Abstract

**Purpose:** The United Nations recently announced A4P+, a priority for the implementation of A4P following A4P to emphasize the qualitative improvement of peacekeeping operations and the sharing of responsibilities among related actors. In this paper, I will consider the A4P+ priorities to be implemented for UN peacekeeping operations between 2021-2023 and draw implications for the Korean military deployment policy in peacekeeping.

**Method:** To this end, Literature analysis centered on official documents published by the United Nations related to A4P and A4P+, was conducted, and military-related data were referenced among various data on the United Nations web page.

**Results:** A4P and A4P+ presented areas and tasks to be implemented in peacekeeping operations by the UN, member states, regional organizations, and host governments related to the deployment of UN personnel. Upholding A4P and A4P+ are WPS(Women, Peace, and Security) and data-driven and advanced technologies. All stakeholders in Peacekeeping must do their commitments in eight areas of A4P and prepare for the materialization of A4P through A4P+ priorities based on the two. Member states providing military and police are responsible for providing their competent peacekeepers to field missions for their safety and security and mandate implementation. Peacekeeping operations emphasize high-tech and information collection systems for effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping, TCC/PCC should read and reflect the changes required from the UN into their deployment policy.

**Conclusion:** Korea should do its commitment pledged to the UN to contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. First, Korea shall contemplate its deployment policy, focusing on how and what it can implement A4P+ within a limited period. Second, Korea needs to re-consider the current participation of military and equipment. Qualitative expansion in Korea’s participation rather than quantitative one should be prioritized first.

**Keywords** Action for Peacekeeping Plus(A4P+), Peacekeeping Operations(PKO), UN Security Council, Multilateralism, TCC/PCC(Troop Contributing Country/Police Contributing Country)

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of action for peacekeeping(A4P)

In March 2018, The UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the Action for Peacekeeping(A4P) initiative at the Security Council meeting on collective action to improve peacekeeping operations.

A4P is not only a consistent effort of the United Nations to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations which is an invention created by the United Nations but also a strong request from it to urge the substantive participation and commitment of member states. So far, the need for reform of the UN itself as well as UN peacekeeping operations has been steadily
raised within the UN, from member states, and even by other international organizations. The United Nations has accepted the demand of member states and other related actors cooperating with UN activities, reviewed field activities on its own, and made efforts to review and implement improvement plans. Examples include the comprehensive review of peace operations, including peacekeeping operations in the peace and security pillar, in the "An Agenda for Peace" by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations(Brahimi Report)” under Secretary-General Annan and “the High-level Independent on Peace Operations(HIPPO)” under Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Indeed the Action for Peacekeeping intended to strengthen peacekeeping by promoting collective action by all peacekeeping stakeholders, including the Security Council[1].

The A4P announced by the Secretary-General differs from previous reports and declarations in that it deals with the methodological aspects of selecting tasks from the United Nations to field missions for the success of peacekeeping, a key UN security activity. Action for Peacekeeping Plus(A4P+) includes more practical and realistic methods to implement Action for peacekeeping(A4P), allowing field missions to operate limited budgets and personnel economically and effectively in conducting mission mandate.

The performance evaluation method for UN peacekeeping operations is a pending issue that has been developed not only by scholars but also within the United Nations. So far all of the efforts at the UN drew pictures to look at them from a long distance. It is notoriously difficult to measure success and failure in peace operations. In 2010, Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman published a 234-page book entitled Evaluating Peace Operations, elaborating the myriad ways in which scholars can how the country developed in the years after the peacekeepers departed[2].

Korea has increased its participation in UN PKO since its first deployment in Somalia in 1993. Moreover, the Korean military is expanding its scope of activity areas not only to the UN but also to multinational cooperation. Especially in the middle of hoping to expand the activities in the UN, Korea needs to read the present trend of UN PKO and re-consider Korea’s deployment policy consistent with the UN. In this regard, Korea participating in UN peacekeeping operations needs to pay attention to A4P+ guiding how to strengthen the effect of its deployment following the efficiency and effectiveness of the current UNPKO. Since the release of A4P, there were few studies dealing with the latest changes of UN PKO and proposed the development of Korean PKO. Especially those who were not able to suggest what the military should do and what practical actions must be taken before military deployment in UN peacekeeping. In this study, I will first look at the core of A4P, and A4P+ which is the A4P implementation strategy. Then, I will examine what more specific actions Korea should apply to the military participating in PKO for raising effect through A4P+, centering on capability improvement, WPS, and the introduction of technology.

