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Corresponding author*
E-mail: david1@daum.net

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Recognition of the Strategic Situation of US-China Relations after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Focusing on Policy Implications for Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

Sangsoo Lee

Korea National Defense University, Nonsan, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: The re-occupation of Afghanistan by the U.S. troops and the Taliban gives many lessons to the security of the Korean Peninsula. As shown in Vietnam Communization, the poor Taliban troops beat the rich troops of the U.S.-backed Kabul regime, which lacks a will to fight and strategy. The purpose of this study is to discover the implications of the Biden administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan with a neoliberal perspective and its implications for security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Method: This paper analyzes the US withdrawal from Afghanistan with the theory of Radall Schweller's neo-classical realism and explains political implications toward the Korean Peninsula. This paper will examine four major domestic factors in neoclassical realism focus on nationalism, military ability to mobilize, the influence of domestic interest groups, and nationalism and ideology. It suggests four implications over security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula by using the theory of the Neo-classical realism's perspective.

Results: First, the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan can be seen as an expression of shrinking nationalism stemming from the U.S. priority that has emerged since the Trump era. Second, the continued burden of the war due to the worsening financial situation in the U.S. due to COVID-19 and the fatigue of the accumulated war was a cause for the US to withdraw from Afghanistan. Third, to win the votes of the white middle class in the Midwest of the United States, known as Trump's supporters, President Biden decided to withdraw from the need to rebuild the middle class. Fourth, the U.S. Biden administration decided to withdraw troops to focus on checking China, an authoritarian regime, based on value diplomacy that values democracy and human rights.

Conclusion: As the Biden administration put more weight on checking China, the declaration of the end of the war pushed by the Moon Jae-in administration has been put on the back burner. The end-of-war declaration pushed by the South Korean government is opposed by the U.S. government as it weakens the justification for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea that is a strategic hub for checking China. The Biden administration is implementing a policy to actively intervene in human rights issues in China and North Korea, focusing on value diplomacy, and is tightening sanctions against those involved, worsening the atmosphere of dialogue for negotiations. South Korea needs quiet diplomacy to promote the peace process. The U.S. sanctions on North Korea are creating an atmosphere and cause for North Korea to provoke more militarily in the future, raising the need to maintain a military response posture to South Korea and the US.

[Keywords] Strategic Situation, Neoclassical Realism, Withdrawal, Political Implication, Peace Process

1. Introduction

President Joe Biden officially announced in May that the U.S. military in Afghanistan would have completed the withdrawal by September 11, 2021. As the Taliban rebels seized the presidential palace in Kabul by force on August 15. About five months after signing a peace treaty with the Taliban, Kabul government which has a population of 37 million and about three times the size of the Korean Peninsula (650,000 square meters) collapsed helplessly.

President Biden put an end to the 20-year war in Afghanistan and carried out a surprise withdrawal of U.S. troops, saying it was time for the Afghanistan people themselves to decide their future. The intention is to no longer sacrifice precious U.S. young people and assets in the Afghan civil war, which cannot be won. However, in the process of withdrawing troops, there is no proper strategy due to the rapid expansion of the Taliban forces. In response to the Taliban's earlier-than-expected advance into Kabul, the U.S. military hurriedly staged a déjà-vu of Vietnam's Saigon escape case in evacuating U.S. citizens and Afghanistan comrades at Kabul Airport.

Despite the success of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, the failure to rebuild a democratic state in Afghanistan was due to the cultural climate of fundamentalists not allowing foreign troops on their soil. With the change of war goal to "state construction," the U.S. fell deeper into the mire of the Afghan civil war, entangled with various races and sects, rampant warlords and antipathy to foreign forces, and Afghanistan's national reconstruction goal has brought in naught.

The re-occupation of Afghanistan by the U.S. troops and the Taliban gives many lessons to the security of the Korean Peninsula. As shown in Vietnam Communization, the poor Taliban troops beat the rich troops of the U.S.-backed Kabul regime, which lacks a will to fight and strategy. It can also be found in common that the timing of the withdrawal was a period when the U.S. economic situation was not good. Currently, the United States suffers a huge fiscal deficit due to the COVID-19 outbreak and trade deficit.

The purpose of this study is to discover the implications of the Biden administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan with a neoliberal perspective and its implications for security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Chapter 2 describes the literature review. Chapter 3 describes the implications of the US withdrawal from Kabul toward the Korean Peninsula and Chapter 4 suggests policy options for the peace process and security of the Korean Peninsula.

2. Literature Review

Park Sang-hyun argued in his paper "Prospect Theory and U.S. Foreign Policy: U.S. War in the Power of the Threat" that the U.S. is unlikely to expand the war on terrorism to the North Korean region unless North Korea carries out terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland [1]. In the paper "Study Against War of Strategic and Operational Levels," co-authored by Yang Soon-il & Choi Yoon-chul, the following three things were highlighted in preparation for a stabilization operation against North Korea in the Future Korean War Against North Korea [2].

First, a stabilization operation plan should be established that takes into account the cultural characteristics of North Koreans and their values. Second, he argued the need for an information import, analysis, convergence, and distribution system at the national strategic level. Third, he stressed the need to organize and strengthen the expertise of organizations that carry out the mission to stabilize the future.

Choi Yun-chul argued in his paper "Lessons from the long-term cause of the Afghan war on the Korean Peninsula." that some aspects of the fourth-generation war could emerge in the future unification of the Korean Peninsula [3]. If the North Korean regime is ousted, war by rebels can be carried out on a regional basis. The Fourth Generation War means an asymmetrical war between regular and irregular forces [4].

They stressed the importance of gaining the upper hand at the psychological and moral level in the Fourth Generation War for victory in the above-mentioned Review. This paper suggests the implications of the Biden administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan and its implications

for security and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula by using the theory of the Neoclassical realism's perspective.

According to Randall Schweller's theory of Balance of Interest, a neo-classical realist, the driver of state action is the pursuit of national interest[5]. Therefore, neoclassical realists view that the state becomes a country that maintains the status quo or seeks to balance or take advantage by comparing the benefits of maintaining the status quo with the benefits of breaking down the status quo. The United States is comparing the benefits from the Middle East with the security benefits from checking China. After all, the US has put its weight on checking China.

While realists believe that the nation's foreign policy is determined by the international system and the country's relative material capabilities. Neo-classical realists argue that the impact factors on foreign policy are a domestic factor due to their indirect and complexity[6].

The neo-realistic point of view is that it is a neo-realistic point of view to define the relationship between the state through structural realism and interaction of domestic reality. Neoclassical realists illustrate that foreign policy is determined by the government's political power and its interaction with parameters such as domestic ideology and identity <Table 1>.

Table 1. Frame of analysis.

Division	International system (Independent variable)	Domestic factors (Intermediate variables)	Foreign policy (Dependent variable)
Neo-classical Realism	Pursuit of the balance of interest between countries (The Balance of Interest)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ·Nationalism ·Ability to mobilize military power ·influence of domestic actors and interest groups ·Perception of politicians ·Identity, ideology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ·Foreign policy tendency (Engagement or expressed as iso- lationism) ·Pursuing the core interest of the nation ·Military Doctrine ·Foreign economic policy ·Preference of Alliance ·Action in times of crisis

Therefore, from the standpoint of neoclassical realism in analyzing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, I would like to argue that the withdrawal was driven by U.S. nationalism, the influence of the middle class in the United States, and the leader's ideological interests. In particular, this paper explains that the core security interests of the United States are checking China's rise.

First, the cause of the Biden administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan is an expression of shrinking U.S. nationalism from Trump's declaration to give up the role of world police[7].

Second, after a 20-year-long war of attrition, the U.S. spent a huge amount of money on Afghanistan. The accumulated fatigue of war put a heavy burden on the U.S.

Third, the Biden administration made a bold withdrawal because it could receive domestic support by reducing overseas spending to protect the interests of the middle class by reducing taxes.

Fourth, Biden tries to check the global expansion of the Chinese authoritarian regime's influence for the US national interest, putting strategic weight on suppressing China by strengthening its democratic alliance network rather than expanding its influence in the Middle East <Table 2>[8].

Table 2. Neo-classical realist's analysis of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Division	International system (Independent variable)	Factors in the United States (Mediating variable)	U.S. foreign policy (Dependent variable)
Neo-classical Realism	Pursuit of the balance of interest between countries (The Balance of Interest)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ·The Transition of national core interests (War on terrorism → Checking the Communist Regime of China) ·Nationalism ·The Worsening financial situation for military mobilization · Biden's targeting middle class voters ·Strengthening democratic state's networks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ·Withdrawal from Afghanistan ·Selective intervention strategy ·increase of strategic flexibility ·Check China by strengthening democratic alliance network

3. Implications of the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan toward the Korean Peninsula

President Biden no longer wanted to continue the US financial waste and sacrifice of young Americans in the long war on terror. The Biden administration is making diplomatic efforts to restore the alliance, breaking away from Trump's shrinking nationalist global strategy, but it has not achieved a remarkable outcome[9]. The U.S. has declared selective intervention because it has reached a critical point in dealing with the economic recession caused by the Covid-19 and the sky-rocketing cost of war[10]. This chapter analyzes the US withdrawal from Afghanistan with the theory of Radall Schweller's neoclassical realism and explains political implications toward the Korean Peninsula. This chapter will examine four major domestic factors in neoclassical realism focus on nationalism, military ability to mobilize, the influence of domestic interest groups, and nationalism and ideology.

3.1. The manifestation of America's shrinking nationalism

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. exhausted its power due to the war on terrorism and the Iraq War and began to withdraw U.S. troops stationed around the world. In particular, the Trump administration demanded an increase in defense spending to wealthy countries such as Germany, the EU, South Korea, and Japan in terms of burden sharing[11].

This sparked introverted nationalism in the United States against the backdrop of 'America first policy', with self-reflection on why the United States protects a wealthy country. This introverted nationalism seems to be inherited from the Trump administration, which was tired of the war on terror and carried out the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The U.S. intended to cease the sacrifice and financial waste of precious young Americans in the mire of a losing war on terror in Afghanistan.

3.2. Deterioration of military mobilization due to the financial situation

The U.S. has spent a huge amount of money on Afghanistan after 20 years of war on terror in Afghanistan, but the results were poor. At the same time, the continued burden on the United States due to the worsening financial situation of the United States and the fatigue of the accumulated war caused by the COVID-19 pandemic[12]. The U.S. has spent \$2.3 trillion on war terror in Afghanistan for 20 years, and the U.S. paid 50 times more than South Korea's one-year defense asset for the war on terror in Afghanistan. This is all the money that American citizens have to pay with taxes[13].

Approximately 243,000 people were killed in the Afghan War, including 2,324 U.S. soldiers, 70,418 Afghan civilians, 78,526 Afghan soldiers and police officers, and 85,731 anti-American armed guerrillas including the Taliban. The number of U.S. civilian deaths in Afghanistan exceeds 3,800, many of whom are former U.S. special forces<Table 3>.

Table 3. Estimated direct war deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan[14].

Estimated direct war deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan (october 2001-august 2021)			
	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Total
US Military	2,324	-	2324
US DOD Civilian	6	-	6
US Contractors	3,917	90	4007
National Military and Police	69,095	9431	78,526
Other Allied Troops	1,144	-	1,144
Civilians	46,319	24,099	70,418
Opposition Fighters	52,893	32,838	85,731
Journalists and Media Workers	74	87	161
Humanitarian Aid Workers	446	105	551
Total	176,206	66,650	242,856
Total Rounded	176,000	67,000	243,000

They are veterans who retired from the military before 9/11 and went to Afghanistan under a contract as armed guards or agent guards of a private service company to make money[15].

3.3. Gain support for domestic interest groups

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is aimed at focusing its financial and energy for building domestic infrastructure, which may lay the foundation for support for the middle class. Biden is going to use it as an opportunity to gain domestic support from the middle class in the upcoming mid-term election which is scheduled to hold in November. To win the votes of the white middle class in the Midwest of the U.S., known as Trump's supporters, Biden needs to lessen the tax burden for them. This is because they believe that this can strengthen the foundation of American democracy. The U.S. foreign policy is called for a "less ambitious" and humble policy that benefits the middle class in the US, rather than being obsessed with a war with a rogue regime[16].

The Biden administration did not abandon Trump's shrinking nationalism but has inherited some of Trump's populism by putting middle-class reconstruction at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Biden recognizes that the best way for political victory is carrying out the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and reducing the tax burden on the middle class.

3.4. Checking China through strengthening the democratic network

President Biden has strengthened the democratic state work to check China by launching a new security partnership AUKUS, which focuses on traditional allies, Britain and Australia in the

wake of withdrawal from Afghanistan[17]. The exceptional U.S. support of nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia can be interpreted as strengthening its blockade against China in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. is strengthening its security cooperation with a high-level network, following the existing Five Eyes and Quad. Biden holds a democratic summit triggering an ideological war against Authoritarian regime like China and Russia.

The strategic meaning of the democratic summit appears to be aimed at restoring U.S. global leadership, which had been tarnished during the Trump administration. The Biden administration said it will invest \$514.4 million (about 499.3 billion won) to promote democracy around the world to defend and maintain democratic values[18]. These budgets will be supported in five areas: free and independent media activities, eradication of corruption, democratic reform, technical support for democracy, and support for a free and fair election. After the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan, the strengthening of the democratic state's network is seen as a global strategy by the U.S. to keep China in check.

3.5. Implications of the U.S.-China hegemonic competition toward the Korean Peninsula

In response to China's move to expand its authoritarian influence globally through the Belt and Road Initiative, the U.S. is keeping China's economic expansion in check by sanctioning China economically. U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken outlined key details of the Indo-Pacific strategy in Indonesia on January 14, 2022. The five key elements proposed by Secretary Tony Blinken are free and open Indo-Pacific development, building a strong network with the alliance, promoting prosperity in the economic sector, cooperating in pandemic and climate change, and strengthening security[19].

Blinken once again used the word "integrated control" mentioned by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to stress the need to strengthen military power in the U.S. Indo-Pacific region. It is needed for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and Taiwan security issues.

At the same time, he stressed the role of the alliance, vowing to adopt a strategy that combines more closely with allies and partners. Referring to the establishment of an alliance network, he mentioned the need to deepen three-way cooperation between the ROK, U.S., and Japan, along with strengthening solidarity with five treaty allies in the region, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The keywords for the U.S. are alliance, military, and economy to check China. In economic terms, the U.S. is focusing on preventing the inflow of high-tech technologies related to semiconductors and autonomous driving into China. It also condemned China's human rights abuses in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur region and tightened individual sanctions on human rights abuses, including a ban on imports of goods produced by forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur region[20].

The U.S. is strengthening its human rights intervention policy against China and North Korea, while China and North Korea are protesting the U.S. human rights intervention as interference in domestic affairs.

Biden's value-oriented diplomacy is a stumbling block to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula for negotiations to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula[21]. As the competition for the U.S.-China hegemony intensifies, ROK's strategic value increases, but the pressure on the camp selection is increasing by both sides. The U.S. is going to expand the role of U.S. troops in South Korea beyond the Korean Peninsula as a natural evolution of the alliance[22]. However, South Korea's position has a kind of politically burdensome to join the US-led anti-China military alliance.

Therefore, South Korea is trying to maximize its national interests by conducting balanced

diplomacy between the United States and China. This is because the Korean Peninsula is geographically connected to the continent and economic security is as important as military security.

Due to the tightened U.S. policy on China, issues such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the declaration of the end of the Korean war, which are part of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, has been put on the back burner, making it difficult for negotiations to take place in the near future. A new Cold War is on the rise as the U.S. is taking issue with the ideology and human rights abuses of China and North Korea[23].

4. Conclusion

This paper tries to analyze the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan with the theory of Randall Schweller's neoclassical realism of four major domestic factors: nationalism, military mobilization capacity, the influence of domestic actors just as interest groups, and ideology.

First, the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan can be seen as an expression of shrinking nationalism stemming from the U.S. first policy that has emerged since the Trump era. The Trump administration has publicly stated that the United States is no longer the world's police force. It argues that rich countries such as the ROK, Japan, and Germany have to pay more defense costs. This introverted nationalism of the U.S. has been inherited by the Biden administration, which is tired of the war against terrorism.

Second, the continued burden of the war due to the worsening financial situation in the U.S. due to COVID-19 and the fatigue of the accumulated war was a cause for the US to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Third, to win the votes of the white middle class in the Midwest of the United States, known as Trump's supporters, President Biden decided to withdraw from the need to rebuild the middle class.

Fourth, the U.S. Biden administration decided to withdraw troops to focus on checking China, an authoritarian regime, based on value diplomacy that advocated democracy and human rights.

After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Northeast Asia is entering a new Cold War era due to the U.S.-China hegemony competition. The Biden administration is trying to restore the alliance under the banner of value diplomacy advocating democracy and human rights.

In Checking China's rise, the U.S. is operating a network of a small security alliance called AUKUS, Quad, and Five Eyes to keep China in check. The political implications of the US-China rivalry toward the Northeast Asia and Korean Peninsula are as follows.

First, the Biden administration recommends that diplomacy between South Korea and Japan need to be normalized to ensure security cooperation among the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. South Korea needs to actively cooperate in natural disasters, infectious diseases, and climate change, in the US-led security alliance. As competition for the U.S.-China hegemony intensifies, there will be a lot of pressure to choose the camp, but South Korea should maintain balanced diplomacy between the US and China.

Second, the US' putting too much emphasis on checking China may hamper the ongoing peace process on the Korean Peninsula. This is because it needs China's constructive role in the peace process of the Korean Peninsula.

Third, as the Biden administration put more weight on checking China, the declaration of the end of the Korean War pushed by the Moon Jae-in administration has been put on the back burner. The end-of-war declaration pushed by the South Korean government is opposed by the

U.S. government as it weakens the justification for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea that is a strategic hub for checking China.

Fourth, the U.S. Biden administration is implementing a policy to actively intervene in human rights issues in China and North Korea, focusing on value diplomacy, and is tightening sanctions against those involved, worsening the atmosphere of dialogue for negotiations. South Korea needs quiet diplomacy on human rights issues to promote the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.

Fifth, the U.S. sanctions on North Korea are creating an atmosphere and cause for North Korea to provoke more militarily in the future, raising the need to maintain a military response posture. If North Korea crosses the red line set by the US, the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula could happen again. There is a need to strengthen South Korea's military capability to support the peace process on the Korean Peninsula due to increased U.S. strategic flexibility to regions such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. The case of Afghanistan reaffirmed that South Korea's independent operational capability to respond to North Korea's military provocations is a crucial factor for national security.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Corresponding author*
E-mail: ilsoo45@naver.com

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A Study on Response to Cyber Threats using Artificial Intelligence

Ilsoo Bae¹

Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Jiwon Yun^{2*}

Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Sejin Seol³

Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: This article examines the impact of the science and technology development and artificial intelligence on cyber threats in the era of the 4th industrial revolution and consideration of national-level defense response to the cyber threats.

Method: The theoretical approach referred to monographs and papers published in academic journals, and technical and current data were studied through the Internet and literature research.

Results: The development of artificial intelligence has provided efficiency, speed, and convenience of mission performance in cyberspace, but threats from unspecified forces in cyberspace are becoming more covert, advanced, and intelligent. Impairment of mission performance and damage to property has emerged as a national crisis. It has become a new security issue that must be dealt at the national security level. In response to cyber threats, the development tasks include nurturing cybersecurity experts, developing artificial intelligence-based security control management highlighting hacking and malicious code breaches based on artificial intelligence, and improving cybersecurity awareness.

Conclusion: Defense, which plays a pivotal role in national security, is expected to serve as an opportunity to strengthen cybersecurity capabilities as a game-changer to respond to cyber threats on the battlefield along with the 4th industrial revolution and the innovative development of artificial intelligence.

[Keywords] The 4th Industrial Revolution, Artificial Intelligence, Cyber Space, Cyber Threats, Cybersecurity


1. Introduction

The expansion of Artificial Intelligence (hereafter AI) along with the development of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) and Information Technology (IT) is changing social systems and industrial structures such as unmanned transportation means, robots, automatic translation, image recognition, and voice assistants. In addition, many human activities are changing. People, computers, and objects are integrated through networks connected worldwide [1][2]. Cyber-attack actors continue to attempt offensive cyber-attacks in cyberspace by implementing intelligent algorithm variants with diversity, organization, and lethality. In particular, advanced and intelligent cyber threats are expanding to target critical facilities and infrastructure at the national level [3].

The high-speed Internet network and 5G/6G wireless communication have rapidly evolved into an integrated communication technology (ICT) combined with big data, AI, the Internet of Things (IoT), and cloud technology, creating a favorable environment for hackers to operate. Hackers' strategy evolves its forms, means, and tactics every day. They can penetrate virtually anywhere, causing serious damage and concerns. Beyond the simple hacktivism (Derived from combining the words 'Hack' and 'Activism', hacktivism is the act of hacking, or breaking into a

computer system, for politically or socially motivated purposes), the scope of the attack is becoming more sophisticated and irreversibly detrimental such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) causing enormous damage to its targets. The 4IR and the development of advanced IT are triggering innovative changes in cyber-space, and the pace of development is unpredictable[4]. Changes and developments in cyber-space can be summarized: First, data capacity and usage are increasing tremendously with smartphones, Social Networking Services (SNS), 5G/6G, and mobile devices. The number of times an individual accesses data through a network increases exponentially. In 2015, from 584 times of data access will increase to 4,909 by 2025.

Figure 1. Annual size of the global datasphere.



Second, the total amount of data is also increasing. The total amount of data in 2018 was 33ZB and predicted to increase to 175ZB by 2025. An increase in the total amount of data means an increase in budgets, facilities, and manpower to store, monitor, and manage sheer volume of paramount data. If these requirements go unfulfilled, then the extent of damage to countries, companies, organizations, and individuals will be catastrophic. <Figure 1> is a graph showing changes in the total amount of global data.


Third, the information sharing and distribution structure is changing to a structure of information convergence. The vast amount of data is converging with IT technologies such as AI, big data, cloud, mobile, and the IoT to increase convenience and improve the quality of life. For example, the IoT implementation technology generates data transmission through wired/wireless means such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 5G/6G, and satellite. The transmitted data forms big data that AI can further process to provide services to users. As these requirements become a reality, this well-integrated/well-distributed technological convergence provides an ideal environment for hacker. In other words, the fatality of paralyzing the entire technological ecosystem by hacker would require little effort.

