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On the Origin of Baekje MILITARY MARTIAL ARTS and the Path and Inflow of Japanese Military Martial Arts

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Abstract

Purpose: This study examined the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts from various angles, which were concluded as follows.

Method: This study examined the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts in depth, and grasped the current situation and problems of Baekje military aspect, presented Baekje military form and Japanese military form, and sought identity.

Results: At that time, the left-wing was the first of the 16 official positions of Baekje, and it was an important position to be selected from the nobles and to replace the king in case of emergency. At that time, about 3,000 people came to Baekje, or Japan, and the brilliant culture of Baekje's Aska culture was passed on to Japan. In addition, the longevity of Baekje's nobles, the head of the government, led the country as the mainstay of Japan. In addition, Baekje's Musa forces expanded to mark the era of Musa regime in Japan, became Emperor in the first year of Emperor Munmu, and made Fujiwara no Miyako a wife. The Emperor of the 45th Emperor of the Holy Moo was crowned in 724, and the Emperor of the Baekje system tried to protect his comfort through Baekje people who moved the military as well as the cabinet. The outbreak of Japanese warriors was founded by the warrior forces in the fall of Baekje by the attack of the Allied forces in 663. In other words, at the end of the Edo period, the warriors were practically disappeared by Saigou Takamori, who lost his battle and self-determination, and the beginning and end were made by Baekje.

Conclusion: As mentioned above, reestablishing the history of ancient Baekje that went to Japan is a way to establish our national view and history. This is because Baekje was destroyed in the past, but its descendants are re-creating new history in Japan, so we should revive our culture once again as a god of law.

[Keywords] Baekje Military Martial Arts, Japanese Military Martial Arts, Musa, Culture, Yusool

1. Introduction

Baekje is an ancient country with a brilliant cultural heritage. It has left a great mark on East Asia. Their military power was the best cavalry, and they were able to invade Goguryeo, Silla, Tang, and Why by cultivating the warriors of the day. The territory was Baekje territory in the southern part of East Asia, and Baekje culture spread to all parts of Japan. Aska culture, as we often know it, has also created an opportunity for Japan to enter a new era, which has helped Japan become a huge country.

In particular, the Japanese Military Martial Arts Act also points to its origins and formation process. The origins and genealogy show that it is a descendant of Baekje and their actions. In addition, the Japanese ancient documents detail where the descendants moved and expanded their military warriors after the fall of Baekje. The reason why Baekje used the military law of war in the military aspect is not yet known in domestic academia. It is noteworthy that all the

forces have exiled to the Kyushu region of Japan since the fall of Baekje, and that the descendants of Jangbogo, descendants of the unified Silla Baekje region, have also been exiled.

In addition, the Japanese martial arts or military law records the swordsmanship, the technique used in the war, and the ancient writings that can be confronted with several people. It is a necessary feed for Baekje military history research because it mentions who the founder is in terms of genealogy. Since swordsmanship, martial arts, and military law against enemy forces are included, in-depth Baekje military research should be conducted.

However, Japan goes through the process of integrating the military martial arts of the Japanese ancient war law as a way to move into imperialism in modern times. The period began in 1986 at the Japanese Metropolitan Police Agency and in 1906, the Japanese martial arts society, which is a righteousness, underwent a process of forcibly integrating all military martial arts into martial arts. At this time, along with the distortion of history, it made a constitutional form as a military martial arts of the Japanese imperialism, and there are also the war law that has been introduced in the meantime, and sometimes it is kept secretly. The Yupa is a descendant of Baekje and the law of the law remains.

However, some martial arts in Korea are in a dangerous state because they are re-established in Japanese imperialism. In other words, Japanese imperialism was organized as a black dragon association in the organization of the Japanese Mudeokhoe and it was a righteous organization that devoted all its efforts to the invasion of Joseon. Therefore, Baekje's military aspect, the War Military Law, was distorted.

Then, the representative preceding studies of Baekje's military aspect are as follows. The Changes of the Military Operation System of Baekje Sabigi and the Battle of Sulfuric Acid Bee by Kang Jong-won(2017)[1], The Expansion and Military Role of Military Participants in the Three Kingdoms and Unified Silla by Kang Bong-yong(2000)[2], the Historical Evaluation and Significance of the Bisa and Baekje Revival Army War by Gil Byung-ok(2019)[3], and the Maintenance and Character of Baekje Military Organization by Park Hyun-sook(1998)[4] 8)'s formation and management of Baekje alliance - Regarding the request of King Wojong's Dodok Baekje military service in Songseo, The military organization and its operation of Baekje in the Sabi period by Lee Munki(1998)[5], and Silla's. The number of troops, the number of troops, the number of troops, the formation of troops, and the formation of battle formation.

The previous studies were analyzed by the preparation of the war and the operation of the military organization system in the aspect of Baekje military. In addition, the historical evaluation of the Baekje period and the defeat due to the participation of any military allies in the defeat of the battle of the Baekje era were studied. It is a study that can look at the degree of fragments related to why and what kind of exchanges they had with them before Baekje was defeated. And so far, studies related to Korean and Japanese martial arts have focused on military martial arts or martial arts, techniques related to martial arts, and changes over the course of the times.

However, there are not enough studies on the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts.

The necessity of this study is to investigate, analyze and discuss the direction of Baekje military aspect through the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the identity of the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts, and to investigate in detail what kind of exchanges were with Baekje and Japan and what military martial arts were.

The purpose of this study is to examine the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts from various angles and to examine how Baekje military martial arts have been spread to Japan in detail and to form the basis of Baekje military martial arts.

This study examined the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts in depth, and grasped the current situation and problems of Baekje military aspect, presented Baekje military form and Japanese military form, and sought identity. In other words, historical papers, reports and books, ancient documents, and Internet

data related to the scope of the research were investigated, analyzed, and discussed. In particular, the review of royal records and materials, including traditional Korean and Japanese books, was not covered by existing research, but also has a more accurate, realistic and objective value in content. This study was to proceed with specific research issues related to the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts.

First, the origin of the fall of Baekje and the Japanese military martial arts were investigated, analyzed, and discussed. Second, the path and central forces of Baekje, which were Baekje after the fall of Baekje, were investigated, analyzed and discussed. Third, the study investigated, analyzed, and discussed the descendants of Baekje and the establishment of the Japanese warrior lineage. Fourth, the study investigated, analyzed, and discussed Baekje culture and Japanese military warriors.

In conclusion, the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts were examined. The Baekje military aspect was drawn in detail.

2. On the Origin of Japanese Military Martial Arts and the Destruction of Baekje

The origin of the Japanese military martial arts is where it is, and there are many waves in the formation process and mention different history, which is causing confusion and confusion in the martial arts.

The background of all martial arts is formed by war first, and the law beyond human instinctive life and death is completed at the end of life and death. Rather than saying that an individual has created a martial arts, it refers to the process of reestablishing and systematically establishing the martial arts that he has learned and trained in the meantime. The martial arts that are out of the form of practical martial arts are not martial arts that have led to a tradition system. Since it is a method completed by oneself in life, death and many battles, it is necessary to think about how to effectively extinguish the enemy, and the physical technique changes in what kind of method the enemy uses. In that sense, I would like to present Baekje martial arts. It is obvious that Baekje's Asuka culture hidden in history and how their martial arts YuSool were formed will be the beginning of Baekje's military system. If so, when Baekje is raised, it only talks about the dark history of destruction such as King Chair and Samcheon Palace Lilchstone. There are not many people who know about Baekje, which was really strong. How much do we know of Baekje, a powerful empire that ruled over the Shandong Peninsula and the capital in the deep continental Yoshu region.

Baekje, which had attacked four times with the best gallery in front of Silla, was forced to cross the current sea by retreating against the huge barrier of the Allied forces. In particular, on August 27, 663, Baekje finally concealed its traces on the ancient Korean peninsula. At that time, the Japanese clerk recorded this, which seems to be as follows.

On August 27, the Japanese fleet and the Tang fleet, or ship, began the war. The Tang and Silla armies were besieging the coast to prevent the landing of Japanese ships, and it was impossible to land without breaking the Tang Dynasty ship first.

At the beginning of the first fight, the Japanese military was overwhelmingly large, but the Tang Dynasty, which was well-formed, was favorable and Japan had to retreat. In the next day's attack, Japanese longevity and Pungjang(Prince of Baekje) did not even observe the weather and did not review the enemy's tactics that were familiar with the terrain around the river.

The party lured the Japanese ship into a narrow area and the battle began, and the Japanese ship that rushed forward was unable to turn away from the middle and rear ships without moving. The Japanese ship, surrounded from side to side by the Tang Dynasty, collapsed in flames(hwapo), and the Prince of Baekje fled to Goguryeo [6].

Baekje, who was in the process of fighting before the Battle of Baekchon River, asked for the army, and why sent 800 ships and about 27,000 soldiers to Baekje with the Prince of

Baekje at that time. Despite sending many troops, Baekje and Why were greatly defeated, and Baekje exiled to Japan, which seems to be as follows.

On September 24, Baekje arrived at Terye Castle and sailed to Japan on the 25th. There is a story of scholars named Kimje and there is a story of Boseong in Jeonnam, but there is no definite record. There are records of the left-wing woman, Dasol, Dasol, Dasol, and Dasol[6].

According to the above nuclear power plant article, at that time, the left-wing is the first of the 16 official positions of Baekje, and it is an important position to be selected from the nobles and to replace the king in case of emergency. In particular, Dalsol is the second largest after the left-hander, and at that time, the number of people is 30, which is usually the position of the local area. At that time, about 3,000 people came to Baekje, or Japan, but at least 100,000 scholars are seeing it.

3. Path and Central Power of Baekje Introduction to Japan after the Baekje Destroy

All Japanese cultures are made by Baekje's Aska culture, where Baekje was destroyed, all the central forces moved to Japan and evaluated new areas. In addition, Baekje people who headed to Japan settled in Kyushu and expanded their power to Osaka and Kyoto as well as Kanto. The article of the nuclear power plant of "Japan Seogi" below shows as follows.

In March of the 3rd year of Emperor Chunji, in March of 664, Baekje was living in a wreck. The wreck means Osaka Nanba now, and later it becomes Baekje's village and the barons rule this area[6].

Baekje subclass and the family of the left-wing Boksins House of Deacons of the Baekje people to live in the Forsaken Army of the Baekje people. "The Forsaken Army of the Geungang country is the present Shiga Prefecture and later becomes the village of Baekje people. In the third year of King Chunji, 664, he built a defensive property on the hemp and the Shaft(Kyushu); Mercury[6].

As such, Baekje entered Kyushu safely and settled down, but the Nadang coalition was still afraid, so now it builds Baekje Saturn in Kyushu Fukuoka Tazaifu.

In August of the fall, three people were named Dalsols, the long-lived master of Baekje[6].

As such, King Cheonji gave out the fields so that Baekje could live, and the congratulatory address is the eastern part of Fukuoka in the current administrative district. Daeyaseong is one of the many castles built by Baekje's longevity and why the army to defend the attack of the Nadang coalition.

Five years, sixty-five years, winter. He moved to the river, and 2,000 Baekje men and women lived in Dongguk. He moved the capital to the river, and he took 2,000 Baekje people to strengthen the power of the emperor and make Baekje the basis for ruling the country[6].

In January of 10, 671, the Ten Years of the Emperor Chunji(Daesanha-Jangmu Daebo) The Deacon of the House of Deacons(Sosanha-Jakjikdu) The Deacon of the House of Deacons(Hanbyeong-gu) The Deasol Gokna Jinsu(Hanbyeong-gu) The Dalsol Eokyebokryebok(Hanbyeong-gu)(Dismissal) Deoksang(Dalson-Dalson) Gil-Gang(Dalson-Dalson-Dalsonha) Descended Dasol and 50 others.

In this way, the contents of the Emperor Chunji give the royal family and longevity of Baekje and rule the country are relatively detailed. Of course, it did not record all the personnel, and the other 50 people were abbreviated, but considering that the Japanese clerk was written in 720, it is actually described in considerable detail.

According to the above contents of the nuclear power plant, the female god and the deacon are the highest among the 16 official classes of Baekje. In particular, the deacon was the son of the deacon who developed the revival movement before Baekje was destroyed. King Chun Ji-cheon will appoint a deacon to the school, and the school is now the minister of education.

In addition, his son, Gwissin, was called a cancellation and acted as a medical doctor and gave him the position of Daesanha. And it is the most important part of Baekje's longevity,

and it gives a position of Daesanha of Han Byeong-il to several longevity including Dalsol's voice.

The term "one-man law" here refers to the skills necessary for all wars, such as swordsmanship, spearship, archery, and martial arts, as well as military tactics at the time. The Dahlsols of Baekje, which was adopted under the Daesan of the Hanbyeong Law, convey all the techniques to the reason. This fact can be seen through the records of the nuclear power plant "Japan Secretary".

As you can see from the above records, what was able to become a formal state was that Baekje's brilliant culture was passed on to Japan, and the longevity of Baekje's nobles, the leader, led the country as the main axis of Japan. In addition, it is undeniable that Baekje's military martial arts have been introduced since Baekje's military forces have expanded more and more and opened the era of the Japanese military regime. It is detailed in their genealogy, and I want to reveal the reality in the next chapter[6].

Finally, in the domestic military history and martial arts, many martial arts are misconceived as being introduced into Korea from Japan, but the origin of them can be seen through historical sources that they began from the ancient Korean peninsula and were transmitted to Japan. Therefore, we will have to study with more interest and enthusiasm for ours and regain ours once again with refutation.

4. The Descendants of Baekje and the Establishment of Japanese Musa Genealogy

Baekje blossomed a brilliant Asca culture in Japan, and even if a country is destroyed, if there is a soul and culture of the country, it will be revived again. For example, Baekje lives in a lake. However, after hundreds of years of disappearance, when the lake is again created, the fish of Baekje that fits the soil is revived.

As such, the Emperor's family in Japan, no matter how much they want to deny it, is the descendants of Baekje, and the Emperor's family does not bow or worship the Yasukuni Shrine. It is mentioned as a descendant of Baekje, Orji.

The center of Japanese culture is Baekje's Asuka culture, which is also the origin of martial arts. Martial arts are transmitted and generated through exchanges of war and culture. No matter how many Japanese claim the Japanese origin, there is a problem with what kind of faction is called. There are more than 200 factions of Japanese martial arts and YuSool. The beginning was a general noun and a proper noun, which led to obscurity, but as history passed, it extinguished its unique aspect and simplified technology, creating obscurity. This is a framework that leads to the form of self-artificial martial arts and leads to the establishment type.

Then, in order to know the exact origin of Japanese military martial arts and YuSool, Baekje's "Shin Chan Sung" was presented. Baekje's roots and settlement in Japan were 663 years after the fall of the Nadang Union Army, but the old literature shows that there was an exchange longer than this and that it is a clan that divided blood together beyond simple exchanges. It is a family tree of the ancient clan of Japan made in 820. It is recorded as a Baekje person named Daewonjin, and it is said to be the descendants of King Mindal Baekje. Mindal means the Emperor Vidatsu(Mindal Emperor 572-585), the 30th Emperor of Japan, and that the royal family of Baekje is the Emperor of Japan, that is, it is easy to see that Japan was the kingdom of Baekje at that time[7].