1.2. Importance of multilateralism centering on UN

The nature of war is not new, because being a violent act of clash of wills between two actors, what is new in the 21st century is the means that these actors incorporate in the execution of the war, allowing the effects of these means, develop new forms of confrontation[3]. Nevertheless, recent wars, in other words, do not arise only between the two actors. The conflict pattern in the post-Cold War became even more complex. In the post-cold war era, regional disputes and armed conflicts occurred by the factors like ethnicity, race, religion, territory, resources, etc., which lie hidden under the order of the cold war. New types of regional conflicts, such as territorial sovereignty, resource nationalism, and separate independence movement, have appeared in the third world. International disputes led to consumptiveness such as military collision and terrorism regardless of their intention[4].
Recently, new forms of threats have threatened global and national security. Terrorism that has emerged since the 2000s is an example. Violence such as terrorism occurs when there is a gap between the value expected by a particular individual or group and the ability to realize that value. According to Piazza(2006), many scholars who studied terrorism considered material poverty important as the cause of terrorism, but as a result, absolute and relative poverty did not have a significant impact on the occurrence of terrorism. Piazza studied the causes of terrorism from 1986 to 2002 based on poverty-related variables in 96 countries (such as poverty, inequality, inflation, unemployment, etc.) and explained that social divisions related to relative deprivation had a greater impact on terrorism than poverty-related variables. Hoffman (1998) defined terrorism as an intentional act of causing political change and fear through violent acts, means, and threats based on violence [5]. What is the correlation between terrorism and peacekeeping?

In 2004, The UN Deputy-SG warned of the danger that the war on global terror may cause states to lose sight of the needs of UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the demand for Peacekeeping troops increased after 9/11 in 2003. 16 UN peacekeeping operations working at the end of 2004 strongly required more cooperation among states in the UN [6].

From 2020 to the present, COVID-19 is threatening the world. As the crisis that began in the health sector expands to political, economic, and social crises, it is a serious threat to the international community. The liquidity and uncertainty of the global security environment are increasing due to the global spread of COVID-19 [7]. With the emergence of new forms of international peace and security threats, not only individual countries but also the entire international community are threatened by the threats. In the dimension of humanitarian aid, the Pandemic made member states realize the need for multilateralism to overcome it together.

Because of this, multilateral international organizations have taken central positions in democracy and defense around the world [8]. A universal organization, the UN as the epicenter of global multilateralism remains a source of hope and a challenge for the future of humanity [9]. Today, the COVID-19 crisis is spreading rapidly due to the openness and mobility of the international community as one of human security and poses a major threat to humanity. Due to the imbalance of related substances such as vaccine development, quarantine system, medicines, and masks, there is a serious gap in response between developed and underdeveloped countries. In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the international community wants to strengthen cooperation and solidarity to contribute to the construction of a bright future for Mankind [10].

2. Reform of Peace and Security Pillar

In the post-Cold War era, changes occurred in the international environment of the 21st century, including changes in the form of conflict, rapid globalization, and the emergence of new security threats. Among these, reforms in the Security Council and peacekeeping that are responsible for the peace and security pillar have been continuously raised.

In 2017, Secretary-General Guterres submitted the "Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar report of the Secretary-General" to the General Assembly. In December, the General Assembly adopted the UN peace and security reform [11]. The purpose of the restructuring is to organically integrate and cooperate with the tasks of the relevant departments responsible for peace operations, including peacekeeping.