2. The Development of AI and Its Impact on National Defense

2.1. Emergent mutations in AI

AI is a technology that realizes various human abilities such as learning, perception, reasoning, and natural language understanding through computer programs[5]. AI is mainly used for judgment, prediction, and consultation of all plans introduced to unmanned machinery, control of cultivation environment, and facilities. However, there is no unified conceptual definition of AI that everyone agrees. Therefore, the goal of pursuing the existing AI was how closely it thinks and behaves similarly to humans through learning, prediction, recognition, and judgment.

Figure 2. AI vs Machine learning vs Deep learning.



Recently, there were some speculations that AI technology will likely surpass human intelligence and behavior due to the rapid increase in data, improved performance, and the development of innovative algorithms. However, as shown in <Figure 2>, AI is different from deep learning and machine learning. Deep learning is a method of processing information using an artificial neural network. In contrast, machine learning aims to make a machine learn through data, sequentially increasing problem-solving attribution.

AI, which started in the 1950s, has been emerging as a key factor in the development of science and technology with the rise of the 4IR since 2016. The AI roles and domains occupied by the economy, social culture, national defense, and daily life are vast. AI that is superior to humans is some-times classified as 'Super AI,' and can create new algorithms on its own with self-awareness, self-improvement, superhuman abilities, scientific creativity, and social sensibility. As such, futurist Ray Kurzweil predicted that a singularity in which technology surpasses humans will come around 2030 and that AI would evolve explosively at that time [6].

The future of AI, the core of the 4IR, may be a rosy utopia, but it can bifurcate to become a threat to mankind. For example, in the case of job replacement by AI and robots, which are the most worrisome aspect. According to a 2016 survey by the Korea Employment Information Service, 41.3% of all workers by 2020 are likely to be replaced and 70.6% by 2025. In such a case, AI could become a disaster rather than the hope of mankind. Among them, occupations with a high automation re-placement were jobs with simple repetitive and less-sophisticated movements or had relatively low communication with people.

On the other hand, creative jobs based on emotion such as Arts were selected as difficult jobs to replace with automation. To cope with this uncertainty, the European Union (EU) parliament passed the Robot Civil Act in February 2017, which defines AI robots as electronic humans, giving them legal status and obligations. This became the first case in history to present the status of AI robots and guidelines for the development and use of AI robots. In the content, technical and ethical standards were prepared under the premise that AI robots should help humanity. For example, if an AI robot causes an accident, it is a mandatory requirement that the government intervenes and immediately stops with Kill Switch [7].

2.2. The impact of AI on national defense

The technological structure of the 4IR and the development of AI are also affecting national defense in connection with defense reform. Combined with military science and technology, it directly impacts military capability consisting of weapon systems and their operation. With the development of precision strike and guidance technology, the weapon system's range, precision, and lethality increase with various battle platforms intricately connected due to the development of Information Communication Technology (ICT). For example, AI, robots, unmanned combat systems, and micro nanotechnology will improve monitoring capability and all-weather operation capability with enhanced detection technology and maximized combat effectiveness [8].

A revolution is also taking place in cyber warfare. Offensive Cyber Operation (OCO) tools can cause partial to total paralysis of computers and network nodes of state and military forces. Cyber warfare can cause catastrophic paralysis in just a few minutes. It is possible to disable and incapacitate all the basic control systems of the national society by destroying them at a low cost. Since all today's physical domains of battlefield, such as land, sea, air, and space, are structurally connected to cyberspace, the destruction or paralysis of cyberspace can arguably "be-all and end-all" destruction and paralysis of all battlefield domains. Suppose the hyper-connected and intelligent reconnaissance-strike complex system becomes the main effort in the future battle landscape. In that case, the superiority of cyber warfare capabilities will soon become the critical key to success over myriad of diverse battlefield of the future.

Cyber warfare affecting the future defense operational environment can be surmised as follows:

1. The battlefield space will expand, including space and cyber domains and the traditional operational domains such as land, air, and sea.
2. With the development of precision strike and guidance technology, a specific weapon system will operate in other operational domains not confined by a single domain, thereby expanding the scope of operation of the weapon system that is truly multi-domain operational.
3. The fusion of the battlefields will be possible by maximizing the interoperability by integrating the multi-domain operational weapon systems in real-time with the development of Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C5ISR).

In addition, the expansion of the battlefields, the expansion of the scope of weapon system operational capabilities, and the convergence of the battlefields also expect to encounter an increased number of threats, including but not limited to hacking, reverse use, paralysis of core functions, sourcing operators and psychological warfare[9].

As AI science and technology in the 4IR era advances, cyber warfare capabilities need to focus on cybersecurity to counter emerging cyber threats effectively. In addition, as the role of AI gets maximized, the hacktivist could use increased dependency on the AI implementing reverse hacking. Therefore, developing an intelligent cybersecurity system armed with AI that is relatively superior to hacktivist is in much demand.

3. The Cyber Threats using AI

While cyberspace provides numerous benefits to mankind, increased number of threats lurk in the cyber domain. Cyber threats occur in various forms, including but not limited to Malware, Emotet, DoS, Man in the Middle, SQL injection, Password Attacks, Ransomware, identity theft, and information system neutralization. In cyberspace, it is difficult to identify the subject or method of an attack. This allows various non-state actors to use cyberspace to carry out their intentions. The international community voices concerns of cyber war as a potential World War

III[10]. The convergence between advanced science and technology and AI creates a favorable operational environment for hacktivist for the following reasons:

1. At low cost, even non-professionals can hack into a specific target network in a sophisticated and continuous manner. In manually creating malicious code, hacktivist can create codes that the information protection system using AI cannot detect.

2. Existing threats are extended to cyberspace using networks. The attack method becomes applicable, and the increased number of unspecified attackers using AI introduces a new breed of threats.

3. The emergence of new threats that humans cannot do using a "Super AI system." For example, the enemy can weaponize autonomous vehicles by injecting data that can only be recognized by AI algorithms that interfere with autonomous driving and causes accidents.

4. There is a characteristic that the appearance of the threat is not common. Although the actual terrorist has the psychological burden of facing the target, the AI does not feel the psychological burden of attacking; therefore, a more effective attack is possible.

The essential 4IR technologies are block chain, the IoT, and AI. They have a computer, communication network, and voice recognition function, enabling convenience and quality of life for mankind. However, the 4IR technology is vulnerable to cyber threats and requires watchful cybersecurity at all times.


Table 1. Types of cyber attack damage.

Security Threat	Damage Type (Individual, Corporate, National)	
Information Leakage	Individual	Personal date/biometric info (computer, mobile, webcam, CCTV)
	Corporate	Customer data, corporate classified info
	Nation	National info/military info, national basic infrastructure
Financial/Economic Damage	Individual	Terminal malfunction, data deletion, password disabled
	Corporate	Corporate Network/System/malfunction/paralysis
	National	National Infrastructure Paralysis, Disaster Accidents
Psychological Damage Threat to Societal Integrity	Individual	Personal attack and disinformation
	Corporate	Fall of Corporate Image (disinformation)
	National	social conflict/confrontation/aggravate confusion, degrade integrity (illegal harmful content)
Life-threatening	Individual	Threat to individual or client life (Hacking to IoT)
	Corporate	
	National	Cyber Terrorism towards a nation-state

As shown in <Table 1>, external cyber-attacks inflict damage on countries, companies, and individuals in various ways and means. Such attacks cause chaos in the country and the international community in terms of economic loss, invasion of privacy, and information leakage compromising national security. In addition, cyber-attacks are linked to international crimes and could spread to political and diplomatic issues that is life-threatening.

For example, hacking in cyberspace can be carried out using various means. As shown in <Figure 3>, the sources of hacker such as networks, servers, software, phishing, mail, and SNS are unknown. Cyber investigation requires time, technology, and manpower to identify them. In the initial stage, it is not very important to distinguish whether it is the enemy's action. However, it is important to note that when a cyber threat or intrusion is the enemy's action, there is always a possibility that it can extend to cyber warfare [11].

Figure 3. Infringement accident factors.



4. The AI-centric State and National Defense Response to Cyber Threats

Cyber threat is terrorism that the nation responds with the new perspective of security threat. Even though cyber threat is not a physical method, but a covert attack through cyber space. Cyber threats can paralyze and incapacitate the computer networks that form the critical infrastructure that governs the communication backbone of the country, such as control systems, financial business systems, process processing systems, manufacturing process systems, defense-related systems, and national computer networks. Cyber threats are actions that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems. Confidentiality is to prevent disclosure of sensitive information from unauthorized persons, and loss of confidentiality means information has been leaked or eavesdropped. Integrity guarantees the completeness, accuracy, and immutability of computer network information or operating programs, and loss of integrity means that such information has been altered. Availability refers to ensuring that information and data are available to users anytime, anywhere. Loss of availability means that the network is shut down or the system is down [12].

Cyber threats within the military sector are rapidly increasing due to the 4IR advancement, the development of advanced military technology, and the implementation of a smart barracks culture. The diversity, complexity, sophistication, and lethality of threats make it challenging to respond and require a new strategy with substantial efficacy.

The author believes that, as an IT powerhouse, Korea's cybersecurity capabilities using ICT technology and AI will play a role as a blue ocean strategy on the battlefield of the future in the North East Asia. In this sense, I recommend the national and defense response to the cyber threats using AI technology as follows:

4.1. Cultivation of security control and cybersecurity experts

With the increase of intelligent cyber threats, the number of security events that occur daily is about 8.3 billion and about 150,000 alarm events, exceeding the limit that humans can handle. Considering the intelligence, advancement, and speed of hacking, security control is limited to simple equipment and people with average IT skillset. As a suggestive solution, AI-integrated security control is 'Must' [12][13]. Since information security controllers need accurate detection and rapid response capabilities, security professionals require using AI-integrated security systems with big data capacity to monitor cases of infringement and malicious codes in real-time [14]. Advancement of AI control and expansion of new security technologies to AI integration should improve control accuracy and continuation of updates, reinforcing the machine learning and detection algorithms. Moreover, the new security technology should continuously manage the AI control system with the utmost collection of cyber threats analysis, real-time data processing capability, and reliable automation [15]. Also training for cybersecurity professionals plays a critical factor to ensure seamless cybersecurity as the new ICT technology emerges.

In the era of the 4IR, IT continues to develop, but the pool of cybersecurity experts is still shallow. It is estimated that there are about 200,000 experts in the cybersecurity field in the Republic of Korea, and an additional 90,000 are needed. Even so, only about 800 information security technicians are produced each year. In fact, in the case of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, there have been 500 hacking intrusions over the past five years, and each cybersecurity professional manages 2.7 nuclear facilities, which is paramount in comparison with the United States at 1.7, France at 0.6, and Japan at 1.0 [16]. In order to effectively respond to cyber threats, specialized personnel should be assigned to each institution in charge of cyber operations. In addition, during a crisis, professional cyber investigative personnel should deploy to conduct investigations to prevent further damage. Nevertheless, there is a shortage of professional talent in the current information security market. However, the incentive of cyber professionals is remarkably low.

Cybersecurity experts will have to be responsible for the integrated and systematic management while operating an office of primary responsibility from the central government. Since cyber threats occur in all sectors across the country, the public, private, military, and police must respond in an integrated manner with a pool of cybersecurity experts at the national level. Furthermore, since cyber threats may accompany AI-based algorithms, thorough training with continuous learning and well-managed operation with preventive contingency plans with timing and accuracy should be considered.

4.2. Countermeasures against hacking incidents based on AI


The target and scope of hacking are expanding to all daily activities. The attack method is also becoming more intelligent. Ransomware, phishing, and scam attacks used as bait related to COVID-19 are hacking in all directions to medical facilities, cloud services, and home networks. Phishing attacks use various channels such as text messages and voice messages, and attacks on supply chains are also increasing. Moreover, phishing attacks are becoming more sophisticated through AI and machine learning [17].

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a technique in which a hacker continuously intelligently attacks a target over a long period. There are two attack methods of APT: Zero-day and Rootkit. Zero-day refers to hacking using vulnerabilities of specific software that has not yet been published or has been published but before a patch is released. A rootkit is a tool used by hackers to gain administrator access rights while hiding that they have entered a computer or network. An attacker can use the rootkit to gain administrator-level access to the system. APT attack

process proceeds in the order of penetration-search-collection-exfiltration steps. In the infiltration stage, we investigate what software the target uses, what version of the software, what security devices are used to access the web, and what websites are frequently accessed. Based on the contents of this investigation, vulnerabilities are found and infiltrated. These penetration methods include watering-hole and spear-phishing through the web.

In this way, the target downloads and executes a malicious file by accessing a web page or by e-mail. This process is called the dropper stage. After the execution of the malicious code is completed normally, the callback communication that we are familiar with and the callback communication to the C&C server are performed. From this point on, all control over the PC from which the malicious file was downloaded is transferred to an external hacker. In the search phase, the hacker searches all infrastructures and systems in the organization through the infected PC. For example, finding the address of an update server such as a PMS server, or finding the address of a server with core data, plans the next step. The collection stage accesses the PMS server acquires control, and distributes the malicious code to all agents through the PMS server. As a result, all control over the target's network is passed on to the hacker. The hacker will collect data on the compromised system. In the last leak stage, hackers leak internal data or interfere with system operation, and in severe cases, destroy core data of the system [18].

Figure 4. Active learning architecture[19].



In order to respond to such APT attacks, AI and security controllers collaborate to use Active Learning technology with a virtuous cycle structure, as shown in <Figure 4>. Among the large-capacity security events and logs that occur in the big data system, unlabeled data is selected using AI to select more efficient data for learning and a request is sent to the security officer. Suppose the security officer labels the data according to the request and applies it to machine learning. In that case, it will be possible to effectively respond to the APT hacking attempt through the expert's intuition and learning AI [20].

4.3. Countermeasures against malicious code breaches based on AI

Malware is any kind of program whose creators harm users for malicious purposes. Because malicious codes are distributed as hidden in attachments and emails, the inflow paths vary, and tracking can be difficult. Based on the spreading method, the following types are worms, viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, and ransomware. Existing malicious code blocking has limited real-time network, impossible SSL encryption detection, and known vulnerability to zero-day attacks. However, as the AI image-based end-to-end deep learning security technology evolves, it was possible to quantify the level of malicious code threats, and detection was possible with the stealth engine-based security technology.

Table 2. Malicious code infringement accident prevention technology.

Prevention Technology	Description
Process Pattern Detection	Diagnosing files during library loading Process Modeling, Classification, Regression
Malicious Behavior	Diagnosing and determine abnormal behavior, malicious behavior
Exploit auto-block	Overwriting code, RAN Scrapping Implement self judgment-based block
Real-time Prevention on Code Injection	Memory Remote Allocation. Block Mapping Real-time Over Flow Prevention in advance
Active Script Attack Analysis	Malicious Power Shell Script Analysis Infer malign state as a result of virtual implementation
VBA Macro Attack Detection	File-Less based attack detection/block Analyzing script within Office documents
Smart App Risk Management	Manage operable APP list Time series analysis on APP behavior
Storage Function Auto-Control	Track Driver-level DMA data Cycle Stealing Word unit analysis
New Malicious Code Detection	Behavior-based Modeling/Execute Pattern Normal/Malicious Behavior vector distance measurement
Mutant Malicious Code Detection	Existing Signature analysis, learning transference Block similar code based on Fine Tuning

In order to detect malicious behavior, prevention technology is required, as shown in <Table 2>, and multi-dimensional AI technology must be in use to perform learning based on various related analytical information. By applying the classification model to the data collected through this process and applying an algorithm that can predict probability according to the degree of risk, it will be possible to predict intrusion accidents and analyze and respond to risks if the judgment mode is separated from the prediction mode and prediction model is used for the framework configuration.

4.4. Increase cybersecurity awareness

The cyber-world is closely related to our daily life, and the disconnection of cyberspace means the disconnection of our daily life. Cyber terrorism destroys important national facilities and paralyzes national infrastructure, threatening even the people's lives. It is not only for personal hacking but also for political means between countries. It is time to be wary of cyber breaches militarily. With the advent of the un-tact era due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all our daily lives are connected to the Internet, heightening the importance of the 4IR technologies. However, the more interconnected, the more new threats to cybersecurity continue to rise.

In recent years, continuous cyber-attacks at home and abroad are causing not only economic paralysis but also social chaos[21]. In May 2021, a cyber-attack on an oil pipeline, a lifeline, occurred in the United States. The dark side, a Russian hacking organization, attacked the U.S. Colonial Pipeline, which spans 5,500 miles, with ran-somware. As a result, the energy supply to the southeastern part of the United States was cut off, causing social chaos that paralyzed transportation, medical care, and logistics in the region[22]. Cyber-attack methods such as ransomware, spear phishing, spam, and various malicious codes are becoming more sophisticated and developing day by day. This prompts an urgent calling for the cybersecurity profession on-demand. Accordingly, a coordinated response between countries and institutions is important. Cyberspace in modern society is no longer a virtual space but an extension of our reality. Most of today's hackers are causing serious problems, such as intruding into major information and communications networks such as public institutions, financial institutions, media institutions, and military command centers through continuous attacks to steal and leak national information or delete important data[23]. Security experts say that it will be difficult

to make fundamental improvements to solve security problems without changing the level of security awareness of the world[24].

If the individual lacks awareness of security, it would not be wise to shift the responsibility to the individual. In other words, the only effective way to achieve robust cybersecurity from any potential threats will be possible when those in charge of national, corporate, and national defense provide security awareness training with calibrated measures of effectiveness.

5. Conclusion

Although various researches on cyber-attacks and security have been conducted, cyber threats targeting users in companies, public institutions, individuals, and especially in the defense field are expected to increase in the future. Cyber threats are evolving rapidly as fast as the speed of advanced science and technology development, so an AI-based cybersecurity system that can integrate humans and machines responding to massive amounts of threats will be a solution[25]. This goal requires the following:

First, AI-based integrated security control and the nurture of cybersecurity experts[26][27]. When the application of AI to cybersecurity is underway, the side effects of AI must also be considered. As cybersecurity threats become advanced and intelligent, an AI platform of an integrated security control system can learn, process, and respond beyond the limitations of reactive event processing methods. At the same time, trained experts can manually find, analyze, and respond to newly introduced-cyber threat information.

Second, countermeasures against hacking incidents and malicious code incidents based on AI. The AI technology of cybersecurity can continue learning to detect new malicious codes, intelligent threats, or abnormal behaviors. If an AI platform replaces simple repetitive and manual tasks, work efficiency can improve significantly. This can be an effective response by working quickly from detection, analysis, response, and situation reporting in a short time.

Third, raising cybersecurity awareness. Information protection cannot be overemphasized. It requires the full and practical interest of individuals and the nation, corporations, and those in charge of defense operations. Cyber threats and vulnerabilities will be further aggravated in the future defense battlefield environment by the wired/wireless complex combat system, autonomous imaginary weapon system, intelligent command, and control system, and operation of various computer networks, namely multi-domain C5ISR. Applying AI technology to address ever-changing cyber threats will be a true game-changer in the future prospect of cybersecurity[28].

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	IB	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	JY	-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	SS	-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Causes and Case Analyses of the Homegrown Terrorism in Korea

Namseol Baek

Korean National Police University, Asan, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: Homegrown terrorism is an act of using violence to achieve a certain purpose or facilitate caution or publicize one's own claim with one's own power, which surfaces in the form of terrorism that causes casualties in connection with socio-political complaints or grievances between nations which are broader than domestic terrorism. The purpose of this study is to block the occurrence of domestic homegrown terrorism in advance by analyzing the causes of domestic homegrown terrorism and actual case analyses.

Method: The concepts of terrorism and homegrown terrorism are defined, and the analyses are performed in regards to the increase of illegal immigrant workers, increase of the students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea, increase of the Muslims residing in Korea, the causes of domestic terrorism including cyber terror threats of North Korea, as well as the recent cases of following international terrorist organization of IS and the case of financial aid for international terrorist organizations among other cases analyzed including the domestic homegrown terrorism.

Results: No nation or individual is safe from against terrorism. Even in the Korean society, various types of discrimination and prejudice have become the factors of conflict due to an increase in the number of illegal aliens, students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea, and the Muslims residing in Korea. This could provide a potential cause for the homegrown terrorism in Korea. Furthermore, it has been identified that there have been recent cases of homegrown terrorism in Korea.

Conclusion: As evident in the cases of homegrown terrorism in Korea, Korea is no longer a safe zone from against terrorism. The best way to prevent terrorism is to eliminate the causes and environment of terrorism. Towards this end, it is even more necessary to share information based on international cooperation and build a cooperative system with relevant institutions.

[Keywords] Homegrown Terrorism, Illegal Aliens, Students of Foreign Nationality Attending School in Korea, Muslims, Cyber Terrorism

1. Introduction

Terror is not easy to define in a single word since the claims, means, and tactics of the actors of terrorism are so diverse. The word "terrorism" is derived from the Latin word of 'terrere,' which means 'extreme fear' or 'psychological state of death,' and it is defined as "a planned illegal act of intimidating or coercing the government, citizens, or specific groups in order to achieve a purpose or secure a symbolic effect." It is also applied as it is in Korea's 'National Counter-Terrorism Guidelines.' Homegrown terrorism refers to an act of using violence to achieve a certain purpose or facilitate caution or publicize one's own claims with one's own power. The causes of the domestic homegrown terrorism may be divided into 4 key factors. First, as the number of illegal alien workers has increased, it may be deemed as one of the

factors which are highly likely to be related to terrorism. Second, since Korea is actively attracting students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea, the number of the international students entering Korea has increased each year. Third, according to the multi-cultural policy of the Korean government, the Muslims account for the majority of approximately 300,000 immigrants each year, which is a factor in facilitating the increase in the number of the Muslim extremists in Korea. Finally, North Korea has continued to commit acts of cyber terrorism against South Korea even while overseeing hackings and cyber terrorisms via 110 research institutes of the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau.

Recently, the cases of homegrown terrorism are also on the rise in Korea. In 2019, there was a case where Park, a discharged soldier, was arrested while following the international terrorist organization of IS and preparing for 'homegrown terrorism.' There was also a case in which they were arrested on the charges of providing funds to 'Al-Nusra Front' through an illegal foreign currency exchange business operator.