In addition, the first year of the Emperor Mindal, in April 572, Baekje Daejung Palace[6].

As you can see from the contents, it can be easily seen from the records that the Emperor of Mindal lived in Baekje Daejung Palace like Baekje Palace on the ancient Korean peninsula.

Especially, the Baekje barons become the center of Japan as the capital is moved to Kyoto as the Heian era opens, and the power is further developed with the Emperor. In addition, at that time, the Emperor was mainly a daughter-in-law among the Baekje's barons, and the

most famous of them, Fujiwara family, became empresses or the wife of the Emperor. Fujiwara is a descendant of Emperor Mindal[7].

In addition, Fujiwara Sung of Baekje became the substitute for me and acted as the Minister of the Interior. I can see that the current chief of security, the current chief of security, was selected from Baekje Fujiwara, and in the 50th Emperor Hwangmu, I can see that Fujiwara no Tamaro and Fujiwara no Korekimi were appointed as preferential candidates. Woo Dae-sin, when he was in the Joseon Dynasty, is equivalent to Woo Ui-jeong[8].

On the 20th page of the Japanese regular season, there was an Emperor's throne in August of the first year of Emperor Munmu, and Fujiwara no Miyako was his wife. This is recorded as the woman of Fujiwara old Hito, Fujiwara old Hito is the son of Fujiwara castle, and all of them are Baekje descendants.

In addition, the most important data is the 45th Emperor of the Holy Moo. According to the literature below, the Emperor is the son of the Moon, his mother is Fujiwara, and his wife is also recorded as Fujiwara. In 724, he was crowned in February of the year, and in April, Fujiwara no Umakai was appointed as a general of the army. This is natural in some ways, but the Emperor of Baekje tried to solidify his comfort by putting Baekje in the headquarters of the army as well as the cabinet.

5. Baekje Culture and Japanese Military Mussadism

All Baekje cultures moved to Japan and blossomed into Aska culture, where Baekje culture became a uniform basis for Japanese culture. In particular, it is no exaggeration to say that the iron culture not only presented direction to the Japanese martial arts but also had a great influence on the Japanese martial arts, namely YuSool, and it is arms(swords, spears, daggers, etc.) and armor. This armor and armor are also Baekje's costumes and are very easy and good for YuSool.

What culture did they have after they encountered? Perhaps it was possible for Baekje to fall and then go to Japan and revive Baekje barons again in Japan. Despite such literature, it is not established in public institutions or academia. When we know Japan and re-examine where their culture occurred, our history will be re-established and our culture can also establish the right history.

In "King of Japan", Baekje ruled Japan, and especially the uninhabited regime by Baekje's longevity grew more and more, and Fujiwara showed a powerful power both inside and outside[8].

In this way, the Japanese royal family, which was compiled in 1800, can be seen that the descendants of Fujiwara, a descendant of Baekje's arrival system, are used in the cabinet and play a pivotal role[9].

Let's take a look at the data on how Fujiwara is a descendant of Baekje. In the ancient clan family of Japan, "Shin Chan Sung" shows the ancient clan family of Japan, and it comes out as a descendant of the Emperor Mindal. In other words, Chunil is a descendant of Emperor Mindal and Baekje is a descendant of Chunil[7].

Especially, local and Fujiwara visit the Chunil Shrine. Here, Chunil is the ancestor of Kookji and Fujiwara, and Chunil Shrine is the place where the ancestor god is housed.

And Fujiwara Castle is recorded as having been a servant in the second year of Emperor Huseom and became Fujiwara Noritaka. Here Fujiwara becomes a local seed and the local seed becomes Seohyang later. In other words, in a simple way, the descendants of King Mindalcheon, Baekje, are Chunil, Chunil is Fujiwara, Fujiwara is local, and local is Seohyang again. There are many reasons for this change in the surname, but for example, some of them are given a surname by the emperor by setting up a ball in the country, and some are changed by the custom of Japan, which changes the surname when receiving or pioneering a new estate.

In particular, Seohyang explained that he came from Fujiwara. The surname that started from the locality was definitely local, local, and west. It is 83 families including mountain, bottled, hapji, turbidity, enemy, and light mine. Seohyang Fengseong is the person of the end of the local government named Kook Ji-won. Here, when we pronounce the western style in Japanese style, it becomes Saigow. This Saigow family is also a famous longevity family in the northern part of Kyushu from the old days, and Saigow Takamori, which we know well, is also a descendant of this family.

Therefore, the samurai, which Japan refers to, was started by the warrior forces of Baekje who had Doyle due to the fall of Baekje in 663 by the attack of the Allied forces of Nadang. This warrior forces showed their power for about 700 years and ruled the country of Japan as a warrior system. It was the occasion for them to disappear. In other words, the samurai was made by Baekje people at the beginning and end.

6. Concluding

Most martial arts or martial arts, including judo, have a positive effect on emotional development as well as physical fitness, so a large number of men and women of all ages participate in the training[10][11][12][13]. In addition to self-management, martial arts have a positive effect on the formation of life values and self-confidence through competitive experiences, and this has been propagated as a necessary part of training for the protection of the people and the training of military personnel with the duty of national defense[14].

In particular, judo, a unique Japanese martial art, is a representative sport that has elevated nationality by achieving good results in various competitions such as the Olympics and World Championships in Korea[15]. It has a great influence on the social and national aspects as well as the relationship between Korea and Japan. It is thought that it may have spread through historical confrontation and exchange, and when excellent martial arts emerges as a national necessity and spread, it is related not only to the social influence of martial arts, but also to the continuation of participants in the martial arts[16][17][18][19].

Baekje did not only play a role in unilaterally transferring advanced Chinese culture. It also served as a bridge for East Asian cultural propagation, which transformed the newly accepted advanced culture into a unique culture of its own and spread it to neighboring Silla, Gaya, and the Japanese archipelago across the sea. Baekje provided Japan with a new advanced culture needed to establish ancient state governance techniques and ruling ideologies through the braking system of Ogyeongbaksa, and Japan developed a relationship to support Baekje with some military and military supplies in case of emergency. The wooden coffin of King Muryeong's tomb was presumed to have been imported from Japan, and Tokyo, a burial product, was also found to be related to the Japanese landscape. Based on this interpretation, it can be inferred that Baekje propagated its advanced culture to Silla and Japan, which served as national security through diplomacy to Silla and Japan, rather than simply cultural exchanges[20].

The study of Korean and Japanese martial arts has been conducted in conjunction with the ideology of Japanese martial arts, and has been described as a step-by-step process called Tao after the development of alcohol to ancient art. In addition, there is no specific and practical explanation of the formation of psychology and techniques centered on cultural backgrounds, as it has the limitation of identifying only mental and physical ideas based on the interpretation of swordsmanship. In 1990, the direction of Japanese martial arts research has been strongly highlighted in terms of cultural convergence with Korea and China and neighboring countries[21]. However, the move poses many problems as it deliberately excludes cultural benefits from the Korean Peninsula and emphasizes the direct influx of Chinese culture as a way to overcome the limitations of traditional ethnocentrism. In other words, the martial arts world of Korea, China, and Japan today has a self-interpretation with a rough and improvised

historical nature made in modern times, but it is necessary to verify the overall perspective and partial chronological historical literature[22][23]. In particular, Japan's martial arts community once again needs to be reinforced because it has suggested its historical roots in favor of Japan's center or its organizations as it does not grasp them[24]. Therefore, it is possible that the traditional martial arts of Korea, including Taekwondo, could be carried into Japan through historical confrontation and exchange.

This study examined the origin of Baekje military martial arts and the path and inflow of Japanese military martial arts from various angles, and examined how Baekje military martial arts were spread to Japan in detail, and presented the influence on forming the basis of Baekje military martial arts.

First, at that time, the left-wing was the first of the 16 official positions of Baekje, and it was an important position to be selected from the nobles and to replace the king in case of emergency. In other words, Dalsol was the second after the left, and at that time, the number of people was 30, not only the position of generalizing the local area, but also the longevity. At that time, there were about 3,000 people who came to Baekje, or Japan.

Second, Japan was able to become a formal state, but the brilliant culture of Baekje's Asda culture was passed on to Japan. In addition, the leaders of Baekje's nobles, the leaders of the nobles, led the country as the main axis of Japan, especially Baekje's warrior forces expanded to reach the era of the Japanese regime. This is an undeniable fact that Baekje's military martial arts were introduced.

Third, it became the Emperor in the first year of Emperor Munmu and made Fujiwara no Miyako as his wife. In other words, Fujiwara is recorded as the woman of Fujiwara old Hito. Fujiwara old Hito is the son of Fujiwara castle, and all of them were Baekje descendants. In addition, the data of the 45th Emperor of Sungmu can be cited. Emperor Sungmu was crowned in 724 and Fujiwara no Umakai was appointed as the general commander of the military. In particular, the Emperor of Baekje tried to protect his comfort by putting Baekje in the headquarters of the army as well as the cabinet.

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8. Appendix

8.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	KL	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	IS	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	HC	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on the Improvement of EXPLOSION TEST on Blast-Proof Door

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Abstract

Purpose: In this paper, the development direction of the blast-proof door verification test was suggested through analysis of the blast-proof door verification test that has been conducted so far. Blast-proof doors are protective equipment that withstands storm pressure from enemy weapons at the outermost part of the building in case of emergency, and must be verified before installation. To ensure the durability and stability of the blast-proof door, the explosion-proof test of the blast-proof door has been conducted four times since 2016.

Method: In the meantime, as domestic blast-proof door certified products came out through explosion-proof tests of blast-proof doors, it has opened the way for domestic blast-proof doors to be used instead of expensive overseas products in domestic protection facilities and evacuation facilities. Based on the progress of the last four demonstration tests and certification results, the opinions of the Korea Gas Safety Corporation, the Defense Installations Agency, and explosion-proof door manufacturers were synthesized to derive improvements. In addition, the explosion-proof door certification procedure and certification standards were reviewed, and the explosion-proof door manufacturing process and documents submitted by the companies that applied for the certification test were reviewed.

Results: As a result of reviewing the requests of the host organization and explosion-proof door manufacturers in the process of preparing the demonstration test such as purchasing TNT, preparing the test site, conducting an explosion test, and issuing a certificate, the need for improvement in the implementation of the demonstration test was identified. Improvement needs were identified in the agency in charge of the demonstration test, the verification method, the method of measuring the displacement of the explosion-proof door after the explosion, and the alternative method of the demonstration test.

Conclusion: I suggested that the explosion-proof test of the blast-proof door be supervised by the military institution. Through this, it is expected that the work related to the explosion-proof test will be more efficiently controlled. Also I concluded that it is necessary to supplement the method of measuring the displacement of the blast-proof door, and consider implementing a reduced-scale explosion test. In addition, it is proposed to supplement and develop the blast-proof door blasting demonstration test through computer simulation using the empirical test data accumulated in the future. Once the explosion-proof test of the blast door is improved as suggested in the conclusions, it is clear that the result will be of benefit to the military, companies, and ultimately the people who will be provided with certified high-quality blast-proof doors and installed in the protection facilities.

[Keywords] Blast-Proof Door, Verification Test, Explosion, Protective Engineering, Protective Facilities

1. Introduction

Countries around the world are interested in protective facilities to protect the lives of the people and important facilities in the event of a war or national crisis[1][2]. The Republic of Korea has been

continuously exposed to North Korean threats since the Korean War in 1950. After North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, there has been a growing voice that the safety of national key facilities should be reinforced for public safety[3]. It is also necessary to prepare for bomb attacks on government and military facilities by terrorists[4][5][6]. North Korea continues to develop weapons of mass destruction against South Korea and neighboring regions through the development of nuclear weapons and missiles with various ranges[7]. However, for a long time in Korea, there has been no safety verification system for explosion-proof doors installed in protective facilities. Since 2016, Korea Gas Safety Corporation(KGS) has been selected as a KOLAS(Korea Laboratory Accreditation Scheme) certification agency and it has become possible to certify domestic blast-proof products including blast doors.

Demonstration tests for blast-proof doors of large-scale bombs cannot be conducted in a laboratory, so they are being conducted at an explosion testing site under the cooperation of the military. The explosion-proof test on the blast-proof door, which explodes a large-scale bomb and verifies the durability of the protective product can only be carried out with organic cooperation between the military and civilians[8][9][10]. <Figure 1> shows a blast-proof door explosion test conducted in 2018.

Figure 1. A blast-proof test on a blast door in 2018.



In case of emergency, it is essential to install blast-proof doors that have been confirmed to be safe to withstand the storm pressure at the outermost part of the building. To ensure the durability and stability of the blast-proof door, the explosion-proof test of the blast-proof door has been conducted four times since 2016. In this paper, the development direction of the blast-proof door demonstration test is suggested through analysis of the blast-proof door demonstration test that has been conducted so far.

2. Blast-Proof Door Verification Test System

Currently, KGS is responsible for the certification of blast-proof doors. As a KOLAS certification agency, it is responsible for national certification. It is supervised and implemented by the KGS at the request of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy(MOTIE) and the Ministry of National Defense(MND). <Figure 2> shows the process of blast door certification. At this time, the criteria set by the MND is applied. Until now, all four demonstration tests were provided by Army Engineer School and the available days for the demonstration tests were very limited due to the high priority on the use of the test sites. The scope of cooperation with related organizations and business is specified in the "Explosion Proof Door Explosion Demonstration Test Implementation Guide" established by the Defense Installations Agency(DIA) in 2014. It specifies the agencies involved and the scope of cooperation. According to this, there are various agencies related to the MND, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, KGS, the Army, Hanwha, blast-proof door manufacturers, and the DIA, but most of them are related to the military. Explosion demonstration tests can be conducted in cooperation with citizens, government, and military, and among them, cooperation of the military can be said to be the most important. KGS is in charge of receiving test evaluation and issuing test certificates, but the MND approves the necessity of the demonstration test, and the DIA

cooperate with the Army Headquarters in providing test sites. The reason why the MND and DIA were involved in the blast-proof door demonstration test is that the certification of the blast-proof door is deeply related to the military. Most of the blast-proof doors are supplied to the military and used, and cooperation from the military is also required to purchase TNT used for the test and to cooperate with the use of the test site. The TNT used in the test is relatively large and strict regulations are applied to the purchase and transportation of ammunition in the private sector, so cooperation from the military is essential for the demonstration test[11]. In addition, it is not easy to secure a test site in private facilities for a safe distance separation for testing of large-scale bombs such as 125kg of TNT[12].

Figure 2. Blast door explosion test certification procedure.