Reform of peace and security pillar Undergoing reorganization of the Secretariat, UNSG António Guterres, at the Security Council Meeting on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations, launched the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) in 2018 [12]. It emphasized the sharing of political responsibilities of the UN, member states, TCC/PCC, host counties, and others and their collective efforts to pursue the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping opera-
tions. The UNSC reform was powerless to perform its functions and duty to safeguard international peace and security since the Cold war, as well as to resolve many large-scale armed conflicts since the Cold War\[13\]. Discussions on the reform of the Security Council continue. However, there is still no consensus on the increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members, regional arrangements, and exercise of veto power.

2.1. UN efforts for peacekeeping reform

Reform on peacekeeping has also been discussed in earnest since the 1990s from the Brahimi report that recommended changes in overall peace operations in 2000 to the current A4P and A4P+ to implement it. The concept of security differs from country to country and when member states participating in dispute resolution seek specific interests, the performance of the troops is thwarted by the cynical and selfish conduct of their government. Countries will join a peacekeeping mission for reasons for specific, but selfish, national interest, such as the financial allowances granted by the UN\[14\]. Therefore changes for the evolution of peacekeeping did not come easily around until the late 1980s. the achievements of UN peacekeeping forces between 1948-1988 were modestly successful, overall. Actions for peacekeeping reforms came out with the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on the action in security crises since the end of the Cold War\[15\].

2.2. Relevance of action for peacekeeping(A4P) and action for peacekeeping plus(A4P+) 

The A4P mentioned by the UN Secretary-General in the Security Council in 2018 is not a new initiative. It once again reminded the international community of the various challenges faced by peacekeeping and problems of field missions and re-emphasized the cooperation to solve that problem. That is, A4P is a call of the UN on the Member States, the Security Council, host countries, troop, and police-contributing countries, regional partners, and financial contributors to renew their collective engagement with UN peacekeeping and mutually commit to reaching for excellence\[16\]. Gathering various stakeholders and putting them in global activities to resolve common concerns present that A4P is the instrument of UN multilateralism and collective actions to resolve conflict centered on the United Nations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>① Politics</td>
<td>Advance political solutions to conflict and enhance the political impact of peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>② Women, Peace and Security</td>
<td>Implement WPS agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>③ Protection</td>
<td>Strengthen the protection provided by peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>④ Safety and Security</td>
<td>Improve the safety and security of peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑤ Performance and Accountability</td>
<td>Support effective performance and accountability by all peacekeeping components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑥ Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace</td>
<td>Strengthen the impact of peacekeeping on sustaining peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑦ Partnership</td>
<td>Improve peacekeeping partnerships to enhance collaboration and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⑧ Conduct of Peacekeepers and Peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Strengthen conduct of peacekeeping operations and personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from <Table 1>, 8 areas of A4P is not a new concept. They have been considered often for reform of UN peace operations, including peacekeeping. However, in this case, the selection of the words is more refined. Setting goals to achieve in each area gives actors clearer
messages to implement. Responsibilities to be shared by a single member state, the Secretariat alone, and both member states and the Secretariat were clear by implementing tasks. WPS, Protection (of Civilians), and Safety and Security are commitments shared by member states and the Secretariat.

Also, cooperation with regional organizations has been a core element in resolving conflict. If the meaning of cooperation from a regional organization was to support UN and UN peacekeeping in the past, partnership with a regional organization now is a necessary condition and consolidation for successful peacekeeping. ⑦ is related to the support from NATO and OIF as well as cooperation with AU and EU, which are major regional organizations in peacekeeping. The core content of A4P means that for successful peacekeeping, member states with different capabilities and levels, Troop Contributing Country (TCC) / Police Contributing Country (PCC), and other partners must constantly strive to demonstrate capabilities fulfilling the UN’s standards.

How different are A4P and A4P+? They are not a respective concept. The goal of A4P+ is to practically fulfill the shared commitments of each actor in promoting eight areas with A4P+ deliverables. Deliverables of A4P+ are the things that stakeholders can carry out. What the UN DPO (Department of Peace Operations), the implementation department, should do to accelerate the implementation of the A4P agenda with the support of member states. A4P+ selects and implements priorities at the DPO level for the development of all A4P agendas [17]. Therefore, this requires coordination and cooperation with relevant departments of the UN secretariat such as DOS (Department of Operational Support), DPPA (Department of Political and Peace-building Affairs), member states, and field mission missions.