Hence, in this study, the causes and cases of the domestic homegrown terrorism were analyzed. Based on which, it is intended to present the basic data for a counter strategy to prevent the occurrence of domestic homegrown terrorism on a preemptive basis.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Previous studies

Many papers and books have been published on the international terrorism domestically and internationally, yet many papers have been published recently on the homegrown terrorism. First, Cheolhyeon Park (2010) analyzed the factors which are operative in the process of radicalization of the Islamic terrorism in "A Study on the Possibility of Occurrence of the Homegrown Terrorism in Korea," then claimed the possibility of homegrown terrorism in Korea given the increase in the number of foreign workers, etc[1]. In the "Police Activities for the Prevention of Homegrown Terrorism in a Multi-cultural Society," Jaeheon Shin (2013) claimed that homegrown terrorism takes on such characteristics as the difficulty of tracking down the attacker, large scaled damages, and the lack of time in responding to terrorism, and insisted on strengthening police activities for responding to the homegrown terrorism [2]. Manjong Lee (2014) diagnosed the problems of the police counter-terrorism system according to the changes in the terrorist environment in the "Legislation on Police Response System Study of Terrorism" and also suggested that it is necessary to design the police counter-terrorism system [3].

Bonghan Yoon, Sangjin Lee, and Jongin Lim (2015) analyzed the factors which could become the motive for the lonely wolves in the Korean society, such as an increase in the movement of international population, surge in the marginalized class, and the intensification of ideological conflicts in "A Study on the Feasibility of 'Lone Wolf' Terrorists in Korea" [4]. In the "A Study on the Homegrown Terrorism based on the Institutional Anomie Theory," Juho Jung, Seungpyo Hong (2017) examined the relationship between social institutions and the occurrence of homegrown terrorism, and verified economic system, family system, and political system as the factors influencing the occurrence of homegrown terrorism [5]. In the "A Study on Countermeasures by Police to Autogenous Terror in Korea" Cheolho Yang (2018) claimed the need to demonstrate interest in the marginalized class and strengthen the local community interest in order to respond to changes in the domestic homegrown terrorism environment, such as the surge in the population capable of committing homegrown terrorism while supplementing the response posture in accordance with the enforcement of the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security, etc. [6]. In the "Cyber Policy to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism," Kyeonghwan Son (2018) claimed for the activities of protection rather than surveillance by introducing the concept of cyber patrol [7].

2.2. Concept of terrorism


Terrorism is not easy to define in a single word since the claims, means, and tactics of the terrorists are so diverse. While terrorism has walked alongside the human history, the reason as to why it is so difficult to define it is that it is possible to assume that terrorism becomes a patriotic conflict or a heroic noble act depending on the position of the parties in the diverse environment of the international community[8]. The word “terror” is derived from the Latin words of “terrere,” which means “extreme fear” or “psychological state of death” [9]. It is also defined by the FBI of the United States as “a planned illegal act of intimidating or coercing the government, citizens, or specific groups in order to achieve a purpose or secure a symbolic effect” [10]. Korea's 'National Counter-Terrorism Guidelines' also apply the definition of the FBI of the US as it is[11].

2.3. Concept of the homegrown terrorism

Homegrown terrorism refers to the act of using violence to achieve a certain purpose or facilitate caution or publicize one's own claim with one's own power[12]. The term 'homegrown terrorism' was first used in the United States and means the "act of using or planning force or violence for the purposes of intimidating the government or citizens of the United States or any portion thereof for political or social objectives by any organization or individual which or who were born or grown or based in the United States or within any matter or subject owned thereby or therewithin" [13].

Recently, there is a clear distinction made between domestic terrorism and homegrown terrorism. While the former promotes terrorism which occurs within a country, homegrown terrorism manifests itself in the form of terrorism that inflicts mass casualties in connection with the broader international and socio-political dissatisfaction[1]. The recent homegrown terrorism includes the Boston Marathon terrorist attack of April 2013, simultaneous terrorist attacks of 2015 in France, and terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida of 2016, as well as the truck terrorist attack in Lise, France. As such, it is distinguished from the traditional terrorism in that the subject of terrorist attack is a citizen of own's own country or a member of society in general, and it is an act of terrorism by a self-generated lonely wolf rather than a form of terrorist attack committed by a member[11]. It is evident that the homegrown terrorism which was committed in the country by its own citizens who were born, raised, and educated in the local country as the 2nd or 3rd generation immigrants is of a different type from the international terrorist attacks by the members of international terrorist organizations [14]. Furthermore, it refers to an act of a citizen with radical Islamic thinking to attack his or her own country by prioritizing his or her belief and religion ahead of others, and also takes on the form of suicide terrorist attack[15].


Figure 1. 2020 global terrorism index.



In recent years, many countries have actively attracted students of foreign nationality attending school in their countries, and the immigration of international students has further expanded[20]. This is because the students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea do not pose a cultural threat unlike the illegal alien workers or international refugees and do not impose economic burdens on the host country. In 2015, the Korean government established the goal of 'attracting 200,000 students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea by 2023' to enhance the international competitiveness of universities, after which, excluding the recent 2 years experiencing the COVID-19, the number of them in Korea has continued to grow. According to the basic educational statistics of 2018, the total number of students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea was 142,205, which increased by 18,347 people (14.8%) based on 123,858 people in 2017, whereby the illegal aliens disguised as the students have emerged as a factor in the creation of the domestic terrorist organizations. They experienced relatively high levels of depression and anxiety during their university life due to their daily life maladjustment in Korea, interpersonal problems such as dating of the opposite sex, and mental health problems, and very often, were also influenced by actors of larger unit such as family and community beyond the individual context[21].

Recently, the influx of the students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea or refugees has grown, and they have demonstrated different characteristics from the illegal alien workers in terms of the purpose of stay, period of stay, and whether they repatriate, and hence, the factors for the factors of self-generation of terrorist organizations by and among them will also need to be seriously considered[22].

Figure 2. Foreigners staying for more than 90 days (by nationality).



3.3. Increase of the Muslims in Korea

Nationalist terrorism is divided into 2 types, and the first of which is, if and where the multi-ethnic people are included in a single country which advocates for a specific ideology and system, it is converted into terrorism due to an inter-ethnic conflict. Another is the case in which the same ethnic group is separated into 2 different countries or systems, and in the process of integrating them into a new national system, the national leaders use terrorism as a way to secure hegemony[23]. In Korea, the Muslim population is continuously increasing due to the increase in the demand for industrial manpower due to the aging society. In 2018, the Korean Muslim Federation estimates the Muslim population in Korea to be approximately 260,000. Among which, it is known that there are over 60,000 Korean Muslims. According to the Korean government's multi-cultural policy, the Muslims account for the majority of approximately 300,000 immigrants each year, which is a factor in the increase in the number of the Muslim extremists in Korea. In November 2015, IS released a new video containing the threat of terrorism against 60 countries, in which, the Korean flag was included, causing a shock. An Indonesian, who had worked for 2 years at the Seongseo Industrial Complex in Daegu, was found to be a

member of IS who died in fighting in Syria, and 10 Koreans publicly supported IS and specifically attempted to join IS. As evident in the case of the self-generating factor of the terrorist organizations by the Islamic extremists in Korea, Korea is no longer a safe country from against terrorism, and it is expected that it will be affected by the chaotic domestic and international terrorists moving forward.

3.4. Cyber terrorism of North Korea

There is a department called the “Technical Reconnaissance Bureau” within the General Bureau of Reconnaissance, which is North Korea's operation unit against South Korea, and is also the department in charge of cyber operations. The 110 research institutes inside of the Bureau are in charge of hacking and cyber terrorism[24]. North Korea views cyber warfare as one of the 3 major asymmetric forces alongside the nuclear and guerrilla warfare, and the cyber warfare as a decisive factor in determining the victory or defeat of the final decisive battle[25]. While North Korea's cyber infrastructure is mediocre at best, North Korea's hacking capabilities are world-class. North Korea's hacking and cyber terrorism capabilities are evaluated to be superb[26]. Examining the cases of terrorist attack caused damages by North Korea, it is evident that the DDoS attack of 2008, computer network paralysis of Nonghyup of 2011, and the cyber terrorist attacks which caused an estimated damage of over KRW 1 trillion including the computer network paralysis of broadcasting companies and financial institutions of 2013, among others, and given the nuclear data leakage incident of 2014, the extent of cyber terrorist attacks of North Korea has become far more sophisticated, including the hacking incident of the 'PC management program server' of the Seoul Subway Lines 1 through 4 in July in which 58 PCs were infected with malicious codes and the National Defense Data Integration Center's hacking of 2016[26].

4. Cases of the Homegrown Terrorism in Korea

4.1. Case of following the terrorist organization of 'IS'

Park, who was discharged from the army in July 2019, was arrested by the investigative agencies for following the international terrorist organization of IS (Islamic State) and preparing the so-called 'homegrown terrorism.' He enlisted in an army unit in October 2017, and while undergoing special training for bombers at the Army Engineering School, he stole and stored a military explosive ignition device. He is also accused of propagating and instigating the IS activities, such as by collecting videos and data of the IS terrorist activities or posting related materials on the Internet from 2016 until recently. Furthermore, before his enlistment, he received orders from the IS members or installed a secret application used by the supporters on his mobile phone to record and store the process of making live ammunition, while 'Jungle sword' which is similar to those used by the terrorist organizations was found in the house in which he resided,, and it was also confirmed that he received emails from a person believed to be a member of IS. While conducting an internal investigation after receiving intelligence from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the police confirmed that Park was serving in the military and notified the military authorities accordingly. This is the first incidence where a self-generated terrorist plan was uncovered in connection with IS in Korea.¹

In November 2015, Mohammad, an illegal immigrant of the Indonesian nationality who followed Al-Nusra Front, a sub organization of the international terrorist organization of Al-Qaeda,

¹Dated July 4, 2019, yonhap news.

was arrested by the investigative authorities. He was an illegal resident who stayed with a manufacturer in Chungcheongnam-do from October 2007 until his arrest, during which period, he purchased a sword via a Korean online shopping mall, and purchased a gun which resembled M4A1 in shape and stored it at his house, while also posting articles or photos in support of 'Al-Nusra Front' through the social media.

4.2. Case of financial aid for the terrorist organization of 'Al-Nusra Front'

Al-Nusra Front is an Al-Qaeda associated organization based in the northern Syria, and is also an Islamic extremist organization. This organization carried out a car bombing in Syria in or about February 2012, a suicide bombing in Syria in or about April 2012, a kidnapping of 13 nuns in or about March 2013, and a bomb attack in or about February 2014, whereby it was designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations (UN), and was also designated as a terrorist organization by the United States (May 2014) and the United Kingdom (July 2013), respectively. A, a Russian national, is a Muslim entered Korea on July 20, 2017 and was resolved to communicate frequently through social media including Telegram with B, a member of 'Al-Nusra Front' active in Syria, promote terrorist organizations operating in Syria targeting Muslims residing in Korea, and provide funds for 'Al-Nusra Front' by delivering the funds raised in Korea to B via the so called illegal foreign currency exchange business operator. From about August 15, 2018 until about May 24, 2020, KRW 11,013,890 were raised from C, D, and E, etc., and stored them, after which delivered them to B via the illegal foreign currency exchange business operators, thereby providing funds for 'Al-Nusra Front.' A was found guilty of such charges and was punished for violating the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security².

There have been 6 to 7 cases of financial aid for the terrorist organizations each year since 2019.

5. Conclusion

Homegrown terrorism surfaces in the form of terrorism which causes mass casualties in connection with a broader range of international and socio-political dissatisfaction than the domestic terrorism. The homegrown terrorism which has occurred recently includes multiple terrorist attacks in France of 2015, terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida of 2016, and the terrorist attack in Lise, France, etc. Terrorism is a problem for all of the international community, and no nation or individual is safe from against terrorism. In the Korean society, various types of discrimination and prejudice have become a factor of conflict due to the increase in the number of illegal aliens, students of foreign nationality attending school in Korea, and the Muslims residing in Korea, etc., thereby fueling the potential cause of homegrown terrorism in Korea. Furthermore, North Korea's cyber terrorism capabilities are evaluated to be superb, and in fact, the extent of cyber terrorist attacks of North Korea, such as the National Defense Data Integration Center's hacking of 2016, has become far more sophisticated than ever. Park, who was discharged from the army in July 2019, received orders from the members of IS or installed a secret application used by the supporters on his mobile phone to record and store the process of privately manufacturing live ammunition, and received an email from a person who was believed to be a member of IS, among the facts uncovered by the investigative authorities for preparing for the homegrown terrorism. In November 2015, Mohammad, an Indonesian national who worked as an illegal resident for a manufacturer in Chungcheongnam-do, was arrested by the investigative

²Judgement numbered 2020GODAN4010 sentenced on september 9, 2020 by the seoul central district court.

authorities on the charges of following 'Al-Nusra Front,' a sub organization of Al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization. A, a Russian national, entered Korea on July 20, 2017 and communicated frequently with members of the international terrorist organization of 'Al-Nusra Front' via Telegram, from about August 15, 2018 until about May 24, 2020, while raising and storing KRW 11,013,890 then providing them for 'Al-Nusra Front' via the illegal foreign currency exchange business operators. As such, Korea is no longer a safe zone from against terrorism. The best way to prevent terrorism is to eliminate the cause and environment of terrorism. Towards this end, it is necessary not only to share the relevant information based on the international cooperation, but also share it with related institutions and build a cooperative system.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	NB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Corresponding author*
E-mail: stcho1126@sunmoon.ac.kr

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Afghanistan's Tribe Mosaic, Weak State, and Taliban Rule

Sungtaek Cho

Sunmoon University, Asan, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: 18-year occupation of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan has ended. The ideal goal of removing terrorism desired by the international community and forming a democratic and liberal state through the formation of a government has been broken by the Taliban's ruling. There are several factors that do not form a state in Afghanistan. The purpose of this paper is to consider these factors.

Method: For the purpose of research, it is important to look at the historical context and social structure of Afghanistan and to look at the results of the Western 'anti-terrorism war'. First, we examine the tribe-centered decision-making system (Jirgah) and the ideological role of Islam. And we examine whether the formation of a national state has been stagnant through wars since the late 19th century and the civil war in Afghanistan.

Results: The role of the extreme Sunni Islamic group played a role in the rapid growth of the Taliban. Mujahideen was formed during the war against Britain and the Soviet Union, of which the Taliban of the Pashtun people living in southeastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan grew their power during the civil war in Afghanistan, and the Taliban was given a representative position in the war against the United States. In addition, the Taliban succeeded to some extent in integrating a divided ethnic society by force.

Conclusion: After the United States-Taliban 'Doha Agreement' (Peace Agreement), where the Afghanistan government was excluded, the Taliban occupied most of Afghanistan in a short period of one month. Although the Taliban group does not have a unified leadership system, it will become the ruling power of Afghanistan in the future. The Taliban's Wahhabism or Salafism will serve as the norm of social integration in Afghanistan.

[Keywords] Pashtun, Jirgah, Mujahideen, Deobandi, Taliban

1. Introduction

The Taliban established the Taliban regime after occupying Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, on August 16, 2021 [1]. This happened more than a month after President Joe Biden declared the end of the United States military mission in Afghanistan on July 8. There were intermittent battles due to the Taliban attacks, but government forces surrendered in most areas, and it did not develop into a national civil war. The Taliban announced the formation of an interim government on September 6. The international community has begun to worry about the Taliban's non-human rights feasibility and the spread of terrorism.

The United States launched an "anti-terrorism war" to oust Al-Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda's forces reached the level of collapse, but the Taliban did not collapse and immediately began armed action to dominate Afghanistan as a peace treaty announced plans to withdraw the United States.

The main thing that Afghanistan was pursued by the United States and NATO coalition forces was to establish a stable national state system, form a democratic society, and prevent Russian and Chinese influences from expanding in Central Asia. These experiments in the United States and NATO ended in failure. Some scholars compare the failure of the United States in Afghanistan with that in Vietnam. According to their arguments, there were consequences such as the withdrawal of the United States troops without strategic alternatives, the initiation of peace negotiations excluding the Afghanistan government, and abandonment of the Afghanistan government, as the United States showed at the end of the Vietnam War.

What this paper intends to deal with is not to discuss the failure of the United States strategy. In this paper, we examine the reasons why it was difficult to form a historically integrated state in Afghanistan and the process of the Taliban growing up and re-enforcing power for the first time in 20 years since the 1990s. Specifically, I try to grasp the political and social characteristics of Afghanistan by looking at the historical context of Afghanistan. In addition, I would like to find out why it was difficult to form a national state, but whether the Taliban became the leading force and was able to take power. Finally, I would like to describe the prospects of change in Afghanistan after the peace agreement.

2. Afghanistan's Social Characteristics :Tribe-centered Society and Islam

The history of Afghanistan was the history of invasion and plunder of various tribes. The tribes present in Afghanistan were formed during this invasion. The first residents were not identified, but the first migrants were the Indian Aryans. Starting with the invasion of Arian, the invasion of Greeks, Arabs, Mongolians, and Iranians continued[2].

Afghanistan's geographical environment was more suitable for nomads than agriculture, and a strong tribal tradition serves to make the construction of a nation-state incomplete by forcing the individual to understand other tribes as strangers or hostile forces[3].

Afghanistan's dominant tribe is the Pashtun. They claim themselves to be of pure descent in Afghanistan. Pashtun is located in southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan and is called the Pathans in Pakistan. The Pashtuns account for 42% of the population of Afghanistan and are divided into the Durrani tribe and the Ghiljai tribe. The Ghiljai tribe uses Pashto and lives a nomadic life. The Durrani tribe conquered Qandahar in the 18th century and lived in settlement. Other people were Iranian, once occupied Afghanistan and India, and now about 27% of Afghanistan resides. In addition, there are the Hazara, Aimak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen of Shia.

In the Pashtun society, there is a norm called Pashtunwali consisting of detailed norms such as Badal, Melmastia, and Nanawati. In addition, there is a meeting of tribal leaders called Jirgah, and through Jirgah, important issues of the tribe are determined. In the Pashtun society, there is a norm called Pashtunwali consisting of detailed norms such as Badal(revenge), Melmastia(hospitality), and Nanawati(protection). In addition, there is a meeting of tribal leaders called Jirgah, and through Jirgah, important issues of the tribe are determined.

It is difficult to establish an integrated state among the tribes that make up Afghanistan. The majority of Afghans are religious Muslims, but they do not prefer an orderly state system under one central power. Therefore, historically, there have been many cases where certain tribes resist taking over central power, and conflicts have frequently occurred within the tribes. Conflicts within Afghanistan are divided into five categories[2].

First, it is a dispute between individuals related to Pashtunwali. Revenge of blood leads to disputes between family and relatives over political power. A representative example is 'revenge between the Mushahiban family and the Charkhi family'. Second, it appears in conflict within the tribe, that is, between clans. There are several blood clans inside the same tribe, but

there is no integration or harmony between blood clans. For example, the Durrani built the Durrani Empire in the 18th century, but fought for power of the 18th century. Third, it is a conflict over political development within the same race. The Ghiljai and Durrani have political differences due to the difference between settlement life and nomadic life. The fourth is the confrontation between tribes. The confrontation between Pashtun and non-pashtun is the biggest obstacle to the formation of a national state in Afghanistan. There is no marriage between Pashtun and non-pashtun. Fifth is the conflict between the central power to build a national state due to hostility between tribes and the local power against the central power to preserve the tribe society.

For Afghanistan, the state has been accepted as an immigrant ruler or as a being different from the tribal living community. In this situation, the central state power was largely in urban areas such as Kabul and Kandahar, which are spatially far from the Pashtun tribe, and in rural Pashtun tribes, national security services were rarely provided[4].

Traditionally, Islam in Afghanistan was conservative but not extreme. However, it was the Soviet -Afghanistan War, where the Soviet invasion began, that served as an opportunity for the seed of Islamic extremism to be sown in this traditional Afghanistan tribal society. As the Soviet uprising unfolded, the existing traditional society focused on the Mujahideen struggle, and the military struggle against the Soviet army functioned as a leading paradigm governing the daily lives of the tribe. Along with this, many foreign Muslims volunteered for the Mujahideen struggle in Afghanistan flowed into the Afghan region, followed by Sunni Islamic extremism. Islam in Afghanistan also begins to extreme as extremist Islamic law scholars who followed foreign Mujahideen begin to exert dominant influence throughout Pakistan's refugee camps and Afghanistan tribal society. War orphans who lost their parents in the Afghanistan-Soviet War live in refugee camps in Pakistan and grow up receiving Islamic extremist religious education, terrorism and military training at religious schools run by Islamic extremists. After that, they formed the Taliban and grew into the main force of this organization.

This is also the case with Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban. Among these religious schools, the most direct background of the birth of the Taliban was the Deobandi-affiliated religious school. Against this background, Taliban-led Islamic extremism later contributes to the transformation of Islam in Afghanistan into a form of Islamic extremism such as Deobandi, Wahhabism, and Salafi extremism through the Taliban regime. Islamic extremism in the Afghan region continued after the collapse of the Taliban regime and served as a leading and influential Islamic perspective in this region today. In Islamic extremism, ethnicity, nationalism, and national state are basically regarded as paganism, which is interpreted in a religious sense[2].

The worldview of Islamic extremism understands this world by dividing it into Muslim and pagan regions. From this worldview, the area of Islam is viewed as the territory of Allah following the teachings of Allah (God), and the area of paganism is dominated by Satanic elements, so it is ultimately viewed as a left area to be conquered by Islam. This unique Islamic worldview acts as a serious obstacle to the creation of Afghanistan's people and the construction of national states, and continues to undermine the political stability of the local national state by continuously allowing the influence of foreign Islamic extremism such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Islamic extremism divides non-Muslims or pagans into two concepts: Kafir and Munafiq. Kafir refers to pagans who are not believers or Allah's people. This includes all non-Muslim populations, including Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, or atheists, socialists, nationalists, and republicans who have never been Muslims. On the other hand, Munafiq is a word that means hypocrite, false, traitor, Muslim, or Muslim on the surface, or actually secular political power, wealth, or Western individualism, liberalism, nationalism, secularism, or material civilization[3].

Islam, which has traditionally been believed in Afghanistan, has been tolerant of different sects, different religions, and different lifestyles. Until 1992, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews played an important role in the country's market economy, and since 1992, this tolerance has collapsed due to the brutal civil war, leading to unexpected ethnic battles between sects. Until the Taliban established control of Afghanistan, Islamic fundamentalism such as Saudi Arabia's conservative Wahhab faction did not come in.