2.1. Types of blast-proof doors and criteria for determining protection performance

Blast-proof doors can be classified according to the materials used in manufacturing and the opening and closing method. Materials used to make blast-proof doors are reinforced concrete, steel plate, and composite material such as H-beam and steel plate combination. Among them, to overcome the pressure of 40 bar or more, the form of a composite door that uses reinforced concrete inside while using section steel and a steel plate is used. Through this, there is an advantage of being able to resist the penetration of fragments while securing a weight that can withstand blast pressure. Classification according to the opening and closing direction includes single-leaf door, double-leaf door, and sliding door[9][13][14][15]. Recently, the size of blast-proof doors is gradually increasing due to the tendency of the size of the protection facilities to increase and the size of vehicles entering them. In the case of sliding doors, as the size of the door increases, a manual opening/closing method to an electric opening/closing method is also emerging. The design and manufacturing principles of blast-proof doors follow the Design Standards for Explosion-proof and Bullet-proof Facilities and the Design Standards for Chemical and Biological Protection Facilities[16].

2.2. Criteria for determining the protection performance of blast-proof doors

2.2.1. Ductility ratio

To determine whether the protection performance is satisfied, the rotational ductility and the displacement ductility must be satisfied[17]. Rotation ductility refers to the maximum rotation angle at the support of the blast-proof door when an explosion load acts on it and is defined as $\theta = \tan^{-1}(2X_m/L)$. Where X_m is the maximum displacement and L is the height of the blast-proof door. The displacement ductility is the ratio of the maximum strain to the elastic strain and is $\mu = X_m/X_e$. X_m is the maximum displacement and X_e is the elastic displacement of the structure. X_m is measured in the explosion-proof test, and X_e is calculated by the door manufacturer at an accredited certification agency and submitted before the proof test. In <Table 1>, values of rotational ductility and displacement ductility for each level of protection are presented[18].

Table 1. Ductility ratio of blast door corresponding to protection level.

Protection level	Ductility ratio	
	Rotation(degree)	Displacement
A	$0 < \theta < 1$	$0 < \mu < 10$
B	$1 < \theta < 6$	$10 < \mu < 20$
C	$6 < \theta < 12$	-

2.2.2. Normal operation of door after blasting

The fact that the blast-proof door should operate normally even after the TNT explosion is the most basic matter to be confirmed in the blast-proof door demonstration test[19]. For internal and external personnel and equipment to enter and exit freely without any problem, the blast-proof door must have no problem with the function of opening and closing the door after a certain pressure is applied. If only one side or part of the door is opened and closed, it is desirable to judge that it has failed in consideration of the purpose of operation of the blast-proof door because the equipment cannot be accessed.

2.2.3. Destruction of the door frame and latch

The door frame, together with the blast-proof door, resists external load and prevents external pressure from flowing into the interior. Therefore, it is necessary to check whether the door frame is destroyed as well as whether the blast-proof door itself is deformed. The latch is a device that adheres to the blast-proof door to the door frame and structure. If the latch is broken or severely deformed, the blast-proof door will not function properly and personnel and equipment will not be able to enter. Therefore, whether the latch is damaged or deformed is an important factor to consider in the verification test.


2.2.4. Damage on sealing material

Sealing material is placed around the door to prevent high pressure from penetrating the building. As a result of the demonstration test, it can be seen that the rubber sealing material attached around the door is severely deformed or dropped out due to a high-temperature and high-pressure. Therefore, whether the sealing material is damaged or deformed should be carefully observed in the blast-proof door verification test.

2.3. Explosion proof test method

An explosion-proof test is an experiment to confirm whether the blast-proof door withstands the explosion pressure of 125kg of TNT exploding at a distance of 5.66m. As shown in the <Figure 3(a)>, blast-proof doors are installed in three directions around TNT, and pressure sensors, accelerometers, and strain measurement sensors are used to determine whether the behavior limit of the blast-proof door by the explosion pressure meets the standard. <Figure 3(b)> shows the installation of various measuring equipment on the door for the explosion test.

Figure 3. (a)test field layout and (b)sensors on the blast door.



2.4. Explosion proof test result

From 2016 to now, four demonstration tests have been conducted. It can be said that the demonstration test was conducted once every 1.25 years. 17 blast-proof door products from 11 companies participated in the demonstration test. 11 products have received the certification, and the pass rate is 65%. <Table 2> summarizes the results of explosion-proof tests that have been conducted so far.

Table 2. Summary of explosion-proof test result.

Company	Door type	Result	Decision
A	Sliding	Unable to open	Fail
B	Single leaf	-	Pass
	Double leaf	-	Pass
C	Double leaf	-	Pass
D	Single leaf	Unable to open	Fail
	Double leaf	Door frame and sealing corruption	Fail
E	Single leaf	-	Pass
F	Double leaf	-	Pass
G	Sliding	Unable to open	Fail
H	Sliding-1	-	Pass
	Sliding-2	Unable to open	Fail
I	Single leaf	-	Pass
	Double leaf	-	Pass
J	Double leaf	-	Pass
K	Single leaf	-	Pass
	Double leaf	-	Pass
	Sliding	Unable to open	Fail

The pass rate of single- and double-leaf type blast-proof doors is high at 86% and 80%, respectively, while the sliding type's pass rate is low at 20%. Due to the characteristics of the product, the protective facilities using sliding doors are larger than those using other types of blast-proof doors, and the size of the blast-proof doors itself is larger than that of other types. In addition, unlike other types of blast-proof doors in which the blast-proof door is connected to the structure with a solid hinge, the sliding type is hung or raised on the upper or lower rail, so the resistance to explosion pressure is inevitably weak.

3. Explosion-Proof Test Analysis

Before the explosion test, there was no certification agency related to high explosives in Korea, so related companies had to send products overseas for certification and request certification. This resulted in a delay in product development and expensive certification testing expenses. In addition, as there were no domestic certified products, most of the domestic protective facilities were installed with expensive imported products. Since the explosion-proof test was conducted in 2016, domestic explosion-proof door certification products were released through the explosion-proof test, paving the way for domestic explosion-proof doors to be used instead of expensive overseas products in protection facilities. It can be said that it is a result achieved by the cooperation among KGS, DIA, Army Headquarters, and Hanwha. At the same time, several problems revealed in the implementation process were identified as follows:

3.1. Institution in charge of the test

Most of the facilities that require blast-proof doors are under the MND. The criteria for passing the explosion demonstration test are also set by the MND. However, the role of the MND in the demonstration test of the blast-proof door is insignificant. KGS, which is a public company under the MOTIE, has been experimenting the experiment with the cooperation of the MND's agencies, such as preparation of ammunition and explosive materials necessary for the test and preparation of the test site. It can be said that the independence of the judgment is guaranteed by authenticating the blast-proof door to be used by the MND by a separate certification body, but the efficiency of work may be reduced. If the explosive demonstration test can be conducted and certified through a testing facility or manpower at the MND level, the procedure for purchasing ammunition for the explosion test will be simplified, and it will be easy to secure training grounds and support personnel.

3.2. Limited experimental opportunities and unpredictability of schedule

The verification tests, which started in 2016, have not been conducted as many as the number of tests desired by companies. Even now, more than 10 companies are waiting to apply for the demonstration test. While the certification is delayed, companies and certified products that have obtained certification can occupy an advantageous position in the supply competition. Until now, it is difficult for companies to predict when the explosion demonstration test will be conducted, as it is unclear whether the bomb purchase and the support of auxiliary equipment necessary for the explosion demonstration test are unclear and the training site availability schedule is uncertain.

3.3. Limited point measurements of displacement on the blast door

A laser displacement meter is installed in the center of the blast-proof door to measure the deformation of the blast-proof door. However, depending on the height of the blast-proof door, the magnitude of the explosion pressure acting on it differs^[9]. The location where the maximum displacement occurs may be a location other than the center of the blast-proof door. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the measurement points in the vertical and horizontal directions of the blast-proof door to observe the deformation of various points and reflect the rotational ductility and displacement ductility in the calculation.

3.4. Need to improve simulation accuracy before verification test

According to the "Explosion Proof Door Explosion Demonstration Plan Promotion Plan", companies applying for the demonstration test are required to submit simulation results in advance. Nevertheless, it can be said that the fact that the actual verification test pass rate was 65%, which proves that the simulation result was not accurate. The elastic limit range of the blast-proof door uses the value suggested by the door manufacturer, and the larger the elastic limit value(X_e), the smaller the value of displacement ductility($\mu = X_m/X_e$). Therefore, the blast-proof door manufacturer would like to enter the value as large as possible. Therefore, it is necessary to thoroughly verify

whether the elastic limit value suggested by the explosion applicant is valid. In order to supplement this, it is necessary to devise a standardized method such as enacting a material test method.

4. Improvement Direction

4.1. Expansion of test opportunities and demonstration test led by the MND

The reason why the demonstration test has been limited so far is that the KGS, an organization outside the military, has conducted an explosion demonstration test in anticipation of the military's cooperation. Since the military did not feel the urgency of the blast-proof door explosion demonstration test due to the training and the current operational work, the priority of using the training ground was pushed. Therefore, if the MND conducts the demonstration test, it will be possible to proceed on a predictable schedule with smoother cooperation. If necessary, it could be considered that the DIA is in charge of the certification work for blast-proof doors as part of enhancing the research capabilities of the DIA. In addition, it is necessary to conduct verification tests at least twice a year to solve the demands from companies and expand various products that have passed verification. In order to secure economic efficiency, explosion-proof tests on explosion-proof glass and valves could be conducted in parallel with the explosion-proof door tests.

4.2. Improvement of displacement measuring

If a laser displacement meter and a pressure sensor are installed at several points on the blast-proof door, the magnitude of the pressure acting in the horizontal and vertical directions and the displacement occurring in the blast-proof door can be more accurately measured. However, even if multiple displacement gauges are installed, this is only point data for a specific spot. To compensate for this, it is necessary to observe the displacement occurring in the front and rear of the blast-proof door using a 3D laser scanner. In the case of scanning the front of the blast-proof door after the explosion, it is necessary to analyze the displacement with attention to this point because the bends due to debris and boulders occur in the front of the blast-proof door and this can be reflected as a displacement due to pressure. If three-dimensional laser scanning can be performed by entering through the passage installed in the structure before opening the blast-proof door after the explosion is over, the displacement of the blast-proof door due to pure pressure can be measured. In addition, if the internal state of the blast-proof door can be imaged before and after the explosion using a non-destructive testing machine that can explore the inside of the steel door, it will be an effective method for modeling such as future simulations.

4.3. Reduced-scale test and simulation

The proof test takes at least 6 months from preparation to implementation at a high cost, and a lot of attention is required in preparation and quality control. In the case of a large-scale explosion test with TNT 125kg, it is difficult to find a suitable place for the experiment in countries where urbanization has progressed nationwide, such as in Korea. The larger the size of the explosive for the test, the larger the test site is when considering safety, and it is difficult to rent a test site that can detonate large explosives. The power of an explosion depends on the amount of explosives, but the amount of pressure is greatly influenced by the distance. In general, the explosion pressure is calculated using the relationship between the size of the explosive and the distance, and the formula used for this is the scaled distance(Z). The scaled distance(Z) is a value obtained by dividing the separation distance from the explosive by the power of $1/3$ of the amount of the explosive[20]. If the size of the explosive is reduced and the distance between the explosive and the blast-proof door is shortened, the effect of the demonstration test can be realized while reducing the size of the explosive.

Meanwhile, simulation is low in cost, is not limited by time or place, and results can be derived without consuming resources. In order to take advantage of these advantages, a modeling technique

that allows simulation variables to reflect the same conditions as the actual explosion situation should be supported. For this, it is necessary to be able to determine the values of various variables, and to ensure transparency of the simulation results by revealing the variables used in the simulation. Although it is said that the simulation technique has been developed, the variable values become more complex than the simulation for an object composed of homogeneous materials when different materials are composed of a complex such as an blast-proof door used in a demonstration test. Therefore, when a certain level of data is accumulated through the explosion test, a successful simulation will be possible while controlling various variables.

5. Conclusions

Explosion demonstration tests have been conducted since 2016 under the supervision of KGS. Through this, domestic blast-proof doors, which have been evaluated for the durability of blast-proof doors required for military and government protection facilities, are being installed in the protection facilities. This can be evaluated as having the effect of improving the level of national protection technology and reducing the cost of purchasing expensive foreign companies' blast-proof doors. In the meantime, there have been some difficulties in preparing for a place for the explosion test of the blast door and securing a training ground for the construction of a structure and the installation of the blast door. In addition, the issue of equity between a company that has not undergone a verification test and a company that has already obtained certification through a blast-proof door verification test is being raised.

The fact that many blast-proof doors failed in the demonstration test proves that the simulation's variable control was not effectively implemented. There are external environmental restrictions in the demonstration test. To obtain verified products required by the military and to promote the technology development of companies, it is necessary to shorten the period of implementation of the demonstration tests and to regularize the test schedule.

The conclusions of the study are summarized as follows:

(1) Until now, 11 products from 7 companies have obtained certification through the blast-proof door verification test. It is now possible to install domestic blast-proof doors that have been evaluated for durability through the constructed explosion-proof system.

(2) The blast-proof door certification procedure has been supervised by KGS under the MOTIE. As the explosive demonstration test and certification procedure are supervised by the military agency, it is expected to increase the efficiency of the certification process.

(3) As the number of measuring points on the blast-proof door is increased, and the displacement is measured with a 3D laser scanner, the displacement of the blast-proof door can be more accurately observed.

(4) When considering the preparation of the explosive test site, the effect of the demonstration test can be realized through a reduced-scale explosive test that closes the separation distance while reducing the amount of explosives. In addition, it is necessary to accumulate many years of verification test data to replace the verification test through computer simulation in the long term.

Once the explosion-proof test of the blast door is improved as suggested, it is clear that the result will be of benefit to the military, companies, and ultimately the people who will be provided with certified high-quality blast-proof doors and installed in the protection facilities.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Author contribution

Initial name		Contribution
Author	SB	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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The Effect of ARMY Professionals' Perceptions of the System on Organizational Commitment: The Mediation Effects of Professional Identity

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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze the mediation effect of professional identity in the process of the effect of Army professionals' perceptions of the system on organizational commitment, and to draw policy implications for the training and utilization of effective professionals.

Methods: The survey was conducted on Army professionals and the hypothesis was verified using structural equations (AMOS18.0).

Results: First, system trust did not have a significant effect on professional identity. Second, system internalization had a positive(+) effect on professional identity. Third, the indirect effect of professional identity was not significant in the relationship between system trust and organizational commitment. Fourth, the indirect effect of professional identity was significant in the relationship between system internalization and organizational commitment.

Conclusion: First, it is necessary to consider the organizational level of professional personnel management system that allows professional personnel officers to have a positive perception and agree with its purpose. Second, in the process of system change, the situation and opinions of the army specialist officers who are subject to the system change should be reflected as much as possible, and the detailed consideration of the organizational level that makes them well accept the purpose and purpose of system change is necessary. Third, when the Army professional personnel officers are provided with conditions to work with a high professional identity and implement related policies, their organizational commitment can be increased.