A4P+ priorities consist of seven areas. These seven priorities are to derive and overcome specific challenges that hinder, undermine, and slow the development of the A4P agenda implementation. The most distinctive part is fundamentally to utilize information collection systems from UN HQs to field levels. Evaluation systems to calculate visible and non-visible outcomes are emerging as a critical element about A4P and A4P+ because the determination of A4P+ priorities is based on the assessment, results, and collective analysis for UN peacekeeping.

Figure 1. Relevance of A4P and action for peacekeeping plus(A4P+) [17].

Each of the seven A4P+ priorities spans several, if not all, A4P commitments and any effort to address any of the seven A4P+ priority areas will have positive multiplier effects across several
A4P commitments[17]. Simply speaking, the A4P+priorities will be conducted during 2021–2023 for 3 years. Those have concrete desirable results with designated actors of the UN Secretariat or UN system. Department of Peace Operations (DPO) as a leading actor interacts and supports other relevant departments and external partners in charge of some of the A4P+ priorities.

2.3. A4P Implementation strategy (A4P+) for the effectiveness of PKO

UN peacekeeping operations have gradually decreased, and 12 missions are currently active, and the peacekeeping budget has also decreased to about $6 billion. Budget reduction entailed reform of peacekeeping operations. The budget cut demanded the UN headquarters strengthen the overall cooperation of the UN family, including UN agencies, funds, programs, regional organizations, and departments of the Secretariat. Mutual support between member states is highly encouraged arranged by the UN. Complementarity among member states is a win-win strategy for them and the UN.

There are two critical foundations to uphold A4p+ priorities as well as A4P. The first one is Women, Peace and Security (WPS). The second one is Innovative, Data-driven, and Technology-Enabled Peacekeeping. In a peacekeeping context, WPS agenda can help UN peacekeeping resolve conflict, strengthen people-centered approaches, and drive sustainable, inclusive and long-lasting peace outcomes. Peacekeeping operations must accelerate technology in the field to improve safety and security, protection and analysis of operation barriers. What should be implemented in the A4P+ priorities over three years from 2021 to 2023 can be summarized as follows.

Table 2. A4P+ priority requirements for 2021-2023[18].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Implementations of priority</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective coherence behind a political strategy</td>
<td>Increase political dialogue and engagement with UN partners for common political strategies of peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic and operational integration</td>
<td>Internal Integration of planning and reporting between military, police and civilian in the peacekeeping context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities and mindsets</td>
<td>Improve uniformed capabilities, progress on operational and tactical peacekeeping intelligence, and promote meaningful participation of female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability to peacekeepers</td>
<td>Improve the safety and security of peacekeepers, improve camp protection, provide reliable medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability of peacekeepers</td>
<td>Encourage member states to dispatch peacekeepers highly disciplined, assess regularly peacekeeping performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic communications</td>
<td>Continue to communicate with all key audiences and stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with host countries</td>
<td>Commit to a clear and open dialogue with host countries and communities</td>
</tr>
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In order to strengthen base protection and protect peacekeepers in Priority 4 (Accountability to peacekeepers), high technology should apply to the introduction of protective equipment, education, and training with simulated circumstances for peacekeepers. Military, police, and civilian peacekeepers working in the field are increasingly in contact with local populations and communities. At the site, it is required for field missions to strengthen the integrated measures and capabilities necessary for the performance supported by joint operations of military and police or non-UN security forces. To improve the performance of peacekeeping operations, the mission and the UN headquarters should regularly evaluate the results of the mission performance and derive essential measures for insufficient performance.
Accountability of peacekeepers is about what the United Nations and TCC/PCC should do to make excellent peacekeepers participate in peacekeeping. First, to reduce the capability gaps among TCC/PCC, it is required to establish common standards of the United Nations for the competence of peacekeepers and support the training process for them. A4P+ is also helpful to continue to reinforce their capabilities by operating an evaluation system that evaluates the performance capabilities of the military and police. While the UN monitors a framework of progress against the seven A4P priority areas, UN DPO reviews the implementation of the A4P+ plan regularly through implementation assessment of leadership in DPO and field missions. It means that the monitoring and implementation system continue to operate from UN headquarter and field mission level. However, member states and peacekeeping partners, including regional organizations are indispensable to UN efforts to implement A4P+implementation.