Islam's interpretation by the Taliban presupposes a radical and self-righteous interpretation of Deobandism taught by a Pakistani mullahs in a refugee camp in Afghanistan. During the war against the Soviet Union, a small number of deobandis were ignored. However, during the war, JUI (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam) established hundreds of Islamic seminaries in Pakistan's Pashtun areas to conduct military training for Afghan refugees and young Pakistanis. Theological Seminary was run by mullahs who could hardly read letters and did not study their original reformist doctrine of Deobandism. Mullahs were being funded and paid for tuition in Saudi Arabia and were greatly influenced by conservative Wahhabism[5].

The reason why Islamic forces can be politicized in Central Asia is that first, as the economic difficulties faced by Central Asians continue to exist, they are dissatisfied with the ruling forces who take the lead in long-term dictatorship with security. Second, before becoming president, Central Asian leaders appointed a large number of families and hometowns from major government posts, and under these circumstances, the role of secular leaders was reduced and Islamic parties were highlighted[6].

The Soviet invasion provided an opportunity for the unusually diverse tribes and ethnic groups to cooperate with a sense of unity across geographic boundaries in Afghanistan's history to defeat huge foreign powers. However, this unity was temporary, and the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992 exposed conflicts between Islamic and other Mujahideen forces, in which Taliban forces took control of much of Afghanistan and began power in 1996.

The United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a turning point for the resurrection of the Taliban. As the United States focused resources and attention on military operations and occupational rule in Iraq, the Taliban gradually expanded its power in northern Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. It should be noted that the Taliban differs greatly from the international terrorist network Al-Qaeda in its goal and methodology. Al-Qaeda launched a strategy aimed at attacking Western Christian and Jewish forces to protect the Islamic world. On the other hand, the Taliban had the character of a rebel to remove Afghanistan's "internal enemies" and expand its territory with the aim of constructing a nation-state of a divine nature based on Islam as a national ideology[7].

Given that the Taliban was once the ruling power of Afghanistan, it also had its own legitimacy to take over the power deprived by the U.S.-led West. Therefore, Islamic forces such as the Taliban were not the direct cause of Afghanistan instability, but rather a derivative political organization created by political instability and vacancy caused by the formation of an inadequate national state[8].


3. The Emergence of the Taliban and Islamic Fundamentalism

In the center of Afghanistan, there is a high mountain area, including the Hindu Kush Mountains. The largest ethnicity of the land is Pashtun, which accounts for about 42% of the total population, mainly in the southern region. There are more than 27% of Tajiks in the northern region, including Uzbeks (9%), Hazara(9%), Kyrgyz, and Turkmen. It can be said that the special terrain and the land inhabited by various races were the result of the 18th-19th century Russia and Britain's dispute[9]. The tribe that took the lead in this area was Pashtun, especially the

Taliban composed of Pashtun people.

After 10 years of war with the Soviet Union, Mujahideen occupied Kabul and civil wars began across the country. During the civil war, the Taliban, which consists of Pashtun, the majority of southern and eastern Afghanistan, declared that it would realize peace, establish law and order, and disarm to apply Sharia. In 1998, the Taliban occupied most of northern Afghanistan and drove the Northern Alliance, which consisted of minorities except Pashtuns, into a small area in the northeast[5][10].

Figure 1. Formation of tribe groups in Afghanistan.



In 1994, the Taliban was established in changing Afghanistan. As the Taliban dominated major roads, cities, airports, and customs posts within four years of its establishment, they implemented a transition from local predatory warlord based on a criminalized open economy to weak 'rental state' power[11].

The Taliban resulted in inheriting legitimacy as an armed Islamic tribal community that instilled strong religious ideology into the symbolic community of Afghanistan's traditional resistance and struggle. The Taliban approached the base of the people with a thorough asceticism with the purest and most powerful Islamic doctrine, and was recognized as different from other political forces and warlords. For them seeking to build a state beyond pure Islam, the public sentiment rapidly assimilated, and eventually they grew into the largest political force with infinite support from the public, entered the capital Kabul and emerged as a ruling force. They maintained a doctrinal style of governance with a powerful Islamic Sunni regime. These were the ruling forces that effectively ruled Afghanistan until they stepped down to the southern region due to the United States anti-terrorism war.

The growth of the Taliban can be attributed largely to the support of Pakistani government agencies behind the United States. The purpose of the United States supporting the Taliban was to need a Sunni regime that could become Iran's opponent under the Shiite regime in Afghanistan, where the Soviet Union stepped down and quartered amid the confrontation of the Cold War. It is also due to the importance of the Tripartite Coordination connecting the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to block links between Iran and the Soviet Union, which turned to

extreme anti-American tendencies after the Islamic Revolution. At its peak in 2001, the Taliban regime did not come to power by democratic voting, but was recognized as a legitimate regime [9].

Behind these Taliban is Deobandism, a kind of Sunnis. Deobandism was a movement initiated in India by Pakistan's Mullah for the purpose of trying to converge Islamic doctrine and reality, that is, regenerating Islamic society, but established anti-American and anti-imperialist political parties in Pakistan, and trained them militarily.

However, the seminary here did not study the original reformist Deobandi doctrine. This is because most of these seminaries are located in rural and Afghanistan refugee villages, and they were run by Mullahs, who had nothing to do with the early reform agenda of the Deobandi school and had little education. They received a lot of funding and tuition support from Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism along with religious influences. The Taliban insisted on an extreme attitude that they did not need discussions on doctrines or interpretations of Quran with other Muslims, as well as knowledge of Islam such as Quran and Sharia, as well as those ignorant of Afghanistan's history. The Taliban can be said to be a new form of Islamic radicalism based on Pakistan's radical and fundamentalist Deobandism JUI, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism, which provides financial support, and Jihadism and Islamism [12].

Historically, Afghanistan is a very conservative Islamic country, and governance was mainly based on Sharia interpretation by tribes. 80% of the population is Sunnis, especially among the most free Hanafi sects. People in Afghanistan were very tolerant of different sects, different religions, and different lifestyles. No Islamic radicalism emerged in Afghanistan until the Taliban appeared. However, after the Soviet army stepped down in 1992, religious tolerance disappeared by the Taliban as the civil war, which killed more than 40,000 people [13].

4. The response of the United States: Strategy to stabilize Afghanistan, Counter-terrorism and the Formation of a Nation State

Afghanistan is having a greater impact on neighboring countries. The civil war in Afghanistan polarized the entire region. This is because Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, India, and the former Soviet Union of Central Asia supported the anti-government Northern Alliance [5].

The collapse of the Afghan government provides fascinating opportunities for Muslim warriors in Pakistan and Iran, former Soviet Union countries in Central Asia, and the Xinjiang Uighur region. This is because Afghanistan is a sanctuary where you can run away in case of an emergency and is becoming a place to raise funds through dark transactions.

During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral. After World War I, civil war and coups occurred frequently in Afghanistan, and it was communalized when the People's Democratic Party took power in 1978. The Soviet government supported the People's Democratic Party and confronted the people of Afghanistan [14].

In December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. The background of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan is based on maintaining authority over the World Communist Movement, maintaining power in the Indian Ocean, concerns over the spread of Muslim power, and worsening relations with the United States [15][16]. At the same time, with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, a Soviet reformer, the former enmity between the two countries began to rise [17]. The Secretary-General of the United Nations agreed to negotiate a ceasefire, and eventually on May 16, 1988, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a ceasefire negotiation, and Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan [18].

When the Soviet Union was disbanded in 1991 and the new Russia refused further support,

the Najibullah regime collapsed in April 1992. Najibullah hid in the accommodation of United Nations employees. A power struggle began between the remnants of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and rebels and warlords who had fought against each other [19][20]. The Taliban was born in 1994, and the Taliban quickly took control of Afghanistan.

By 1990, the battle between government forces and Mujahedeen became fiercer. However, interest in Afghanistan in the United States and the Soviet Union declined. The international community focused its attention on the simultaneous Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and did not pay attention to the situations occurring inside Afghanistan. However, the rapid expansion of the Taliban's power following Mujahedeen drew attention from neighboring countries such as the United States and Pakistan. The United States evaluated that the Taliban would be a force to establish order in Afghanistan, and wanted to do so. Pakistan's support was behind the Taliban's expansion of power.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, which appeared following Mujahedeen, attempted to establish a centralized system to resolve division and corruption, but their attempts rather amplified conflicts between tribes. This is because the Taliban thoroughly united around the southern Pash-tun to maintain their power. They continued ruthless control over other tribes. Their attention was focused on how to spread power deeper into the village and control society rather than on the formation of a power system.

On October 7, 2001, the United States attacked Afghanistan with the aim of destroying terrorist organizations. It has been identified that there are several major terrorist groups.

As a Taliban-affiliated terrorist organization, the first is the Afghanistan Taliban. Political and military organizations aimed at ruling Afghanistan. It has now occupied 60% of Afghanistan and protected Bin Raden, the head of Al-Qaeda. Second, the Pakistani Taliban was separated from the Afghanistan Taliban in the 2000s and aimed to overthrow the Pakistani government. The third is Al-Qaeda. Although it was an organization that caused the 9/11 terrorist attack, it has not maintained the same power as before since Bin Raden's death. Recently, only terrorist activities have been carried out in Africa, and the Al-Qaeda branch in the Middle East seems to have become a significant number of IS members. Fourth, an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization in Afghanistan enters IS, forming the IS-K (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province). They are at odds with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and are currently active in Kabul and Ghazni [21].

The international public opinion was that the attack by terrorist organizations was a thorough violation of international law and international norms, and 58 countries around the world supported the United States attack. The early Bush administration focused on the short-term and military goals of removing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Air operations focused on aerial attacks, ground operations using the 'Northern Alliance', information acquisition aimed at searching for Bin Raden, and operations by a small number of elite special forces were carried out, and large-scale ground operations were later carried out. When the United States launched an attack on the Taliban, Pakistan provided an operational base to the United States military [22].

The purpose of the American War against the Taliban is, first, to reduce Russia's power by strengthening its influence in Central Asia. Second, it was possible to achieve the economic goal of securing resources by organizing disorder between the Caspian Sea neighboring countries based on the Caspian oil field and natural gas and constructing oil pipelines and pipelines that do not pass through Russia. Third, by taking control of Afghanistan and Central Asia, China, Russia, and Iran can be monitored in neighboring regions.

However, the United States also sought to achieve its military goals and the goal of "national construction" in Afghanistan. As the Taliban's power base collapsed by the military attack,

American attention was focused on forming a democratically elected government in Afghanistan[23]. Through the so-called Bonn Process, the United States tried to complete Afghanistan's "national construction." During this period, the United States and NATO Allied forces allocated more than 90% of their operational hours to reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Despite these efforts, however, the democratic construction of the state in Afghanistan has not been completed to the extent that it has gone through the Bush administration and the Obama administration[24].

In August 2017, the Trump administration of the United States changed its policy to give up further national construction in Afghanistan and focus on military goals again. The burden of achieving the two goals of Afghanistan's national construction and the elimination of the Taliban was greatly evaluated. Finally, on February 29, 2020, the United States signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, ending an armed conflict with the Taliban. President Trump announced that he would complete the withdrawal within 14 months. However, the agreement failed to form a consensus between the United States, Taliban, and Afghanistan governments, and two days after the agreement, the Taliban resumed its attack on Afghanistan[25].

5. Conclusion: Doha Agreement and Outlook

In the center of Afghanistan, there is a high mountain area, including the Hindu Existing experts generally argue that there are three causes of the prolonged Afghanistan war. First of all, it is argued that the war between superpowers is prolonged because they have unusual ambitions, complacency, and pride of the strongest country[26]. The second is that even though the nature of the war has changed in modern times, the United States military did not prepare enough for it and carried out the war. Third, the United States military initiated and carried out the war without sufficient strategic and operational preparations due to a lack of information[27].

On February 29, 2020, the United States and Afghan armed organization Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar. The move is aimed at ending the Afghan War, which has resulted in a total of 136 countries participating or supporting and killing about 160,000 people over the past 18 years since October 7, 2001. The agreement signed by United States envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar calls for the withdrawal of United States and NATO forces within 14 months of ending relations with extremist armed groups, including al-Qaeda[25].

The United States has set the way out of the longest war in history that has cost about \$2 trillion over the past 18 years, with the Doha agreement not interfering with Afghanistan's internal affairs, withdrawing 12,000 U.S. troops within 14 months and lifting economic sanctions on the Taliban in August.

Experts' assessment of the United States war in Afghanistan after the merger is summarized as follows. First, in 1973, the United States decided to withdraw Vietnam only to end the war without a strategic alternative, and in Afghanistan, President Donald Trump's election pledge to end the endless war agreed without a "strategic alternative." Second, just as the United States excluded Vietnam in 1973, the United States excluded the Afghan government from the Doha agreement. Third, it was a decision made by domestic politics in the United States. In 1973, the heightened atmosphere of war in the United States resulted in the end of the Vietnam War, and this Afghan war also had a great political influence on President Trump, who is considering the presidential election, to put the end of the war as a diplomatic achievement. Fourth, just as the United States gave up the Vietnamese government after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the United States will give up the Afghan government in the future. Fifth, there is no principle of distribution of power between the Afghanistan government and the Taliban. Sixth, it is

civilian damage. In particular, the Taliban will reproduce non-human acts against girls and young women. Seventh, the Taliban is likely to defend the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, which is expected to threaten neighboring countries.

Some scholars predict that Islamic principle forces will naturally disappear in Central Asia [6]. However, these predictions proved wrong. The reason why Islamic principle prevails is that major groups' indifference to democracy, dictatorship, and economic development are insufficient, deepening economic discrimination, and monopolizing certain forces of major domestic resources. Unless these backgrounds are resolved, there will be an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalists to emerge at any time. By appropriately transforming and interpreting the pure religious ideology of Islam in problems that the existing system cannot solve, citizens are brainwashed and forced through force. The United States wanted to resolve the corruption of the ruling forces in Afghanistan and contribute to the interests of the United States as a stable country, but it did not go as planned by the United States [28][29].

Although the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, there will be several difficulties in advancing to an integrated state encompassing all tribes.


First, Afghanistan's tribe-centered decision-making system has a certain opposition to allowing the central government. Since the Taliban's occupation of Kabul, some forces have resisted while armed with opposition signs. This anti-Taliban resistance movement will not easily end thanks to topographical conditions.

Second, another Islamic fundamentalist group, such as IS-K, will not quietly wait and see the Taliban's conciliatory diplomatic strategy with neighboring countries. The Taliban is not pleased with signing a peace agreement with the United States and having talks with China and Iran.

Third, it is difficult to predict how the Taliban's extreme religious rule will affect. From the standpoint of citizens who enjoyed Western liberalism for 18 years, the Taliban is always feared, and if the Taliban recognizes it as an object of overthrow, reform movements such as the 'Arab Spring' could emerge. Recently, several measures have been taken to alleviate discrimination against women, but public complaints will accumulate if the Taliban still maintains a coercive ideology without human rights protection.

Fourth, since opium cultivation alone cannot properly function Afghanistan's economy, economic backwardness and discrimination will always be resisted by new forces. One of the biggest reasons for the repetition of civil wars in Islam is that it originated from economic discrimination [30][31].

Figure 2. Opium production intones (1990-2019).



In Afghanistan, Taliban-led Salafism and rule using military power will be difficult to last. In light of the current situation, related countries expect the Taliban to realize democratic rule and revitalization of a free market economy, but it will be difficult to put any pressure on them for the time being. At best, it is all about pressing economic measures that make Afghanistan people's lives needy. It is necessary to take a close look at whether the Taliban ruling forces will take measures to reform themselves in the future.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SC	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Perspective towards North Korean Defectors according to the Educational Background, Rank, and Job Acquisition Path of South Korean Security Police Protecting North Korean Defectors

Hoyeun Youn¹

Daewon University College, Jecheon, Republic of Korea

Sunggu Jo^{2*}

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

Bongjun Choi³

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: In this study, after the North Korean defectors enter into South Korea and undergo education and training for a certain period, they are transferred to the police and take the first step towards their settlement in the South Korean society under the protection of the security police for a certain period of time. This means that the security police officers are playing and performing such a crucial role in the process of their settlement and social adaptation for the North Korean defectors. Hence, the purpose of this study is to analyze the perception and attitude of the security police towards the North Korean defectors and explore a policy related plan for the impact on the North Korean defectors' successful settlement in the South Korean society.

Method: In this study, the perception and attitude towards the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors was analyzed through the Self-Administration Method applied survey of 100 police officers in the security department of the Police Human Resources Development Institute, which is the police educational institution of South Korea. Among the main variables for measurement, educational background, rank, and job acquisition path were used. In particular, among the various characteristics of security police, the study has focused on how the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors varies according to the educational background and rank job acquisition path of the security police department.

Results: As a result of the analysis performed, it turned out that the higher the educational background of the security police, the higher the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors. Across most of the questions which demonstrated statistical significance in terms of the job acquisition path, it turned out that the security police officers from the executive candidates evaluated the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors far more positively than the general police officers or special recruits.

Conclusion: In order for the security police officers from the relatively low educational background and the general police officers to renew more voluntary and active safety awareness of the North Korean defectors, it is first necessary to improve the overall job acquisition path of the entire police organization, including the security police. The negative evaluation of the North Korean defectors by the security police officers with a relatively low educational background and general police officers may be a kind of negative reaction to the problem which the security police organization is constantly undergoing changes according to the government's political inclinations. Hence, in the future, the government, political circles, and the police leaders should not make abrupt changes to the security police organization according to the government's political orientation and microscopical changes in terms of the inter-Korean relations.

[Keywords] Protection of the North Korean Defectors, South Korea's Security Police, Job Acquisition Path, Educational Background, Rank

1. Introduction

Recently, in the case of a North Korean defector who recently defected over the front-line fence of the Eastern Front in November 2020 and defected to North Korea again after a year, the North Korean defector and the security police who have been managing the defector are once again attracting attention in significant depth[1], while the support activities for the North Korean defectors in Korea are carried out as a part of the security police activities among the police activities.

The South Korean government is focusing on the self-support and self-reliance policies for the North Korean defectors, yet the success of the self-support and self-reliance policies depends on whether the North Korean defectors successfully settle in the South Korean society. The North Korean defectors are making great efforts to start their new lives in the South Korean society, but it is not easy to adapt to a capitalist society. In particular, economic instability, different values, sociocultural heterogeneity, psychological and mental instability, etc., which the North Korean defectors demonstrate in the process of their adaptation to the South Korean society, are major factors in their social maladjustment[2].

If the North Korean defectors fail to settle in the South Korean society economically, culturally, and psychologically in a stable manner, their exposure to safety may increase. That is, if the North Korean defectors continue to stay in the lower class economically, they can easily fall into the temptation to commit crimes, and if they are not psychologically stable, they are very prone to the victimization of crimes[3].

In particular, the involvement of the North Korean defectors in crimes due to their lack of understanding of the domestic judicial system and difficulties in their livelihood is increasing, which might operate as a new security threat.

As a matter of fact, it has been reported that the North Korean defector who defected to North Korea this time lived in Nowon-gu, Seoul and lived in difficult circumstances, such as by working as a cleaner as a single household. It has been known that he was receiving more than KRW 500,000 per month as the basic living allowance and the basic housing allowance, and his assets were over KRW 10 million[4].

Hence, it may be said that the successful settlement of the North Korean defectors in South Korea is an important factor not only for the success of traditional security activities against North Korea, but also for the domestic security and safety, as well as blocking any links with transnational crimes[5].

In this respect it is necessary to discuss the security police, which is the department in charge of the North Korean defectors of the police, which is the first criminal justice institution we come into contact with in our daily lives.

The existing security police activities mainly focused on cracking down on the security criminals related to North Korea and anti-communism, but the increasing number of cyber terrorism including North Korea, airport and port security activities, and the North Korean defectors, especially the security police organization, as the police organization that guarantees public order and security, may be able to provide better quality security related services and security services when they are positively formed according to the sound perception of the security police[6]. The role of the security police is far much more important because the security police organization, which is significantly affected by the organization as a whole, can change the status, role, size, and manpower structure of the organization depending on their capabilities[7][8].

Hence, in this study, the perception and attitude towards safety of the North Korean defectors was analyzed according to the educational background, rank, and job acquisition path of the security police targeting the police officers of the security police organization, which is the

central institution in charge of security in the Republic of Korea, and based on which, the study seeks to explore the ways to help improve the active safety awareness of the security police towards the North Korean defectors[9].

In particular, this study has focused on how the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors varies according to the educational background, rank, and job acquisition path of the security police department among various characteristics of security police. This is because among the important topics in terms of the personnel management not only for the security police but also for the entire South Korean police organization is the educational background, rank, and the job acquisition path of individual police officers[10].

As a matter of fact, in the case of the South Korean police, the educational background of the police officers is widely distributed such as high school graduation, junior college graduation, university graduation, and graduate school graduation, as well as a special institution of education called the Korean National Police University. Furthermore, the police's job acquisition path is consisted of not only general police officers, but also various ranks such as the rank of inspector consisted of candidates for police officers or graduates of the Korean National Police University, and other lieutenants and police officers[11].

Hence, the educational background, rank, and job acquisition path of security police can operate as important factors in the evaluation of the North Korean defectors, and based on which, a negative organizational culture which hinders the growth and development of the organization will be discovered[12][13][14].

Hence, in this study, through the 3 variables of educational background, rank, and job acquisition path, the security police's perception of the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors and the security police's policy measures to improve the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors are intended to be explored.

2. Research Method

2.1. Research subjects and sampling method

In this study, among police officers in the security department as of 2020 who had experience in work related North Korean defectors, 100 trainees in the Police Human Resources Development Institute were surveyed via self-administration method. Among the collected survey questionnaires, 91 were selected as valid samples, excluding those whose answers were incomplete or missing.

Table 1. The general characteristic of the research subjects.