[Keywords] Professional Identity, System Internalization, System Trust, Organizational Commitment, Army Professionals

1. Introduction

In modern society, professionals are the driving force of organizational growth, and most organizations are trying to expand the quantitative and qualitative level of professionals in the field. The importance of professionals is the same not only in society but also in the military [1]. As the area of defense-related work expanded to include almost all the specialties of society, and the trend of change in military organizations became complex, subdivided, and specialized, awareness of the importance of specialized manpower in defense work increased [2]. Therefore, the military classified "an officer who has a master's degree or higher and can be used as a professional position through entrusting education" as defense professionals and conducted professional defense related works [3].

Despite the importance of the role of military professionals, many professionals are experiencing conflict in their identity of their jobs and their commitment to military organizations due to the unstable personnel management system. In this situation, in order to effectively utilize

the military professionals for whom a lot of budget was invested, it is necessary to analyze the factors affecting the organizational effectiveness of the professionals and to improve the personnel management system based on this[4]. Among the factors affecting organizational effectiveness, this study focuses on the factors of perceptions of the system.

So far, the institutional variables have not been used in the study on professional identity and organizational commitment, and tend to be studied independently based on specific systems. However, this study considered institutional variables as important factors. There is a unique system in the organization, and the members are subject to the system. In addition, the system plays a role of a standard in organizational operation, and the nature of the job or organization can be changed according to the system, so its influence is very large. In previous studies, trust in institutions plays a role in mediation various phenomena that occur in individuals and organizations[5], and when organizational members trust the purpose of the system and recognize it positively, the level of human resources in the organization and organizational commitment increase[5][6][7][8]. In fact, the Army professionals have experienced system changes several times, and these system changes have had a great impact on the organizational commitment of professionals, so system-related variables were selected as independent variables.

On the other hand, in the system-related factors affecting organizational effectiveness, it is necessary to examine what psychological states these factors mediate and how they affect organizational effectiveness. At this time, we would like to consider "professional identity" as a parameter in the relationship between the recognition factors of the system and organizational effectiveness. In the existing studies on organizational commitment, psychological factors such as individual values, occupational perspectives, and ethical consciousness affect[9], and value tendencies and organizational situations learned in the process of socialization of individuals such as professional identity affect organizational commitment and job commitment[10]. In domestic research, professional identity has an effect on organizational commitment[11][12][13][14]. However, there have been few studies that analyzed the mediation effects of professional identity by setting organizational effectiveness as a dependent variable.

In this regard, Army professionals' perceptions of the system are important variables that affect organizational effectiveness, and we believe that professional identity will play a mediation role between these factors and organizational effectiveness. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the mediation effect of professional identity in the process of the effect of Army professionals' perceptions of the system on organizational commitment, and to provide policy implications for effective training and utilization of professionals. For this purpose, the following hypotheses were set up.


Hypothesis 1: System trust will have a positive(+) effect on professional identity.

Hypothesis 2: System internalization will have a positive(+) effect on professional identity.

Hypothesis 3: Professional identity will mediate the effect of system trust on organizational commitment.

Hypothesis 4: Professional identity will mediate the effect of system internalization on organizational commitment.

Figure 1. The initial theory model.



2. Research Methods

2.1. Research subjects and procedures

The subjects of this study were 877 professionals in the Army from first lieutenant to colonel. Among them, a total of 773 people were sent a questionnaire, excluding those who were deemed to have insufficient working experience as professionals, and 237 copies were collected (collection rate: 30.7%). Among them, 225 questionnaires were used for analysis except 12 questionnaires that were unfaithfully answered. The demographic characteristics of the subject of the questionnaire are as follows <Table 1>.

Table 1. The characteristics of sample.

Classification		N(%)	Classification		N(%)
Rank	Captain	49 (21.8)	Types of professionals	Policy	115(51.1)
	Major	111(49.3)		Special mission	55(24.5)
	Lieutenant	65(28.9)			
	Colonel				
Education	Master	132(58.7)		Acquisition	49(21.8)
	Doctoral course	39(17.3)		Others	6(2.6)

	Doctor	54(24.0)			
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2.2. Manipulating definitions and measurements of variables;

2.2.1. System trust

In this study, the system trust means "positive expectation of the army professionals about the personnel management system"[15]. Trust is the most basic element that creates a sense of homogeneity in an organization[16], which sustains the relationship between members with voluntary motivation rather than control and supervision, thereby inducing voluntary commitment and enhancing organizational productivity[17].

2.2.2. System internalization

In this study, System Internalization means the internalization process in which the meaning of institutional rules and regulations spread well to the implementation unit of the system and are settled in the organization properly. In order for the system to be effective, it is not enough as the existence of the system itself, it is necessary for the members to internalize the system[18], and effective System Internalization has a positive effect on organizational effectiveness.

2.2.3. Professional identity

Professional identity means a subjective evaluation that a person who is engaged in a professional job[19]. In this study, questionnaires by Park Jong-woo(1994) were used using tools developed by Snizek(1972)[20][21]. It was divided into five sub-factors and consisted of 23 questions. And it was measured by the Likert 5-point scale. In the structural equation model analysis, the average value of each of the five sub-factors was used as a measurement variable that constitutes professional identity. The reliability of the measurement tool(Chronbach's α) was 0.694 in the study of Jong-woo Park(1994), and 0.869 in this study.

2.2.4. Organizational commitment

In this study, we measured the emotional commitment, which means emotional attachment, identification, and flow of the members of the three organizational commitments classified by Allen & Meyer(1996)[22]. For this purpose, we used the questionnaire developed by Allen & Meyer(1996) and used by So-yeon Choi(2005)[23]. It consists of 6 questions and was measured on a Likert 5-point scale. The reliability of the measurement tool(Chronbach's α) was 0.935 in the study of So-yeon Choi(2005) and 0.908 in this study.

3. Results

3.1. Analysis of measurement models

In order to examine the construct validity of the exogenous variables and endogenous variables used in this study, Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using AMOS 18.0, and model fitness and factor load were measured to determine whether the measurement items of each variable were measured appropriately. The fit indexes of the measurement model showed good model fit with TLI = .934, CFI = .945, and RMSEA = .063. In order to verify the convergent validity and discriminant validity of the latent variables, factor loading value, concept reliability, and variance extraction index of the measurement items were examined <Table 2>. In case of factor loading value, all items except self-regulation(.376) and self-confidence(.411) showed factor loading value of 0.5 or more in the intended

latent variable, and all items except self-regulation exceeded 0.4 which is the standard value proposed by Stevens(2002)[24]. Self-regulation is an important concept that constitutes professional identity and factor loading value is also approximated to .4 so it was used for analysis. Concept reliability was higher than the reference value of 0.7, and the variance extraction index was higher than the reference value of 0.5, so the convergence validity of the potential variables included in the measurement model was secured.

Table 2. The results of a confirmatory factor analysis for the overall measurement model.

System internalization	System 3	0.046	0.031	6.162	***	0.824	0.764
	System 2	0.051	0.03	6.539	***		
	System 4	0.046	0.042	9.212	***		
	System 1	0.68	0.042	9.714	***		
Professional identity	Behavioral criterion	0.627	0.033	8.896	***	0.982	0.919
	Public services	0.623	0.023	8.926	***		
	Self-regulation	0.376	0.04	10.164	***		
	Calling consciousness	0.771	0.026	6.711	***		
	Self- confidence	0.411	0.026	10.065	***		
Organizational commitment	Commitment 2	0.693	0.035	9.755	***	0.993	0.965
	Commitment 3	0.89	0.015	7.015	***		
	Commitment 4	0.889	0.016	7.071	***		
	Commitment 6	0.762	0.027	9.337	***		
	Commitment 1	0.787	0.026	9.107	***		
χ2=214.732, df= 113, TLI=0.934, CFI=0.945, RMSEA=0.063							

Note: *** p<.001.

On the other hand, the discriminant validity was determined whether the variance extraction index of each latent variable has a greater value than the determinant coefficients, which are the square of the correlation coefficients between latent variables. The most significant correlation coefficient between the potential variables is 0.516 and the variance extraction index of all potential variables is greater than 0.266, which is the square of this, so the discriminant validity of the entire measurement model is secured.

3.2. The descriptive statistics and correlation analysis

The descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficient of the variables used in this study were presented in <Table 3>. The results of the analysis showed a significant positive(+) correlation between all variables except the correlation coefficient(0.12) between "institutional trust" and "professional identity" which were not significant. The independent variables, "system trust"(r = .206) and "system internalization"(r = .170) showed significant positive(+) correlation with the parameter, professional identity. There was a high positive(+) correlation between professional identity as a parameter and organizational commitment as a dependent variable(r = .498). Also, there was a positive(+) correlation between the independent variable "system internationalization"(r = .235) and the dependent variable

“organization commitment”.

Table 3. The descriptive statistics and correlation.

Variables	M	SD	System trust	System internalization	Professional identity	Organization commitment
System trust	2.65	0.756	1	.516**	.206**	0.12
System internalization	3.428	0.809	.516**	1	.422**	.235**
Professional identity	3.932	0.433	.206**	.422**	1	.498**
Organization commitment	3.939	0.649	0.12	.235**	.498**	1

Note: N=225, *p<.05; **p<.01.

3.3. Research hypothesis verification

Before the hypothesis verification through the standardized path coefficient of the structural equation model, the suitability of the structural model was verified to see how well the theoretical model represents the collected data. In addition, to confirm whether there is an alternative model more suitable for the collected data than the theoretical model, the study compared the three alternative models set by the researcher with the appropriateness of the theoretical model. The result of comparing the fitness between the theoretical model and the alternative model is presented in <Table 4>.

Table 4. The model fitness comparison.

Models	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	TLI	CFI	RMSEA
Theoretical model ^a	215.949	115	1.878	.939	.946	.063
Alternative model 1 ^b	215.819	114	1.893	.935	.945	.063
Alternative model 2 ^c	214.872	114	1.885	.939	.946	.063
Alternative model 3 ^d	214.732	113	1.9	.934	.945	.063

Note: ^a The complete mediation model.

^b System trust in a complete mediation model → organizational commitment: One path has been added.

^c In a complete mediation model, system internalization → organizational commitment: One path has been added.

^d In a complete mediation model, the paths added to the alternative models 1 and 2 were added at the same time.

The theoretical model is a complete mediation model, in which the influence of independent variables on dependent variables (organizational commitment) is transmitted only through professional identity, which is a parameter. The fit index of the theoretical model was generally good ($\chi^2 = 215.949$, $df=115$, $TLI = .939$, $CFI = 0.946$, $RMSEA = .063$). In this study, three alternative models were set up. First, the alternative model 1 is a model that adds a direct path from the independent variable, institutional trust, to the dependent variable, organizational commitment. Alternative model 2 is a model that adds a direct path from another independent variable, system internationalization, to organizational commitment, a dependent variable. Alternative model 3 is a complete form of partial mediation model with all direct paths to dependent variables added by adding two paths (system trust → organizational commitment, system internalization → organizational commitment) from independent variables to dependent variables to the theoretical model. The fitness of alternative models was similar to that of theoretical models. Except for the alternative models 1 and 2, all models are intertwined, and the chi-square difference testing was conducted to verify whether there is a statistically significant difference in model fitness. As a result of verification, the theoretical model and alternative model 1 ($\Delta\chi^2 = .130$, $\Delta df = 1$, n.s.), alternative model 2 ($\Delta\chi^2 = 1.077$, $\Delta df = 1$, n.s.), alternative model 3 ($\Delta\chi^2 = 1.217$, $\Delta df = 2$, n.s.) did not show any significant difference in χ^2 values. Therefore, the theoretical model, which is a complete mediation model, was selected as the best fitting model for the collected data and hypothesis testing was conducted. Standardized coefficients, S.E., C.R., and observed p-

values of each path shown in the final model were presented in <Table 5>, and the final model and standardization path coefficient for hypothesis testing were presented in <Figure 2>.

Table 5. The path coefficients of the final model.

Classification		Standardized coefficients	S.E.	C.R.	Remarks
System trust	→ Professional identity	-.078	.061	-.764	Hypothesis 1 was rejected.
System internalization	→ Professional identity	.559	.054	5.064***	Hypothesis 2 was adopted.
Professional identity	→ Organizational commitment	.641	.13	6.413***	
$\chi^2=215.949$, $df=115$, $TLI=0.936$, $CFI=0.946$, $RMSEA=0.063$					

Note: N = 225, *** p < .001.

Hypothesis 1 is to verify whether institutional trust has a positive(+) effect on professional identity. As a result of verification, the standardized path coefficient value was not statistically significant and was rejected. Hypothesis 2 is to verify whether System Internationalization has a positive effect on professional identity. As a result of verification, the standardized path coefficient was 0.559(p < .01), which was significant, and hypothesis 2 was adopted.


Table 6. The results of verifying mediation effect hypotheses.

Classification		Total effect	Direct effect	Indirect effect	Remarks
System trust	→ Organizational commitment	-.050	0	-.050	Hypothesis 3 was rejected.
System internalization	→ Organizational commitment	.358**	0	.358**	Hypothesis 4 was adopted.

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01.

Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are to verify the mediation effect of professional identity on the influence of institutional trust and system internalization on organizational commitment. In this study, the mediation effect of bootstrapping analysis was verified. As a result of verifying the mediation effect through the 95% confidence interval, the indirect effect of professional identity(CI = -.174, .078) was not statistically significant in the relationship between institutional trust and organizational commitment, and hypothesis 3 was rejected, and the indirect effect of professional identity(CI = .2) was rejected in the relationship between system internalization and organizational commitment. 35, .474) was statistically significant. At this time, it was found that the professional identity was in a complete mediation because the direct effect was "0". Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was adopted <Table 6>.

Figure 2. The final model.



4. Discussions and Conclusion

This study aims to examine the effects of Army professionals' perceptions of the system on organizational commitment through the medium of professional identity. To verify the hypothesis, a survey was conducted on 225 professionals in the Army, and structural equation techniques were used. The results and implications of the study are as follows.

First, it is meaningful that the theoretical scope of related fields has been broadened by clarifying that institutional variables affect professional identity. Previous studies mainly used individual, job, and organizational characteristics variables, and did not deal with institutional variables. However, as the result of the study by selecting institutional internalization and institutional trust as independent variables, the significance of institutional internalization was revealed, so it was found that institutional characteristics, along with the individual, job, and organizational characteristics variables studied so far, affected professional identity.

Second, it is revealed that System Internalization has a positive effect on professional identity, and it provides implications for the development direction of professional personnel management system. Kostova(1999) emphasized that members understand the purpose and purpose of the system and recognize it positively, and the results of this study support this claim. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the organizational level of professional personnel management system that allows professional personnel officers to have a positive perception and agree with its purpose. In particular, despite various changes in the situation inside and outside the military organization, it is important that the personnel management system for professional personnel is stabilized and implemented consistently. However, if the system change is inevitable in reality, the situation and opinions of the army specialist officers who are subject to the system should be reflected, and the detailed consideration of the organization level is necessary so that they can accept the purpose of the system change.