3. Required Uniformed Capability in PKO Related to A4P+

The success of peacekeeping in each mission means fulfillment of its mandate given by the Security Council. Problems these days at the mission level are that there are too many mandates to conduct in one mission. Mandates that do not take into account the capabilities of each component of the mission are likely to fail. In particular uniformed personnel such as military and police may be key players. Implementation of A4P+ priorities is to remove specific challenges in order to reach the A4P agenda.

The UN demands military and police capabilities suitable for the evolving peacekeeping environment since the launch of A4P. Peacekeeping missions are expected to perform multiple, simultaneous, and independent tasks in the poorer environment with complex mandates and limited resources. Field missions should be able to communicate more with local populations and explain their mandates and activities to them for successful operations. Command and control, communications, situational awareness, and interoperability between other troops from different states. It also must have increased the level of force protection for their safety and security. The safety and security of peacekeepers should be guaranteed in frequent contact with local people and field tasks.

However, various UN data assessing the capability of uniformed personnel present that all troops and individually deployed personnel after training in their country do not always reach the required level that the UN want.

Military contingents from member states must be fully trained under the policies of the United Nations Secretariat, including the requirements for deploying troops and the mission CONOP. In the case of individually deployed peacekeepers, they must raise the capabilities of division-level or brigade-level staff as essential military skills during their pre-deployment training. In the event of deployment of a military contingent, there are capability gaps among personnel even in the same national contingent. Therefore, the UN emphasizes the importance of pre-deployment training courses in each country in training and capacity building. At the same time, in order to narrow the gap in the quality of the training of countries, the UN encourages each country to operate programs to cultivate trainer competencies or support bilateral or multilateral training programs between member countries.

Since each mission has a different operational environment, the peacekeeping mission should pay special attention to mission-specific pre-deployment training.

For example, the peacekeeping mission in Mali(MINUSMA) requires IED and UXO training necessary to military contingents before deployment because IED and UXO(Unexploded Ordnance) jeopardize soldiers’ lives and hinder operations on the ground. Military and police peacekeepers in the South Sudan mission(UNMISS) are required to take a training course preparing for working
with riverine units around the river and training on civilian protection during the pre-deployment course. The Main task of uniformed peacekeepers in multidimensional peacekeeping missions is to protect civilians. In this regard, they need to take the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course (CPOC), along with the pre-deployment training course. If necessary, member states can help contribute to building the capabilities of uniformed peacekeepers bilaterally or multilaterally coordinating those courses with other states by providing trainees with funds or facilities to hold such as UN courses in their country.

Due to the budget cuts and the decreased number of authorized troop ceilings by a mission, the UN is diversifying the functions of troops dispatched and strengthening the types and performance of Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE). Namely, Rapid Deployable Unit, Force Reserves Companies, Special Forces, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Force, and Attack Helicopters are required for implementing given mandated tasks [19].

Intelligence-led operations are more critical as UN missions expand into complex environments facing multiple threats. Missions should establish an intelligence system that operates throughout the mission to enable the acquisition, management, analysis, and dissemination of information that supports leadership decision-making. To this end, well-trained and experienced intelligence officers, surveillance, and reconnaissance units are equipped with experts, equipment, and tools.

Enabling units such as engineering, transportation, signals, aviation, and medical units are the UN’s ‘wishful’ ones. They are considered as the mission’s backbone by UN in areas with limited transport infrastructure and insufficient local resources. Most of these units with expertise functions do not have self-protection ability. They have to get protected by military or police troops while conducting their duty. Now the current capability requirement for them demands that these deployed units will have to have the ability to protect themselves. Infantry or FPU (Formed Police Unit) cannot afford to protect all units with a lack of protective equipment, including those units. There are too many tasks required of infantry or FPU to protect enabling troops.