	Description	N (%)	Total
Gender	Male	61 (67.0%)	91
	Female	30 (33.0%)	
Age	20s	7 (7.7%)	91
	30s	28 (30.8%)	
	40s	30 (33.0%)	
	50s or older	26 (28.6%)	
Education	High school	14 (15.4%)	91
	Junior college	30 (33.0%)	
	College	43 (47.3%)	
	Graduate school	4 (4.4%)	
Rank	Policemen/women	1 (1.1%)	91
	Senior policemen/women	19 (20.9%)	
	Assistant inspector	18 (19.8%)	
	Inspector	29 (31.9%)	
	Senior inspector	14 (15.4%)	
	Superintendent	10 (11.0%)	

Employment path	General recruitment	75 (82.4%)	91
	Special recruitment	5 (5.5%)	
	Police Academy	2 (2.2%)	
	Police cadet	9 (9.9%)	
	Other	0 (0.0%)	
The total length of service as a police officer	5 years and less	13 (14.3%)	91
	6-10 years	32 (35.2%)	
	11-15 years	13 (14.3%)	
	16-20 years	13 (14.3%)	
	Longer than 20 years	20 (22.0%)	
The length of service at the security department	2 years and less	16 (17.6%)	91
	3-5 years	56 (61.5%)	
	6-10 years	17 (18.7%)	
	Longer than 10 years	2 (2.2%)	
The number of police officers in the organization	10 or less	18 (19.8%)	91
	11 or more and 15 or less	42 (46.2%)	
	16 or more and 20 or less	24 (26.4%)	
	More than 21	7 (7.7%)	
Service location	Tier 1 areas (big cities)	80 (87.9%)	91
	Tier 2 areas	11 (12.1%)	
	Tier 3 areas (rural areas)	0 (0.0%)	

2.2. Measuring instrument

The appropriate method for each verification method was chosen to increase the content validity and verify the construct validity of the questionnaire. Content validity was validated through consultation with relevant experts to adopt survey questions suitable for the purpose of the study, and the reliability of the survey questions was shown to be Cronbach's α coefficient .878.

Table 2. The questions.

	Questions
Q-1	North Korean refugees are satisfied with their lives in South Korea.
Q-2	North Korean refugees are agonizing because of their families left behind in North Korea.
Q-3	North Korean refugees are feeling threatened.
Q-4	North Korean refugees feel antagonistic towards South Koreans.
Q-5	North Korean refugees believe that there are forces in the South Korean society which follow the North Korean regime.
Q-6	Police officers in charge of personal protection play such an important role in the settlement process for the North Korean refugees in South Korea.
Q-7	North Korean refugees believe that they could pose a threat to themselves following political changes in South Korea.
Q-8	for the North Korean refugees, the police officers in charge of personal protection need a variety of help in addition to their duties.
Q-9	Counseling is provided for the North Korean refugees across various issues as the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-10	North Korean refugees are satisfied with South Korea's police officer system for personal protection.
Q-11	North Korean refugees desire facilitation of legal assistance related issues for the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-12	North Korean refugees desire facilitation of the employment and job placement related issues for the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-13	North Korean refugees facilitation of the personal protection related issues of the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-14	North Korean refugees are satisfied with the duty of the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-15	North Korean refugees believe that the South Korean police organization is an organization dedicated to serving the people.
Q-16	North Korean refugees consider the South Korean police organization to be an honest law enforcement organization.
Q-17	North Korean refugees believe that the South Korean police organization is a coercive organization which rules over the people.
Q-18	North Korean refugees believe that the South Korean organization is one which protects the socially disadvantaged.
Q-19	North Korean refugees visit the South Korean police stations with ease as needed.
Q-20	North Korean refugees visit South Korean police stations to find North Korean refugees or relatives.
Q-21	North Korean refugees visit South Korean police stations because they have been defrauded or assaulted by someone.
Q-22	North Korean refugees visit South Korean police stations to seek legal assistance.
Q-23	North Korean refugees visit South Korean police stations to seek help with how they are treated unfairly such as unpaid wages.
Q-24	Understanding of South Korean society is the most necessary education for the North Korean refugees to adapt to the South Korean society.
Q-25	Understanding legal aspects is the most necessary education for the North Korean refugees to adapt to the South Korean society.
Q-26	Understanding cultural life is the most necessary education for the North Korean refugees to adapt to the South Korean society.
Q-27	Understanding vocational training is the most necessary education for the North Korean refugees to adapt to the South Korean society.
Q-28	North Korean refugees are looking for jobs themselves in the South Korean society.
Q-29	North Korean refugees are looking for jobs in the South Korean society through religious organizations.

Q-30	North Korean refugees are looking for jobs in the South Korean society through manpower agencies.
Q-31	North Korean refugees look for jobs in the South Korean society through the police officers in charge of personal protection.
Q-32	North Korean refugees are looking for jobs in the South Korean society through other governmental agencies (vocational counselors and the North-South Hana Foundation).
Q-33	The largest challenge for the North Korean refugees in settling in the South Korean society is finding a job.
Q-34	The largest challenge for the North Korean refugees in settling in the South Korean society is their personal safety.
Q-35	The largest challenge for the North Korean refugees in settling in the South Korean society is their economic life.
Q-36	The largest challenge for the North Korean refugees in settling in the South Korean society is their adaptation to daily lives.
Q-37	The largest challenge for the North Korean refugees in settling in the South Korean society is their communication with neighbors.
Q-38	The average monthly income per household of the North Korean refugees is moderate.

2.3. Data processing and analysis method

The data processing for this study was performed with the SPSS 23.0 Program, which is a statistical package program, and the statistical verification was performed according to the purpose of data analysis as follows.

First, the frequency analysis was performed to examine and understand the general characteristics by using the SPSS/PC+23.0 program.

Second, to validate the reliability of the questionnaire, the Cronbach's α coefficient was calculated.

Third, the one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine and understand the differences in the perception of the North Korean defectors according to the number of police officers.

Fourth, the t-test was conducted to examine and understand the difference in the perception towards the North Korean defectors of the security police according to the working area.

3. Research Results

3.1. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors of the security police according to the educational background

Table 3. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to the educational background.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	High school graduates	14	2.3571	.49725	3.341	.053	
	Community college graduates	30	2.5000	.68229			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.7442	.58117			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.2500	.50000			
Q-2	High school graduates	14	2.6429	.63332	.181	.909	
	Community college graduates	30	2.5333	.57135			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.5116	.59250			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.5000	.57735			
Q-3	High school graduates	14	2.2143	.42582	.498	.685	
	Community college graduates	30	2.4000	.56324			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.3953	.58308			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.5000	.57735			
Q-4	High school graduates	14	2.3571	.49725	.187	.905	
	Community college graduates	30	2.3333	.47946			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.3953	.49471			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.5000	.57735			
Q-5	High school graduates	14	3.0000	.78446	1.988	.122	
	Community college graduates	30	2.7000	.79438			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.5349	.63053			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.2500	.50000			
Q-6	High school graduates	14	3.4286	.64621	.661	.578	
	Community college graduates	30	3.2667	.82768			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4419	.73363			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-7	High school graduates	14	3.3571	.74495	1.840	.146	

	Community college graduates	30	2.9000	.71197			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.8372	.75373			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.7500	.95743			
Q-8	High school graduates	14	3.7143	.72627	2.100	.106	
	Community college graduates	30	3.1000	.92289			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4419	.73363			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.2500	.95743			
Q-9	High school graduates	14	3.5714	.64621	.995	.399	
	Community college graduates	30	3.1333	.81931			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3023	.88734			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	.57735			
Q-10	High school graduates	14	2.7857	.80178	3.463	.020	C>A
	Community college graduates	30	3.2000	.71438			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4186	.69804			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-11	High school graduates	14	3.0714	.73005	.734	.535	
	Community college graduates	30	3.2000	.61026			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3256	.68037			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	1.00000			
Q-12	High school graduates	14	3.1429	.77033	.841	.475	
	Community college graduates	30	3.3000	.59596			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3721	.78750			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-13	High school graduates	14	3.0000	.67937	1.582	.199	
	Community college graduates	30	3.2000	.71438			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4186	.66306			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	1.00000			
Q-14	High school graduates	14	2.7857	.69929	2.576	.059	
	Community college graduates	30	3.0667	.73968			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3721	.81717			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	.57735			
Q-15	High school graduates	14	3.4286	.64621	.900	.445	
	Community college graduates	30	3.2667	.73968			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.5581	.76539			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	1.00000			
Q-16	High school graduates	14	3.2857	.82542	.926	.432	
	Community college graduates	30	3.2667	.69149			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4884	.76756			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-17	High school graduates	14	2.1429	.36314	.714	.546	
	Community college graduates	30	2.3667	.66868			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.3953	.62257			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.5000	.57735			
Q-18	High school graduates	14	3.1429	.77033	.396	.756	
	Community college graduates	30	3.3000	.70221			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3721	.78750			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	1.00000			
Q-19	High school graduates	14	2.2857	.46881	5.085	.003	B,C,D>A
	Community college graduates	30	2.9333	.73968			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.0233	.85880			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-20	High school graduates	14	2.3571	.49725	1.531	.212	
	Community college graduates	30	2.6000	.67466			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.6744	.60635			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	0.00000			
Q-21	High school graduates	14	3.4286	.75593	.845	.473	
	Community college graduates	30	3.1000	.60743			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.1860	.73211			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	0.00000			
Q-22	High school graduates	14	2.8571	.36314	1.325	.271	

	Community college graduates	30	3.0667	.36515			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.1628	.61452			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.2500	.95743			
Q-23	High school graduates	14	2.5000	.51887	2.051	.113	
	Community college graduates	30	2.9000	.66176			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.0000	.72375			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	.00000			
Q-24	High school graduates	14	3.0714	.91687	1.292	.282	
	Community college graduates	30	3.3667	.55605			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3953	.69486			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-25	High school graduates	14	2.7857	.57893	2.910	.039	C>A
	Community college graduates	30	3.1667	.59209			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3488	.68604			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	1.00000			
Q-26	High school graduates	14	3.7857	.42582	1.414	.244	
	Community college graduates	30	3.4000	.62146			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.5349	.59156			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	.57735			
Q-27	High school graduates	14	3.2857	.72627	.925	.432	
	Community college graduates	30	3.4000	.56324			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.2558	.65803			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-28	High school graduates	14	2.5714	.75593	4.127	.009	C>A
	Community college graduates	30	2.9333	.69149			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.2558	.65803			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.7500	.50000			
Q-29	High school graduates	14	2.5714	.64621	2.408	.073	
	Community college graduates	30	2.9000	.40258			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.9767	.51123			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.7500	.50000			
Q-30	High school graduates	14	3.0000	.39223	.206	.892	
	Community college graduates	30	2.9333	.44978			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.9070	.42617			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	.00000			
Q-31	High school graduates	14	2.7143	.46881	2.406	.073	
	Community college graduates	30	3.0000	.64327			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.2093	.67465			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.2500	.50000			
Q-32	High school graduates	14	3.5714	.64621	2.029	.116	
	Community college graduates	30	3.1333	.62881			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.1860	.58781			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	.00000			
Q-33	High school graduates	14	3.6429	.74495	1.953	.127	
	Community college graduates	30	3.1667	.69893			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.3023	.70828			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.7500	.50000			
Q-34	High school graduates	14	2.5000	.65044	1.098	.354	
	Community college graduates	30	2.2000	.55086			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.3953	.58308			
	Graduate school graduates	4	2.2500	.50000			
Q-35	High school graduates	14	3.7857	.42582	1.512	.217	
	Community college graduates	30	3.4000	.56324			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.5349	.66722			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.2500	.95743			
Q-36	High school graduates	14	3.7857	.57893	1.035	.381	
	Community college graduates	30	3.5000	.50855			
	Four year college graduates	43	3.4651	.66722			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.5000	.57735			
Q-37	High school graduates	14	3.7143	.61125	1.549	.208	

Q-38	Community college graduates	30	3.5000	.57235	1.028	.384	
	Four year college graduates	43	3.5581	.58969			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	.81650			
	High school graduates	14	2.7143	.46881			
	Community college graduates	30	2.9333	.25371			
	Four year college graduates	43	2.8140	.54580			
	Graduate school graduates	4	3.0000	.00000			

Note: A: High school graduates, B: Community college graduates, C: Four year college graduates, D: Graduate school graduates.

<Table 3> illustrates the difference in terms of the perception towards the North Korean defectors of the security police according to their educational background. As a result of the analysis performed, at the 1% level, Q-19 community college graduates, 4 year college graduates, and graduate school graduates turned out to be higher than the high school graduates. Q-28 4 year college graduates turned out to be higher than the high school graduates.

At the 5% level, Q-10 and Q-25 turned out to be higher among the 4 year college graduates than the high school graduates.

The higher the educational background of the security police, the higher the awareness of the safety towards the North Korean defectors. It seems that the higher the educational background, the more positively the South Korean life satisfaction for the North Korean defectors is, and the perception that the most necessary education for the additional supplementation and adaptation to the South Korean society requires an understanding of the legal part.

3.2. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to rank

Table 4. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to rank.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	Police officer	1	2.0000		.598	.701	
	Corporal	19	2.6842	.82007			
	Sergeant	18	2.5000	.51450			
	Lieutenant	29	2.5862	.50123			
	Inspector	14	2.7143	.61125			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.8000	.78881			
Q-2	Police officer	1	2.0000		.800	.553	
	Corporal	19	2.6842	.67104			
	Sergeant	18	2.5000	.51450			
	Lieutenant	29	2.5862	.56803			
	Inspector	14	2.5000	.65044			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.3000	.48305			
Q-3	Police officer	1	2.0000		.645	.666	
	Corporal	19	2.4211	.60698			
	Sergeant	18	2.2778	.46089			
	Lieutenant	29	2.4828	.57450			
	Inspector	14	2.3571	.63332			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.2000	.42164			
Q-4	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.760	.130	
	Corporal	19	2.4211	.50726			
	Sergeant	18	2.2778	.46089			
	Lieutenant	29	2.5172	.50855			
	Inspector	14	2.1429	.36314			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.3000	.48305			
Q-5	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.447	.216	
	Corporal	19	2.8421	.76472			
	Sergeant	18	2.7222	.75190			
	Lieutenant	29	2.3793	.62185			
	Inspector	14	2.6429	.74495			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.9000	.73786			
Q-6	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.473	.207	
	Corporal	19	3.4211	.69248			
	Sergeant	18	3.3333	.90749			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2069	.67503			
	Inspector	14	3.5000	.75955			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.9000	.56765			

Q-7	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.219	.307	
	Corporal	19	3.1579	.60214			
	Sergeant	18	2.8333	.92355			
	Lieutenant	29	2.7586	.78627			
	Inspector	14	2.8571	.66299			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.3000	.67495			
Q-8	Police officer	1	4.0000		.946	.456	
	Corporal	19	3.4211	.83771			
	Sergeant	18	3.2778	.89479			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2069	.81851			
	Inspector	14	3.3571	.74495			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.8000	.78881			
Q-9	Police officer	1	3.0000		2.200	.062	
	Corporal	19	3.3158	.67104			
	Sergeant	18	3.1111	.96338			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1034	.90019			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.64621			
	Chief superintendent	10	4.0000	.47140			
Q-10	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.385	.238	
	Corporal	19	3.1053	.80930			
	Sergeant	18	3.3333	.68599			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1724	.71058			
	Inspector	14	3.5000	.65044			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.5000	.84984			
Q-11	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.442	.218	
	Corporal	19	3.0000	.74536			
	Sergeant	18	3.3333	.59409			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1724	.71058			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.51355			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.6000	.69921			
Q-12	Police officer	1	3.0000		.415	.837	
	Corporal	19	3.2632	.65338			
	Sergeant	18	3.3889	.77754			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2759	.75103			
	Inspector	14	3.2857	.61125			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.6000	.84327			
Q-13	Police officer	1	2.0000		2.657	.028	
	Corporal	19	2.9474	.77986			
	Sergeant	18	3.3889	.50163			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2759	.75103			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.64621			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.7000	.48305			
Q-14	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.046	.396	
	Corporal	19	3.0000	.66667			
	Sergeant	18	3.2778	.82644			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1379	.78940			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.75593			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.3000	.94868			
Q-15	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.077	.379	
	Corporal	19	3.5789	.60698			
	Sergeant	18	3.4444	.70479			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2414	.83045			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.75593			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.8000	.78881			
Q-16	Police officer	1	3.0000		1.377	.241	
	Corporal	19	3.3158	.58239			
	Sergeant	18	3.5000	.61835			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2414	.83045			
	Inspector	14	3.3571	.74495			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.9000	.87560			
Q-17	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.536	.187	
	Corporal	19	2.2632	.56195			
	Sergeant	18	2.1667	.38348			
	Lieutenant	29	2.5862	.73277			
	Inspector	14	2.3571	.63332			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.2000	.42164			
Q-18	Police officer	1	4.0000		2.280	.054	
	Corporal	19	3.1053	.73747			
	Sergeant	18	3.3333	.76696			

	Lieutenant	29	3.1379	.69303			
	Inspector	14	3.5000	.75955			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.9000	.73786			
Q-19	Police officer	1	2.0000		.640	.670	
	Corporal	19	2.7368	.73349			
	Sergeant	18	2.9444	.80237			
	Lieutenant	29	2.8966	.72431			
	Inspector	14	3.0714	.91687			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.1000	1.10050			
Q-20	Police officer	1	2.0000		.859	.512	
	Corporal	19	2.4737	.51299			
	Sergeant	18	2.6111	.69780			
	Lieutenant	29	2.7586	.68947			
	Inspector	14	2.5000	.51887			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.7000	.48305			
Q-21	Police officer	1	4.0000		1.181	.325	
	Corporal	19	3.1579	.83421			
	Sergeant	18	3.1111	.58298			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1034	.61788			
	Inspector	14	3.1429	.77033			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.6000	.51640			
Q-22	Police officer	1	3.0000		2.780	.022	
	Corporal	19	2.9474	.40465			
	Sergeant	18	3.1667	.38348			
	Lieutenant	29	3.0345	.42112			
	Inspector	14	2.9286	.61573			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.6000	.84327			
Q-23	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.114	.359	
	Corporal	19	2.7368	.80568			
	Sergeant	18	2.9444	.72536			
	Lieutenant	29	3.0000	.46291			
	Inspector	14	2.7143	.46881			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.1000	.99443			
Q-24	Police officer	1	2.0000		3.218	.010	
	Corporal	19	3.1053	.73747			
	Sergeant	18	3.4444	.51131			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2414	.68947			
	Inspector	14	3.5000	.65044			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.9000	.56765			
Q-25	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.770	.128	
	Corporal	19	3.2105	.63060			
	Sergeant	18	3.2222	.73208			
	Lieutenant	29	3.0345	.49877			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.64621			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.5000	.97183			
Q-26	Police officer	1	4.0000		.845	.522	
	Corporal	19	3.4737	.61178			
	Sergeant	18	3.5000	.61835			
	Lieutenant	29	3.4138	.62776			
	Inspector	14	3.7143	.46881			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.7000	.48305			
Q-27	Police officer	1	4.0000		1.333	.258	
	Corporal	19	3.3684	.59726			
	Sergeant	18	3.2778	.57451			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1724	.71058			
	Inspector	14	3.3571	.63332			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.7000	.48305			
Q-28	Police officer	1	2.0000		.784	.564	
	Corporal	19	3.2105	.85498			
	Sergeant	18	2.9444	.72536			
	Lieutenant	29	3.0000	.65465			
	Inspector	14	3.0714	.61573			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.9000	.73786			
Q-29	Police officer	1	2.0000		.981	.434	
	Corporal	19	2.8421	.50146			
	Sergeant	18	3.0000	.59409			
	Lieutenant	29	2.8276	.46820			
	Inspector	14	2.8571	.36314			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.0000	.66667			

Q-30	Police officer	1	3.0000		.621	.684	
	Corporal	19	2.9474	.40465			
	Sergeant	18	3.0556	.41618			
	Lieutenant	29	2.8621	.51576			
	Inspector	14	2.8571	.36314			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.0000	.00000			
Q-31	Police officer	1	3.0000		.578	.716	
	Corporal	19	3.0000	.66667			
	Sergeant	18	3.0556	.63914			
	Lieutenant	29	2.9655	.49877			
	Inspector	14	3.2857	.72627			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.2000	.91894			
Q-32	Police officer	1	4.0000		.612	.691	
	Corporal	19	3.2632	.73349			
	Sergeant	18	3.1667	.51450			
	Lieutenant	29	3.1724	.53911			
	Inspector	14	3.1429	.77033			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.4000	.51640			
Q-33	Police officer	1	4.0000		2.110	.072	
	Corporal	19	3.2632	.80568			
	Sergeant	18	3.4444	.61570			
	Lieutenant	29	3.0690	.70361			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.64621			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.8000	.63246			
Q-34	Police officer	1	2.0000		1.275	.282	
	Corporal	19	2.3684	.59726			
	Sergeant	18	2.5000	.70711			
	Lieutenant	29	2.1724	.38443			
	Inspector	14	2.2857	.46881			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.6000	.84327			
Q-35	Police officer	1	4.0000		1.668	.151	
	Corporal	19	3.5263	.61178			
	Sergeant	18	3.6111	.50163			
	Lieutenant	29	3.2759	.64899			
	Inspector	14	3.6429	.63332			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.8000	.63246			
Q-36	Police officer	1	4.0000		.653	.660	
	Corporal	19	3.5789	.60698			
	Sergeant	18	3.6111	.50163			
	Lieutenant	29	3.4138	.62776			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.64621			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.7000	.67495			
Q-37	Police officer	1	4.0000		1.788	.124	
	Corporal	19	3.5789	.60698			
	Sergeant	18	3.6667	.48507			
	Lieutenant	29	3.3448	.61388			
	Inspector	14	3.4286	.75593			
	Chief superintendent	10	3.9000	.31623			
Q-38	Police officer	1	3.0000		.359	.875	
	Corporal	19	2.7895	.53530			
	Sergeant	18	2.8333	.38348			
	Lieutenant	29	2.9310	.37139			
	Inspector	14	2.7857	.42582			
	Chief superintendent	10	2.8000	.63246			

Note: A: Police officer, B: Corporal, C: Sergeant, D: Lieutenant, E: Inspector, F: Chief superintendent.

<Table 4> illustrates the difference in the perception towards the North Korean defectors of the security police according to their rank. As a result of the analysis performed, Q-13 and Q-22 turned out to be higher than at the 1% level. As for Q-7, Q-8, Q-21, Q-27, Q-32, Q-33, Q-36, and Q-37, and at the 5% level, grade 2 (small and medium cities) areas turned out to be higher than the grade 1 (large cities) areas. However, as for Q-14, grade 1 (large cities) areas turned out to be higher than the grade 2 (small and medium cities) areas.

In terms of the difference in the perception towards the North Korean defectors in the working area according to the rank route, as for the 5% level for Q-7, Q-8, Q-21, Q-27, Q-32, Q-33, Q-36, and Q-37, grade 2 (small and medium cities) areas turned out to be higher than

the grade 1 (large cities) areas. This is because, among the security police organizations, those located in large cities exhibit high work performance through their voluntary and active work related motivation, as well as their collaboration through smooth communication between the upper level managers or middle level managers, the so-called leaders, and the lower level members. This is because the “followership” formed by the positive leaders can voluntarily lead to the 'passionate' and 'intelligent' efforts of their subordinates.