Third, professional identity not only has a positive effect on organizational commitment, but also completely mediates the relationship between institutional internalization and organizational commitment. That is, a person with a high professional identity can switch the particularity of the professional group to contribute to the entire organization. In addition, even if the System Internalization is high, it is manifested as organizational commitment through professional identity. This shows that when the professionals are provided with conditions to work with a high professional identity and implement related policies, their commitment to military organization can increase.

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6. Appendix

6.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	YK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	YI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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Kosovo War and Retaliatory TERRORISM: Exclusive Nationalism of Albania and Serbia

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Abstract

Purpose: Although the Balkans have historically diverse ethnic groups, there have been ethnic and religious conflicts since modern times due to the failure to form a nation-state and the emergence of interests and socialist systems of neighboring powers. After Tito's death, Kosovo's armed conflict between Serbia and Albania intensified, leading to NATO's involvement, and serious crimes during the war. The purpose of this study is to study the relationship between forces and war crimes that emerged during the war.

Method: To examine ethnic problems in the Balkans and the formation of ethnic states, especially ethnic conflicts and war patterns in Kosovo, and to analyze the armed struggle between the Serbian-led Yugoslav government and Albania's KLA. We also look at crimes committed by both groups and why NATO was involved.

Results: Western support for the KLA's armed struggle to form an independent state in Kosovo resulted in Albanian ethnic groups taking over Kosovo and developing from autonomous to sovereign states. The war led to the kidnapping, torture, massacre and sexual assault of innocent citizens, but the leaders of the KLA were transformed from terrorists to official authorities in charge of the regime.

Conclusion: Ethnic problems have internal problems that cannot be solved by external interference. In addition, if external forces intervene under the pretext of resolving the problem of ethnic conflict, it can be seen that ultimately dominating hegemony within the region is essential. The international community's interest in human rights violations by the state during the war should be raised.

[Keywords] Balkan, KLA, Rambouillet Talks, NATO, Terrorism

1. Introduction

Today, the international community has had numerous humanitarian problems, including large-scale atrocities against ethnic minorities, forced mass migration, and refugees, although conflicts between countries have eased and the risk of war has decreased. Therefore, international guarantees of individual human rights are more urgently requested, and the international community's perception that human rights issues are no longer a nation's domestic concern is increasingly firmly established. Even human rights violations committed within a country can threaten international peace and safety if the scale and extent of them are significant. There is no other opinion on the legitimacy of collective intervention by the United Nations to resolve this situation. And throughout the recent series of events, the Security Council has shown more active activism in protecting human rights, expanding its scope of activities through the expansion of the concept of a threat to peace.

NATO's attack on Kosovo was not approved by the UN Security Council. NATO sought to expand its power to Eastern Europe, and the United States had a strategy to maintain hegemony through NATO in cooperation with Western Europe. In the Yugoslav Federation, each ethnic

group formed an independent political system, and in Kosovo, the Albanian people also wanted to have an independent state. However, it came into conflict with Serbia's attempts to maintain control of the region after Tito's death.

The conflict between Albania and Serbia led to the Kosovo War. During and after the war, brutal ethnic extermination crimes such as the massacre between the two ethnic groups occurred, and numerous citizens were damaged. The war was over and Kosovo was granted independence from many countries except Russia and China. Serbia still claims Kosovo as its territory, possibly reigniting the conflict following changes in international dynamics. In this paper, we will study the background of the Kosovo War, the participation of neighboring countries in the war, and war crimes.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Yugoslavia, a multiethnic nation in the Balkans, and Kosovo

The Balkans served as an important bridge between Asia and Europe since ancient times. The Kingdom of Serbia was established in the 9th century and ruled most of the Balkans in the 14th century. In 1389 he was defeated by the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Kosovo and became independent of Serbia in 1881. In 1914, Serbs killed the Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary, which was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but regained its occupied territory in 1918[1].

The Balkans are areas where many wars occurred, including World War I. The Balkans include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Turkey's Thracian Peninsula, Croatia, Slovenia and the New Yugoslavia.

The name "Balkan" comes from Turkish for dense forests and steep mountain ranges, and there are several mountain ranges in the Balkans, including the Pindus, the Balkans, and the Rodov Mountains. The Balkans were part of the Roman Empire for 500 B.C. It was not until the 6th century that the Slavic peoples moved here[2].

Kosovo is a mountainous land-locked territory about the size of Connecticut. In the south, the Sharr Mountains rise 8,000 feet, separating Kosovo from Albania and Macedonia. The Accursed Mountains to the west mark Kosovo's border with Montenegro. The Kopaonik range is made up of low-altitude slopes flowing downward to Serbia. Kosovo's rivers run to the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas. Kosovo was an important historic trade route connecting the southern port city of Shkoder in Albania with cities to the north on the Adriatic. Kosovo also served as a link to the east, connecting the coast with Tetovo and Debar in Macedonia, as well as destinations in Bulgaria. Belgrade lies 150 miles to the north. Serbia is a land-locked territory whose access to the Adriatic runs through Kosovo and northern Albania[3][4].

2.2. Yugoslavia before Tito regime

The Yugoslav region, founded in the Balkans, is a complex region of ethnicity, religion and language, and has a history dominated by various forces. It also borders several neighboring countries and was heavily invaded by them. It is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious state consisting of six ethnic, five republics, four languages, and three religions. This diversity is an element of conflict and repetition, and for the past 500 years Catholics, Muslims, and Greek Orthodox Christians have been without major conflict, but the 1941-45 war and the 1991-95 war began to break the peace of coexistence.

The Kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, founded in 1918, was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, destroyed by German attacks in 1941, and revived by the communist regime of the Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia in 1945. It was renamed the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia in 1961 and dissolved in 1991 when Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent.

Kosovo has historically been the territory of Bulgaria, the First Reich, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia and Serbia. From 1389 onwards, it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire and incorporated into Islam. Kosovo, which was ruled by Serbia at the end of World War I, was regarded by Serbs as a sacred place to fight against the Ottoman Empire.

Kosovo has a population of 1.8 million, with the majority of ethnic Albanians, including Serbs, Bosnians, Turks and Roms.

After the Russia-Turkish War of 1877, the majority of the Balkans succeeded in forming their own independent states under the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878 and the Treaty of Berlin in June 1878, which was re-signed by Western European states concerned about Russian rule [5]. However, the state formation of the region was delayed due to the continuing ethnic conflict within Yugoslavia's territory.

2.3. Socialism and Yugoslavia

Prior to the Ottoman Turkish invasion, the area was inhabited by Orthodox, Catholic Albanians and Serbian Orthodox Serbs. After the First Kosovo War of 1389 between the Christian Allies and the Ottoman Turks, most Albanians converted to Islam. Serbs' migration to Kosovo was halted by Ottoman Turkish rule, and instead began to migrate to Hungary and Transylvania [6].

It was not until the late 18th century that nationalism began to influence Western history. The French Revolution and the American Revolutionary War were the ideological foundations. The Napoleonic Wars raised nationalism in Europe, and the formation of nation-states in Western Europe. However, the Balkans were colonized by powerful states and could not establish a nation-state [7][8].

After 1945 the socialist government under Josip Broz Tito systematically repressed all manifestations of nationalism throughout Yugoslavia, seeking to ensure that no republic or nationality gained dominance over the others. In particular, Tito diluted the power of Serbia—the largest and most populous republic—by establishing autonomous governments in the Serbian province of Vojvodina in the north and Kosovo and Metohija in the south.

The formal autonomy of Kosovo, established under the Yugoslavia Constitution in 1945, was initially almost meaningless. Secret police cracked down on nationalists, and in 1956 a number of Albanians were tried in Kosovo on espionage and subversion charges. There were a small number of underground groups aiming for independence from Albania, but the impact of the activities was actually minimal due to the large restrictions on their activities. Yugoslavia experienced an economic and political crisis in 1969 when a large-scale economic reform government program widened the gap between the rich and the poor north. Kosovo's political status was further improved in 1974 when the new Yugoslavian constitution expanded its political rights. Vojvodina and Kosovo were declared states and held federal presidents and their own parliaments, police and national banks, and gained much of the power of a full republic.

Tito's death on 4 May 1980 was exacerbated by the growing economic crisis and nationalist unrest, resulting in a long period of political unrest. Communist hardliners put a heavy hand on all kinds of nationalism. Throughout the 1980s, Kosovo suffered from the existence of top secret police officers who ruthlessly suppressed claims by all unauthorized nationalists, including Albanians and Serbs. After the March 1981 Kosovo Albanian riots, about 4,000 Serbs moved from Kosovo to central Serbia. Thirty-three nationalist organizations were disbanded by Yugoslav police.

The peoples of Yugoslavia under the socialist system were forced to undergo 'ethnic cleaning' after liberalization due to ethnic conflict and civil war. The six-republic Yugoslavia was lifted by the 1991 declaration of independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, the 1992 declaration of Bosnian independence and civil war, the birth of the Serbian-Montenegro Union, Montenegro independence in 2006, and Kosovo in 2008 [9].

3. Background of Kosovo War and NATO Military Intervention

3.1. Kosovo liberation army(KLA)'s 'great albania'

On 8 May 1989, Milosevic became president of Serbia and was officially confirmed on 6 December 1989. On 22 January 1990, the 14th General Assembly of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia(LCY) abolished its party status as the only legal party in Yugoslavia. In January 1990, the Yugoslav government announced that it would push ahead with the creation of a multi-party system.

On 26 June 1990, Serbian authorities closed Kosovo's parliament, citing special circumstances. On 1 or 2 July 1990, Serbia approved a new amendment to Serbia's constitution in a referendum. On 2 July, a delegation of 114 Albanians to Kosovo's 180-member parliament declared Kosovo an independent republic within Yugoslavia. On 5 July, Serbia's parliament dissolved Kosovo's parliament. Serbia also dissolved its local administrative council and ruled the province completely and directly. Serbia has taken control of Kosovo's main Albanian press and stopped broadcasting. On 7 September 1990, the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was promulgated by the Kosovo Dissolution Parliament. Milosevic ordered the arrest of representatives of Kosovo's disbanded parliament[10][11].

On 24 May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held an informal election for the parliament and president of Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova, the first president of the Kosovo Republic, pursued a passive resistance policy that succeeded in maintaining peace in Kosovo during the early wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, Rugova called for a UN peacekeeping force for Kosovo[12].

In 1997, Milosevic was promoted to president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(FRY). Milosevic stepped up his oppression of Albania, and the Albanians' idea of this was to fight back with force. Formed in the early 1990s to fight Serbian persecution of Kosovo Albanians, the KLA launched its first campaign in Kosovo in 1995 with attacks on Serbian police. In 1997, he smuggled weapons from Albania and armed them with looting from Albanian police and troops. The KLA was formed by some members of the Rugova-led party, the Union of Kosovo Democrats(LDK). The KLA and LDK shared a common goal of ending Belgrade's repression and making Kosovo independent, but the KLA opposed Kosovo's rule by the LDK.

The ultimate goal of the KLA is Great Albania. It forms an integrated nation from Macedonia to Montenegro to southern Serbia. The KLA received financial and material support from Kosovo and Albanian diaspora[13]. The KLA's fierce resistance to Serbia began because the Milosevic regime in Serbia was a barrier to this plan. The war began with an attack on the KLA police station and a retaliatory attack on the KLA by the police. Serbian police have massacred 60 Albanians, including 18 women and 10 children. The KLA occupied Deçan and most of its surroundings, and operated territory based in the town of Glodjane.

On 31 May 1998, the Yugoslavian Army and Serbia's Interior Ministry launched an operation to seal the KLA's border. During this period, Yugoslav President Milosevic agreed with Russia's Boris Yeltsin to stop offensive operations and prepare for talks with Albanians, who refused to talk to Serbia throughout the crisis, but spoke to the Yugoslav government. The KLA was seeking occupation of more parts of Kosovo during the June-July period. In the process, the Yugoslav army received international criticism for its use of indiscriminate force against Albanians. The Yugoslav army's massacre of Albanians later served as an excuse for NATO intervention, which prompted Milosevic to be imprisoned for war crimes.

3.2. The breakdown of rambouillet talks and NATO's air strike on Kosovo

Milosevic's deprivation of Kosovo's sovereignty gave Albanians a justification for the creation of the KLA and for a guerrilla war against the Serbs. Serbia defined the KLA as a terrorist organization and launched a tough campaign. Peace talks began on 6 February 1999 in Rambouillet, France, following the massacre of Ratchaq in January 1999. The talks involved Serbian representatives, Albanian and Kosovo Liberation Army leaders. The Albanian delegation signed a yes to

the talks, but Serbia-led New Yugoslavia agreed to join the unarmed UN observers in Kosovo, but did not sign the deal, strongly protesting NATO's presence.

On the other hand, the New Yugoslavia federal government launched a massive campaign against the KLA in Kosovo, forcing Albanians out of the country and executing Albanians who refused to do so[14].

Following Rambouillet's failure and a proposal for an alternative Yugoslavia, OSCE's international observers withdrew to ensure security prior to NATO's bombing on 22 March. On 23 March 1999, Rambouillet's talks were officially declared unsuccessful. Hours before the declaration, FRY declared a state of emergency, said war was imminent, and began mobilizing large-scale troops and resources. At 19:00 on 24 March, NATO launched a bombing operation against Yugoslavia. The operation lasted until June 11.

The Kosovo War was a war between KLA and FRY(Serbia Montenegro and Montenegro) on 24 March 1999. On 23 March, after the failure of the Rambouillet talks was confirmed, NATO air-bombed Kosovo in the name of ending human rights abuses committed in Kosovo's autonomous state. In response to NATO's attack, Yugoslavia called it a violation of international law. Yugoslavia filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice(ICJ) against NATO member states, citing violations of its prohibition of use of force, non-intervention of domestic affairs, violation of the Geneva Convention(1949), and violation of the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide[15][16]. NATO claimed that the attack on Yugoslavia was intended to expel inhumane crime groups and eliminate war crimes[17].

NATO began to consider ground forces, and Milosevic, who strongly opposed NATO's presence, accepted the terms proposed by the Finnish-Russian arbitration team and agreed to a UN-led military presence in Kosovo. The deployed NATO ground forces began to stay in Kosovo in partnership with the KLA.

The war ended with the Kumanovo Treaties, and Yugoslavia and Serbia agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and the Kosovo Liberation Army was disbanded shortly thereafter. The Kosovo war was fought over a four-month period in 1999, and was concluded in June that year by 'the Security Council Resolution 1244'. The administration of Kosovo was handled by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK), while the security and defense sectors were handled by the Kosovo Force(KFOR). The war ended, but conflicts between the Serbs and Albanians often escalated when the Albanians declared unilateral independence in 2008.

