, the incremental weakening of support policies for the North Korean defectors has raised concerns that the North Korean defectors will inevitably become isolated given their social and cultural differences, as well as economically fall into the poor, thereby posing a social risk. Furthermore, such a concern, combined with the terrorist crimes by lonely wolves, which became a problem in the western society at the same time, leads to a view of the North Korean defectors as a potential source of insecurity in the South Korean society.

On top of which, the social and economic vulnerability of the North Korean defectors made it impossible for them and their second generation to pursue and attain additional education, that is, sufficient educational achievement required in the South Korean society could not be attained, thereby resulting in the transmission of vulnerability[7]. It has already been empirically studied that such level of education has had a significant impact on the political and social status of the North Korean defectors[8].

The problem of such North Korean defector related support policy is not simply a failure of the policy, but a serious problem in that it causes a negative perception of the North Korean defectors in the South Korean society, thereby impeding the possibility of their integration over the long-term. That is, there are broadly 2 views towards the North Korean defectors in the South Korean society. The positive view may be expressed as one of the 'future which came first' or the 'unification which came first'[9]. Such a view can absorb the shock of unification which may occur in the future as the North Korean defectors coexist with the South Korean society and recover the national identity[10].

Furthermore, according to the 2018 public perception survey on the North Korean defectors published by the North Korean Human Rights Information Center and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in South Korea, one of them was not well known academically or publicly, but the community is suspicious of the North Korean defectors and avoid forming communities with them (Data No.: A1-2014-017).

#### **4.4. Security police, the beginning of the North Korean defectors' settlement related support system**

The process of the North Korean defectors settling down in the South Korean society is consisted of the 3 phases of i) request for protection and transfer to South Korea, ii) settling in South Korea, and iii) settling in their place of residence [11]. In terms of the protection request and transfer to South Korea phase, and when the relevant individual so requests for protection,

the situation is reported and disseminated to the relevant ministries, and is accommodated in a temporary protection facility in a foreign mission or host country. After completing the personal identification, the immigration negotiation with the host country and domestic entry procedures will be carried out. Following which, in the settlement in South Korea phase, the information and investigation agencies undergo a joint investigation stage and offer education before entering into Hanawon. Lastly, in the settlement in South Korea phase, sign up for various social security systems, vocational training, education support, and personal protection officers are designated to induce their settlement in the local community. In this process, 3 types of protection officers, consisted of residence protection officer, employment protection officer, and personal protection officer, provide support for the North Korean defectors from a short distance[12], while the personal protection officer plays the largest role in assisting the North Korean defectors settle in the local community as a matter of evaluation[13][14]. Furthermore, such personal protection officers are not only responsible for the protection related to North Korea, but also for preventing the North Korean defectors from becoming victims or perpetrators of crimes[15].

The security police responsible for such personal protection are in charge of protecting the personal safety of the North Korean defectors, yet are also in charge of the management and initial adaptation support rather than the personal protection while building a significant level of trust, whereby their level of protection and interest in the North Korean defectors has influenced not only on the rate of crime and their social settlement[16]. However, the limitations of the security police, which are in charge of such diverse and practical roles, are surfacing given the changes of the times, downsizing of the organization and the neglect of excellent manpower[17]. That is, the police officers for personal protection are not only in charge of practically all support tasks other than personal protection, but also form human ties with the North Korean defectors and perform their duties at the closest distance, and hence, they are required to provide various services but are currently facing their limitations given the lack of manpower and expertise[18].

As such, given the situation where the security police's work related fatigue has accumulated due to the current and realistic circumstances, it is natural for their job satisfaction to affect their job performance. Hence, the job satisfaction of the security police has been examined based on the area of service of the security police.

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## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	WP	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	JK	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	SJ	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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