3.3. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to the job acquisition path

Table 5. Differences in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to the job acquisition path.

		N	M	SD	F	sig	post hot
Q-1	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.6000	.61512	.452	.717	
	Special recruits	5	2.6000	.54772			
	Police university	2	3.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.7778	.83333			
Q-2	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.5600	.59820	.418	.740	
	Special recruits	5	2.6000	.54772			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	2.3333	.50000			
Q-3	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.4000	.56949	.587	.625	
	Special recruits	5	2.4000	.54772			
	Police university	2	2.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.2222	.44096			
Q-4	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.4000	.49320	.613	.608	
	Special recruits	5	2.2000	.44721			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	2.2222	.44096			
Q-5	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.5867	.67969	1.550	.207	
	Special recruits	5	3.2000	1.09545			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	2.8889	.78174			
Q-6	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2933	.73104	3.248	.026	D>A
	Special recruits	5	3.6000	.54772			
	Police university	2	4.0000	1.41421			
	Executive candidates	9	4.0000	.50000			
Q-7	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.8533	.74785	3.363	.022	B>A
	Special recruits	5	3.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.2222	.66667			
Q-8	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2533	.80695	3.156	.059	
	Special recruits	5	3.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	4.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.7778	.83333			
Q-9	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.1333	.79412	6.973	.000	D>A
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	4.0000	.50000			
Q-10	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2133	.72211	1.256	.295	
	Special recruits	5	3.2000	.44721			
	Police university	2	4.0000	1.41421			
	Executive candidates	9	3.5556	.88192			
Q-11	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2133	.62154	2.948	.057	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.83666			
	Police university	2	4.0000	1.41421			
	Executive candidates	9	3.6667	.70711			
Q-12	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2800	.68891	2.334	.080	
	Special recruits	5	3.0000	.70711			
	Police university	2	4.0000	1.41421			

	Executive candidates	9	3.7778	.66667			
Q-13	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.1867	.67169	4.069	.009	C>A
	Special recruits	5	3.6000	.89443			
	Police university	2	4.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.6667	.50000			
Q-14	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.1600	.75409	2.052	.113	
	Special recruits	5	3.0000	.70711			
	Police university	2	4.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.2222	.97183			
Q-15	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.3467	.72584	3.081	.052	
	Special recruits	5	3.6000	.54772			
	Police university	2	4.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.8889	.78174			
Q-16	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2933	.69308	3.694	.015	D>A
	Special recruits	5	3.6000	.54772			
	Police university	2	3.5000	2.12132			
	Executive candidates	9	4.1111	.60093			
Q-17	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.4133	.63869	1.560	.205	
	Special recruits	5	2.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	2.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.1111	.33333			
Q-18	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2133	.74059	3.782	.013	D>A
	Special recruits	5	3.4000	.54772			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	4.0000	.70711			
Q-19	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.9333	.72286	3.651	.016	C>B
	Special recruits	5	2.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	1.41421			
	Executive candidates	9	3.0000	1.22474			
Q-20	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.6667	.62240	1.986	.122	
	Special recruits	5	2.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	2.5556	.52705			
Q-21	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.0667	.66441	5.765	.001	B>A
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.5556	.52705			
Q-22	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.0533	.43163	2.473	.067	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	3.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.4444	1.01379			
Q-23	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.8933	.62759	.326	.807	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.83666			
	Police university	2	2.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.0000	1.00000			
Q-24	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2133	.66360	6.842	.000	B,D>A
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	4.0000	.50000			
Q-25	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.1600	.63756	1.432	.239	
	Special recruits	5	3.2000	.44721			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.4444	1.01379			
Q-26	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.4533	.59940	2.616	.056	
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.7778	.44096			
Q-27	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2667	.64375	1.870	.141	
	Special recruits	5	3.4000	.54772			
	Police university	2	3.5000	.70711			

	Executive candidates	9	3.7778	.44096			
Q-28	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.0400	.68655	.637	.593	
	Special recruits	5	2.6000	.89443			
	Police university	2	3.0000	1.41421			
	Executive candidates	9	3.1111	.78174			
Q-29	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.8800	.51883	.075	.973	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	3.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.8889	.60093			
Q-30	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.9467	.43163	.241	.867	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	3.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.8889	.33333			
Q-31	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.0533	.59031	1.740	.165	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.83666			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.1111	.92796			
Q-32	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.1333	.60030	4.160	.008	B>A
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	3.5000	.70711			
	Executive candidates	9	3.4444	.52705			
Q-33	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.2000	.69749	5.385	.002	D>A
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.8889	.60093			
Q-34	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.3067	.54459	2.190	.095	
	Special recruits	5	2.2000	.44721			
	Police university	2	2.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.7778	.83333			
Q-35	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.4267	.61892	3.240	.056	
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.8889	.60093			
Q-36	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.4533	.59940	2.443	.070	
	Special recruits	5	4.0000	.00000			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.7778	.66667			
Q-37	Publicly recruited police officers	75	3.4400	.59820	4.578	.005	B>A
	Special recruits	5	4.2000	.44721			
	Police university	2	4.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	3.8889	.33333			
Q-38	Publicly recruited police officers	75	2.8667	.41373	.630	.598	
	Special recruits	5	2.8000	.44721			
	Police university	2	3.0000	.00000			
	Executive candidates	9	2.6667	.70711			

Note: A: Publicly recruited police officers, B: Special recruits, C: Police university, D: Executive candidates.

<Table 5> illustrates the difference in the perception towards the North Korean defectors of the security police according to their job acquisition path. As a result of the analysis performed, as for Q-9, the executive candidates turned out to be higher than the publicly recruited police officers, and as for Q-24, the special recruits and executive candidates turned out to be 0.1% higher than those of the publicly recruited police officers.

As for Q-13, the police university turned out to be higher than the publicly recruited police officers, and as for Q-21, Q-32, and Q-37, the special recruits turned out to be higher than the publicly recruited police officers, and as for Q-33, executive candidates turned out to be higher than the publicly recruited police officers by 1% level.

As for Q-6, Q-16, and Q-18, executive candidates turned out to be higher than the publicly recruited police officers, and as for Q-7, the special recruits turned out to be higher than the

publicly recruited police officers, and as for Q-19, the police university turned out to be higher than the special recruits by 5% level.

Across most of the questions which demonstrated the statistical significance in the job acquisition path, it turned out that the executive candidates or security police officers of the police university positively evaluated the perception towards the North Korean defectors relative to the general police officers or special recruits.

This means that the lower ranking members of the general police officers with a relatively low educational background tend to have a stronger negative perception towards the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors. Furthermore, such an analytical result means that the security police officers with a relatively low education background and general police officers, do not exercise their positive followership in terms of the leader's authority or in a conservative organizational culture, yet lead a passive and passive organizational life.

4. Conclusions and Discussion

As noted earlier, this study empirically validated how the perception and attitude towards the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors varied according to their educational background, rank, and job acquisition path targeting the police officers of the security police organization.

As a result of the analysis performed, first, in most of the questions which demonstrated the statistical significance in the difference in the perception towards the North Korean defectors according to educational background, the higher the educational background of the security police, the higher the safety awareness towards the North Korean defectors.

It seems that the higher the educational background, the more positive the South Korean life satisfaction for the North Korean defectors is, and the perception that the most necessary education for additional supplementation and adaptation to the South Korean society requires the understanding of the legal part[15].

Following which, across most of the questions which demonstrated the statistical significance in the rank path, it turned out that the executive candidates and security police officers from the police force positively evaluated the safety awareness towards the North Korean defectors relative to the general police officers or special recruits.

In particular, among the security police organizations, those located in large cities demonstrate the high work performance through their voluntary and active work motivation, as well as their collaboration through smooth communication between the upper and middle managers, so-called leaders, and the lower level members[16][17].

Lastly, across most of the questions which demonstrated the statistical significance in the job acquisition path, it turned out that the executive candidates or security police officers of the police force positively evaluated the safety awareness towards the North Korean defectors relative to the general police officers or special recruits. This means that lower ranking members of the general police officers with a relatively low educational background tend to have a strong negative perception towards the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors[18]. Furthermore, such an analytical result means that security police officers with a relatively low education background, general police officers, do not exercise their positive followership in terms of the leader's authority or in a conservative organizational culture, yet lead a passive and passive organizational life[19].

Consequently, such an analytical result means that the lower ranking members of the general police officers with a relatively low educational background tend to have a strong negative perception of the safety awareness towards the North Korean defectors within the security police organization to which they belong[20]. Furthermore, such an analytical result means that the security police with a relatively low education background and the general police of-

officers are not able to exercise their positive work competency in a conservative organizational culture and lead a passive and passive organizational life [21].

As such, if the dissatisfaction with the organization should continue to accumulate, they would experience such low levels of work and job stress and burnout, while the importance of the security police to maintain the security system would decline, and hence, such negative organizational culture must be improved as early as possible [22].

The security police officers are important security assets who have been nurtured over a long period of time based on the professional security management system [23]. Nevertheless, the security police officers with a relatively low educational background, who comprise the majority of the security police organization's human resources negatively evaluate the leader's followership and demonstrate an alienated form of followership as well as the organizational efficiency, which further might trigger the problem of lowering the capability of the security police, which is directly related to the national security [24].

Hence, from such a point of view, in order for the security police officers with a relatively low educational background and the general police officers to renew as the more voluntary and active exemplary followers, it would first be necessary to improve the overall job acquisition path of the entire police organization, including the security police.

As for the security police officers, professionalism is far more important than rank. However, the executive candidates, police officers who graduated from the police university, and other so-called managerial level police officers are given higher positions irrespective of their professionalism, and based on which, they can lead and supervise the security police officers with a relatively low educational background and the general police officers, in which case, naturally, it would be difficult to form a positive organizational culture in the perception of safety towards the North Korean defectors [25].

Hence, ultimately, it is necessary to unify the police's job acquisition path for the general police officers, yet in reality, this would be difficult to implement in such a short period of time. At least in terms of the security police organization, the personnel management which prioritizes professionalism over rank will be required [26].

For instance, it would be necessary to strengthen the capabilities of the security police officers who have achieved their long term performance through a high level of professionalism. It would be no exaggeration to state that the key factor which can effectively improve the North Korean refugees' safety system depends on the capabilities of the security police. It would also be necessary to demonstrate the interest in the manpower's increase and budget support to ensure that the security police can work to their full potential, and a strategic approach to increase manpower annually, no matter how small it is, it would still be necessary. Apart from the manpower's budget support, it would also be an urgent issue to change the awareness of the security police officers in order to strengthen the capabilities of the security police [27].

Second, it is necessary to systematize and substantiate the security police's on-site and daily life related services for the North Korean defectors. Even if various settlement support systems for the North Korean defectors are in place and systemized, while a comprehensive policy with equity and continuity is implemented, it is necessary to prepare for a vacuum situation that cannot be found because they are left out or marginalized in reality. Whether the effect of their settlement support is evenly reaching out to all North Korean defectors across the nation, and whether there are overlapping or omissions that halve the effect, it is considered that the settlement support system can function properly if and only when a site based settlement support system which checks on and supplements the site is systematized, and a sup-

port system which identifies problems on the site and suggests solutions on the spot is routinely used[28].

Third, it is necessary to facilitate the civilian support system for the North Korean defectors by the security police. In order to expand the infrastructure of the settlement support system for the North Korean defectors, the participation in providing civilian support is essential, and it is also necessary to supplement the settlement support system focused on the central government and collect opinions from the private sector during the policy formulation and implementation. Unlike the government-led settlement support system, the private support system has advantages over the public support across all aspects, such as resource mobilization capacity, field expertise, and support efficiency and effectiveness. In the local community, the North Korean defectors mainly promote cooperative projects such as establishment of specialized counseling systems for each field, security cooperation committee can offer to enable the expansion of vocational training and accommodation placement, and support for the youth learning and education, and it is considered that the security police will be able to further improve the safety awareness of the North Korean defectors by providing a support service which is appropriate for each North Korean defector by providing a one-one-one support service customized for the characteristics of each North Korean defector[29].

Lastly, it would be the need for the security police's participation in the integration and coordination of the settlement support system for the North Korean defectors. In order to create an efficient settlement support system for the North Korean refugees along with the formation of a network for the settlement support systems, it would be necessary to integrate and adjust the overlapping and overcrowded settlement support systems to help prepare a clear linkage system and a system through which the division of roles is properly executed. With a support policy which stresses on the equalization and homogenization of support services from the perspective of the support entity, while realistically ignoring the opinions of the security police who manage and supervise the North Korean defectors, the safety awareness related service which the North Korean defectors truly desire cannot be expected, and given the support system's duplication and overcrowding, the quality of support services deteriorated and the North Korean defectors' will for self-support and self-reliance would likely be weakened, and ultimately, they would not be able to settle safely in the Republic of Korea safely[30].

A security police officer deployed on site says, "If the problem is on the site, the answer will also be on the site". As the center of the system to help support the safe settlement of the North Korean defectors, it cannot be helped but be stated that a large amount of manpower and budget support is urgently needed to strengthen the capabilities of the security police who share the concerns of settlement support on site, and the emphasis needs to be place again that the proactive support and a high level of interest are the shortcut to solving the problem. We will all need to think that the successful settlement of the North Korean defectors in the South Korean society is not only about realizing their humanitarian values, but also about providing support for the socially disadvantaged or recovering human life, as well as being an important asset for the future of unification on the Korean Peninsula.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	HY	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	SJ	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	BC	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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Corresponding author*
E-mail: korprof270@gmail.com

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U.S. National Strategy and Implications for Domestic Terrorism -Focus on Violent Extremism-

Chiyong Lee¹

Yongin University, Yongin, Republic of Korea

Youngseok Lee^{2*}

Kyungbuk College, Yeongju, Republic of Korea

Whanbog Bang³

Kyungbuk College, Yeongju, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: In the case of the U.S., a representative country of the anti-terrorism war, this study focused on the 'National Strategy for Domestic Terrorism in 2021' published based on various cases and analysis and analyzed its implications and suggested the direction of Korea's anti-terrorism national strategy.

Method: Based on the literature analysis, the U.S. predicts the trends and prospects of terrorism through its national strategy and background analysis of terrorism in Korea. In addition, a comparative study was conducted on the PVE policies of the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Results: The United States uses information sharing, community utilization, office establishment, violent extremism prevention education, Internet proliferation program development, and a comprehensive approach by experts in various fields.

Conclusion: Domestic terrorism should be addressed as a task of establishing legal concepts, sharing information, using local communities and partners, inviting experts in various fields and taking comprehensive and active approaches to resolving various social, cultural and political conflicts.

[Keywords] Domestic Terrorism, Terrorism, USA National Strategy, CVE, Violent Extremist

1. Introduction

Terrorism, as part of a war of terror, activities and ideologies, has led to soft-target terrorism targeting people, civilian facilities and transportation as a way of achieving terrorist group ideas, ideology and political purposes since September 11, 2001[1][2]. These aspects and characteristics of terrorism created the concept of new terrorism, and the war against terrorism against foreign terrorist groups and terrorists began[3][4]. Since then, strong anti-terrorism policies and legislation have been carried out in response to the internationalization of terrorism, and institutions in each country have conducted research and maintenance to establish a new anti-terror system to cope with new attack groups such as bioterrorism and suicide bombings[5][6][7]. Osama bin Laden, who was behind the September 11 attacks in 2011, was eventually killed and alliance of international nation won the war against Islamic States, which became an international terrorist organization due to the Syrian conflict, but was left with a variety of ideologies and conflicts, including religiously, ethnicity and racially[8][9].

Islam State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a representative international terrorist organization that emerged after Al-Qaida, spread violent ideas and ideologies to people around the world using the Internet[10], and many young people were deceived by their propaganda and transformed into violent extremists[11][12][13][14]. In addition, numerous ideologies have been differentiated due to issues such as religion, society, culture, politics, and race, and activities involving policy-making and coercion by the local government, and various conflicts caused by individuals

and organizations are pointed out as the cause. This situation left the task of not only forcibly restricting the violent acts of extremists around the world but also fundamentally solving the high conflict situation that emerged throughout society.

As such, the recent characteristics of terrorism have been directly attributed to war and conflict, as well as the radicalization of indirect and personal social issues such as age, class, position, gender, discrimination, violence and taste in all areas of society[15]. As a result of the change in terrorism, the United Nations prepared resolution 2178 and a report on the prevention of violent extremism in a meeting to analyze the social and economic conditions of violent extremism and to require countries to formulate national action plans[16][17]. Conflict prevention, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, participation in civil society, strengthening youth capacity, strengthening women's capacity, education, training and employment, and seven strategies through the Internet and social media include resolving various social conflicts. It can be seen that this was based on efforts to resolve the fundamental causes of violent extremism, away from extremist policies based on physical responses in the past.

As a result, countries have established a system for preventing, preventing and responding to violent extremism, and South Korea has selected and announced the "16 National Action Plans for Preventing Violent Extremism" based on the resolution of the 5th National Terrorism Countermeasures Committee in January 2018. In addition, there is a lack of research on violent extremism and there are not many cases for self-analysis, so it is only indirectly predicting the phenomenon through psychological, social, and eventual characteristics through foreign cases[18][19][20][21].

Then, In the case of the U.S., a representative country of the anti-terrorism war, this study focused on the 'National Strategy for Domestic Terrorism in 2021' published based on various cases and analysis and analyzed its implications and suggested the direction of Korea's anti-terrorism national strategy.

2. Background of U.S. National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism

2.1. Background

In August 2011, the White House announced a national strategy to prevent violent extremism in the United States, and made efforts to prevent violent extremism through policy planning and service to establish continuous ties between local and local government officials, develop support policies and various programs for the vulnerable.

In particular, a strategic office for information sharing was established in the Los Angeles area, an inter-agency partner system for law enforcement was established, and a terrorist prevention system was established in other regions.

This can be said to be representative examples of the establishment of DHS (Department of Homeland Security) dedicated to counter terrorism, the Afghan War, the dispatch of troops to Iraq, and the Syrian air strikes, starting with a national response system centered on overseas terrorism after September 11.

Domestic terrorism of self-sustaining terrorism emerged as a new problem as it sympathized with the use of asymmetric power by terrorist groups, propaganda, recruitment, and spread of ideology using the Internet, or intensified individual ideologies and conflicts. As the foreign counter-terrorism strategy has shifted to a domestic counter-terrorism system, long-term and comprehensive policies are being promoted to solve the fundamental causes of domestic terrorism through the concept of violent extremism.

The violent extremism prevention policy aims to protect the United States and protect the human rights and freedoms of the people by securing a system of prevention and response to domestic terrorism. In addition, unlike in the past, when war between foreign terrorist groups and terrorists was focused, the detailed goal is to clearly recognize, understand, and respond to various political, religious, ethnic, racial conflicts, ideologies, and domestic terrorism caused by these ideas and violence.

Behind the policy are the El Paso retail shooting, Charlottesville protesters, and the Gilroy Garlic Festival shooting, which means that the cause of these incidents has turned into problems that lead to events other than one "conflict factor" dealt with by each agency.

However, this kind of terrorist incident was prohibited by Article 1 of the U.S. Liberal Constitution, which prohibits investigation and classification of individual ideological ideas, and within the concept and scope of domestic terrorism (even if it represents similar violence), there was a limit to response.

Therefore, DHS' Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, published in September 2019, included "white supremacy" in the threat list for the first time since DHS was established since 9/11 and recognized ethnically motivated violent extremist, especially from the U.S.

2.2. Representative violent extremist incidents

Most of the violent extremist events in the United States show a high statistical rate of right-wing extremist events. Here, among violent extremist events, the main events appearing in the US domestic terrorist strategy report are summarized and the causes are briefly described.

2.2.1. Shooting at El Paso Walmart

Figure 1. Memorial of el paso.



Note: www.independent.co.uk (2019).

A shooting incident at Wall-Mart at the Cielo Vista Shopping Mall in El Paso on August 3, 2019 resulted in 20 deaths and 26 casualties. The culprit was 21-year-old Patrick Crucius, who justified his actions in a post suggesting racism in the name of a peaceful means that Hispanic immigrants were taking away white jobs and threatening their place in the future. This is an eco-fascist ideology that justifies violence for environmental protection and human happiness, representing a racist and anti-human ecological position.

2.2.2. Charlottesville protesters rushed into a car

Figure 2. Charlottesville protesters.



Note: www.vox.com (2017).

On August 12, 2017, thousands of members of far-right organizations across the country gathered at the University of Virginia at night with iron bars, clubs, armor, torches, pistols and attack rifles to hold a "right-wing integration" torch demonstration in Charlottesville. While civil rights and progressive citizens who criticize and oppose them protested on the streets the next day, a white supremacist rushed a vehicle toward opposing protesters, seriously injuring four people and killing a woman. An alternative right-wing/white supremacist group led by Richard Spencer protested with torches when the incident decided to remove the statue of Robert E. Lee, a South Korean general during the Civil War, in Charlottesville, and protesters protested with candles. Later, on June 8, the KKK group protested, and on July 8, the KKK group protested once again, but stepped down after confronting the protestors who opposed it. As such, conflicts between groups escalated and the Charlottesville protesters incident occurred.

2.2.3. Shooting at the Gilroy garlic festival

Figure 3. Memorial of gilroy.



Note: www.npr.org.

A 19-year-old shooting suspect William Leagan fired an aggressive rifle at the Gilroy Garlic Festival, killing three people and injuring 15 others. Regan, who was the culprit, was shot and killed by police responding to the scene.

On the Instagram account under Regan's name, a photo of the Garlic Festival was uploaded, and a photo of the sign "High risk of fire today" and a message recommending reading the book "The Power is Justice or Survival of the Reds." Published in 1890, this book contains the content of advocating narcissistic anarchism and post-moralism.

3. U.S. National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism

3.1. Concept of domestic terrorism

The concept of domestic terrorism is defined as "an activity involving the following dangerous actions against people's lives," indicating intentional threats and coercion by U.S. criminal law, coercion and violence affecting government policy, genocide, assassination and kidnapping, and the first occurrence within U.S. territorial jurisdiction.

3.2. Classification

One aspect of domestic terrorism is the inspiration for racial and ethnic threats from violent extremists, the network groups that lead to violence, and the support of violent activities [22]. They have a variety of motives, but they represent a common part of having violence against objects such as people of color, immigrants, Jews, Muslims, minorities, women, and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+). Their violence is also sometimes apparent, sometimes not obvious, but there is a white supremacy ideology that claims abhorrence and twisted violence, such as "purification" and "cleaning." Other categories include anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists. They call themselves "militias" and resist state power through violent means, and anti-government violent extremists who want to overthrow the government by judging that capitalism, international cooperation and governance are harmful to society, and Sovereign Citizen violent extremists who want to remain unaffected by state power and law. Those who cannot are classified as others.