4. Result of Kosovo War

4.1. The aftermath of the war

NATO's attack on Yugoslavia caused the destruction of industrial facilities. The bombing of industrial facilities in major Yugoslavian industrial cities, including Pancevo, caused massive toxic leaks. The Donau River was followed by oil bands from destroyed oil refineries, and dioxin was detected from Hugo's chemical plants, even in Hungary and Austria[18].

NATO's bombing has not been approved by the UN Security Council and has been controversial since at least 488 Yugoslav civilians, including Kosovo refugees, were killed. During NATO's operation, more than 50 civilians were killed in an Albanian refugee convoy attack, and three Chinese journalists were killed when they bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The Yugoslav government and the Chinese government strongly condemned NATO's wrong attack.

In the 2008 joint study by the Humanitarian Law Centre(an NGO from Serbia and Kosovo), The International Commission on Missing Persons, and the Missing Person Commission of Serbia made a name-by-name list of war and post-war victims. According to the updated 2015 Kosovo Memory Book, 13,535 people were killed or missing in Kosovo during the conflict, from 1 January 1998 up until December 2000. Of these, 10,812 were Albanians, 2,197 Serbs and 526 Roma, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and others. 10,317 civilians were killed or went missing, of whom 8,676 were Albanians, 1,196 Serbs and 445 Roma and others.

Yugoslavia's counterattack in Kosovo lasted 18 months from 1998 to 1999, with 225 of the 600 mosques damaged or destroyed. Extensive rape and sexual violence by Serbian troops, police and paramilitary groups occurred during the conflict, with the majority of the victims estimated at 20,000 Kosovo Albanian women. During the NATO attack, more than 3,000 civilians were killed by air bombing, murder, rape and arson.

After the war, around 200,000 Serbs, Romani, and other non-Albanians fled Kosovo and many of the remaining civilians were victims of abuse. Serbia became home to the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Europe.

4.2. KLA activities and terrorist crimes

The KLA was an Albanian militant group that separated Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia in the 1990s and emphasized Albanian culture and ethnicity. Yugoslavia was considered a terrorist group until it was disbanded. The Kosovo Liberation Army, which was regarded as a 'terrorist' group in the early 1990s, has now been 'transformed' into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) with the primary objective of protecting this war-torn province against 'natural' disasters. The creation of a 'civilian', uniformed and 'multi-ethnic' corps is a unique experience for the international community as it has been undertaken by a United Nations interim administration within the sovereignty of a state-the now defunct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-that had no input during the planning or implementation of this transformation process[19].

In late 1980 the KLA began to resist the detention of Albanian nationalists by Yugoslav police. The KLA maintained its regular military presence until NATO's air strike on Kosovo, fought militarily against the Milosevic regime's ethnic cleansing, and gained support from NATO.

During and after the war, the KLA kidnapped and killed Serbs, Romans and moderate Albanians. The KLA carried out a massacres operation to remove ethnic Serbs from Kosovo.

The KLA received a large amount of funding from the Albanian diaspora group. It has been alleged that it used drug terrorism to fund its operations. War crimes and abuse were committed by the KLA during and after conflicts such as the massacre of civilians, the destruction of camps and the destruction of cultural heritage. In June 2020, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor's Office indicted a number of former KLA members, including Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The Kosovo war resulted in a significant increase in government casualties due to the KLA ambushes, the invasion of communications lines and the kidnapping of security forces, resulting in Yugoslavia's retaliatory campaign. In early March, these attacks and anti-terrorism operations led to the evacuation of many villagers or dispersed into other villages, cities or hills. In the process, the KLA kidnapped and killed Serbs as well as Albanians who cooperated with Serbia. The representative examples are Klečka killings, Lake Radonjić massacre, Gnjilane killings, Orahovac massacre, Staro Gracko massacre, Ugljare mass grave, Volujak massacre.

The KLA also operated camps at Lapunik Prison Camp and Jablanca Prison Camp, where prisoners were detained, tortured and abused. The KLA committed extensive and systematic arson and looting of houses belonging to Serbia, Rome and other minorities, and the destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries. They engaged children in the war and raped and killed women who cooperated with Serbia.

The Yugoslav government designated the KLA as a terrorist organization, but France and the United States designated the KLA as a terrorist organization, but removed it from the list as the war began in earnest[20].

During the war, the KLA forces cooperated with NATO forces and were reborn as the KPC after the war. And the leaders of the KLA took over positions such as the president and prime minister of Kosovo's government.

5. Conclusion

The reason why Kosovo has not been resolved peacefully is that the Balkans are unilaterally trying to resolve the ethnic interests of the region in complex religious and cultural mosaic properties and historical experiences[21][22][23].

The reason NATO decided to launch an air strike on the Kosovo war is because of the interests of NATO's leading country, the United States. The first is to gain leadership in Eastern Europe, which has been mired in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw alliance, secondly to confirm alliance between NATO members, to show U.S. influence, thirdly to develop high-tech weapons industries, and boom in the U.S. economy.

The Kosovo war resulted in Russia's loss of influence in Eastern Europe, strong oppression of the multi-ethnic Russia and China's nationalist minority movement, and NATO's expansion. Armed struggle and terrorism occurred in the process of ethnic self-determination, religious and cultural identity of minorities who had been suppressed in the socialist system. This extreme conflict is developing into a new Cold War conflict between Russia and China, the leaders of Western powers and socialist systems. Russia and China still have many minorities, and some of them are fighting to regain sovereignty, modeled after the Balkans' newly independent nation.

Meanwhile, Serbia and Albania's exclusive nationalism in Kosovo has had the worst consequences of armed conflict and ethnic extermination. The war spread because of President Milosevic's justification for genocide and the protection of universal human rights, but the Albanian KLA also engaged in retaliatory atrocities against Serbs, other ethnic minorities and Albanians who were recognized to have cooperated with Serbia. The Kosovo war was a war that could not be judged as good on one side and evil on the other. Both camps should be held accountable for acts of anti-humanitarian terrorism carried out during the war.

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7. Appendix

7.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	SC	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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A Study on How to Expand the Role of MILITARY Mobilization Forces in the Event of a National Disaster -Focusing on the Local Government and Regional Reserve Forces-

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Abstract

Purpose: This paper proposes a plan to expand the role of Regional Reserve Forces(RRF) as a key mobilization force for regional defense, in the event of a national disaster, and to more effectively support the disaster response of the local community. It also proposes a desirable policy direction for the advancement of cooperative governance of local communities on disasters toward international cooperative security against non-traditional threats.

Method: Firstly, it analyzed laws and regulations related to disaster and RRF, and then reviewed the reality of the organization and formation of Regional Defense Battalions(RDB), Local Government's Disaster & Safety Countermeasures Headquarters(DSCHQ), Defense Integrated Disaster Management Information System(DID-MIS), and compensation costs, etc. In addition, the analysis of Disaster Mobilization cases and the opinions of experts were reflected.

Results: The disaster mobilization of RRF must be clearly and concretely presented in relevant laws and regulations. Mobilization requirements give flexibility to mobilize from the beginning of the disaster, but the deadline must be strictly specified. If Part-time Reservist are employed as liaison officers, disaster officers, and military affairs cooperation officers of local governments, it is possible to expect not only the disaster management of local governments but also the development of the Regional Integrated Defense System(RIDS).

Conclusion: One of the important missions of the reserve forces is to protect the lives and property of the people from disasters and to support the local community. The disaster management of local governments in the future will require more military support. Therefore, the disaster management should be given high priority to national policy. Furthermore, a disaster management agenda that can lead the international community should be drawn up, and the role and contribution of the RRF to the international community should be sought.

[Keywords] Mobilization, Reserve Force, Nontraditional Security, Disaster, Cooperative Security

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of research

Korea is currently overcoming a national disaster called COVID-19, which has not been experienced in the past[1]. Recent disasters have made it difficult for the military to carry out traditional missions as the linkage and spread of its effects tend to transcend traditional military threats. Modern disaster management should be led by local governments at the disaster site so that the situation can be resolved early. To this end, the cooperation and support system between local governments and regional RRF needs to be strengthened.

Local governments are one of the key elements of RIDS[2]. Since the damage of war is similar to a disaster, the ability of local communities and local governments to quickly recover from a disaster with their own capabilities is the goal of disaster management and an essential factor in regional defense.

In the event of a disaster, the military supports local governments, but this is the last resort[3]. This is due to the military's unique mission to maintain military readiness. In this sense, the RRF is resource of local governments that can be utilized in the event of a disaster and the mobilization force of Regional Defense units.

This study is to present a plan to expand the role of supporting RRF, which is a key mobilization force for RIDS, in the event of a national disaster more effectively in responding to disasters in the local community. It also proposes a desirable policy direction for the advancement of cooperative governance of local communities on disasters toward international cooperative security against non-traditional threats.

1.2. Status of support by RRF in case of disaster

The RRF contributed to the disaster recovery by mobilizing 3.9 million people 45 times from 1972 to 2018. Compared to the 1970s, in the 2010s, the number of disaster assistance of the reserve decreased significantly(1%) in terms of the number of times(12 → 3 times) and scale[4]. Even so, the number and scale of disasters did not decrease. Rather, disaster damage and casualties increased[5]. As such, the fact that the mobilization of the reserve declined despite the increase in the incidence and damage of major disasters seems to be a problem in the effectiveness of the mobilization of the reserve in case of a disaster.

Considering that modern disasters are completely new and complex, and their ripple effects are enormous, specialized rapid response organizations should perform disaster relief, rescue, and recovery. However, there may be doubts that it will not be possible to respond to such a disaster with current reserve capacity. This is because disaster recovery that relies on simple manpower is now less effective.

There was once in 2007 legal disaster mobilization under the Reserve Forces Act. At that time, the RRF were mobilized to the heavy snow scene as much as the supplementary training time they had to complete. In other cases, they participated in damage recovery instead of training reserve forces, and in fact, it is difficult to say that they were called by “disaster mobilization”[6].

It is necessary to reconsider whether mobilization of RRF for non-traditional security is unnecessary in case of current emergency as well as in the future threats. As can be seen from the recent COVID-19 situation, mobilizing the nation's total resources to respond to disasters is a characteristic of modern disaster management and a trend of the international community[7][8].

1.3. Scope of research

There are several previous studies on this topic. Seon SB insists for the creation of a “reserve army emergency response unit” with expertise because it requires local-level personnel who can respond quickly and professionally in disaster situations. The problem of establishing a separate disaster response unit with expertise has difficulties in recruiting reserve forces and increasing the budget, but the solution to this problem is insufficient[9]. Woo KH argues that as the strategic environment changes, we need to increase our preparedness for comprehensive security. He said that the laws and regulations should be improved because the contents of the Act on the cooperation system with military-related organizations in case of a disaster and the timing and procedure for support by the regional responsible force are redundant and ineffective. However, it is insufficient to provide detailed measures on which laws are insufficient and how to improve them[10]. Seon MS & Lee YM reviewed the basis, procedure, and organization of foreign military support for national disasters. And they confirmed that in these countries, the military is sending liaison officers to local governments in case of disaster. They emphasize that the ROK military needs to develop legal basis and procedures for disaster assistance to local governments, just like these countries[11].

This study presents improvements to expand the role of RRF by analyzing laws and regulations on disasters and reserve forces. In addition, it proposes development plans based on past cases and expert advice on the organization and formation of RD units, disaster response organizations and formations, and compensation costs.

2. Korea's Disaster Management System and the Role of the Military

2.1. Introduction

The disaster management refers to all activities ranging from disaster Prevention, Preparation, Response, and damage Recovery[12]. Currently, disaster management in Korea is a system in which the responsible ministries related to the cause of the disaster deal with accidents[13]. This does not mean that national disaster management can be carried out independently by any specific ministry[14]. It is a multilateral area where various stakeholders directly or indirectly participate and engage in all stages[15]. The “Framework Act on the Management of Disaster and Safety Management” enacted in 2004 is the first law of disaster management that covers all disasters[16]. The military also supports in-military disaster management, civil disaster response and recovery, and emergency rescue in accordance with Instructions on the Defense Disaster Management(Article 1).

According to this Disaster Safety Act, the military provides manpower and equipment requested by the central government and local governments(Article 39). In the event of a disaster, the military establishes a its DSCHQ in units of the brigade level or higher. In addition, each echelon will cooperate with local governments-a metropolitan city/province at the level of operation commands and corps, and a city/county/district at the division level-sharing disaster information and supporting manpower and equipment. To this end, each unit may dispatch a military liaison officer to the relevant agency upon receiving a request from the government or local governments to dispatch a liaison officer.

In the Reserve Forces Act, for “Support for civil defense activities and operations under the Framework Act on Civil Defense”, reserve forces can be mobilized in case of a disaster to assist civilians in recovering from disaster damage(Article 2). This is called “disaster mobilization”. The mobilization order authority is the Minister of National Defense or the head of the military unit to whom the authority has been delegated. According to the reserve forces mission, reserve forces can be divided into mobilization reserve forces for active military units, workplace reserve forces for workplace defense, and regional reserve forces for regional defense. The workplace reserve group is organized by the work unit, and the RRF is organized by the administrative city/county/district unit where the residence is located. As such, reserve forces are the subject of mobilization, a key force in RID, and human resources of the local community that can be utilized in the event of a disaster. A RDB is generally responsible for a city/county/district. They are mobilized according to the Military Service Act and Reserve Military Act, and are subject to the applicable laws according to their status. Among them, RRF are the subject of this study.

2.2. Improvements and developments to expand the role of RRF in case of disaster

2.2.1. Direction to expand the role of RRF

In the event of a disaster, the role of RRF must first be expanded preemptively throughout the disaster management process. Currently, the mission assigned to the reserve forces is to support only the disaster response and recovery phases. However, the disaster support mission assigned to the reserve forces in 1972 was to provide support from the damage prevention phase. In the event of a disaster, the military's support to the civilian government should be recognized as one of its duties, and institutions and capabilities should be developed to support all phases of disaster management[17].

Second, the military should actively participate and support the military in establishing and strengthening cooperative governance in disaster management of local governments[18]. The military has a lot of experience in establishing traditional military preparedness plans. And the military is also a highly trained organization with a quick and clear command system[19]. Therefore, the military will be able to provide appropriate advice and models to local governments for building governance that strengthens community consensus and accountability necessary for the entire disaster management process by leading organizations and associations in the local community.

Third, at the systemic level, the model in which the reserve forces support local communities in the event of a disaster should be extended to apply to international cooperation beyond the national and

local levels[20]. In addition, it should contribute to the achievement of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) and the international community goals for disaster risk reduction and reinforcement of national and regional resilience[21].

2.2.2. Legal and institutional improvements

In modern disaster management, the efforts of the central and local governments are integrated, and policies and implementations based on cooperation are required[22]. However, as for disaster response, the local government should lead the situation so that the situation can be corrected at the disaster site. Therefore, the role and importance of local government should be larger[23]. This means that there is a need to strengthen the cooperation and support system between RRF and local governments, which have city/county/district as their responsible areas.

One of the important tasks of local governments is to prevent various disasters and minimize the damage when a disaster occurs[24]. However, it is impossible to carry out the task with the single competence of the local government. Therefore, local governments should establish their own disaster management system, including government agencies, public and private organizations, non-profit associations, and RRF within their jurisdiction[25].