Force protection is the most prioritized capability for the safety and security of the military and police. TCC/PCC and UN should continue to make efforts to equip IEDs of main threats to force protection, the establishment of mine detection and removal system, acquiring mine-resistant vehicles, and fire detection and warning systems integrated with bases’ C3 (operations centers). The application of advanced technologies is essential in areas such as communication networks, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, and force protection measures. For example, UAV, counter-mortar radar systems, satellite imagery, visual surveillance equipment, and remote sensors have become necessities for uniformed personnel to perform their tasks effectively in peacekeeping missions. The introduction of high technology into field missions is inevitable for effective and efficient peacekeeping in the field although the process requires much effort from member states and also takes much time to operate the system properly.

Gender mainstreaming is always at the center of the UNPKO. According to the Secretary-General’s Gender Parity Strategy, the UN set a goal to ultimately reach the ratio of women deployed individually and members in military contingents up to 15 and 25 percent of all military peacekeepers by 2028.

The proportion of uniformed women has been increased gradually but still, it is not nearing the stated goal. Missions with the lowest percentage rates of individual female military personnel – and therefore the greatest need – are MINUSCA (10.5 percent), MINUSMA (9.4 percent), and UNIFIL (9.2 percent). On police, as of April 2019, 14 percent (goal: 20%) of all police serving in UN peacekeeping operations are women [19]. The proportion of women in the UN police has increased significantly compared to the military. All these actions related to the above are being
The increase of simple figures of women in PKO cannot accomplish gender balance and equality. The UN requires women peacekeepers to have the capabilities to match field task performance at the same time as the proportion of women increases. Like FMOC (Female Military Officers' Course), the UN directly operates training courses for women peacekeepers, or member states host the courses on behalf of the United Nations.

In the case of the leadership of uniformed commanders, military and police commanders are required to have much operational and training experience, and ethics. Commander's leadership has an important impact on the success or failure of the mission in the field when the host government or the parties to the conflict do not fully agree with the presence of the mission and freedom of action. Currently, TCC/PCC sends approximately 3,500 individual peacekeepers to the UN. The United Nations wants member states to select and send skilled and qualified officers in military planning, United Aircraft System (UAS), Counter-Improved Explosive Devices (C-IED), logistics, GIS, Image Analysts, defenses sector reform, and civil-military liaison.

The most important thing to UN for peacekeeping is the matter of having peacekeepers with specialized and high-performing capabilities. Just observing and monitoring activities required of peacekeepers are not matched with handling current conflict situations. More engagement with local populations and even armed groups is needed to reach the success of the mission's operation. Engagement activities of uniformed personnel bring the provision of information, path to communicate parties to the conflict and civilians, shaping friendly conditions of peacekeeping, and others. On the other hand, more security and safety concerns around peacekeepers occur that demand more protection equipment. To this end, member states have to sustain a certain standard and review how to protect their soldiers deployed while pursuing a successful peacekeeping operation.

4. Conclusion and Considerations

A4P+ is a strategy necessary for evolving peacekeeping operations and must be implemented first.

It does not mean presenting a new implementation strategy, but the development of tasks that have been carried out. In addition, the goal is to successfully achieve a peacekeeping mandate through coordination and cooperation between stakeholders, i.e., giving each actor a clear commitment and implementing it.

Korea can also prioritize several issues in implementing A4P+ priorities. First of all, its attention should be paid to strengthening the capabilities of military peacekeepers. They need to have the capabilities necessary for autonomous force protection, contact with residents and collection of information, and integrated activities with police and civilian components. It is also a way to strengthen its capabilities by sharing training programs with other countries with extensive experience in a specific mission. As in the present, regional-oriented exchange programs have limitations. Above all, peacekeepers should have mindsets to overcome challenges and endure poorer conditions for peacekeeping.