3.3. Characteristic

A nature of domestic terrorism is in the form of individuals (alone) or small, unstructured groups. They are recruiting people at cost to meet their goals and satisfaction. Ideas are highly fluid, developed and duplicated, and are linked to conspiracy theories and false information. This form of independent and rapid change is making it difficult for counter-terrorism efforts to prevent, hinder and deter domestic terrorism. In particular, Internet-based communities and platforms are developing public platform monitoring and programs for the spread of Internet-based violent extremism because they have the characteristics of amplifying these threats.

3.4. Strategy

The United States sought to continually improve on how it could analyze and understand the threat of domestic terrorism. The U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Center for Counter Terrorism (NCTC) have already provided data on domestic terrorism trends and environment based on information collected by experts, investigators. However, in addition to this regular information, we plan to collect additional threat information from states, federations, regions and authorities to improve policy steps through information sharing, training, prevention and interference so that appropriate law enforcement activities can be made available. In practice, the government provides strategic directions to improve the ability to judge violent extremist terrorism by enabling

systematic information to be provided to related organizations and officials based on the collected information. In addition, it provides directions to exclude prejudice and inappropriate effects of data analysis by external institutions, and furthermore, it provides a systematic approach to domestic terrorism on all axes of the state-private sector for human rights and individual freedom.

3.4.1. Reinforcement of investigation, analysis and information sharing system

Through the strengthening of the information sharing system, terrorist information is published and distributed as an open-source through non-confidential information production and classification, and additional indicators, warnings, and response levels and steps to potential threats are provided to enable fast and effective information sharing. It also provides guidance and development of indicators that can collect and provide various views and data based on data related to various domestic terrorists so that information sharing in related states, regions and organizations can be facilitated.

Since domestic terrorism spreads ideological propagation and violent acts across international boundaries, it is essential to consider international aspects to identify and respond to them. Modernized information analysis sharing and activities are complex because they are collected from various countries and institutions, and they plan to train people who receive support or training from the institution. It also plans to conduct intelligence sharing with foreign organizations to investigate and analyze terrorist funds at home and abroad. Furthermore, efforts are being made to establish a comprehensive area of response to identify the current and imminent issues of domestic terrorist threats as well as the factors that contribute to more violence in the future.

Since domestic terrorism spreads ideological propagation and violent acts across international boundaries, it is essential to consider international aspects to identify and respond to them. Modernized information analysis sharing and activities are complex because they are collected from various countries and institutions, and they plan to train people who receive support or training from the institution. It also plans to conduct intelligence sharing with foreign organizations to investigate and analyze terrorist funds at home and abroad. Furthermore, efforts are being made to establish a comprehensive area of response to identify the current and imminent issues of domestic terrorist threats as well as the factors that contribute to more violence in the future.

3.4.2. Prevent domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilization to violence

In order to reduce the risk of domestic terrorism, some measures are being taken to limit the availability of a wide range of online services as part of reducing access to weapons and ammunition that can be used in terrorism. However, this is set in a way that takes into account privacy and human rights aspects. It also requires veterans or related subjects to report on membership or recruitment, extends relevant education and technical support, and enhances individuals' resilience and responsiveness to violent activities and false information by developing a documentary. Domestic terrorism is caused by a lot of preparation online and offline. These activities are taking place online at a personal level, including social media, online game platforms, file upload sites, and chat platforms, helping terrorists avoid violence by exploiting Internet-based communication platforms.

3.4.3. Disrupt and deter domestic terrorism activity

The main institution behind domestic terrorism activities is the FBI and the Justice Department, which are planning to cope with domestic terrorism by expanding the infrastructure of analysts, investigators and executives from the two agencies through additional budgets in 2022. Based on this, the government will also improve the stage of information sharing to analyze

threats of terrorism in Korea and share updated information with related organizations. In addition to the existing information sharing platform, the process plans to receive feedback from each agency so that sharing can be achieved through platform improvement and mobile application development. It also includes strengthening programs developed by the Department of Homeland Security, including training in identifying topology, semiotics, linguistics and potential domestic terrorists, state-regional anti-terrorism training, initial response toolbox, mobilization indicator 4th edition booklet, and understanding and support for effective field response. In addition, collaboration on new approaches and ideas is envisioned on how to effectively utilize the current ban on private military activities to counter military violence extremism. The United States has also experienced the side effects of legal enforcement of violations of individual human rights and freedoms in the past, so it must consider provisions that have practical effects on potential legislative amendments related to domestic terrorism as well as civil liberties and rights. This background includes the evaluation of domestic terrorism-related legislation through the Ministry of Justice's evaluation of domestic terrorism strategies in consultation with Congress. The United States has a very powerful search system, and over time it has been improved and corrected around civil liberties and rights. Based on this experience, additional scrutiny and terrorist activities are effectively excluded when suspected terrorists enter. Internally, all employees of military, police and government agencies have the effect of preventing and promoting domestic terrorist threats by employees through questionnaires such as (SF)-85, SF-85P, and SF-86, and continuing to maintain human resource provision and training programs such as airports, ports, chemical plants, and critical facilities.

3.4.4. Confront long-term contributors to domestic terrorism

The fourth strategy calls for the eradication of racism at the government level, the resolution of polarization, the establishment and enforcement of equity laws, calls for a democratic solution to various conflicts by means of nonviolent means, and continues federal efforts to address imminent terrorist threats.

4. Environment of Violent extremism in Republic of Korea

In Korea, the second vice minister's remarks at the Council on Violent Extremism in March 2015 emphasized education as a prevention of violent extremism. After that, in accordance with the UN's action plan to prevent violent extremism in 2016, based on the resolution of the 5th National Terrorism Countermeasures Committee in 2018, 16 national action plans categorized government ministries into issues of extremism such as foreigners, vulnerable groups, teenagers, ideological issues such as gender equality, and human rights.

Table 1. Korea national action plans for prevention of violent extremism.

Action Plan	1. Establishment of a foundation for establishing a culture of dialogue and communication.
	2. Monitoring policies and strengthening reflux to protect and promote human rights.
	3. Local community prevention and security reinforcement.
	4. Block the influx of violent extremism abroad.
	5. Support for foreigners in Korea to adapt to Korea.
	6. Social security for the vulnerable.
	7. Healing victims of violence and correcting perpetrators.
	8. Reinforcement of education to foster a sense of respect for life and community for youth.

	9. Support for vulnerable adolescents to adapt to society.
	10. Promotion of gender equality and women's participation.
	11. Promote youth employment and support start-ups.
	12. Raising awareness of the community through global citizenship education.
	13. Conducting education on the prevention of violent extremism for soldiers serving in the military.
	14. Creating a sound Internet environment through public-private cooperation.
	15. Strengthening the capabilities of terrorist organizations to prevent abuse of information and communication technology.
	16. Encourage activities to improve Internet culture.

In Korea, the spread of the concept and ideology of violent extremism is dealt with only in part because there is a lack of standards or data that can be called examples of violent extremism.

However, related incidents have occurred, including incident of Kim's , departure to Syria for joining foreign terrorist group called IS, the incident of Opesan Tunnel, attack to national police by using self-manufactured gun and the incident of Dani, who uploaded link to ISIS' support and inquiries[23]. These cases are classified as terrorist incidents or common crimes due to links with foreign terrorist groups.

5. Implications and Conclusions

Violent extremism has become a new threat in various ideologies and conflicts. Violent extremism in Korea has yet to be actively discussed or superficially serious about the legal system, definition, and classification. However, crimes similar to violent extremism are gradually emerging in Korea due to the differentiation of various ideologies among countries, organizations, and individuals along with various political, social, cultural, and racial diversification [24]. In particular, domestic extremism can be caused by gender, age, economic class, minority, business, political orientation, and controlled quarantine policies among the socially disadvantaged and vulnerable, including extremist communities, multi culturalism, Muslim religious conflicts [25]. In addition, there are inherent factors that can utilize and plan propaganda, agitation, recruitment, and group actions through the Internet space where people with the same tendency can gather and communicate, so in the event of an incident, the spread of ideology and crime through the media can also be a new threat[. Federal agencies, including the U.S. FBI, have categorized terrorism as "international terrorism" that is affected or associated with it, but have published this national strategy, comprehensively define domestic terrorism, including violent crimes and foreign terrorism in the past criminal justice system. In comparison, South Korea defines international terrorist groups and foreign terrorist fighters designated by the UN as "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which requires the establishment of terms related to domestic terrorism and improvement of legislation. In January 2018, 16 national action plans were established for the prevention of violent extremism, but no specific program has been implemented, so it is urgent to come up with policies for the prevention of violent extremism that not only suppress terrorist acts but also turn ordinary individuals into terrorists or support terrorist acts [26].

The only content related to "terrorism" in the action plan is strengthening the capabilities of terrorist groups to prevent abuse of information and communication technology. This can be seen as a similar concept of violent extremism and terrorism, but the actual legal basis indicates

that there is a lack of legal basis to define violent extremism as "terrorism" under the anti-terrorism law, which focuses on foreign terrorist groups and terrorists.

In this situation, Korea's action plan to respond to violent extremism was desirable in terms of prevention and response to violent extremism, but there is no control tower or organization established by DHS, and it does not classify the scope and characteristics of violent extremism and events. This can be interpreted as a result of the UN's statement on comprehensive preventive measures without distinction between terrorism and violent extremism, and it is necessary to establish a legal and institutional basis for the Prime Minister's Office counter-terrorism center in Korea to conduct action plans. Therefore, under the current law, violent extremism is forced to be dealt with in the same procedures and methods as ordinary criminal crimes, and it seems necessary to establish a concept of domestic terrorism. Thus, legal concepts should be established in Korea to comprehensively define the criminal justice system and the concept of terrorism, classify domestic terrorism and foreign terrorism, or enable the interpretation and law enforcement of the concept of violent extremism.

In addition, the anti-terrorism center should report the implementation of the overall action plan for comprehensive preventive measures against violent extremist crimes to each ministry every year to secure the basis for data-based domestic terrorist concepts, classification, characteristics, and more detailed response plans. In this context, the use of information sharing and local communities and partners to assess threats to violent extremism and to prepare specific prevention and response programs is required[27]. It is self-sustaining in the nature of violent extremism, and it is important to identify local communities and causes rather than approaching them as large units of state[28]. Then, experts from various fields should be invited to resolve these various conflicts to address domestic terrorism as a comprehensive scope and an active approach[29][30]. Specifically, through the private investigator system introduced in Korea, local police, national police, and intelligence agencies should be able to collect and share the information through cooperation with the state as well as private partners and veterans.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	CL	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	YL	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	HB	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Corresponding author*
E-mail: yyun0916@naver.com

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A Study on the Multi-Domain Environment and Revolution in Military Affairs of the Korean Military

Jaseong Baek¹

Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Jiwon Yun^{2*}

Sangmyung University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the technology of the fourth industrial revolution on the changes in the operational environment, and present the operational employment concept and military buildup related directions of the Korean armed forces in accordance with the changed operational environment in terms of revolution in military affairs.

Method: The existing studies of domestic and foreign academics on combat domain, fourth industrial revolution, revolution in military affairs, and joint operations, etc., and the literature focused on research papers published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army were explored. Based on which, the historical evolution process of technology and domain was examined, and after deriving the evolutionary direction of the field that the fourth industrial revolution will bring, an exploratory approach was attempted to present the joint operational concept and military buildup related direction in line with the characteristics of the new domain.

Results: The impact of the fourth industrial revolution across all sectors of society is reflected in the military field as well, fundamentally changing the concept of weapon systems and military operations. The advancement of military science and technology is creating a multi-domain environment by expanding the cross domain. In such a multi-domain environment, joint operations ought to include not only the integrated operation of traditional military types, but also the integrated operation of the domain at the same time. Furthermore, it was confirmed that in order to secure cross domain capabilities appropriate for the multi-domain environment, it is necessary to review the basic concept of joint operation, develop a new paradigm for the appropriate allocation of capabilities, and set a variable point of equilibrium for efficient operation of capabilities.

Conclusion: Revolution in military affairs is a process which dramatically amplifies combat effects by developing a new power system by applying the new military science and technologies, and innovatively developing and harmoniously operating joint operational concept and the organizational structures related thereto. Hence, approaching the multi-domain operation (MDO) of the US Army in terms of revolution in military affairs rather than operational aspects will offer useful implications for the Korean armed forces.

[Keywords] Fourth Industrial Revolution, Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA), Multi-Domain Environment, Joint Operational Concept(OEC), Military Buildup

1. Introduction

Since the multi-domain combat was first presented as a concept in 2016, various discussions of the combat domain (hereinafter, "domain") have been conducted across various defense-related fields of the United States. Meanwhile, the US Army is building military capabilities by presenting specific operational concepts in the "US Army's Multi Domain Operation in 2028."

Since the end of the Cold War, the US military improved its formation to a slimmer one in consideration of local warfare and counter-terrorism operations. However, facing the strategic

environment of the rise of China and the re-emergence of Russia, the US military was required to develop a new operational concept which assumed an enemy capable of strategic competition. The concept developed in this context is the multi-domain operation (MDO) of the US Army [1].

Since the concept of multi-domain operation was first introduced in the US Army, various studies have been conducted in terms of revolution in military affairs, not only within the Korean military, but also in the academia in Korea [2]. However, previous studies on the multi-domain and revolution in military affairs of the Korean military in the era of the fourth industrial revolution have explored the applicability of the Korean military while analyzing the multi-domain operation of the US military at the operational level, or advanced weapons based on the technology of the fourth industrial revolution, thereby merely presenting the system-oriented revolution in military affairs. The Korean military's revolution in military affairs ought to focus on developing a joint operational concept appropriate for the future operational environment of the Korean Peninsula and building its capabilities while fully understanding the principle of change in the battlefield environment following the fourth industrial revolution [3]. Hence, it is necessary to predict how the battlefield environment will change in the future for the Korean military's revolution in military affairs, and comprehensively present the joint operational concept and required capabilities to achieve military goals in such an environment. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the fourth industrial revolution technology on the changes in the operational environment, and present the concept of the Korean military's operational employment and the directions of military buildup in line with the changed operational environment in terms of revolution in military affairs.

2. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Changes in the Operational Environment

2.1. The impact of the fourth industrial revolution on the military sector

The term "fourth industrial revolution" is known to have been claimed by Klaus Schwab, the then chairman, at the World Economic Forum in 2016. Schwab explains that the reason the 21st century is called the fourth industrial revolution is because of the properties and effects of technology. That is, in the 21st century, the rate of emergence of new technologies is increasing exponentially, and the rapid technological development is leading to an unprecedented paradigm shift in individuals, economies, businesses, and society as a whole. This is because it is leading the overall system related changes [4]. As a result, it was claimed that the convergence phenomenon was accelerating across various fields that were previously classified according to clear boundaries. Table 1 illustrates the fourth industrial revolution technologies presented by Schwab in his book [5].

The Army presents the attributes of advanced traditional science and technology, fourth industrial revolution technology, and future military capabilities which have been spun on with their effects as networked, intelligent, and mobile [6][7]. Networking refers to the property of making the battlefield visible by closely connecting all combatants and combat platforms to a network through various communication means, thereby enabling the real-time command and control and integrated operation of various forces. Intelligence refers to the property of replacing the various roles played by combatants with an unmanned autonomous system by loading artificial intelligence into all combat platforms. Mobility refers to the property of improving maneuverability to ensure that non-linear warfare can be performed by expanding the operational space and doubling the operational tempo in the future operational environment. The Army is pursuing the realization of such attributes while planning the future military buildup. As such, the impact of the fourth industrial revolution on all sectors of society is being reflected in the military field as well [8].

Table 1. Technologies leading the fourth industrial revolution.

Field	Key technologies
Physical	Unmanned transportation(Autonomous vehicle, Drone, Aircraft, Boat), 3D Printing, High-tech robotics, Advanced materials.
Digital	IoT, Block-chain, On-demand economy, Digital platform
Biology	Genetics, Human genome Project, Synthetic biology, Bioprinting

Note: Klaus S. The fourth industrial revolution. Mega study (2016).

2.2. The impact of the fourth industrial revolution on the future warfare

The fourth industrial revolution technologies and effects as such are grafted into military science and technology and have a direct impact on military capabilities [9]. The impact of the development of military science and technology on military capabilities can be presented in four major ways. First, with the development of precision guidance technology and strike system, the lethality, range, and the precision of weapon systems improve [10]. Second, as various battle platforms are networked with the development of information and communication technology, the battlefield visualization and real-time command and the control capabilities will significantly improve. Third, with the development of aerospace technology and detection technology, monitoring capability and all-weather operational capability will be improved. Fourth, the combat effect is maximized with the development of artificial intelligence, robot and unmanned combat system technology, and ultra-small nanotechnology [11][12].

The development of such military capabilities will also influence the future operational environment. First, the battlefield space will be expanded, and space and cyberspace will be operated as battlefields in addition to the traditional battlefield space on land, air, and sea. Second, with the development of precision guidance technology and maneuver and strike systems, a specific weapon system will be able to go beyond the limited battlefield space and be operated in other battlefield spaces. Third, with the development of information and communication technology, the convergence of battlefield space will be possible via the real-time integration of the weapon systems operated across various battlefield spaces and maximizing interoperability. As such, the development of military science and technology based on the technology of the fourth industrial revolution is fundamentally changing the concept of weapon systems and military operations, which is acting as an operational environment that demands a revolution in military affairs from the Korean military.

3. A New Approach for the Battlefield

3.1. A re-review of the definition of domain

The US Army's multi-domain operation refers to an operation which rapidly and continuously integrates capabilities across all domains and environments in order to take advantage of synergies using multiple domains and available attack patterns [13]. The US military defines a domain as the domain of activity within the operational environment, including land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace, in which operations are organized and conducted. The Korean Army also has a similarly defined domain. If so, do such definitions fully explain the nature of the domain?

Jared Donnelly and Jon Farley critiqued that, 'While there are many philosophical discussions of the future of war, most of the important conversations about the definition of the domain remain untouched. There are many smart people who are trying to figure out what domain means for the military operations, but much of that effort is wasted since the current defense

community does not have a basic definition of the word domain. Until we understand what forms a domain and what is not important, the paradigm shift of multi-domain cannot proceed'[14].

General Stephen Townsend, former Commander in Chief of the US Army noted that, "For the concept of multi-domain to become truly joint and multi-service, we need clarity and alignment in our dialogue"[15]. As we study concepts and doctrines, it is evident that a clear definition of the term domain and the formation of consensus were surprisingly inadequate. To gain insight into the domain, it is necessary to examine some of the relevant research data abroad.

- Prior to Sputnik's launch in 1957, the domain of space existed physically yet was not operationally accessible[16].
- Frequency hopping radios increase the maneuverability of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by one level, thereby automatically maneuvering between thousands of channels and making it much more difficult to respond. It is stronger than the mobility in any other domain[17].
- If cyberspace is considered as a battlefield, the focus will be placed on achieving control in this domain rather than the original purpose of cyberspace operations[18].
- While the land-based long-range precision missiles capable of striking maritime targets are obviously effective for the survival of friendly ships, they are not significant compared to their effects on the basic principles of organizing military forces[19].

Here, several meanings can be associated in connection with the concept of domain. That is, a domain is something that has access to it, can maneuver within it, and can achieve some effect through military activity, and is something related to the organization of military power. Among various scholars, Jeffrey Reilly defines domain as 'a macro maneuver space in which access or control is essential to secure the freedom and superiority of actions required by a mission' to best match this association[20].

According to Reilly's definition, an important part of the concept of a domain is the mission, the effects to achieve it, and the maneuvers to create such effects. Military terminology does not have to be identical to the concept defined by the academic community. However, the military strives to clearly define military terminology to designate clear communication and precise uses. In this context, it is necessary to define domain as 'a physical and conceptual maneuvering space that operates the military capabilities required to achieve the effects necessary for mission performance.' This definition will provide a basis for further developing military concepts, and in particular, citing our military's multi-domain concept.

3.2. Phenomena arising at the boundary between domains

The land, sea, and air forces in charge of traditional land, sea, and air domains have operated some of the capabilities of other domains for operational effectiveness in their own domains since the past[21]. While the boundaries between macroscopic domains remain the same, in the process of operating capabilities to achieve operational effects, the boundary becomes blurred. However, if the domains are strictly divided to address such problems, an issue arises in terms of the effectiveness of operation execution. Each military cannot cooperate with the capabilities of other domains for which support is uncertain to achieve operational effects in its own domain, and cannot have all of the necessary capabilities. A reasonable balance is required. As such, the boundary of the domain has the three functions of the division of the macroscopic domain, efficient operation of capabilities, and the rational allocation of capabilities.

An important factor which divides the domain was the method and means of maneuvering.

As a maneuvering means of a specific domain with improved performance played a complementary role in achieving the effects of other domains, the boundaries between domains became unclear and had their own width. That is, at the boundary of the domain, the specialized abilities of a specific domain overlap. Thus far, the issue of capacity management near such boundaries has been treated as a joint category. Joint means an activity, operation, or an organization in which two or more members of the military service of a single country participate. Joint operation is a form of joint operation[22].


Joint and joint operations to date have been such as to operate specialized capabilities of two or more military types to achieve operational effects in a specific domain. However, the operation of overlapping capabilities of two or more domains has elements which are quite different from typical joint and joint operations. Nevertheless, there was a limited possibility that the concept of congruence could be further expanded by being tied to the integrated concept of congruence.

3.3. Expansion of the inter domain boundaries and multi domain environment

The expansion of ambiguous boundaries between domains promotes intended overlap, that is, cross-domain. Traditionally, the element of joint operation has been the professional ability of each military class, but as the boundaries between domains expand, the overlapping capabilities of each military group, that is, the heterogeneous element of cross domain capabilities, have expanded. Now, it is necessary to understand that there is a difference in terms of the nature between the professional ability of each military and the cross domain ability to the extent that the operation of the cross domain ability has to be separated from the joint category. Operating the specialized capabilities of each military class is a typical concept of joint operation which integrates military types, and operating cross domain capabilities is a concept of expanded joint operation which integrates domains[23]. Such distinction does not mean that the value of the traditional joint operation has decreased, but rather that the traditional concept of joint operation needs to be expanded as the element of cross domain capability operation becomes more important. <Figure 1> illustrates the result of such recognition as a picture.