However, since the Regional Defense Battalion(RDB) is also composed of about 70 to 80 personnel, it is not capable of sufficient support to the request of local governments in the event of a disaster. For this, mobilization of RRF is inevitable. In order for the RRF to proactively support local governments in the event of a disaster, there are several problems that must be resolved in the legal and institutional areas. It is going to analyze these related contents and suggest alternatives.

First of all, only “military units” are specified in the resources requested by local governments to the Ministry of Defense under the Disaster Safety Act. There is no mention of “reserve forces”. The problem is that reserve forces are not included in the “National Armed Forces” under the act on the organization of National Armed Forces[26]. This is causing the inability to mobilize the RRF in a timely or preemptive manner. Of course, according to the Reserve Forces Act, the Minister of Defense and the commissioned military commander may decide and mobilize the mobilization, but it is highly likely that only the active duty of RRF will be considered in the early stages of the disaster.

Therefore, it is necessary to amend the relevant provisions to request for assistance from military units and reserve forces. Moreover, in the future, considering the reduction of military resources, changes in the defense environment, and the development of military science and technology, it is necessary to take a forward-looking attitude toward mobilizing reserve forces. The standing force should be operated as both a quick response force and a deterrent force, and the reserve force should respond to various threats as a base force. Selection and concentration are necessary in assigning and operating missions to the standing and reserve forces. In this way, ROK troops, including reserve forces, will be able to participate in international peacekeeping activities, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction activity to disaster-affected countries.

Second, the requirements for disaster mobilization of RRF are ambiguous in the laws and directives. In the Reserve Forces Act, it is referred to as "if deemed necessary for the reserve forces to muster for the performance of their duties"(Article 5), and in the Instruction, it is said as “if it is determined that the support of the military unit is necessary”(Article 83). In a disaster situation, the specific criteria and details necessary for the commander of the commissioned military unit to decide on the mobilization of RRF are insufficient. Therefore, it is necessary to establish standards as requirements for disaster mobilization of RRF immediately after the Declaration of State of Disaster according to laws and directives, or the extent of damage to life and property[27].

Third, the RDB commander who best grasps the local government's disaster situation should be given the authority to mobilize the RRF. This is because the commissioned military commander can waste time waiting for the guidance from the higher units, monitoring changes in disaster situations, and collecting resource information. In particular, by adhering to the principle of “support by request,” the commissioned military unit may miss the right time to mobilize the RDB to deal with disasters.

Therefore, it is necessary to delegate the mobilization authority to the commander of the RDF and establish flexible criteria for judgment. One way is to examine publicity, urgency, and substitution as a criterion for judgment. Publicity is about the need to protect people and property in order to maintain public order. Urgency refers to the degree to which the need for rescue and rescue is urgent, and substitution refers to evaluating the degree and importance of the lack of appropriate alternative means except for RRF.

In the future, in a disaster situation, the chairman of local government should be given the authority to mobilize RRF directly according to the severity and urgency of the situation at the level of regional defense, and the procedure should be simplified[28]. In other words, the head of the local government is ordered to mobilize and dispatch RRF in the event of a disaster with the advice of the commander of the commissioned military unit or his/her military affairs assistant. In this case, the local governments should take responsibility for both regional defense and disaster management with the help of the RDB from fostering, managing, and training RRF. Alternatively, the head of the local government can directly request the RDB commander without passing through the commander of commissioned military unit and review the system development that the RDB commander can decide.

Fourth, in the event of a disaster of RRF, the period of mobilization should be short, but the deadline should be specified. This is because regional defense missions are also important to RRF. Also, the reservists are citizens who engage in economic activities for a living. In the Reserve Forces Act, the period of mobilization is vaguely specified as "the reason for mobilization ceases to exist"(Article 5), and in the Instruction, "from the time of issuance of the mobilization order until the reason for the mobilization is resolved"(Article 84). Long-term mobilization also increases extra expenditures such as salaries, meals, and compensation. Therefore, it is appropriate to lift the mobilization order when the emergency and military disaster control is over. In the event of a disaster, it would be desirable to ensure that the mobilization period of reserve troops is 72 hours for immediate response and no more than 20 days for damage recovery, taking into account the annual reserve force training limit.

2.2.3. Strengthening the support capacity of RRF

Unlike other organizations, RRF can exhibit exceptional capabilities and roles. The military's search and search technique, expertise, rapid maneuvering, and unmatched command and control system will provide excellent support for disaster relief and damage recovery with a sense of responsibility and mission in extremely dangerous environments such as disasters.

The RDB's ability to respond and support disasters is generally weak. First of all, in terms of the organization of RRF, reservists be mobilized in the event of a disaster have not been previously designated. As a result, there is no choice but to reorganize the organization just before mobilization or to organize and assign missions based on the convocation situation. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the type of disaster expected, countermeasures, and requirements for reservists and units through consultation with local governments in advance.

As a solution to this, there is a method of prioritizing the "5-6th year platoon" consisting of 5-6th reservists and the reserve squadron of the RDB as subjects for early disaster mobilization. Alternatively, there is a plan to organize a "disaster dedicated unit" separately and notify the relevant personnel in advance. Then, in case of emergency, it will be possible to save time and minimize confusion while transmitting and distributing the mobilization order. As for the scale of mobilization, it is important to derive the types of disasters that can occur in the responsible area and essential mobilization requirements through prior consultation with local governments. This will provide the basis for RRF to mobilize and support from the prevention/preparation phase in disaster management.

Second, the plan and practice of operating the commander of the reserve unit as a liaison officer dispatching to local governments should be improved. In March 2020, 52% of the personnel dispatched to local governments as liaison officers of the Defense Rapid Response Team(NRRT) operated mobilization non- or commissioned officer and Reserve Forces Management Military Personnel. The liaison officer should be located at the regional DSCHQ and serve as a linkage channel to identify local

government needs and provide military resource information until the situation is over. However, since these are commanders of reserve troops, they must command and control the reserve units when a mobilization order is issued. If they are not at the convocation site because of their liaison duties, the convened reservists will be abandoned and the confusion of the command system and public sentiment may be shaken.

Therefore, for liaison officers dispatched to local governments, it would be effective to use the Part-time Reservists. Part-time Reservists refers to reservists who serve for a certain period of time from peacetime in major positions during the war. This system began to be selected and operated in RDB from 2016 after the test operation in 2014. In addition, it allows them to exercise certain discretionary powers over the military, and functions as a military affairs cooperator for both the RDB and local government. Then, it will be possible to link the liaison services necessary for RID and disaster management between local forces and local governments. This will help the RDB create and strengthen cooperative governance of local communities centered on local governments[29].

On the other hand, it is possible to think of a plan to employ and utilize a regional reservist as an Emergency Preparedness Officer of local government. Reservists are competent personnel who have extensive expertise and experience in mobilization, RRF, and disaster management, and have good cooperation and ties with ordinary local governments. If they are managed well, they will be able to promote stable development in the areas of RID and disaster management that require long-term service and expertise, and in case of an emergency, they will be able to advise the local government chairman for decision-making.

Third, it is necessary to establish the Defense Integrated Disaster Management Information System(DIDMIS) and link it with the government's disaster monitoring/information system to track and manage the disaster situation at the command of the operations commands, corps, and regional defense division. And the organization of disaster-related officials should be newly established or reinforced. The disaster information management system operated separately by the Ministry of Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air Force must be integrated into one. Also, it should be possible to link various information held by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security and the Meteorological Administration.

In addition, if such information is integrated and an intelligent information system capable of analyzing and predicting disasters is developed and provided, it will be possible to help RDB and local governments make decisions and improve the response capabilities of RRF at disaster sites. And, it would be appropriate to organize disaster management officers up to the battalion level, and use the Part-time Reservists that can work for long periods of what is currently in charge of most active duty. Along with the liaison officers dispatched to local governments, a human resources management system that grants job incentives according to professional qualifications and commissioned training by agencies recognized by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security and the Fire Service for disaster management officers should also be prepared[30].

Fourth, the equipment and materials that will be used in the event of a disaster by the RRF should be used in principle to use those organized for the purpose of regional defense. Acquiring additional resources for disaster support is because it does not meet the basic mission of the reserve force for the purpose of regional defense[31]. However, it is necessary to prepare minimum equipment and materials to ensure personal safety at the disaster site. The important thing is to master the use of equipment and materials for disaster management by local governments, disaster mobilization procedures, and matters necessary for mission performance through regional defense training. In addition, RRF should actively participate in large-scale disaster preparedness drills such as the Disaster Response Safety Korea Training, Hwa-rang Training, and the like, to develop the capacity for integrated disaster response and cooperation between the public, private, and military at the level of the pan-governmental government[32].

Finally, it is necessary to realize the payment of compensation for the reservists mobilized in the event of a disaster. Reservists mobilized in the event of a disaster are treated as having completed training hours for the year or the following year. There is currently no action against RRF mobilized in

a disaster or other urgent situation declared by the Minister of Public Administration and Security. In accordance with the law, compensation for actual expenses is to be settled after consultation with the relevant agencies(Article 63 of the Disaster Safety Act). In the event of a disaster, compensation for reserve forces is expected to be around 7,000 won per day for meals and 8,000 won for transportation, the same as the training call. However, the reservist of RRF mobilized in disaster must be subject to the minimum wage specified in the Constitution in the same way as the general public[33]. Currently, difficulties such as revision of laws, provision of financial resources, and national consensus remain, but in the event of a national crisis, it is appropriate for the state to pay compensation corresponding to the sacrifice and dedication.

2.2.4. Regional cooperative security

The new disaster called COVID-19 became an opportunity to test the country's crisis management capabilities[34]. Most of the nation's chose to live for themselves rather than solidarity and cooperation. However, it gradually returned to the representative position of joint response to the cross-border threat. In particular, Europe is re-learning cooperation through a crisis. Countries are promoting cross-border cooperation, such as sharing information and raising funds.

On the other hand, countries in East Asia, including Korea, China, and Japan, appear to be divided in the crisis of COVID-19[35]. However, everyone is well aware that these security threats require a transnational response and cooperation. This is because it is impossible to face a new disaster such as an infectious disease with only one country's response. It is necessary to consider what Korea can contribute to regional cooperation and to show an active attitude toward cooperation and support in areas where Korea can do well[36].

Disaster assistance from RRF can be used for humanitarian aid to developing countries. It plays a role in protecting civilians from diseases and environmental disasters that threaten human security. Examples of these include Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRT) in Afghanistan, NATO's International Security Assistance Forces(ISAF), and Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team(DSRT)[37]. They are actively using their own reserve forces in most disasters. It is time for Korea to prospectively review the pursuit of national interests abroad through the dispatch of reserve forces. The subject of overseas dispatch of the reserve forces needs to be continued for follow-up studies.

And, the adaptation of the RRF to the disaster support system provides opportunities for job experience and mastery necessary to carry out Civil Affairs, Civil Military and Stability Operations in case of emergency. The Civil Affairs forces and Stabilization Operation Divisions have a mission to restore security by promptly putting them in when a sudden change occurs. Currently, it is evaluated that the level of preparation and training for establishment is insufficient. If the system for part-time reserve forces and disaster mobilization are well maintained, it will be possible to secure sufficient capacity for Civil Affairs and Stability Operations.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, as a way to effectively support disaster response by local governments in areas where national disasters occurred, a plan to mobilize RRF to manage disasters was proposed. Disasters in the future will become more complex, new and larger. To prepare for such a disaster, the disaster mobilization system and the capacity of RRF must be reorganized. And it is necessary to strengthen the disaster resilience of the local community by establishing cooperative governance with the local community[38]. It is also necessary to invest in the development of the reserve forces institution and their capabilities so that the roles of the reserve forces can be expanded in connection with the Disaster Risk Reduction Agenda in the international community.

In 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration selected "National Life and Safe Society" as its main strategy, advocating the era of people-centered national sovereignty. Accordingly, building an integrated disaster management system and reinforcing capacity for immediate response to disaster sites are being

promoted as national tasks[39]. In recent years, the Ministry of Defense is also actively conducting research on ways to actively utilize RRF in non-traditional threat situations such as disasters, terrorism, and infectious diseases.

In the future, disaster management should be a high priority in national policy. This is because sustained national growth cannot be achieved without ensuring safety from disasters. This is possible only when the competencies of various organizations of the local community are integrated and developed in the direction of reinforcing social consensus and that accountability. Ultimately, the role of RRF should focus on strengthening the resilience of the local community. Furthermore, it is necessary to lead the international community cooperation through discovery and consultation on agendas for disaster management, and seek to expand the role of the ROK RRF in participating and contributing to disaster management in developing countries.

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5. Appendix

5.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Author	IJ	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>-Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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The NATIONAL SECURITY Perspective of the First President Rhee Syngman of Korea

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Abstract

Purpose: This study aims to examine the security perspective of the first president Rhee Syngman of ROK and bring some implications in making defense policy making.

Method: This paper utilizes multidisciplinary approach. This contains the perspective of threat, allies, defense policy, independent defense. Specifically this uses various speeches, interviews, memoirs, and testimonies about and by Rhee Syngman.

Results: This paper did find out that President Syngman Rhee not only had a firm view against communism, but also maintained a thorough anti-Japanese view against Japan. However, the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the resulting South Korea-U.S. alliance, which were agreed upon with the U.S. during the Korean War. And his security perspective could actually play a major role in curbing the recurrence of the war on the Korean Peninsula and securing South Korea's sustainability and security.

Conclusion: The first President Rhee Syngman had tried to devote his best efforts to settle down Korea's solid dynamic security through closely good friendship with US. To make this objective he took very a serious vigilance and concerns to North Korea and the revival of expansionist Japanese militarism. As a first president of ROK, he made fundamental base of ROK and its security.

[Keywords] Rhee Syngman, Security Perspective, Defense Policy, Independent Defense, Korea-U.S Mutual Defense Treaty

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of research

Security is an important issue that is directly related to the survival of the country. Especially in the president centered countries, the president plays a key role in national security issues. In addition, the president is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Korea, the Supreme and Final Decision Maker of National Security and National Defense. As the Korean Constitution adopts a president-centered system, similar to countries such as the U.S. and France, the president holds and exercises crucial authority to determine the survival of the people and the fate of the nation, including the right to declare war, the right to take emergency measures in the event of a national crisis, and the right to declare martial law. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea has the right to make important decisions on national crisis and security policies, such as national representation(Article 66 of the Constitution), the right to refer to a referendum(Article 72 of the Constitution), the right to ratify the conclusion of a treaty, the right to declare and strengthen war(Article 73 of the Constitution), the sovereignty of the armed forces(Article 74 of the Constitution), the right to take emergency measures of the Constitution(Article 76 of the Constitution), and the right to declare martial law(Article 77 of the

Constitution). Historical examples include U.S. President Kennedy's decision during the Cuban crisis, each country's decision to participate in the war during World War I and II, the U.S. decision to participate in the war during the Korean War, and the dispatch of South Korean troops overseas, the president is responsible for deciding on actions that play a decisive role in the fate of the people and the nation.