Korea's troop deployment region is South Sudan and Lebanon. Korea deploys infantry and engineering contingents and individual military officers composed of 536 people[20]. If the characteristics of the units deployed for each mission are different, the Korean military may review what functions each unit will reinforce considering A4P+ priorities. For example, infantry units can reinforce information collection functions or engineering units can strengthen their force protection functions by introducing modernized equipment to replace troops, away from the manpower-oriented mission.
About WPS, increasing female peacekeepers and the cultivation of their competence is a big trend of the UN. If the ratio of women’s participation is relatively small in a particular mission, the UN will have to emphasize TCC/PCC to deploy more female peacekeepers into that mission. What I emphasize in this paper is that the ratio of women’s participation in UN peacekeeping should be considered by each mission. However, still Korean military tends to look at the women’s proportion as the whole number of its all participating missions. Korean military has to review the number of female peacekeepers number deploying to missions, and then more women will have to be selected and deployed to the particular mission which has the lowest number of Korean females.

In general, there are units and equipment that peacekeeping missions want to have essentially. They include the Rapid Deployment Units, Special Force, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Forces and Attack Helicopters described earlier. This means that on-site peacekeeping operations must respond more quickly and immediately to specific situations. This is because peacekeeping operations need to exert much greater influence on local populations and the host government to form conditions for themselves to find political solutions. A4P+ will continue to evaluate the results of the implementing mandate of field missions and adjust the plan by reflecting the requirements of member states into the field. In consideration of these changes, Korea’s peacekeeping policy should also be adjusted.

Overall, the UN requires more commitments from member states to make PKOs successful. The commitments in the military are largely divided into several parts. They lead to states’ considerations for PKO.

First, peacekeepers have to be more competent with capabilities before deployment. The more engagement with the population securing their safety and security, and joint operations with different countries gradually increased, the Korean military needs to think about how we provide the more skilled peacekeepers. Additionally increasing joint operations with different levels’ troops (military, police, or even host country’s security forces) is likely to fail if they do not make an effort to narrow the work capability gap. How to train them to adapt to evolving peacekeeping environment is the key point before and after deployment.

Second, UN pursues active, effective, and efficient PKO with various enabling units beyond regular infantry formation. The size of deployed troops may be one of the measuring contributions of states in peacekeeping. Now, it is time to turn the focus on the quantity-centered troops into the qualitative unit with high-tech equipment. In addition to contributing the equipment itself to the peacekeeping mission, it is also important for deployed peacekeepers to equip high-functional equipment or systems. It can also be a consideration to contribute different types of units to other missions as well as the mission when they require them.

Third, peacekeeping intelligence based on high technology will play a key role as the most basic source. UN claims data-driven and technology-enabled peacekeeping through A4P+. the military is working at the tactical level, interacting local population as human intelligence. Military activities must be conducted focusing on and obtaining reliable information and intelligence to ensure effective operations. Also, leadership has to set up a mindset of how to provide information and utilize intelligence in military operations. When speedy delivery of intelligence through a system can contribute to strategic and operational integration from a mission to UN HQ, operational readiness and response of military will have to accelerate.

UN integrates diverse efforts from the UN system and outside of it into peacekeeping. Emphasis on the integration among relevant actors is nothing new. UN has carried out until now since it involved in peacekeeping. Something new is that A4P+ shows methodological matters for us to materialize our commitments suggesting the same standards from specific requirements of the UN.
In this paper, I contemplate actions for peacekeeping and the current trend that UN wants to share the burden with other actors. How to measure the accomplishment applied by A4P+ priorities and studies on the effect of the implementation on peacekeeping operations should continue.

5. References

5.1. Journal articles


5.2. Additional references


## 6. Appendix

### 6.1. Authors contribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial name</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| HK           | - Set of concepts ☑  
              - Design ☑  
              - Getting results ☑  
              - Analysis ☑  
              - Make a significant contribution to collection ☑  
              - Final approval of the paper ☑  
              - Corresponding ☑  
              - Play a decisive role in modification ☑  
              - Participants in Drafting and Revising Papers ☑  
              - Someone who can explain all aspects of the paper ☑  |

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