Just as the operational environment in which the integration of military species is required and implemented is called a joint environment, the environment in which the integration of domains is required and implemented can be defined as a multi-domain or multi-domain environment. Such a multi-domain or multi-domain environment is not a simple aggregation of domains, but a state in which multiple domains are converged. This means that certain capabilities operating in one domain may achieve operational effectiveness in another domain. Furthermore, it refers to the state and environment in which the capabilities of various domains are being operated simultaneously in a single domain. A domain is no longer a combat space where a specific army can exclusively use its abilities.

Figure 1. The integration of the services and the domains.



Note: This is a conceptual diagram which the author has newly conceived to explain the expansion of the joint concept, and the expression has focused on the expansion of cross domain capabilities within each individual domain.

3.4. The impact of multi domain environment on the revolution in military affairs

Among the three functions of the boundaries of the domain defined in the above, efficient capability management and rational capability allocation are still valid even in a multi-domain environment. A series of approaches to setting operational effects from the perspective of the joint military commander, imagining optimal capabilities to achieve the effects, allocating those capabilities to a specific organization (including the meaning of organizing a new organization), and effectively operating capabilities process are needed. Absent such an approach, the Korean military could make the mistake of closing the window of opportunity of multi-domain opportunities presented by technological advances. Hence, in the era of the fourth industrial revolution, the Korean military's revolution in military affairs ought to be promoted integrally with situational awareness, joint operational concept setting, and military buildup which are appropriate for the multi-domain environment[24].


4. The Directions of the Korean Forces' Revolution in Military Affairs

In this paper, in connection with the multi-domain operation of the US military, the focus is placed on the background of the idea rather than its operational aspect. In this background, there are concerns that strategic rivals may have equal or partially superior capabilities to those of the United States across various domains, thereby forming a deadlock in conflict situations across various levels[25]. Accordingly, the US military understood that the current military technology development is creating an entirely new operational environment, and came to devise a multi-domain operation as an alternative.

4.1. Joint operational concept in a multi domain environment

In a multi-domain environment, it is difficult to achieve the operational effectiveness only by integrating the capabilities of other military types. Since the enemy will not only integrate the unique capabilities of the military species which can achieve operational effects in a specific domain, but also simultaneously and integrated the cross domain capabilities possessed by each military species, thereby ensuring that the capabilities of the entire field will be prepared for interaction. To neutralize the enemy's readiness, the allies ought to simultaneously approach the enemy with the combined capabilities of various domains and achieve superiority in all domains at the same time to achieve operational effectiveness[26]. That is, it ought to be possible to simultaneously and integrately operate the unique capabilities of the military and cross domain capabilities. This concept of operation is a concept which integrates domains and plays a role in expanding the scope of joint operations in the traditional sense of integrating military and species. <Figure 2> illustrates an example of such a joint operational concept.

Figure 2. Operational employment concept in a multi-domains environment(e.g.).



Note: This is a conceptual diagram which the author has newly designed to make it easier to understand the attributes of the ability to operate in a multi-domain environment and the new operational employment concept.

4.2. Directions of military buildup

In connection with the military buildup appropriate for the multi-domain environment, it is necessary to approach it from two perspectives.

The first is the viewpoint of the Joint Force Commander as an integrated viewpoint. This is based on a series of approaches towards the multi-domain and multi-domain environment presented in the above. In the Korean military, this process can be materialized through the joint combat development system. The second is the perspective of the formed force's commander as a domain related point of view. From this point of view, it is important to have the unique ability to achieve effective operational effects in one's own domain while satisfying the demands of joint operations. The military buildup ought to be pursued simultaneously from such two perspectives.

From two perspectives on military buildup, the direction of military buildup may be explored by asking a few questions. The first question is how to design the cross domain capabilities required from an integrated point of view, while the second question is how to allocate such capabilities for each group, and the third question is how to find the point of equilibrium for the cross domain.

First, the cross domain capability required from an integrated point of view ought to be materialized through the joint combat development process of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The currently valid basic concept for future joint operations applies a logical procedure from the concept of operation performance to the required capabilities and the direction of joint combat development. If the concept of multi-domain and multi-domain environment presented in the above is consistently applied, a more creative and integrated joint operational concept can be proposed, and from such concept, an even more substantial and new character of competence may be derived. In this respect, it will be meaningful to reexamine the current basic concept for future joint operations to ensure that the definition of a multi-domain or multi-domain environment is clearly defined, and the joint operational concept that the Korean military ought to pursue under such an environment, and the military capability requirements are reflected.

Second, once the required cross-domain capability has been conceived, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to designate the military that will actually possess and operate this capability. For example, the long-distance strike capability required to secure naval control in a specific sea domain can be operated by all of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. However, not all forces may use this ability, nor can it be used only by specific armies. This is because the national defense resources are limited, and each military force has its own weaknesses. Hence, it is necessary to appropriately allocate capabilities in consideration of the availability and operability of resources.

Third, in regards to the operation of capabilities in the cross domain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to establish a variable point of equilibrium in consideration of environmental changes and secure the ability to cooperate with each military. The AI-based hyper-connected C4I system, which is expected to be operational in the future, will provide a point of equilibrium where various capabilities of each domain and cross domain can be operated without mutual interference to maximize operational effectiveness. This will be a condition of evolved congruence rather than current interoperability. The maximization of the capability that each military species can operate in its own domain ought to ultimately coincide with the direction of maximizing the joint effect under the multi-domain environment. Each military type ought to accept this situation transformatively from both an integrated and territorial point of view regarding the military buildup. This is because military capabilities are bound to be limited by national finances, and hence, the overall military capabilities need to be optimized by and between the components.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, while paying attention to the background that the US Army presented as a concept of multi-domain operation assuming an enemy capable of competing in the future, the priority domain is 'a physical and conceptual maneuvering space which operates the military capabilities required to achieve the effects necessary for the mission.' was newly defined. Furthermore, a multi-domain or multi-domain environment is a state in which multiple domains are combined rather than a simple set of domains, which means that a specific capability operated in one domain can achieve operational effects in another domain, and it is defined as the state and environment in which the capabilities of the domain are operated at the same time.

A revolution in military affairs is required to adapt to the changing operational environment. From the point of view of this revolution in military affairs, the scope of joint operation has been expanded by adding a dimension which integrates the domain to the existing joint operation with the dimension of unifying military type. This is a concept to achieve superiority across all domains at the same time by approaching the enemy with the combined capabilities of various domains simultaneously with a view to respond to the complex enemy readiness.

For the realization of this joint operational concept, first, the cross domain capability required from an integrated point of view ought to be specified through the process of true joint combat development, and second, the cross domain capability appropriate for the multi domain environment ought to be reflected in the availability and operation of resources. In consideration of efficiency, it ought to be appropriately assigned to the required military type. Third, a variable point of equilibrium ought to be established for the efficient operation of various domains and cross domain capabilities.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	JB	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	JY	-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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New Duties of Intelligence Agency in Response to the Pandemic of COVID-19

Sunggu Jo

Kyungwoon University, Gumi, Republic of Korea

Abstract

Purpose: During the pandemic of COVID-19, we have again felt the importance of 'information' and have also realized that medical and scientific technology alone cannot control the pandemic caused by disease. Hence, it is intended to discuss the role of intelligence agency under such uncertainties.

Method: In order to study such social phenomena, the pandemic of COVID-19 situation has been analyzed over the past two years as well as the methods to collect the necessary information through many existing literature and data. The analysis attempted to interpret the meaning of the phenomenon through the intuitive insight of the researcher.

Results: The result is that people's lives, as with COVID-19, may become insecure and unpredictable overnight. Furthermore, despite medical and scientific technology and development, the COVID-19 virus has expanded to delta mutations and omicron mutations, and hence, it is still unknown as to when this uncertain situation will end, which will have a direct impact on the national security.

Conclusion: It is of the view that the medical and scientific technology alone cannot control situations such as the pandemic of COVID-19, and the 'power of intelligence' to prepare for and against such scenarios in the future should be supported, and this duty will become a new task for the intelligence agency.

[Keywords] COVID-19, Pandemic, National Security, Intelligence Agency, Duties

1. Pandemic of Covid-19 and Uncertainties

On January 2, 2020, a medical team led by Dr. Chaolin Huang of Jinyutan Hospital in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China reported that 41 patients in Wuhan City showed pneumonia symptoms caused by the novel coronavirus in the medical journal of "The Lancet" for the first time[1]. Thereafter, on January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an 'international public health emergency,' and on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared a global infectious disease 'pandemic' of COVID-19.

The COVID-19, which started in the Wuhan region of China, has brought many changes to our lives for two years as a disaster for the mankind. The overall contraction and disconnection of the economic system due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the chaos of the international order, the decline of globalization, and the intensification of competition have also revealed the vulnerability of democracy and nationalism such that 'We first' for the hegemony of the United States and China has also shown to be vulnerable[2]. The world is at a new point of inflection in the international relations and globalization as the world goes through the pandemic of COVID-19[3][4].

'Uncertainties' such as the pandemic of COVID-19 make all citizens, including governments and businesses, very uneasy, but amidst this, we have again felt the importance of 'information', and in this pandemic of COVID-19[5][6][7][8][9], the intelligence of each country has the role of the agency for granting new duties after going through cyber warfare with the advent of the Internet from the traditional Humint of the Cold War era.

As such, the role of the intelligence agency is to overcome the crisis by exerting how much information it has in the national security crisis caused by group infections caused by viruses as well as tangible threats such including war, terrorism, and cyber attacks.

Hence, this study seeks to discuss the change in the role given to each country's intelligence agency, and the way to overcome the threat of the pandemic of COVID-19 which has struck humanity at the beginning of the 4th industry is 'information'.

2. Advancement in the Science and Medical Technology Industry and the Pandemic of Covid-19

2.1. Development of the industry

The 4th industrial revolution refers to the next-generation industrial revolution led by such information and communication technologies as artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), robot technology, drones, autonomous driving and virtual reality (VR)[4], and entering the era of the 4th industrial revolution, medical technology develops rapidly, and with the aftermath of the pandemic, the public demand for medical services is gradually increasing[10]. As intelligent systems are integrated across every aspect of our lives, the revolution is expected to bring about cultural and social change on an unpredictable scale to date.

The Industrial Revolution, which first began in England, began with the 'triangular trade', in which alcohol and textiles were exchanged for slaves in Africa with the discovery of the Americas, and the slaves were used as human resources to secure capital through large-scale sugar-cane plantations in the Americas, as a matter of dominant opinion.

The process unfolding into the current 4th industrial revolution is as follows.

① The first industrial revolution was a mechanization revolution based on steam pipes during the 18th century, and it was mass production of the British textile industry using steam engines.


② The second industrial revolution was a mass production revolution based on electric energy from the beginning of the 19th and 20th centuries, and power was supplied to factories and mass production using belt conveyors.

③ The third industrial revolution was the universal expansion of the Internet and smart devices due to the rise of global IT companies as a knowledge information revolution based on computers and the Internet from the late 20th century.

④ The fourth industrial revolution is a super-intelligent revolution of all things based on AI and Metaverse since 2015, bringing people, things, and spaces towards hyper-connection and super-intelligence to bring about a revolution in the industrial structure and social system.

Currently, the fifth industrial revolution, also known as a super-smart society which utilizes artificial intelligence for medical manufacturing and logistics, is undergoing discussion beyond the 4th industrial revolution[11].

Figure 1. Timeline of the industrial revolution and the emergence of society 5.0 amidst the pandemic of Covid-19 of 2020.



Note: <https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/> (2021).

The 4th industrial revolution may be characterized by 'technological convergence in various fields' and 'very fast pace of development', and medical care is no exception[12].

There are claims that we may fall into an ethical dilemma, but the medical community believes that with the help of AI and technological convergence of the 4th industrial revolution, we can restore our humanity and have an opportunity to show our original creativity.

2.2. Damages caused by Covid-19

2.2.1. Casualties

According to the data released by the Korea Central Disease Control Headquarters, as of 00:00 on February 23, 2022, there were 171,271 new confirmed cases in Korea and 181 cases imported from abroad, resulting in a total of 171,452 newly confirmed cases, while the total cumulative number of confirmed cases is 2,329,182 people (28,554 people from overseas).

Furthermore, while hospitalized, 512 patients with severe symptoms and 99 deaths were reported, with a cumulative death toll of 7,607 (fatality rate of 0.33%), respectively.

Given the recent rapid increase in the number of confirmed cases and the shortage of acceptable beds, home treatment is increasing. As the COVID-19 patients undergoing home treatment die one after another, concerns about the blind spot for home treatment are increasing.

2.2.2. Economic damages

COVID-19 has brought about an economic crisis along with the direct damages of infection. As contactless consumption became active, there were industries where sales did not decrease or increased, yet the awareness of the risk of infection restricted individual and group actions, and social restrictions due to quarantine measures added to a sharp decrease in consumption[13]. After the outbreak of COVID-19, sales plummeted mainly in face-to-face service industries such as food and accommodation, wholesale and retail, and education service, which led to an employment shock.

As unstable employment and income conditions continue, economic uncertainty increases stress, and stress weakens the immune system, thereby raising concerns about a vicious cycle of increasing the risk of infection[14][15][16].

Figure 2. Small business owners' demand for 100% of loss compensation and protest.



Note: <http://www.sjsori.com/news> (2022).

2.2.3. Other damages

Less than a year after the COVID-19 pandemic was declared, a new record was set in global health governance with the development of COVID-19 vaccines.

While over half of the world's population has completed vaccination against COVID-19, many people complain about side effects from the vaccinations, but it is not easy to prove direct causation, and conflict over whether compensation is further intensifying.

According to a report by Seoul Economic Daily on February 22, 2022, in the case of the United Kingdom, if side effects of the vaccine are recognized, a lump sum of 120,000 pounds (approximately 200 million won) will be paid in cash. Countries around the world are reviewing ways to compensate for the adverse effects of COVID-19 vaccination, but those who suffer from vaccine side effects in most countries and their families still find it difficult to escape from the difficult situation of proving the causality of vaccine side effects.


3. Limitations of Science and Medical Technology

COVID-19 has brought many changes to the people's lives in such a short period of time, but the largest has been that the people's lives may become insecure overnight, and the future is uncertain indeed. From the moment when COVID-19 became a pandemic, it is natural in this sense that an attempt to predict 'post-coronavirus' and find something certain that can guarantee people's lives in the midst of it started.

However, despite the development of science and technology and industry, the COVID-19 virus, which started in the Wuhan region of China in 2020, has expanded to delta mutations and omicron mutations, resulting in numerous victims as of 2022, which is two years later. As a pandemic, it is of the view that national security and the economy related issues cannot be resolved.

Since the proliferation of such innovations alone can entail safety-related risks and uncertainties[17][18][19], it is of the view that 'power of intelligence' should be supported for such 'uncertainties', and such duties will be a new task for the intelligence agency.

Figure 3. Situation by country, territory or area.



Note: covid19.who.int.

4. Humanity and the Emergence of Intelligence Agency

Men wanted to live safely and away from wild beasts or natural disasters in the ancient society, but the discovery of tools in the Neolithic Age started a collective life consisted of clans and tribes through rice cultivation [20]. As a result, wars occurred with adjacent clans and tribes, and the role of information necessary to establish war strategies began to emerge.

1. Discovery of Neolithic tools
2. Farming rice began by using tools and a group life consisted of clan and tribe began
3. Wars with adjacent clans and tribes began
4. The role of information needed to formulate war strategies began

Figure 4. The neolithic age of greece.



Note: tourinfo.org.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) described national security as the act or state of forcing the will of the opponent by using all means, including military force, between opposing countries or groups equivalent thereto. Furthermore, it was defined as the continuation of politics by forcing the will of ours. As such, it may be seen that extreme national security crises such as war have a close correlation with politics.

A past example is the Sarajevo Assassination of 1914. The Sarajevo Assassination caused World War I, followed by World War II, which then led to the Cold War, the Middle Eastern War, the invasion of Afghanistan and the ISIS. If, in Sarajevo in 1914, Gavrilo Princip obtained information on an assassination plan for Archduke Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand in advance, how would the history of mankind have changed that the assassination was unsuccessful?

5. Development of Intelligence Agency

Military strategy has walked together with the beginning of mankind, and according to the flow of history, the security agency is separated from the military and the intelligence agency has come to be with the change of the security agency [21].

① Ancient Greece: The police were all activities of the city-state (Polis), meaning the constitution itself.

② Middle Ages: Under the German Imperial Police Act of 1530, the first concept of the police was specified as 'a state of good quality in the community'.

③ Era of Police State: In line with the times when a mercantilistic economic policy was promoted based on an absolute monarchy, the police included not only passive order maintenance but also active welfare promotion functions, and when police included state power which is exercised over all administrative areas except for special administrative fields such as diplomacy, military, finance, and judicial affairs. Meanwhile, the Steinian concept of police was divided into constitution and administration, and administration is a means of national activity that pursues individual improvement, and constitution refers to the state's right to participate in national decision-making or the policy making stage.

④ Modern state ruled by law: Since the 19th century, the concept of the police in the era of free democracy was based on the liberal ideology of natural law and was limited to the operation of military force to maintain public well-being and order.

⑤ Modern society: Based on the maintenance of social order and protection of life and property, it is the prevention of crime, the arrest and investigation of criminal perpetrators, the recovery of theft and lost property, the assistance of the weak and sick, the enforcement of criminal laws, and public services for the local community.

Furthermore, the military organization has established itself as an individual institution by being specialized according to the characteristics of its work, such as security, security, intelligence, firefighting, etc [22][23][24]. However, it can be seen that the fact that they still maintain a close mutually cooperative and complementary relationship started from the same purpose related to national security.

6. Current Status and Role of Intelligence Agency

Figure 5. US intelligence agency



Note: <http://www.futurekorea.co.kr/> (2013).

As shown in <Figure 5>, This is because the DNI learned the painful lesson that the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of more than 3,000 Americans on the mainland of the United States, were carried out because intelligence agencies were aware of the information in advance but did not properly share it. There are currently 16 official intelligence agencies in the US federal government. CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, AFISRA, INSCOM, MCIA, ONI, FBI, DEA, ONSI, I&A, CGI, OICI, INR, TFI acting independently. According to Reuters, the CIA had information about three of the 19 hijackers 20 months before the 9/11 attacks, and the NSA learned that one of the hijackers was linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. there was. The CIA did not tell the FBI that one of the hijackers had entered the United States, but the FBI knew that suspicious Middle Easterners were learning how to fly. In order to solve the problem of information sharing among intelligence agencies, Congress enacted the Information Reform and Anti-Terrorism Act in 2004 and established the Director of National Intelligence to lead 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. The DNI directs and oversees the U.S. national intelligence program, reports national security information directly to the president, and serves as the head of all U.S. intelligence agencies. The director of the CIA, synonymous with US intelligence, is also required to report CIA activities to the DNI. In addition, NCTCC was established to have CIA, FBI, and Ministry of Defense intelligence agencies gather together to share and analyze national security information. They were invited to attend and discuss national information. The budget for US intelligence agencies has more than doubled compared to before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 70% of this budget goes to information collection and analysis, and intelligence agencies work under contracts with sub-governmental organizations or private companies. According to the Washington Post, as of 2010, there were 1271 government agencies and 1931 private companies in the United States engaged in anti-terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence activities, and 854,000 people held top-secret licenses. The NSA is known to be able to monitor up to 75% of Americans' emails and phone calls. Therefore, the mission of the pandemic that threatens national security as well as terrorism is newly presented to intelligence agencies.


7. Future of Intelligence Agency: Development into Private Industry

Recently, as the activities of PMFs have increased in various conflict zones around the world, the phenomenon of outsourcing of war is intensifying. The use and control of military force was the sole property of the state (government), but as recently shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, non-state entities such as rebels and international terrorist groups are emerging as major actors in war or armed conflict. Because they are not states, they tend to wage war for their own identity

and beliefs rather than pursuing national interests. In addition to these changes in actors, as cutting-edge technology is used in warfare, a great change is taking place in the way war is waged. As a result, there is a discussion about the change in warfare. This study examines how the alliance between the state and private military companies pursuing corporate interests, not national interests, will change the nature of war, what conditions will make this alliance possible, and the Corona 19 pen like future wars. Demic should consider how it will change in the future.

Therefore, considering the impact of a global pandemic such as Corona 19 on national security in the future, it can be seen that it is difficult to respond to Corona 19 without the help of the national intelligence agency, as long as it has been proven that this mission is difficult for the health authorities to handle. However, in the future, since intelligence agencies are also being privatized, expectations for prevention and response to a pandemic such as Corona 19 can be predicted from companies such as the private military companies described above.

Figure 6. Private military company (PMC).



Now, the period of national security belonging to the government in the past is divided into Private Military Company (PMC) for development, and just as military organizations in the past were specialized according to the characteristics of their work in security, security, intelligence, and firefighting, it is expected that Private Military Company (PMC) will gradually expand and become specialized and individual institutions according to the principle of market capitalism.

Four theories based on market capitalism are presented as the basis for this claim[25][26][27][28].

Table 1. Private military company (PMC)'s expansion theory.

Privatization theory	It is a theory which claims that the transition from state-led internal supply to private-led external supply takes place, and in this process, competition in the market provides better service.
Cavitation theory	It is a theory that the state and the private sector complement each other to compensate for the vacuum which was created when both state-led internal supply and private-led external supply failed to reach each other.
Beneficiary's payment theory	It is a theory that the beneficiary should bear the benefits of specific corporations and individuals as a state public authority.
Economic reduction theory	This is a theory which claims that, when the economy is good, businesses and individuals have the opportunity to spend their surplus capital on private services, and private services develop according to this demand. Whereas, when the economy is bad, crime increases due to an increase in the unemployment rate, and private services are expanded by some capitalists.

Furthermore, if both the state-led supply and the private-led supply are not satisfied, consumers will eventually depend on private services, and it is predicted that the core technologies of the 4th industrial revolution such as AI and Metaverse will be grafted here.

In particular, during the pandemic of COVID-19, everyone agreed that the state-led policy is not perfect, and in the future, not only war but also all threats such as the pandemic of COVID-19, it is gradually transformed into a model of cooperation between the state and the private sector or a private-led model.

It has taught us how important the role of information is in the operation of state affairs, and this formula has been with the beginning of mankind through the World Wars I and II and the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, and military strategy has been with the beginning of mankind. and intelligence agency came along with the change of security institutions.

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9. Appendix

9.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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