By looking at the security forces that have been maintained and expressed by former presidents who have exercised such powerful power on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of Korea's founding, the research is aimed at understanding the basic direction of Korean national security and contributing to establishing the right security for the people.

1.2. Status of reality and problems

Until now there has been a lack of historical comparative analysis and instructive data on the defense and security of previous presidents. In particular, even though various changes in the origins and views of the nation's top leaders on national security in the wake of the national foundation, the Korean War, industrialization, and democratization have had a profound impact on national development, it has not been properly utilized due to the lack of systematic analysis. In this regard, it is necessary to draw implications through in-depth analysis and research on the security of first president Rhee Syngman and to support the establishment of the right security view of future national leaders and citizens. It is necessary to ensure the gradual and continuous safety of the country through focusing on positive aspects rather than negative aspects.

1.3. National security and national security of the president

The dictionary meaning of national security is to protect national security from danger, crisis, invasion and invasion. Etymologically speaking, the security of English comes from the Latin word securitas(se=free from, i.e. freedom, care, i.e. anxiety, concern). In addition, security is the basis for establishing security policies and defense policies as a human view of security. In other words, security was defined in terms of military defense against military threats in terms of protection from crises. The traditional security concept is that a country protects its territory, independence or its people's life and property from external military aggression, which is the most fundamental and important issue. Recently, however, it is also important to have a comprehensive security concept that preserves and improves the values pursued by the nation and the country by comprehensively operating the nation's policy areas such as politics, diplomacy, society, culture, economy, and science and technology, suppressing, preventing and excluding various positions and indirect threats across the military and non-military originating from home and abroad, and responding to them appropriately in case of emergency. In particular, it is traditionally important to secure national safety from direct external threats, but with the widespread perception that indirect action or disturbance caused by indirect invasion can also endanger the safety of the country, securing internal security has also been included as a major area of national security. In case of the Republic of Korea, the president's research on national security can be very useful work in forming a consensus on the importance of national security and the basic implementation direction, and can be used effectively when developing specific alternatives to national security in the future.

1.4. Scope of research

It is intended to examine the security officers of former presidents by dividing them into threat officers, allies, military officers, and independent firefighters, and to analyze the personal characteristics and situation of the times of previous presidents necessary in relation thereto. This research tried to extract key and insightful content that could be a reference to the present and the future in terms of the importance of inheriting the past positively rather than denying the past. While analyzing the basic contents of threat officers, allies, military officers, and independent defense officers held by previous presidents, they sought to enhance objectivity by using various speeches, interviews, memoirs, and testimonies of their neighbors.

2. View on Security of President Syngman Rhee

2.1. Introduction

President Syngman Rhee served as the first president of the Republic of Korea and the first president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea from August 13, 1948 to the collapse of the April 19 Revolution in 1960[1]. During the Japanese Colonial Period, he served as president of the Provisional Government, mainly campaigning for independence in the United States. After liberation in 1945, he returned home and became the first president of the Republic of Korea in the divided South. After the Korean War, he remained in office until 1960, but he resigned in 1965 in Hawaii after the April 19 Revolution broke out due to corruption and irregularities in the regime. During his tenure, President Lee staged an anti-Japanese independence movement in the U.S., and as the U.S. defeated Japan in World War II, the U.S. took control of the 38th parallel south of the Korean Peninsula to disarm Japan, and he faced the Korean War during his tenure as president of the First Republic. Major security-related incidents while in office are as follows <Table 1>.

Table 1. Major security incidents while in office.

Date	Event
April 3, 1948	Jeju 4.3 incident occurred
August 15, 1948	Republic of Korea established
October 19, 1948	Yeosu-suncheon incident occurred
June 25, 1950	North Korea invaded the South Korea
July 14, 1950	Transfer of wartime operational control(OPCON) from South Korea to UN
April 19, 1960	The april 19 revolution was launched

In particular, President Lee graduated from George Washington University in the United States in 1904 and earned a Ph.D. in 1910 from Princeton University on the subject of international law called "Neutrality as influenced by the United States." In this regard, President Lee was basically pro-American as a Knowing-America(知美)—or Using—America(用美). Upon the establishment of the government on August 15, 1948, President Lee held an inspection ceremony of the Navy, Navy, and Navy at the Central Government Office. Immediately after the establishment of the government, they signed a military agreement between South Korea and the United States. On August 24, 1948, Lieutenant General Haji visited President Lee and officially signed a military agreement discussed between the two sides[2]. It was to be implemented during the transition between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces Korea.

The signature was made between President Lee, the commander-in-chief of the military, and Lieutenant General Ha Ji-hyeong, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Forces Korea under the Korean Constitution. The agreement dealt with joint security guarantees between South Korea and the U.S., which were only allowed to temporarily take effect until the U.S. military made a request from South Korea, which was to transfer the Commander-in-Chief, the leader of the defense military, as soon as possible and gradually as possible[3]. As a result, the Republic of Korea became an independent nation and had its own national defense and military. After the establishment of the government, the national defense organization is as follows. Based on this, President Lee sought to promote the early defense and security policies of the Republic of Korea[4].

However, the change in the security environment of the new Republic of Korea was newly developed with the emergence of the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Japan to disarm the Japanese military. Due to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the South Korean military had to advance its goal of urgently switching to defense forces at the same time as increasing its power. The U.S. decision to withdraw will be found in changes in its Korean policy in the U.S. and the construction of North Korea's military power[5]. At that time, the change in the U.S. policy on Korea was essentially due to changes in the U.S. global strategy. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States was established as part of a blockade policy against the Soviet Union. This was driven by changes in the situation related to Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech on March 15, 1946[6].

This change in the U.S. position emerged in the spring of 1947 as the creation of NATO in terms of

the Marshall Plan and military aspects[7]. Following this discussion, President Lee initially opposed the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but sought aid to the U.S. by understanding the U.S. strategic changes and advocating alliance strategies and joint defense policies[8][9]. Korea, in particular, must have had national and economic limitations in urgently building national defense as a new independent country. In addition, South Korea's security threat was facing a double threat, with its security situation very unstable due to North Korea's military construction and compliance with domestic armed security[10]. Therefore, the security policy of the early days of the founding of the country can be regarded as united defense. In his speech marking the declaration of the establishment of the government on Aug. 15, 1948, President Lee pointed out, "It is difficult to solve our problems without the goodwill and help of all allies," and he recognized that friendship between South Korea and the U.S. was the key to national survival[11]. In fact, as the virtual enemy is "international communism," it was judged that "unified defense" that unites with the United States was absolute to cope with it[12].

The Korean government also stepped up efforts to strengthen Korea's defense capabilities following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1949[13]. However, due to the country's financial limitations, there was no choice but to strongly demand U.S. military aid. (a memorandum sent by Secretary of Defense Shin Sung-mo to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, October 20, 1949, Department of Defense 1, 1984, 142) Through these efforts, 19 million additional troops were raised in January 1950 and another \$ 10.97 million in aid was confirmed around March[14]. However, the U.S. military's aid did not meet South Korea's expectations, and the South Korean military had to deal with threats from North Korean and communist forces at the same time in the 38th parallel and rear. During President Lee's tenure, the new security situation in South Korea was exposed to threats from North Korea's military construction and rear public security, but its defense capacity to deal with it was very insufficient due to the nation's economic limitations and the lack of U.S. military personnel. In order to fill these limitations and security gaps, the United Defense Policy was promoted. Along with the outbreak of the Korean War, Korea's sovereignty was in danger, which led to the transfer of operational control to the commander of the Combined Forces Command. At that time, under the security situation facing South Korea, President Lee's strengthening security was basically dependent on U.S. military aid, and much of his own defense spending was used to subdue red guerrillas or rebel districts in the rear <Table 2>.

Table 2. Defense reserve for fiscal year 1948/1949 and defense expenditure for 1950.

Unit: 1,000 won			
Year	Total	Name of business	Cost
1948	208,085	Rebel district probationary fee	197,183
		Heat transport and ship transport costs	4,497
		Specific benefits	105
		Ship management	6,300
1949	4,684,160	Troop expansion fee	1,539,293
		Increase the amount of supplies	2,800,540
		Increased fuel costs for weapons	294,327
		Army hospital installation fee	30,000
		Defense magazine(for information education)	20,000
1950	132,440,000	National defense headquarters	270,000
		Each army(army, navy, air force)	20,180,000
		Defense supplement	1,960,000
		Military expenses/senior monument	6,360,000
		6. 25 company attorney's compensation	103,670,000

Immediately after its foundation, under many ancestral rites and limited conditions, the security policy basically established the power to support the construction of an independent national state, while making efforts to achieve the ideological unification of the military, which was rooted in anti-

communist ideology. In addition, while emphasizing the solidarity of freedom-friendly countries including the U.S. under the motto of the united defense, it promoted the reinforcement of national defense and the reinforcement of troops, and promoted anti-communist policies such as the punishment of public expenses in the rear[15].

2.2. View on threat

At that time, President Rhee externally recognized North Korean Kim Il-sung forces and expansionism Japan, backed by Russia, as security threats and internally recognized the seniority-based pro-North faction's murder, arson and destruction as security threats. President Lee said, "If the people do not claim, the regime could fall into the hands of politicians and factions, putting the whole country in danger," and argued that the general public should perform their positions to love and protect the government[16]. In his opening speech, President Rhee said, "If we give the Koreans of the Communist Party one last chance and work together to restore the national sovereignty that the entire nation insists on, we will forget the past and treat them as good compatriots, and we will be punished severely with the intention of committing murder, arson, and destroying the country to another country, so from now on, it is clear that forgiving or releasing the country through another country's interference will be blocked, so we will have to obey the law to live and enjoy the right to freedom together."

In this regard, however, President Rhee was a thorough anti-communist and maintained a confrontational stance during his decades of exile. For example, "Communism, which is associated with Soviet expansion, is like cholera," he said. "It is impossible to cooperate or compromise with communism. There is no choice but to succumb to or oppose totalitarianism." Rhee's anticommunism was also evident in his speech at the Declaration Ceremony of the Establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea, calling for a "full push" for the democratic system, not dictatorship as a basic condition for the nation's foundation, saying, "Communism is hating and harming each other by creating conflicts between classes and classes, and creating conflicts between groups and groups." "I recommend it to the communists, those who wish to destroy national sovereignty under the pretext of the Communist Party as an enemy, so it would be better to decide their own country at the instigation of others, to abandon the act of rebellion to seek the help of others, to restore the work of our ancestors through the mental unification of South and North Korea, and to work together as a communist or anything in accordance with the people's will." He said, "As I have said many times, we do not oppose the Communist Party but oppose the traitorism of the Communist Party, so we hope that the North Korean communists will realize and change this and cooperate with us to unify the two Koreas peacefully as soon as possible so that they can enjoy all the rights of politics and economy."

2.3. Alliance building

President Rhee was a thorough anti-communist and anti-Japanese, and at the same time a thorough as a Knowing-America(知美) — or Using —America(用美). He mentioned to Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, who visited Seoul to discuss the signing of a defense treaty as follows. "Despite our firm trust in the U.S., we have been betrayed by the U.S. twice in the past, as seen in Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 and the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945. Current progress suggests something that can be called another betrayal."

Indeed, like "U.S. unbenevolence", his "Japanese boundary theory" was simply based on Koreans' exclusive anti-Japanese sentiment because he was deeply aware of the possibility that Japan, which was rebuilt through huge economic and military support from Ara and the U.S., will once again reveal its expansion ambition for the Korean Peninsula. However, the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, a symbol of the South Korea-U.S. alliance agreed upon during the Korean War, was a valuable fruit of President Lee's strong belief and persistent Korea-U.S. negotiation strategy, which he recognized as more important than anything else in South Korea's survival[17][18][19].

In his opening speech to the first speaker of the National Assembly, President Rhee also expressed his gratitude to his ally, the U.S., as follows. "We're here today to open the first National Assembly today. First of all, we will be deeply grateful for the achievement of God's grace and the sacrificial blood of our patriotic fighters. Thirdly, the world knows that our allies, especially the U.S., has no territorial

or political ambitions for any country and maintain peace in the world and that it will be a common benefit through international trade and friendship, so it will only be the favor of our people, so because of the international situation, we're going to walk away if we don't want it at any time, so we won't have to worry about it."

2.4. View on military

President Syngman Rhee's perception of the armed forces was recognized as a very important factor, such as emphasizing the need for a national defense organization to preserve the country's independence and independence. For example, he said, "We ask our allies who participated in the Korean War to help foster defense forces" [20], and asked the military organization for help.

However, President Rhee also emphasized the loyalty of the military, but also showed the use of the military's support to consolidate his political position. In particular, it served as a factor that undermined the institutionalization of military operations by expressing excessive bias against certain figures in military personnel. For example, Chae Byeongdeok was appointed to three major positions, including the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Army twice.

However, President Rhee's Great Military Officer seems to have expressed his affection for the important elements of national security as shown below. The following were mentioned on the Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. "I understand that it is meaningless to say empty words of appreciation(感想談) on the memorial day of the three fallen soldiers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to commemorate the loyalty of our patriotic soldiers and to comfort the bereaved families[21]."

2.5. View on self-defense

President Rhee stressed the need for self-defense forces for the country's independence and prosperity. "The maximum purpose of this National Assembly is to establish a constitution based on democracy as already known to the world, establish a government according to the Constitution, and organize defense forces to preserve peace and order and territory in accordance with the Constitution"(the opening speech of the first National Assembly speaker). It also said, "Since there are two conditions for Korea to exist as an independent country, one is to cooperate with the friendly sympathy of all democratic countries, and the other is strengthening the capacity of our Navy, Navy, and Air Force[22]." At the same time, President Rhee stressed the need for economic development and the need to focus on fostering a strong South Korean military.

3. Conclusion

The first President Syngman Rhee of Korea had settled down a big stone in establishing Korea. Among his efforts we cannot forget the firm view of communism and the thorough anti-Japanese view of Japan. However we cannot disregard his effort to make good relationship with US. To do that he did make the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, through this treaty South Korea could continue to make Korea-US alliance. During the Korean War, he had actually played a major role in closing the war on the Korean Peninsula and securing South Korea's survival and security. President Rhee's persistent demand to the US was to make sign South Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty to secure the threat from North Korea and other communist forces before Armistice Treaty. Even if there was his private weakness in terms of corruption and aggressive anti-democratic attitude during his late ruling period, his effort to make solid defense attitude should not be under-evaluated.

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5. Appendix

5.1. Authors contribution

	Initial name	Contribution
Lead Author	HC	-Set of concepts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Design <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Getting results <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Analysis <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corresponding Author*	GP	-Make a significant contribution to collection <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Final approval of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Corresponding <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Play a decisive role in modification <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Co-Author	YI	-Significant contributions to concepts, designs, practices, analysis and interpretation of data <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> -Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>